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Summary 
This PhD thesis studies the role of national parliaments in the policing of the EU subsidiarity 
principle. The Treaty of Lisbon enshrines the Early Warning System (EWS) in Protocol No. 
2, according to which national parliaments may review Commission proposals for 
compatibility with the subsidiarity principle expressed in Article 5(3) TEU. On the basis of 
the number of reasoned opinions submitted, which count as votes, national parliaments may 
trigger either a ‘yellow’ or an ‘orange’ card, each of which entails different consequences for 
the Commission draft act in question. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the functioning 
of the EWS and to explore why national parliaments participate in this mechanism. To 
achieve this task, this thesis analyses the reasoned opinions issued under the EWS. Hence, 
this thesis firstly conducts a case study of the Commission proposal on the establishment of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office which triggered a ‘yellow card’. This example 
shows that national parliaments tend to conduct a broad scrutiny of Commission proposals, 
which includes aspects other than the subsidiarity of the proposal: its legal basis, the 
competence of the EU to act, its proportionality and its substance. This practice of national 
parliaments is evaluated according to a textual, structural and functional interpretation of the 
EU Treaties, and as a result, a narrow subsidiarity test is suggested for the purpose of the 
EWS. Thereafter, the thesis explores the national procedures of ex ante (EWS) and ex post 
(action before the ECJ) scrutiny. In addition, national debates are studied in order to analyse 
the relationship between national legislatives and executives, between parliamentary 
majorities and opposition, as well as the reflection of regional interests. This detailed study of 
debates also points to the first reasons for the participation of national parliaments in the 
EWS: the protection of idiosyncratic national interests and the restriction of EU redistributive 
policies. Further reasons for national parliaments’ participation in the EWS are indicated on 
the basis of two case studies, dealing with the Monti II regulation (competence), and the 
Tobacco Products Directive (‘delegated legislation’). These suggest that the EWS is used by 
national parliaments to increase their impact in the EU legislative process. The last case study 
of this thesis – the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal – ponders the application of the EWS to 
‘genuine’ fundamental rights proposals, showing that the subsidiarity tests at stake here are 
focused to a much greater extent on a political willingness to protect universal values, rather 
than on efficiency. The thesis concludes by discussing whether the EWS enhances the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy and decreases the EU’s competence creep, which were the leading 
ideas behind the introduction of the Protocol No. 2 mechanism. It is pointed out that, 
although the impact of national parliaments on EU policy-making is uneasy to measure, some 
of the criticism of national parliaments is taken on board by the EU legislator. Because the 
‘competence creep’ of the EU is rather limited, it also does not demand a great deal of 
involvement on the part of national parliaments. 
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Introduction 
After the Maastricht Treaty established the subsidiarity principle, Pierre Pescatore argued that 
without subsidiarity ‘one could [also] have lived quite happily and in peace in European 
home.’1 However, subsidiarity has become one of the leitmotifs of European integration. 
Granting national parliaments the power to control subsidiarity was chosen by the Laeken 
Declaration and later by the Convention on the Future of Europe as a means of providing for 
more democratic legitimacy and less ‘competence creep.’ Integrating national parliaments 
into the decision-making process of the European Union (EU) and granting them control over 
the EU’s ‘creeping competence’ was supposed to ‘kill two birds with one stone,’ by 
strengthening both its federal and its democratic safeguards.2 This thesis offers a study of this 
new role of national parliaments in the policing of the subsidiarity principle. 
The following parts introduce the research question and show the point of departure of this 
thesis. The next sections outline the research approach and the structure of the thesis. 
1 Research question 
‘Democracy was not part of the original DNA of European Integration,’3 and even ‘[t]he 
current European Union is not a democratic showcase.’4 What these thoughts express, in fact, 
is a perceived lack of legitimacy of the EU, popularly referred to as a ‘democratic deficit.’5 
The ‘democracy issue’ is that the EU institutions suffer from a legitimacy crisis.6 ‘Input’ and 
‘output’ legitimacy are two ‘legitimizing beliefs’ for the exercise of governing authority.7 As 
                                                 
1 Pierre Pescatore, ‘Mit der Subsidiarität leben’ in Ole Due, Marcus Lutter and Jürgen Schwarze (eds), 
Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Nomos 1995) at 1094. 
2 Robert Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law (Oxford 
University Press 2009) at 258. 
3 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘In the face of crisis: Input legitimacy, output legitimacy and the political messianism of 
European integration’ (2012) 34 Journal of European integration 825, 837. 
4 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9 to 
12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 315, 316.  
5 There are two major exceptions: Moravcsik and Majone. Moravcsik argues that ‘democratic deficit’ is a myth: 
the EU is assessed against the ‘idealized conception of Westminsterian or ancient style democracy.’ Cf. Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘The myth of Europe's' democratic deficit'’ (2008) 43 Intereconomics 331. Majone argues that 
efficiency-oriented policies in contrast to redistributive policies can be delegated to institutions independent of 
the political process. This delegation is justified by non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy such as ‘expertise, 
procedural rationality, transparency, accountability by results.’ Cf. Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s 
‘democratic deficit’: The question of standards’ (1998) 4 European law journal 5, 28. 
6 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, 2472.  
7 Fritz W Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999) at 6. Weiler 
adds a third pillar of democratic legitimacy: narrative (entity, myth, dream, political Messianism): in the EU the 
‘justification for action and its mobilizing force derive not from process, as in classical democracy, or from 
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explained by Scharpf, input-oriented legitimacy means that ‘political choices are legitimate if 
and because they reflect the “will of the people” – that is, if they can be derived from the 
authentic preferences of the members of a community.’8 Under output-oriented legitimacy 
‘political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare 
of the constituency in question.’9 Viewed from this perspective, the transfer of competence 
from the national level to the EU level within the process of European integration raised the 
question of the legitimisation of EU authorities and laws, about the Union’s input and output 
legitimacy, and the balance between them. 
The transfer of power expresses the idea that competences that used to be exercised at the 
national level, have ‘disappeared.’10 While at the Member State level, the law is enacted by 
democratically elected parliaments, the European level is perceived as not having the same 
democratic legitimacy. With the transfer of power, however, the legislative process at 
European level has strengthened the position of governments, ‘by making the statal executive 
branch the ultimate legislator in the Community.’11 In addition, the scrutiny of governmental 
decisions at EU level remains a national process, aimed at holding into account national 
actors.12 This creates an input legitimacy deficit. A parallel transfer of democratic legitimacy 
has not accompanied the transfer of competences; the European level has not received more 
legitimacy. National parliaments ‘appear[ed] as the net losers in the new institutional 
equilibrium resulting from EC membership.’13 
The essence of the EU’s democratic deficit is the asymmetry between input and output 
legitimacy. Two attempts have been made to solve the EU’s ‘democratic issue’; the first 
centred on the European Parliament (EP); the second on the national parliaments.  
The first of these attempts has been to increase the role of the directly elected EP in the 
legislative process. Indeed, the EP ‘emerged as a winner in the Lisbon Treaty,’ due to the 
extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, whereby decisions are taken jointly by the EP 
                                                                                                                                                       
result and success, but from the ideal pursued.’ See Weiler, ‘In the face of crisis: Input legitimacy, output 
legitimacy and the political messianism of European integration’ 832. 
8 Scharpf at 6. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Leonard FM Besselink, ‘National parliaments in the EU’s composite constitution: a plea for a shift in 
paradigm’ in P. Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Europa 
Law Publishing 2006) at 119. Besselink points also to the use of ‘transfer’ instead of more neutral ‘attribution’ 
or ‘conferral’ of competence. 
11 Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’ 2430. 
12 Besselink, at 119. 
13 Bruno De Witte, ‘Community law and national constitutional values’ (1991) 18 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 1, 8. 
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and the Council, and the conferral of more control over the appointment of the President of 
the EU Commission.14 Critics of the second-order character of EP elections (a well-known 
claim of Reif and Schmitt is that EP elections have the character of a protest vote against 
governments in power and that the electoral turnout is lower each time) might also have 
softened their views after the 2014 EP elections.15 The elections outcomes16 show that 
‘traditional left-right and pro-anti-European integration counterbalanced the traditional 
determination to punish national governments,’ proving some politicisation of these 
elections.17  
The second attempt to strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy has been to reinforce the 
role of the national parliaments within the European legislative process. The latter process, 
the core of which is the Early Warning System (EWS),18 will be the subject of examination in 
this thesis. Beyond the improvement of EU democratic legitimacy, its second rationale was 
the oversight of the exercise of EU competences.  
Declaration No. 23, annexed to the Nice Treaty, first invited national parliaments to 
participate in the debate on the future of the EU. Next, the European Council, meeting in 
Laeken on 15 December 2001, adopted a Declaration on the Future of the European Union 
which pointed towards a new role for national parliaments.19 Specifically, under the heading 
of ‘better division and definition of competence in the European Union’, the Declaration 
asked the question of ‘how is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here?,’ also making 
sure that a new division of competences would not cause a ‘creeping expansion of the 
competence of the Union’ or encroach upon the exclusive competences of Member States or 
                                                 
14 Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and treaty reform (Oxford University Press 2010) at 72. 
15 Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine Second‐order National Elections–a Conceptual Framework 
for the Analysis of European Election Results’ (1980) 8 European journal of political research 3. Cf. Andreas 
Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’ 
(2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 533, 536. 
16 The 2014 tournout was 43.09% in comparison to 43% in 2009, hence it did not improve, but also did not fall. 
See further: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/turnout.html 
17 See Alexander Trechsel, ‘Reflecting on the Nationalization and Europeanization of European Elections, 30 
June 2014’ 
<http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/ReflectingOn/3006Trechsel.aspx. >  
For a more critical view see ibid Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Fateful Elections? investing in the Future of Europe,’ 
(2014) 12 International Journal Of Constitutional Law 273. 
18 Following the European Convention, I use the name Early Warning System instead of Early Warning 
Mechanism often used in the litereature on the topic, as for example by Philipp Kiiver. Cf. European 
Convention, Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, 23.09.2002, CONV 286/02, point 
II (b). 
19 See Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions, Laeken 14 
and 15 December 2001. For the critical apparisal of the post-Laeken reforms, see Garreth Davies, ‘The post-
Laeken division of competences’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 686, 695. 
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regions.20 In the section on democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU, the 
Declaration posed the question about the role of national parliaments, namely whether they 
should be represented in a new institution and whether they should concentrate on the 
question of division of competences between the EU and the Member States. As an example 
of this function, the Declaration put forward an idea of a preliminary check concerning 
compliance with the subsidiarity principle.21 To answer these and other questions, the 
European Council decided to convene a Convention on the Future of Europe.22  
Following the indications of the Laeken Declaration, the Convention established two separate 
working groups, dedicated to the subsidiarity principle (Working Group I) and to the role of 
national parliaments (Working Group IV), respectively.23 Their conclusions overlapped on 
the issue of granting national parliaments a competence to review the subsidiarity principle.24 
Whereas the final report of Working Group IV highlighted that an enhanced involvement of 
national parliaments would strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy and ‘bring it closer to 
the citizens,’25 the Conclusions of Working Group I provided the rule concerning the 
subsidiarity scrutiny: ‘these improvements should not make decision-making within the 
institutions more cumbersome or lengthier, nor block it.’26 In conclusion, Working Group I 
gave three guidelines on the control of subsidiarity principle. First, the EU institutions should 
reinforce their scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle during the drafting and examination of 
proposals. Second, an ‘Early Warning System,’ with a role for national parliaments, should 
be created, and third, an opportunity for ex-post referral to the Court of Justice on subsidiarity 
issues should be provided.27 In agreement with Working Group IV, it was thus proposed that 
national parliaments would be involved in the European legislative process ‘for the first time 
in the history of European construction’ through a process of monitoring of the subsidiarity 
                                                 
20 Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union at 22. 
21 Ibid at 23. 
22 Ibid at 24. 
23 European Convention, Mandate of the Working Group on the principle of subsidiarity , CONV71/02, 
30.05.2002. 
24 European Convention, Summary of the joint meeting on 22 July 2002, CONV 210/02, 30.07.2002, page 1. 
25 European Convention, Final report of Working Group IV on the role of national parliaments, CONV 353/02, 
22 October 2002, point 4. 
26 CONV 286/02, 23.09.2002, Point I (2). 
27 Ibid point II. 
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principle.28 While putting all national parliaments on an‘equal footing,’ the system did not 
make the procedure more cumbersome, and did not create any new bureaucracy.29 
The subsidiarity review places itself between the national level and the EU level, allowing 
national parliaments to contribute to the larger, polycentric EU constitutional order, not 
confining their role to the national level, as in the case of scrutiny of the government in EU 
affairs, but broadening it to the EU arena, and thus allowing them to become ‘an integral part 
of a truly composite constitutional order.’30 In this sense, the subsidiarity review also avoids 
identifying the democratic deficit in only one institution (e.g. the Council) and transferring 
the decision-making to an alternative institution (e.g. the EP). In contrast, improving only the 
national level as a point of reference could have been perceived as unsatisfactory, because the 
democratic deficit may also affect the Member States themselves (for example, as they often 
also do not fulfil the ‘democratic and constitutional ideals of full representation and 
participation’).31  
The subsidiarity review creates an interaction between national parliaments and the EU 
institutions, predominantly the Commission. According to its procedure, national parliaments 
may influence the EU legislative process at a very early stage. As prescribed by Article 12(b) 
TEU and complemented by the procedure established in Protocol No. 2, national parliaments 
review all EU legislative drafts sent directly by the Commission for their compatibility with 
the subsidiarity principle. In light of the reasoned opinions subsequently issued by national 
parliaments, the EU institutions review the draft and further decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw it; in some cases the EU legislator can even stop the legislative procedure. The 
legislative act created in this process captures the involvement of the national and European 
polity. It will be one of the aims of this thesis to establish whether and to what extent the 
subsidiarity review mechanism has helped to address the EU democratic deficit. 
As stated above, the second concern of Member States that the subsidiarity review 
mechanism was supposed to address was the ‘competence creep’ within the EU. To tackle it, 
the mechanism was to include checks on any tendency of the EU to take shared competences 
                                                 
28 Ibid point II (b) 
29 Ibid. The Working Group rejected an idea of creating a body specialized in the subsidiarity monitoring, see in 
Point I (2). 
30 Besselink at 121-123. 
31 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: what if this is as good as it gets?’ in Joseph H.H. 
Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 
2003) at 84. 
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away from the Member States. This thesis will also deal with that issue by establishing to 
what extent national parliaments became guardians of the subsidiarity principle. It will be 
argued that national parliaments have garnered a far-reaching role extending beyond their 
position under Protocol No. 2, instead of staying faithful to the wording, structure and 
function of the subsidiarity review.  
The main questions this thesis asks are rooted in the practice of the subsidiarity mechanism as 
observed thus far, especially, but not limited to, the two ‘yellow cards’ that national 
parliaments have triggered. Why do national parliaments participate in the Early Warning 
System? Why do they go beyond the role granted by Protocol No. 2? And what does this say 
about the purpose of the Early Warning System? How can we ‘live with subsidiarity’ without 
undermining the EU’s ‘capability to function?’32 
2 Point of Departure from Existing Scholarship 
The existing literature relevant to this thesis derives from various sources. First, since the 
Maastricht Treaty, EU legal scholarship extensively contributed to the understanding of 
subsidiarity and the procedures introduced by the subsequent treaties aiming at making it 
more operative. 33 In particular, the monograph of A. Estella provided a legal and political 
critique of the subsidiarity principle 10 years after the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty.34 The main argument was that subsidiarity is not an apt tool to deal with the federal 
legitimacy problems, because of a lack of clear legal content and because, from a normative 
point of view, the vertical logic of subsidiarity, and not necessarily its counter-integrationist 
logic, does not ‘fit’ the EU’s current federal legitimacy problems. Moreover, Estella 
explained the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) restrained subsidiarity jurisprudence first 
through its concerns about its own legitimacy; it did not want to be perceived as taking 
political decisions instead of technical-legal ones. The second explanation was that 
subsidiarity posed a threat to the Court’s own EU integration agenda. While Estella’s work 
was an important stepping-stone toward the discussion on subsidiarity, it did not elaborate on 
the EWS. This thesis thus addresses this gap, namely the lack of a subsidiarity analysis from 
the perspective of national parliaments. 
                                                 
32 Pescatore at 1080 (own translation). 
33 See Chapter 1. 
34 Antonio Estella De Noriega, The EU principle of subsidiarity and its critique (Oxford University Press 2002). 
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However, because the role of national parliaments in the EU has been of interest to both legal 
and political science scholars, as a second source, this thesis draws upon the relevant 
literature on the new role of national parliaments, including comparative studies of the 
procedures of scrutiny of governments in EU affairs and the factors that condition more 
effective control. 
The seminal edited volume of Maurer and Wessels studied the institutional and procedural 
developments in national parliaments as a response to the challenges of EU integration.35 
They established a ‘considerable’ change in the legal and institutional aspects over time: the 
creation of EU affairs committees, the establishment of the procedure of ‘mandating’ in some 
Member States, or an early involvement in the scrutiny of EU documents. Yet, they also 
highlighted a ‘modest’ impact of national parliaments on the real life patterns of access to 
information and influence, scoring below what the EU Treaties and national provisions 
offered.36 The study of real patterns of behavior of national parliaments led Maurer and 
Wessels to define four models of parliamentary involvement: first, strong policy makers and 
‘national players’; second, ‘potential’ or latent ‘national players;’ third, ‘modest policy-
making legislatures’ and finally ‘slow adapting parliaments.’37 Their results were confirmed 
in another volume on the topic by O’Brennan and Raunio. In their view ‘national parliaments 
have proven that they are capable of institutional adaptation and learning,’ and hence they 
‘should no longer be simply labeled as losers or victims of integration.’38  
Furthermore, a volume edited by Philipp Kiiver reviewed three main aspects of parliamentary 
participation in EU affairs along comparative lines: first, the regional aspect of 
parliamentarisation; second, the parliamentary participation beyond the control of the 
executive and third, the involvement of national parliaments in the drafting of EU Treaties.39 
The study pointed out that regional parliaments tend to seek new ways to participate in EU 
affairs, yet the involvement of national parliaments in the Convention on the Future of 
                                                 
35 Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or 
Latecomers? (Nomos 2001). 
36 Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to 
National Players?’ in Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), National Parliaments on their Ways to 
Europe Losers or Latecomers? (Nomos 2001) at 435. 
37 Ibid at 461-462. 
38 John O'Brennan and Tapio Raunio, ‘Introduction: deparliamentarization and European integration’ in John 
O'Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National parliaments within the enlarged European Union: from'victims' of 
integration to competitive actors? (Routledge 2007) at 16.  
39 Philipp Kiiver, ‘Parliaments, regions and European Integration; Fresh Perspectives on the European 
Constitutional Order’ in Philipp Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional 
Order (Europa law publishing 2006) at 4. 
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Europe was ‘mostly very modest,’ which may simply show the remoteness of EU issues for 
the citizens and their representatives in the parliament.40 
A volume edited by Tans, Zoethout and Peters presents another comparative contribution on 
national parliamentary systems, seeking common elements in the ways in which national 
parliaments control EU decision-making process.41 In contrast to the previous studies, their 
aim was to answer the question of ‘how to find constitutional norms to improve ‘post-
national’ democracy?’42 The findings of Tans et al. point to three main ‘common grounds’ in 
the organization of control of EU decision-making: adherence to the democracy principle, 
adherence to the principle of ministerial accountability, leading role for EU affairs 
committees and mutual dependence in the executive-legislative relationship. The common 
grounds, according to the authors, show that the idea of investing national parliaments with 
the role to establish more input legitimacy faces practical problems and hence other avenues 
for parliamentary participation should be sought, for example direct accountability of EU 
institutions to parliaments or the possibility to bring actions before the ECJ.43 
These studies offer a valuable overview of parliamentary procedures in EU affairs, mostly 
taking into account their powers vis-à-vis their governments. Having said this, it must be 
taken into account that the functioning of the EWS does not depend only upon national 
executives. Protocols Nos. 1 and 2 offer a right to national parliaments to receive information 
directly from the Commission, in contrast to a situation where a government would forward 
information to parliaments. Of course, national parliaments may receive explanatory 
memoranda from the government, which include a subsidiarity assessment, but these are not 
the main source of information necessary to participate in the EWS. Moreover, the EWS was 
established to grant national parliaments a direct influence at the EU level, in contrast to the 
earlier procedure where their influence was exercised via national governments. Hence, 
whereas this thesis builds upon the studies reviewed above, it goes beyond this literature and 
focusses on the actual operation of the EWS in order to look for reasons and motives for 
national parliaments’ participation. 
                                                 
40 Ibid at 9. 
41 Olaf Tans, ‘Introduction: National Parliaments and the European Union: In Search of Common Ground’ in 
Olaf  Tans, Jit Peters and Carla M Zoethout (eds), National parliaments and European democracy: a bottom-up 
approach to European constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing 2007) at 4. 
42 Ibid at 6. 
43 Tans, ‘Conclusion: National Parliaments and the European Union: Coping with the Limits of Democracy’ at 
247. 
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In this particular area, Philipp Kiiver published the first comprehensive book on the Early 
Warning System, which inquired into the procedure and the content of the reasoned opinions 
issued within the COSAC pilot project between 2004 and 2011.44 In his exploration of the 
parliamentary attitudes in the EWS, he divided national parliaments into four groups, taking 
into account their approach to subsidiarity scrutiny. 45 First, ‘literalists’ stick to the wording 
of Protocol No. 2 and do not assess the political merits of Commission proposals. This 
approach is taken mainly by non-Eurosceptic parliaments, which try to avoid being seen as in 
competition with the EP, but which still want their opinions to fulfil the conditions required 
to be counted as a reasoned opinion.46 Second, ‘pseudo-colegislators’ try to position 
themselves in the EWS as co-legislators, through issuing detailed reports. This attitude is 
represented in the upper chambers, compensating for their rather weak position in the 
national system.47 Third, ‘pre-empters’ use the ‘Barroso dialogue’ rather than the EWS.48 
Kiiver explains that this approach is present in typically ‘strong’ parliaments, Eurosceptic or 
upper chambers, with a possibility that all these factors play a role.49 Finally, the ‘absentees,’ 
parliaments that do not participate in the EWS, correspond with the parliaments that were 
typically labelled as weak scrutinizers.50 Although there might be some overlap, Kiiver 
highlights that his typology only partially coincides with the old categories of ‘strong,’ 
‘moderate’ and ‘weak’ parliaments.51 
Moreover, Kiiver’s research points to two other notions connected to the EWS. First, he 
designated the EWS as an ‘imperfect’ accountability mechanism. Indeed, the Commission 
must justify its measure, but this justification covers the proposal only at an initial stage and 
the only sanction available is indirect, through opposition in the Council.52 The accountability 
within the EWS according to Kiiver is also at least partially a legal one – national parliaments 
often bring legal arguments, typical of courts rather than parliaments – which in turn means 
parliaments are willing to look for new ways to enforce accountability.53 The motive of 
                                                 
44 Philipp Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical 
reality (Routeledge 2012) at 77. 
45 Ibid at 136. 
46 Ibid at 137.   
47 Ibid at 138. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at 139. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid at 136. 
52 Ibid at 103 ff. 
53 Adam Cygan, Accountability, parliamentarism and transparency in the EU (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 
at 125. 
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accountability through the involvement of national parliaments is also discussed in Adam 
Cygan’s monograph. According to the latter, ‘national parliaments have a duty to pursue 
accountability,’ which is required for achieving greater EU legitimacy.54 Yet the author 
argues that the EWS does not present an adequate answer, because it does not provide 
sufficient output legitimacy.55 Following on the Lisbon judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court Cygan argues that the EP is not inserting sufficient input legitimacy into 
the legislative process which in consequence does not improve output legitimacy. In addition, 
Cygan points out further limits: the heterogeneous EU scrutiny procedures in the Member 
States and the fact that EU regulation is not limited to the ordinary legislative procedure, but 
also encompasses intergovernmental processes.56  
Kiiver’s second point builds upon the fact that arguments from national parliaments often 
have a legal character, although they are likely politically motivated. The idea of national 
parliaments as a Council of States is based upon the consultative role of the French Conseil 
d’Etat, which is consulted by the government before a bill is sent to the parliament.57 Kiiver 
sees a possibility that a coalition of active chambers, most probably upper chambers, which 
are more independent from national executives, will develop and assess the lawfulness and 
justifications of EU drafts in an advisory rather than a co-legislative manner.58  
Whereas Kiiver’s collective role for national parliaments focuses more on ensuring 
compliance with subsidiarity than on its function in enhancing the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy,59 the suggestion by another scholar – Ian Cooper – of an ‘emerging 
tricameralism,’ in his view, provides for more democratic representation at EU level.60 
Cooper argues that the EWS ‘creates a third chain of representation linking the citizen with 
the EU’ and rather than repeating the representative functions of the EP and the Council, it 
has a ‘representational “value added” effect.’61 Cooper shows it on the basis of three aspects. 
First, national parliamentary elections may not mirror public opinion views on EU affairs, as 
                                                 
54 Ibid at 7-9. 
55 Ibid at 214. 
56 Ibid at 212. 
57 Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical reality 
at 127. 
58 Ibid at 133. 
59 Ibid at 145. 
60 I. Cooper, Bicameral or Tricameral? National Parliaments and Representative Democracy in the European 
Union, 35 Journal of European Integration 2013, 531-546.  
61 Ian Cooper, ‘Bicameral or Tricameral? National Parliaments and Representative Democracy in the European 
Union’ (2013) 35 Journal of European Integration 531 at 533-534. 
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these are a rather marginal issue in the public debate, yet in a broader sense of representation, 
the EU can be seen as representing ‘diffuse national interests represented by a parliament as a 
whole.’62 Second, within the EWS, national parliaments take a position independently from 
the executive.63 And third, with the EWS national parliaments operate as a ‘virtual’ chamber; 
one that may not be homogeneous and does not meet in one place, but one that still performs 
the main parliamentary functions, namely legislating, representing and deliberating.64 
Against the background of the existing literature on the topic, this thesis explores the 
functioning of the EWS in a number of new ways. First, my empirical analysis is based upon 
the reasoned opinions from after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until August 2014. 
This sample was chosen in order to study why national parliaments participate in the 
subsidiarity review. Second, this thesis argues for a limited role for national parliaments 
within the EWS, putting forward a set of textual, structural and functional arguments and 
arguing that the ‘Barroso initiative’ offers a venue for addressing broader concerns. 
Moreover, it is argued that, for the sake of the EU institutional balance, the EWS should not 
lead to granting national parliaments broad participation rights, which could, for example, 
lead to a veto right. Third, the thesis elaborates upon questions not addressed thus far in the 
contributions to the topic, such as the relationships between institutions at the national level 
(executive, legislative) and between majority and opposition under the EWS. Fourth, this 
thesis systematically analyses the content of national parliaments’ reasoned opinions, 
studying in depth such issues as the review of the principle of conferral, the scrutiny of 
delegations included in Commission proposals, as well as the assessment of Commission 
proposals against fundamental rights standards. 
3 Method and sources 
This thesis studies the role of the national parliaments in the policing of the subsidiarity 
principle from a legal point of view, taking into account the political context of the 
mechanism. I will deal with the different topics described in this thesis from a legal point of 
view. This concerns in the first place the design and role of the subsidiarity review. In this 
regard, I review the existing literature on the principle of subsidiarity, as well as on the role 
of national parliaments in the EU. Building on this research, I then conduct an empirical 
                                                 
62 Ibid at 541. 
63 Ibid at 542. 
64 See more in Ian Cooper, ‘A ‘virtual third chamber’for the European Union? National parliaments after the 
Treaty of Lisbon’ (2012) 35 West European Politics 441. 
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analysis of all of the reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments thus far. I argue that 
the reasoned opinions of national parliaments usually consist of an inquiry into the principles 
of conferral and proportionality and the merits of the proposal, and only to a lesser extent into 
the principle of subsidiarity, thereby going beyond the role ascribed to them by Protocol No. 
2. This point is illustrated by the second ‘yellow card’ ever issued by national parliaments 
with regard to the proposal concerning the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.  
The fact that the intensity of national parliaments’ participation in the subsidiarity review is 
differentiated demands that this thesis look at diverse groups of national parliaments which 
may seem to lack coherence. In this regard, it needs to be underlined that the thesis takes 
what might be termed an accordion approach.65 Depending on the purpose of each chapter, 
the scope of the legislatures subject to analysis might stretch or squeeze like an accordion, 
varying between broad sweeps and narrowly focussed sections. In particular, in Chapter 3, I 
provide an overview of the measures adopted in the national parliaments of all Member 
States to enable subsidiarity review, and I categorise these into groups. The idea is to present 
a closed catalogue of different designs of ex ante scrutiny. Similarly, Chapter 4 takes the 
same broad overview of possible ex post review procedures. In contrast to Chapter 3, the 
explanation of different national procedures builds on the political science categories of 
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ parliaments vis-à-vis their executives in EU affairs put forward in 
political science literature. In the chapter in question, such an approach was possible because 
the ex post scrutiny – the subsidiarity action before the ECJ – relies upon the national 
executive bringing the case before the ECJ. Chapter 5 – the purpose of which is to examine 
the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on: executive-legislative relations; parliamentary majority-
opposition relations; and the representation of the regional interests – demanded an analysis 
of a sample of Member States based on factors such as the structure of the state, the party 
system, the model of executive-legislative relations and the extent to which members of the 
legislature are democratically elected. The choice of a limited number of national systems 
was justified by the idea of presenting the main political systems, not claiming however that 
all the possibilities are taken into account, and by the feasibility of the study, which 
demanded a detailed inquiry into parliamentary debates that are mostly conducted in national 
languages, restricting the set of documents that could be examined in detail. The following 
                                                 
65 The accordion is probably not as popular anymore, as it was in the times when my father occasionally played 
it to accompany family events. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘a musical instrument played by stretching 
and squeezing with the hands to work a central bellows that blows air over metal reeds, the melody and chords 
being sounded by buttons or keys.’ Cf. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/accordion. 
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chapters, which focus on the principle of conferral, delegated legislation and fundamental 
rights, respectively, have a two-tier construction. To establish the role of national parliaments 
in these fields it is necessary to first, ‘stretch the accordion’ to give an overview of the 
concerns of national parliaments expressed in their reasoned opinions, and then to ‘squeeze’ 
it by looking at three particular case studies of Commission proposals.  
4 Structure 
This thesis is structured in two parts. Briefly, the first part concentrates on the design of the 
EWS and its implementation at the national level. The second part focuses on the content of 
the reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments. 
In order to discover why national parliaments participate in the subsidiarity review, it is first 
necessary to delve into the position of national parliaments in the EU Treaties, the notion of 
subsidiarity and the scope of that procedure. Accordingly, in Chapter 1, I describe the 
evolution of the participation of national parliaments in the EU, together with the 
establishment of the principle of subsidiarity itself, the basic rules of the operation of the 
EWS; the other avenue for participation – the ‘Barroso initiative’ – and the possibilities of 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. Building on this, Chapter 2 focuses on the scope of the 
EWS. In this regard, I study the second ‘yellow card’ triggered by national parliaments and 
compare its outcomes with the first ‘yellow card,’ to draw conclusions on the possible 
consequences of the EWS.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the procedures that Member States have incorporated in order to 
accommodate the ex ante subsidiarity review at the national level. The analysis of 
constitutional and infra-constitutional provisions, including rules of procedure in chambers 
points to three distinct systems of scrutiny. Depending on the role of the parliamentary 
committee involved in the control of subsidiarity, the European Affairs committees and 
specialised committees, I indicate three possible means of scrutiny, namely centralised, 
decentralised and mixed, the latter of which combines both of the former. In Chapter 4 on ex 
post scrutiny, I also discuss the arrangements for any subsidiarity action that governments 
may lodge before the ECJ on behalf of national parliaments. Taking into account the 
approach of the ECJ to the subsidiarity principle, it is asked whether subsidiarity action 
provides a reliable avenue for national parliaments and whether a change in the approach of 
the ECJ may be desirable.  
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Having established the applicable procedures, in Chapter 5 I analyse in detail the content of 
reasoned opinions of parliaments in the UK, Germany, Poland and Belgium. The aim is to 
show how the subsidiarity review impacts upon the executive-legislative relationship; the 
rapport between the majority and opposition in EU affairs, and whether it gives any voice to 
regional interests. 
The next two chapters investigate different areas in which national parliaments seem to apply 
a particularly broad notion of subsidiarity review. First, Chapter 6 explores the control of 
competence concerning Commission proposals by delving into the Monti II case. Chapter 7 
analyses the involvement of national parliaments in the scrutiny of delegations of powers to 
the Commission to adopt delegated and implementing acts. This activity of national 
parliaments is illustrated with reference to the Commission proposal on tobacco labelling. 
Finally, Chapter 8 considers the reasoned opinions that scrutinise Commission proposals with 
regard to the protection of fundamental rights. In this chapter, I inquire in detail into the case 
of the Commission proposal concerning the increase of the share of women on executive and 
non-executive boards in listed companies, in order to explore whether the subsidiarity review 
is suitable for questions of fundamental rights protection in Europe.  
The concluding chapter assesses the influence of national parliaments on democratic 
legitimacy and decreased centralisation. Specifically, by drawing upon the previous chapters 
of this thesis, I assess whether national parliaments, through their reasoned opinions, 
contribute to diminishing the ‘democratic deficit’ and the ‘competence creep’ of the EU, 
which were the main motivations for the introduction of national parliaments into the EU 
legislative process. 
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Chapter 1: 
National Parliaments and Subsidiarity in the EU Treaties 
Introduction 
During the course of the European integration process, national parliaments have been 
increasing their rights step-by-step: the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam were the first 
steps. The Laeken Declaration and the Convention for the Future of the European Union 
clearly stated that national parliaments, as vessels of democracy, should have more of a say in 
the EU, and should control the so-called ‘competence creep.’ Accordingly, first the failed 
Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty granted national parliaments a number of 
new functions, above all that of the guardians of the subsidiarity principle. Protocol No. 2 
annexed to the TEU, as well as the TFEU, enshrines the EWS, in which national parliaments 
may issue reasoned opinions concerning the compatibility of a Commission proposal with the 
principle of subsidiarity. The new role of national parliaments poses many questions, 
especially as its focus is on the ‘deliciously vague word’ subsidiarity,1 which also has its own 
history within EU law. This chapter thus focuses on the establishment of the EWS, analysing 
the role of national parliaments and the incorporation of the subsidiarity principle into the EU 
Treaties. The question posed here sets the background for the forthcoming chapters: How is 
the EWS regulated in the Treaties?  
This chapter aims to discuss this question starting from an analysis of the treaty changes that 
granted national parliaments a position in European integration. In this respect, Section 1 
explores the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. In Section 2, I elaborate on the subsidiarity 
principle and its relevance for the EWS, also exploring the reforms of the treaties, but with a 
focus on the subsidiarity principle itself. In Section 3, I study in detail the role of other EU 
institutions in the subsidiarity scrutiny. Because the EWS is not the only tool available to 
national parliaments to influence draft EU acts, Section 4 explores the ‘Barroso initiative.’ 
Section 5 aims to show that national parliaments do not operate in a vacuum. There is a 
number of ways that they can exchange their views on subsidiarity, and also establish broader 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. The last section elaborates on the new developments 
connected to the Eurozone crisis. 
                                                 
1 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The reformation of European constitutionalism’ (1997) 35 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 97, 127. 
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1 Shaping the role of national Parliaments in the European Union 
I will discuss the incorporation of national parliaments into the EU institutional framework, 
starting with the reforms implemented via the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, then 
outlining those attempted by the Constitutional Treaty and finishing with the current position 
of national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon. Before the Maastricht Treaty, in the 
period between the 1950s and the mid-1970s, national parliaments showed little interest in 
European integration. Because of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ – granting unanimity in the 
decision making process – the rather limited competences of the Community, and the pro-
European public opinion in the Member States, ‘national legislatures remained marginal and 
passive actors in the arena of EC competence.’2 Change came with the accession of Denmark 
and the UK, two Member States with a less pro-European sentiment which led them to 
establish European Affairs Committees to scrutinize Community affairs.3 In addition, the 
White Paper on the Single Market and the Single European Act extended the scope of 
Community competence and introduced the qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. 
The period leading up to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which brought about the 
establishment of the European Union and transferred new competences to EU level, 
engendered changes in the domestic provisions with regard to the participation of national 
parliaments. Since this time, other Member States have also established European Affairs 
Committees.4  
1.1 The Treaty of Maastricht  
The Maastricht Treaty was the first to recognise formally national parliaments within primary 
law. The preceding national level reforms had gained attention at EU level, and this 
culminated in the inclusion of the first provisions concerning national parliaments in the 
Maastricht Treaty5 declarations: Declaration no.13 ‘on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union’ and Declaration no.14 ‘on the conference of the parliaments.’ Nonetheless, 
the Treaty of Maastricht recognized national parliaments only to a minimal extent.  
Specifically, Declaration no.13 encouraged ‘greater involvement of national parliaments in 
the activities of the European Union’ via the governments of the Member States. The 
                                                 
2 O'Brennan and Raunio at 10. 
3 Ibid at 10-11. 
4 Ibid at 11. 
5 Treaty on European Union (TEU), [1992] OJ C 191/1. 
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governments had to ensure that national parliaments received Commission proposals for 
legislation in ‘good time’ for information or possible examination. Moreover, Declaration no. 
13 called upon national parliaments and the European Parliament to arrange regular meetings 
between the parliamentarians interested in the same issues. Further, Declaration no. 14 
concerned the Conference of the Parliaments, consisting of members of the European 
Parliament and members of national parliaments.6 
The Treaty of Maastricht was thus the first step towards elevating the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union context. However, the innovations on their own were not 
of great legal importance, as the declarations did not have a binding character.7  
1.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam 
The next move in introducing national parliaments into the European treaties was the 
Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam ‘on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union.’ This protocol aspired ‘to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in 
the activities of the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on 
matters which may be of particular interest to them.’8  
The first part of the annexed protocol stipulated that all Commission consultation documents 
(green and white papers and communications) had to be forwarded ‘promptly’ to the national 
parliaments.9 This obligation was incumbent upon the Commission.10 In contrast, 
Commission proposals for legislation had to be made available by national governments to 
national parliaments in ‘good time.’11 The protocol further established a minimum period of 
six weeks between the point at which a legislative proposal is made available in all languages 
and placing it on the Council agenda, in order to grant national parliaments time to discuss 
it.12 Finally, although the protocol had a binding character, the formulation that the 
governments ‘should’ inform their respective national parliaments should be seen only as a 
                                                 
6 See further Section 2.1. of this chapter. 
7 There is no evidence found of the practical impact of the Maastricht Treaty. 
8 Treaty of Amsterdam, [1997] OJ C340/1, Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 
Preamble, second recital. 
9 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on National Parliaments, Art 1. 
10 O'Brennan and Raunio at 13. 
11 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on National Parliaments, Art 2. 
12 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on National Parliaments, Art 3. 
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recommendation.13 The second part of the protocol concerned the Conference of European 
Affairs Committees (COSAC).14 
In the context of the subsidiarity review presented in the following sections, it is worth 
underlining that the second protocol, the Protocol ‘on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality,’ did not mention the role of national parliaments at all. This 
is an important point: national parliaments were not yet seen as partners, fit to discuss 
subsidiarity issues with the European institutions. However, in the provisions on COSAC, 
interestingly, we read that this institution was invited to approach the EP, the Council and the 
Commission on the legislative activities of the EU, amongst which were included the area of 
freedom, security and justice and fundamental rights, and also in relation to the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity.15  
1.3 The Constitutional Treaty 
The Constitutional Treaty was the first attempt to go beyond protocols and to prescribe a role 
for national parliaments in the Treaty itself.16 First, the Treaty recognized the role of national 
parliaments via the principle of representative democracy; through taking decisions in the 
European Council or the Council, governments are themselves democratically accountable 
either to their national parliaments, or to their citizens. 17 Second, the Treaty also provided for 
information rights for national parliaments, namely with regard to the flexibility clause,18 
participation in the evaluation mechanisms of the Union policies and political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities,19 and in the ordinary20 and the simplified 
revision procedures.21 Finally, the national parliaments were to be notified about incoming 
Union membership applications.22  
                                                 
13 Philipp Kiiver, ‘Some suppositions, propositions, tests and observations in light of the fate of the European 
Constitution’ in Jan Wouters, Luc Verhey and Philipp Kiiver (eds), European constitutionalism beyond Lisbon 
(Intersentia 2009) at 137.  
14 See Section 5 below. 
15 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on National Parliaments, Art 6. 
16 While this might have a symbolic character, because the parliaments were included in the Treaty, in formal 
sense, Protcols have the same legal values as the treaties to which they are attached. Cf. Koen Lenaerts and Piet 
Van Nuffel, Constitutional law of the European Union (Sweet and Maxwell 2011) at 823. 
17 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C310/1, Art I-46(2). 
18 Art I-18. 
19 Art I-42. 
20 Art IV-443. 
21 Art IV-444. 
22 Art I-58(2). 
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1.4 The Treaty of Lisbon 
However, due to the collapse of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, it was the 
Lisbon Treaty that finally introduced national parliaments into the Treaty as a ‘new player in 
the institutional balance.’23  
Whereas the Constitutional Treaty acknowledged the intermediary role of national 
parliaments in the principle of representative democracy, providing that ‘Member States are 
represented (…) in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable 
either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens,’24 the Treaty of Lisbon lifted their 
position in the institutional framework of the European Union itself. Article 12 TEU 
recognizes national parliaments’ active contribution to the good functioning of the Union.25 
This provision enumerates the key functions of national parliaments. At the beginning it 
refers to the rights of national parliaments indicated in Protocols No. 1 and No. 2: the right to 
receive all the EU draft legislative acts directly from the EU institutions and the scrutiny of 
the subsidiarity principle.26 Next, with regard to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
national parliaments gained information rights concerning the content and results of the 
evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies in that area by Member States’ 
authorities. In addition, national parliaments may evaluate Eurojust’s and Europol’s activities 
together with the EP.27 Article 12 TEU mentions, moreover, the function of national 
parliaments in the revision procedure of the Treaties.28 Finally, national parliaments are 
notified of applications for accession to the Union29 and take part in the inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament.30 Outside of Article 
12 TEU, other important functions of national Parliaments are included in Article 71 TFEU 
(information on the proceedings of the Council’s standing committee on the operational 
cooperation on internal security), Article 81(3) TFEU (notification of planned applications of 
                                                 
23 Youri Devuyst, ‘European Union's Institutional Balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: Community Method and 
Democratic Deficit Reassessed’ (2007) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 247, 314. 
24 Similar to Treaty of Lisbon, [2007] OJ C306/1, Art 10.  
25 This provision was not foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, hence for example, the obligation to forward legislative 
and non-legislative documents directly to national parliaments was foreseen only in Protocol No. 1 to the 
Constitutional Treaty, in contrast to Article 12 TEU, which contains all the main functions of national 
parliaments. 
26 Lisbon Treaty, Art 12 (a) and (b) TEU. 
27 Art 12 (c) TEU.  
28 Art 12 (d) TEU. 
29 Art 12 (e) TEU. 
30 Art 12 (f) TEU. 
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the special passarelle in the area of family law) and Article 352(2) TFEU (flexibility 
clause).31 
Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 contain detailed provisions concerning national parliaments. 
Specifically, Protocol No. 1 ‘on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU’ provides that the 
Commission keeps national parliaments abreast of its agenda: it directly forwards to national 
legislators, contemporaneously as to the EP and the Council, a number of non-legislative 
acts, such as the green and white papers and communications, its annual legislative 
programme, or any other instrument of legislative planning or policy.32 Further, Protocol No. 
1 obliges the Commission and the EP to forward their draft legislative initiatives directly to 
national parliaments, at the same time as to the other institutions. Similarly, the Council 
forwards legislative drafts originating from a group of Member States, the Court of Justice, 
the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank.33 In Article 3, Protocol No. 1 
foresees the subsidiarity review mechanism, the details of which details are elaborated in 
Protocol No. 2. Protocol No. 1 also imposes an eight-week period between the submission of 
a translated draft legislative act to national parliaments and it being placed on the Council’s 
agenda.34 An exception to the eight week period may occur in duly justified exceptional 
cases, but even then, in contrast to the Amsterdam Protocol, the Council may adopt such 
proposal only ten days after it was placed on its agenda. Other information rights for national 
parliaments concern the agendas for and the outcomes of meetings of the Council (including 
their minutes),35 the initiatives of the European Council on the planned passarelles (change 
from the unanimity to qualified majority in the Council or change from special to ordinary 
legislative procedure)36 and the annual report of the Court of Auditors.37 Finally, Protocol 
No. 1 provides for inter-parliamentary cooperation, which is elaborated upon in Section 5 of 
this chapter.38 At this juncture, I omit the competences of national parliaments under Protocol 
No. 2, as I discuss them in the following part on the subsidiarity review. 
                                                 
31 Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical reality 
at 7-9. 
32 Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, Art 1. 
33 Protocol No. 1, Art 2. 
34 Protocol No. 1, Art 4. 
35 Protocol No. 1, Art 5. 
36 Protocol No. 1, Art 6. 
37 Protocol No. 1, Art 7. 
38 Protocol No. 1, Art 9 and 10. 
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2 Characteristics of the subsidiarity principle  
Subsidiarity is a general39 and basic40 principle of EU law. It is also labelled ‘fundamental,’41 
‘constitutional’42 and a ‘regulatory principle’43 or a ‘principle about the functioning of 
democracy,’ as it ‘shapes the structures within which democracy operates.’44 The subsidiarity 
principle understood as a principle of governance can be dated to the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648, with its claim of exclusive state sovereignty and freedom of religion, which is reflected 
‘in the international law principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.’45 Other 
possible roots of subsidiarity lie in Pope Pius XI’s Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which 
focused on the relationship between society and the state.46 However, it was German 
constitutional law through which the subsidiarity principle became a principle of the EU legal 
order.47 
In the EU, the subsidiarity principle was introduced for a number of reasons. Firstly, Craig 
outlines that subsidiarity was seen as an answer to the lack of a clear division of different 
                                                 
39 Art 3 (b) TEU (Maastricht Treaty). See also Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz, The role of regions and sub-
national actors in Europe (Hart 2005) as well as Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The principle of subsidiarity and the Court 
of Justice as an institutional actor’ (1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 217, 218; George A Bermann, 
‘Taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and the United States’ (1994) 94 
Columbia Law Review 331, 388. 
40 Articles A and B TEU (Maastricht Treaty). The subsidiarity principle expressed in Article A TEU (‘This 
Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which 
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’ [emphasis added]) was labelled by de Búrca as 
‘democratic or full-blown subsidiarity’, whereas the one expressed in Art 3(b) EEC as the formally justiciable 
expression of the priniciple, referring only to the execrcise of power on the part of the Community institutions 
or the Member States.’ See Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ 
Harvard Jean Monnet working paper series <http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/99/990701.html> at 
12-13. 
41Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional law of the European Union (Sweet and Maxwell 2005) at 
112. Further, under the Constitutional Treaty subsidiarity, together with the conferal and proportionality 
principles, was labelled as one of the ‘fundamental principles.’ (Constitutional Treaty, Art I-11). 
42 Thomas Blanke, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty’ in Niklas Bruun, Klaus Lörcher and 
Isabelle Schömann (eds), The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe (Hart 2012) at 236; Robert Schütze, From dual 
to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law (Oxford University Press 2013) at 246. 
According to Schütze, subsidiarity enters to EU system from German constitutional law. 
43 Cygan at 121. 
44 Nicholas W Barber, ‘The limited modesty of subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 308, 316. 
45 David Edward, ‘Subsidiarity as a Legal Concept ’ in Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosas and Nils Wahl (eds), 
Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart 2012) at 93. 
46 Deborah Z Cass, ‘The word that saves Maastricht? The principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers 
within the European Community’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 1107, 1110-1112. However, Barber 
points out two main differences between European and Catholic subsidiarity versions; the former is ‘more 
restricted’ because it concerns democratic public bodies while the other one deals with much broader collective 
entities. Second, the European subsidiarity can gain support from different political positions while the other 
one lays on ideological Catholic arguments. Barber at 310. 
47 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law at 246. 
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types of competence in the treaties.48 The second reason built upon the first: in the uneasy 
cases of deciding upon the limits of EU powers, subsidiarity was seen as a complementary 
criterion of ‘better’ achieving the objective. Third, the aim of subsidiarity was to prevent 
‘excessive centralisation’ via treaty amendments, jurisprudence and harmonization. Finally, 
subsidiarity was supposed to boost ‘pluralism and the diversity of national values.’ 
The principle of subsidiarity raises ‘fundamental questions about the appropriate locus of 
political and legal authority within a complex and multiple-layered polity.’49 In particular, 
subsidiarity addresses the issue of the exercise of competences in areas shared by Member 
States and the European Union.50 Subsidiarity is ‘called upon to arbitrate the tension between 
integration and proximity in all matters dealt with by the Union and its Member States.’51 As 
a ‘constitutional safeguard of federalism,’ subsidiarity aims at restraining the exercise of 
powers allocated to the EU.52 In other words, subsidiarity ‘only determines whether in a 
particular case, which is already within Community competence, action should be taken at 
the Community or at the national level.’53 
It has been long discussed whether subsidiarity represents a legal or a political principle. 
Some point out that subsidiarity is clearly legally binding, and under judicial control of the 
ECJ.54 On the one hand, Tridimas says subsidiarity is ‘political in nature,’ which thus has a 
consequence for the jurisprudence of the ECJ – there is no possibility for the Court to apply a 
high level of scrutiny.55 As a result, it means that its enforcement must remain within the 
purview of political institutions.56  On the other hand, it is often put forward that subsidiarity 
is both a legal and political principle.57 Schütze talks about both the political and the judicial 
                                                 
48 Paul Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’ (2012) 50 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 
72, 73. 
49 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ at 43. 
50 Akos G Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’ (1994) 19 European Law Review 268, 269.  
51 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the 
Balance of Federalism’ (1993) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, 848. 
52 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law at 247. 
53Akos G Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 
1079, 1082. 
54 Theodor Schilling, ‘A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle’ (1995) 14 
Yearbook of European Law 203, 211-213. Schilling states that in the Dworkinian sense Art 3(b)(2) EC, current 
Art 5(3) TEU expresses a rule, but subsidiarity understood broadly can be seen a principle which provides that 
decisions must be taken as close as possible to the citizen. Subsidiarity as a principle serves to protect 
‘subsidiarity as a rule’. 
55 Takis Tridimas, ‘The Rule of Reason and its Relation to Proportionality and Subsidiarity’ in Antoinette 
Schrauwen (ed), Rule of Reason Rethinking another Classic of European Legal Doctrine (2005) at 120. 
56 Jit Peters, ‘National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law 
Review 68, 70. 
57 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ at 2. 
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nature of subsidiarity – the first dimension focusing on the procedural aspects of subsidiarity, 
whereas the latter focuses on its ‘substantiation’ before the ECJ.58 
2.1. Subsidiarity in EU Treaties 
The earliest trace of subsidiarity in the treaties is Article 130r (4) of the EEC Treaty, 
introduced by the Single European Act.59 This provision stated that ‘[t]he Community shall 
take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in 
paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual 
Member States.’ The reasoning behind the use of the subsidiarity principle by the Single 
European Act only for the environmental field is questioned by Toth, who sees this policy 
area as demanding, more than others, action at European or international level.60 
The Maastricht Treaty defined subsidiarity for the first time, granting it a binding force vis-à-
vis the whole treaty.61 The Maastricht Treaty elevated subsidiarity to one of the ‘main pillars 
of the Community’, by placing it among the essential provisions of the Treaty.62 The ‘clear 
legal core of subsidiarity’63 was formulated in Article 3b of the EC Treaty, which was added 
by the TEU: 
‘In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.’ 
(emphasis added) 
Although welcomed by some as ‘an important, if undervalued, component of the relationship 
between Community and Member Stats and the way in which power is distributed between 
them,’64 the introduction of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty was criticised 
by others as a ‘retrograde step,’ weakening the Community and slowing down European 
                                                 
58 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law at 257. 
59 For the discussion if this provision indeed embodied the subsidiarity principle (and its confirmation) see 
Christian Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (1996) at 42-47. Lenaerts 
traces subsidiarity’s roots to the Treaty of Rome, which incorporated a ‘“common-sense” idea that government 
should be no more centralized than it is strictly necessary for it to achieve the objectives assigned to its powers.’ 
Lenaerts, 852. See also Vlad Constantinesco, ‘Who's afraid of subsidiarity?’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European 
Law 35, 42. 
60 Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1092. 
61 Calliess at 67. 
62 Ibid at 68. 
63 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ at 14. 
64 Cass at 1134. 
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integration.65 Toth regarded the introduction of the subsidiarity principle as ‘inappropriate,’ 
as the Treaty did not distribute competences between the Union and the Member States in a 
clear and systematic way – ‘the only context in which the principle can work.’66 Moreover, 
according to Toth, the tests inherent in the provision at stake – ‘the test of effectiveness’ (‘if 
and in so far as’) and the ‘test of scale’ (‘by reason of the scale and effects’) – may lead to 
contradictory results, as one of them may speak in favour of the Union and other in favour of 
the Member States.67  
In December 1992, the European Council met to discuss the problems of the Community 
after the negative referendum in Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty, with the aim of regaining 
the confidence of citizens in the construction of Europe.68 The ‘Overall Approach’ annexed 
to the Conclusions of the European Council indicated that subsidiarity ‘contributes to the 
respect for national identities of Member States and safeguards their powers.’69 Subsidiarity, 
as the ‘Overall Approach’ labelled it, was a ‘dynamic concept’ which ‘allows Community 
action to be expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or 
discontinued where it is no longer justified.’70 The ‘Overall Approach’ points out that 
subsidiarity answers the question ‘Should the Community act?’ and that to satisfy the 
subsidiarity principle, both the ‘national insufficiency test’ as well as the ‘comparative 
efficiency test’ must be fulfilled.71  
The ‘Overall Approach’ also establishes guidelines for each of the paragraphs of Article 3b 
EC Treaty.72 On subsidiarity specifically, the guidelines aimed to provide for more clarity in 
the application of the two prongs of the subsidiarity test. To fulfil the subsidiarity test, first 
‘the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by Member States.’73 The second guideline points out that the Community action 
satisfies the subsidiarity principle when ‘actions by Member States alone or lack of 
Community action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (…) or would 
otherwise significantly damage Member States’ interests.’ Three examples are given: the 
                                                 
65 Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1105. 
66 Ibid at 1103. 
67 Ibid at 1097-1098. 
68 European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency. 
69 Conclusions of the Presidency, Overall approach to the application by the Council of the subsidiarity principle 
and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union, Annex 1 to Part A at 14. 
70 Conclusions of the Presidency, at 17. 
71 Ibid at 19. The tests are elaborated on in Chapter 2. 
72 Ibid at 19-22. 
73 Ibid at 20. 
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need to correct distortion of competition; avoidance of disguised restrictions on trade or 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion. The third guideline conditions compliance 
with subsidiarity on the ‘clear benefits [of Community action] by reason of its scale or effects 
compared with action at the level of Member States.’ In addition, the ‘Overall Approach’ 
provides that the subsidiarity reasoning has to be ‘substantiated by qualitative or, wherever 
possible, quantitative indicators.’74 
The ‘Overall Approach’ also gives instructions for all institutions to observe the subsidiarity 
principle when they examine Community proposals. In this respect, it points out that the 
Commission in its pre-legislative consultations could include the subsidiarity aspects of a 
proposal. A recital of the proposal will refer to the compatibility with the principle of 
subsidiarity and the explanatory memorandum will provide more detail in this respect, when 
necessary.75 The Commission should also prepare an annual report on the observance of 
Article 3b of the EC Treaty in its activities. Indeed, the Commission drafted its first report on 
the subsidiarity principle in 1994, later replaced by broader reports on ‘Better Lawmaking.’76 
In order to safeguard an effective application of the principle of subsidiarity by EU 
institutions, the Edinburgh Council envisaged that the EP would present an Inter-institutional 
Agreement in this respect.77 The document adopted, which is still valid today, established 
that the Commission, while exercising its right of initiative and the EP and the Council, while 
exercising their powers, should ‘take into account’ the subsidiarity principle.78 For example, 
the provision of the Inter-institutional Agreement that the explanatory memorandum for 
Commission proposals should include a subsidiarity assessment is of high importance for the 
EWS, and is nowadays a common practice in Commission proposals. 
Despite the attempt to bring more clarity to the application of the subsidiarity principle, the 
Edinburgh Guidelines and the Inter-Institutional Agreement were perceived as ‘vague and 
only indicative.’79 Nonetheless they represented an attempt to make subsidiarity 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid at 23. 
76 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’, 33. 
77 Conclusions of the Presidency, General Conclusions, at 4. 
78 Interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, Bull. EC 10-1993 at 119. The 
declaration is referred to rather by scholars than by the EU institutions themselves. 
79 Ingolf Pernice, ‘Framework Revisited: Constitutional, Federal and Subsidiarity Issues’ (1995) 2 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 403, 408. 
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‘operational’80 and in Lindseth’s view, they suggested a procedural dimension to the 
subsidiarity principle, demanding that the Community conducts an inquiry before 
undertaking legislative steps.81 
As a compromise between Germany and the UK (both supporters of accommodating 
subsidiarity in the treaties), on the one hand, and France together with some southern 
Member States (in favour of mentioning the subsidiarity principle only in the preamble), on 
the other, a protocol ‘on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ 
was added to the Amsterdam Treaty.82 The Amsterdam Protocol borrows the idea of 
subsidiarity as a ‘dynamic concept’83 from the Edinburgh Conclusions and restates that 
compliance with subsidiarity must be demonstrated by ‘qualitative or, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators.’84 In addition, the Protocol repeats the requirement that both the 
‘national insufficiency test,’ as well as the ‘comparative efficiency test’ must be met for 
subsidiarity compliance.85 At the heart of the Amsterdam Protocol are the guidelines 
established for the examination of the subsidiarity principle presented earlier in the 
Edinburgh Declaration.86 The Protocol maintained the obligation on the Commission to 
justify their proposals with regard to subsidiarity in the accompanying explanatory 
memorandums from the Edinburgh Declaration.87 Moreover, the Commission is required to 
submit an annual report on the application of the subsidiarity principle.88 
In addition, the Amsterdam Protocol repeats the provisions regarding the form of action, 
which should be ‘as simple as possible,’ and more specifically fulfil the requirement of 
choosing directives over regulations and framework directives over detailed measures.89 This 
provision is placed in the Amsterdam Protocol alongside the guidelines for the assessment of 
subsidiarity. In fact, the choice of the type of legal act can be seen much closer to the idea of 
                                                 
80 Christian Timmermans, ‘Subsidiarity and transparency’ (1999) 22 Fordham international law journal 106, 
108. 
81 Peter L Lindseth, Power and legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the nation-state (Oxford University Press 
2010) at 195. 
82 Michaela Heilbronner, ‘Die Justiziabilität des Subsidiaritätsprinzips im Lichte der Subsidiaritätsprotokolle ’ 
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83 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Art 3. 
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85 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Art 5. 
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89 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Art 6. 
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a proportionality principle, as it rather concerns a ‘how’ question.90 The ‘General Approach’ 
of the Edinburgh Council is hence more accurate in this respect, as it placed the provision on 
the form of action under the third paragraph of Article 3b of the EC Treaty  (‘nature and 
extent of Community action’), wherein the proportionality principle is currently enshrined.91 
In sum, no major changes concerning the subsidiarity principle have been introduced 
compared to the 1992 Edinburgh version. The Amsterdam Protocol is hence often seen 
simply as a mere extract of the central principles established in the Edinburgh ‘Overall 
Approach;’92 the guidelines ‘largely restate the broad political questions in open-ended terms, 
and do not provide strong legal criteria to answer them.’93 Nonetheless, the Amsterdam 
criteria are still referred to by the Commission94 and national parliaments alike.95  
The Constitutional Treaty provided a new wording of the subsidiarity principle in comparison 
to its Maastricht version, in Article I-11(3).96 This treaty was also the first that foresaw a role 
for national parliaments as ‘subsidiarity watchdogs,’ making sure that EU draft legislative 
acts comply with the subsidiarity principle.97 Protocol No. 2 ‘on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ enshrined this procedure.  
However, proposals to introduce other sorts of subsidiarity concerning both its political and 
judicial enforcement were studied at the time. The Convention on the Future of Europe 
Working Group I discussed a number of institutional ideas for the protection of the 
subsidiarity principle. The ‘political monitoring’ possibilities studied by the Working Group I 
included the creation of a ‘Mr (or Ms) subsidiarity’ to assist each member of the European 
Council and the European Parliament, with verifying and giving a timely opinion on the 
compliance of proposals the principle of subsidiarity.’98 At a later stage, a position of a ‘Mr 
or Ms Subsidiarity’ within the Commission, or of a Vice-President of the Commission, 
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Working Paper 7, (1999), p. 24. 
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ensuring the compliance of proposals with subsidiarity, was discussed.99 In this case, it was 
decided, however, that every Commissioner should be responsible for compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle in the areas under his or her competence, in addition to the 
Commission’s own competence to decide on its internal organisation.100 Another option was 
the creation of an ad hoc institution consisting of national parliamentary representatives, a 
proposal which, however, at later stages of the debates, was perceived rather negatively.101 
The creation of an ad hoc body was ruled out as too cumbersome for the decision-making 
process.102  
The ‘legal monitoring’ options included the creation of an ad hoc ‘subsidiarity chamber’ 
within the ECJ.103 However, the Group concluded that the Court could take such an 
organisational measure itself.104 Moreover, the Group also pondered upon establishing an ex 
ante judicial mechanism, between the adoption of the EU legislative act and its entry into 
force, inspired by provisions of the Member States for monitoring the constitutionality of 
laws.105 In fact, the vision of creating a Constitutional Council for the Community as an 
equivalent to the French Conseil Constitutionnel had been proposed much earlier. This 
prominent idea of Weiler, Haltern and Mayer was put forward before the Convention: they 
proposed a Constitutional Council which ‘would have jurisdiction only over issues of 
competences (including subsidiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a law was 
adopted, but before coming into force.’106 It was foreseen that any Community institution, 
Member State or the majority of European Parliament could bring such an action. The 
Constitutional Council would consist of the President of the ECJ and members of Member 
States’ constitutional courts. However, the conclusions of Working Group I abandoned the 
idea of a Constitutional Council, as in the view of the group, the introduction of a judicial 
review during the legislative phase would lead to the loss of the political nature of the 
subsidiarity review.107 In addition, granting such powers was perceived as problematic, as the 
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ECJ would control subsidiarity at a different stage than conferral or proportionality 
principles.108 
None of these ideas has been given a ‘green light.’ The Constitutional Treaty proposed, for 
the first time, the EWS, and the possibility for a national parliament, which has issued a 
reasoned opinion, to lodge a subsidiarity action109 against an adopted legislative act before 
the Court. Both of these mechanisms were seen as a ‘process-based approach’ in contrast to 
creation of a new institution.110 Working Group IV on national parliaments highlighted the 
need to ensure that these mechanisms ‘would be simple and that [they] would not 
unnecessarily delay decision-making-process.’111 Already at that time, they appeared as a 
compromise solution;112 it was a technical response to the question of subsidiarity control and 
the increasing role of national parliaments without the further complication of institutional 
structure and burdening of the EU legislative procedure.113   
The current wording of Article 5(3) TEU, based on the Constitutional Treaty Article I-
11(3),114 was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Its text reads as follows: 
‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level.’ 
Two differences between the Maastricht and the Lisbon subsidiarity are visible: a textual and 
a substantive one. First, the text of Article 3b of the EC Treaty combined the two parts of the 
subsidiarity test by stating ‘and can therefore,’ whereas the new Article 5(3) TEU uses the 
formula of ‘but can rather.’ Because of the Edinburgh Declaration, and the later Amsterdam 
Protocol, it is without doubt that both subsidiarity tests must be fulfilled. How should this 
                                                 
108 Ibid. For criticism of the idea of subsidiarity monitoring between the moments of adoption and entry into 
force  (in the manner of the French Conseil Constitutionnel), see the opinion of AG Jacobs given to Working 
Group I: European Convention, Summary of the Meeting on 25 June 2002, CONV 156/02, p. 3-4. 
109 CONV 286/02, Point II c. Art. 9 of Protocol No. 2 did not however mention that an earlier reasoned opinion 
was necessary to lodge the action. 
110 European Convention, Final Report of Working Group IV on the role of national parliaments, CONV 
353/02, Point 24. 
111 Ibid. 
112 This was a recommendation of ‘the majority of the members of the Group.’ See CONV 353/02, Point 24. 
113Jean-Victor Louis, ‘National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity – Legal Options and Practical 
Limits’ in Ingolf Pernice and Evgeni Tanchev (eds), (Nomos 2009) at 136. 
114 See further Barber, ‘Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution’. 
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change thus be read? Calliess argues that ‘and can therefore’ in the Maastricht version 
implied that the negative criterion acted as an independent criterion of equal importance, 
relative to the positive one.115 The Lisbon version ‘but can rather’ seems to imply a stronger 
causal connection between the two. Yet, as they are different tests it is unclear how the ‘but’ 
can be read in any way other than ‘and’. 
In terms of substance, the new subsidiarity formula has an added value because of its 
reference to sufficiency of national action at ‘central level or at regional and local level.’ 
Ziller points out that this addition, first proposed by the European Convention, was ‘rather 
symbolic – destined at recognition of regional and local realities in the Member States.’116 In 
contrast to the Maastricht version of subsidiarity, which ‘[did] not reflect the philosophy of 
allowing smaller units to define or achieve their own ends, and refer[ed] only to two levels: 
that of the nation state and that of Community,’ the added phrase now highlights that the 
national level is multi-layered.117 This means that a subsidiarity violation is possible 
regardless of the national level at stake – central, regional or local – that can sufficiently 
achieve the objective.118  
2.1 Design of the EWS 
The second subparagraph of Article 5(3) TEU states that ‘[t]he institutions of the Union shall 
apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.’ The 
EWS procedure to which Article 5(3) refers is established in Protocol No. 2, and its design is 
the following. 
On the basis of Articles 4 and 5, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council 
shall forward draft legislative acts to national parliaments, providing a justification regarding 
the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality for each proposal, including a detailed 
statement to enable the appraisal of compliance with these principles. Article 3 provides that 
for the purposes of Protocol No. 2, ‘draft legislative act[s]’ shall include proposals from the 
Commission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the European 
                                                 
115 In German „und daher”, Calliess at 110. 
116 Jacques Ziller, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité’ in Jean-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochèr (eds), 
Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruylant 2014) at 528 (own translation). 
117 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ at 16. 
118 Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional law of the European Union at 134. 
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Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the European Central 
Bank, and requests from the European Investment Bank, for the adoption of a legislative act. 
Article 6 grants national parliaments eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft 
legislative act to submit a reasoned opinion to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission explaining why the draft is not in compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity.119 The institution from which the draft originates, should ‘take account’ of the 
reasoned opinions received. If, however, the number of reasoned opinions exceeds certain 
thresholds, two special procedures may be triggered.120 First, in the procedure labelled as the 
‘yellow card,’121 if the reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments are equal to at least 
one third of all the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed. For the 
proposals in the area of freedom, security and justice, the respective threshold is one quarter 
of the votes of national parliaments. Subsequently, the initiating institution may decide to 
maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, giving reasons for its decision.122 Second, in the 
procedure commonly referred to as the ‘orange card,’123 if the reasoned opinions against a 
proposal within the ordinary legislative procedure represent at least the majority of votes 
assigned to national parliaments, the Commission must review the draft legislative act. 
Accordingly, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. If it 
decides to maintain the draft, the Commission should provide a reasoned opinion on the 
compliance of the draft with the subsidiarity principle.124 This reasoned opinion of the 
Commission, together with the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments, is forwarded to 
the EU legislator (namely, the Council and the EP), which has the final word. The EU 
legislator should consider these opinions, and if a majority of 55% of the votes in the Council 
                                                 
119 Critically on the 8-weeks deadline see: Damian Chalmers’ evidence to the House of Lords. House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2007–08, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment’, 
Volume II: Evidence. 
120 Reasoned opinions count as votes. Article 7(1), Protocol No. 2 assigns two votes for each national 
parliament: in Member States with a bicameral parliament, each of the two chambers shall have one vote. 
121 The notion of ‘yellow card’ comes from football jargon. See Jean-Victor Louis, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: The 
Irish ‘No’.: National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity–Legal Options and Practical Limits’ (2008) 4 
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122 Protocol No. 2, Art 7(2). 
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‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’.: National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity–Legal Options and 
Practical Limits’ at 438. 
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or a majority of the votes cast in the EP is of the opinion that the proposal is contrary to the 
principle of subsidiarity, the legislative procedure is halted.  
To operationalise the subsidiarity review, the Commission itself proposed a number of 
arrangements that ‘ensure the smooth operation of the mechanism.’125 Accordingly, the 
Commission gave national Parliaments the possibility to decide upon the language in which 
they want to receive legal drafts. This also means that the Commission sends proposals at 
different times, depending on when the translation is ready. To standardize the different 
moments of receipt, the Commission arranged to send a ‘lettre de saisine’ after the final 
language translation, which sets an identical deadline for all the national parliaments to 
submit a reasoned opinion. Moreover, the Commission obliged itself not to count August 
within the eight-week deadline, as it is the usual parliamentary recess month. With regard to 
the scope of reasoned opinions, the Commission urged national parliaments to distinguish in 
their opinions between the indications of subsidiarity violations and other critical comments 
on the draft legislative acts. This differentiation is necessary, in the view of the Commission, 
as the subsidiarity review and the political dialogue (since 2006) function in parallel. Further, 
on the counting of national parliaments’ submissions, the Commission committed itself to 
count all the different aspects of subsidiarity violations expressed in the reasoned opinions of 
national parliaments towards the thresholds of Protocol No. 2. If the threshold is met, within 
eight weeks, the Commission will issue an assessment of the criticised proposal. Most 
interestingly, in the 2009 letter to national parliaments, the Commission expressed a 
commitment to reply to national parliaments’ opinions that did not meet the threshold or 
arrived after the deadline. This approach clearly goes beyond the wording of Article 5, para. 
1 of Protocol No. 2, which prescribes that the Commission (or other institution from which 
the draft originates) shall take account of the reasoned opinions issued by national 
parliaments or by a chamber of a national parliament. The commitment to reply to opinions 
that did not meet the threshold, or that arrived after the deadline, effectively implies a reply to 
every reasoned opinion of a national Parliament. The final important aspect that the 
Commission highlighted is that it will not submit modified proposals for another assessment 
of their compatibility with the subsidiarity principle. 
                                                 
125 Letter from Barroso to national Parliaments of 1.12.2009 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm. 
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The functioning of the procedure of Protocol No. 2 has been analysed and criticised by EU 
scholarship. Even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, at the stage of the 
Constitutional Treaty, it was questioned whether the new system would be satisfactory.126 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, three main issues of the EWS were listed: ‘incentive problems, 
logistical problems, and weaknesses inherent in the subsidiarity review.’127 These weak 
points of subsidiarity scrutiny refer to, first, the reluctance of majoritarian parliaments to 
challenge their government’s position on EU affairs, and low electoral benefits from 
engagement in EU affairs; second, the short eight-week deadline and high volume of 
proposals to scrutinize; and third, the lack of a ‘red card’128 force of the reasoned opinions 
that could stop the legislative procedure.129 Also, the issue that only legislative acts can be 
checked within the subsidiarity review is considered as limiting its effectiveness and 
function.130 It is also bemoaned that, at the stage when parliaments are supposed to send 
reasoned opinions, the Commission has already decided upon the compatibility of its 
proposals with subsidiarity.131 Moreover, by assessing the added value of the EWS, Philipp 
Kiiver critically notes that national parliaments may always direct complaints to the initiator 
of EU legislation, even without the EWS, as, if they are willing to do so, EU institutions can 
always take into account the arguments raised by national parliaments.132 
An important issue in the functioning of the EWS is the eight-week deadline. While the 
scepticism depicting the eight-week time frame as insufficient did not prove to be 
                                                 
126 See Peters at 71, questioning whether MPs as politicians will be able to refrain from assessing of the contents 
of the proposal. 
127 Cooper, ‘A ‘virtual third chamber’for the European Union? National parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 
449. 
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Azoulai (ed), The question of competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) at 238. 
131 Bernhard Schima, ‘Die Subsidiaritatskontrolle durch die nationalen Parlamente nach dem vertrag von 
Lissabon’ (2013) 68 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 373. 
132 See Kiiver, ‘Some suppositions, propositions, tests and observations in light of the fate of the European 
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48 
 
warranted,133 as national parliaments managed to submit their reasoned opinions on time, it 
is, however, often criticised as too short by the practitioners – the national parliaments – 
themselves. As outlined during a House of Commons debate, it is unreasonable to expect that 
a parliament should ‘come to an informed view on compliance with subsidiarity within the 
eight-week time frame allotted for issuing a reasoned opinion without the benefit of an 
analysis by the Government.’134 
In this respect the COSAC 19th bi-annual Report of May 2013 indicates that 12 out of 32 
parliaments/chambers responded that the eight-week period for internal parliamentary 
scrutiny of subsidiarity was not sufficient.135 Six parliaments/chambers136 stated that a 12-
week period for internal parliamentary scrutiny of subsidiarity would be better. Two 
parliaments/chambers (the Hungarian Országgyűlé and the Cypriot Vouli ton Antiprosopon) 
specified that a ten-week period would be more appropriate, especially in the case of 
legislative proposals that bear significant economic or social importance and require more in-
depth analysis. Some parliaments/chambers emphasised that a longer period would not mean 
a significant slowing down of the European legislative procedure (given its usual duration), 
but that it would provide enough time for the national parliaments to thoroughly scrutinise 
subsidiarity, and could lead to an improvement in the quality of the reasoned opinions. The 
Swedish Riksdag supported the view that a review of the current timescales available for 
subsidiarity checks is needed. According to the Riksdag, a longer time frame would make it 
easier for more parliaments/chambers to examine more proposals and would facilitate 
interparliamentary cooperation. 
2.2 Current practice of the EWS 
Against the negative expectations of the scholarship, which speculated that a ‘yellow card 
may never be triggered,’137 national parliaments have shown two ‘yellow cards’ vis-à-vis 
Commission proposals since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. National parliaments 
                                                 
133 Groussot and Bogojević at 238. 
134 Issue raised by the Chair of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, W. Cash, House of 
Commons Hansard Debates for 10 Feb 2014 on COM(2013)821, Column 673. 
135 COSAC, 19th Bi -annual  Repor t  on EU Practices and  Procedures (May 2013)  at 28. 
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have not yet managed to trigger an ‘orange card’ for any of the Commission proposals; hence 
the view of Lindseth that ‘[t]he high thresholds under both yellow and orange card 
procedures could pose significant obstacles to their formal use, thus undermining their likely 
impact’ remains partially true.138 Yet, although rarely reaching necessary thresholds, national 
parliaments do send reasoned opinions within the EWS framework. 
Article 9 of Protocol No. 2 obliges the Commission to publish an annual report on the 
application of Article 5 TEU. The analysis of the reports issued between 2010 and 2014 will 
be focused on three issues: the increase of the number of reasoned opinions; the spread of 
reasoned opinions, and the most and least active parliaments in the EWS. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the Commission reports is that the number of 
reasoned opinions is increasing every year. While the beginnings were quite modest – in 
2010, the Commission published 82 draft legislative acts, and national parliaments issued 34 
reasoned opinions139 – in the following years the numbers increased. For example, in 2011, 
the national parliaments issued 64 reasoned opinions;140 in 2012, 70;141 and in 2013, 88142. 
The ‘yellow card’ threshold was reached on two occasions thus far: in 2012 concerning the 
Commission proposal on the right to strike; and in 2013 concerning the Commission proposal 
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office of the same year. 
Second, the reports show also that the reasoned opinions spread unequally vis-à-vis 
Commission proposals; many Commission proposals receive a single reasoned opinion. 
However, each year there was a group of proposals that received a significant number of 
opinions, though not enough to trigger a ‘yellow card.’ For example, the most commented 
proposals in 2010143 were the Seasonal Workers Directive,144 the Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
Directive,145 and the provisions on Food Distribution to the Most Deprived Persons in the 
Union.146 In 2011, national parliaments issued the greatest number of reasoned opinions 
                                                 
138 Lindseth at 241. 
139 European Commission, Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality (18th report on 
Better Lawmaking covering year 2010), COM(2011) 344, at 4. 
140 European Commission, Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality (19th report on 
Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011), COM(2012) 373, at 4. 
141 European Commission, Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality (20th report on 
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Better Lawmaking covering the year 2013), COM(2014) 506, at 4. 
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(nine) with regard to the proposals for the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB)147, the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional 
circumstances148 (six reasoned opinions) and the Common European Sales Law149 (five 
reasoned opinions).150 In 2012, the ‘yellow card’ right to strike proposal raised 12 reasoned 
opinions, and was followed by five reasoned opinions for the Commission proposal151 on the 
Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived.152 In 2013, the proposal that received the most comments 
was the ‘yellow card’ trigger, the EPPO proposal, with 13 reasoned opinions; the draft 
directive establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal 
management153 received nine reasoned opinions; while the new Tobacco Products 
Directive154 and the draft regulation on market access to port services and financial 
transparency155 triggered seven each.156  
Third, the most active parliament throughout 2010-2014 was the Swedish Riksdag, which 
issued a total of 43 opinions in four years with a record 20 in 2012. Yet its number of 
reasoned opinions visibly decreased in 2013, to a more moderate 9 (although this is still the 
highest of all chambers during that calendar year). Other particularly active chambers include 
the French Sénat (15), the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés (15) and the UK House of 
Commons (14). The chambers with the lowest number of reasoned opinions included smaller 
Member States such as the Državni svet in Slovenia, which issued zero opinions or chambers 
in Estonia and Hungary, which issued one each. 
3 The subsidiarity review from the perspective of EU institutions 
In order to give a full overview of the design of the subsidiarity review, the role played by 
EU institutions also needs to be explored.  
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3.1 The European Parliament 
The EP comes into play in the subsidiarity review mechanism if the national parliaments 
trigger an ‘orange card.’ As I outlined in Section 2 of this chapter, according to Article 7(3) 
(b) of Protocol No. 2, if the majority of the votes cast in the EP before the end of first reading 
state that the proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, it will result in a 
rejection of the legislative proposal. It seems that the majority of the votes cast under the 
‘orange card’ does not make it easier for the EP to dismiss a Commission proposal, as the 
same majority (a simple majority) is needed in the first reading during the ordinary legislative 
procedure in order to adopt its position (Art. 294(3) TFEU).157 However, the phrase used in 
Article 7 of Protocol No. 2 ‘before concluding the first reading’ seems to mean that the vote 
on the compatibility of the proposal will take place separately, or at least before, the EP votes 
on the first reading. 
Moreover, the possibility of stopping the analysis of the draft legislative act offered by 
Protocol No. 2 may help the EP to dismiss Commission legislative drafts that are unwanted 
for reasons other than subsidiarity before the end of the first reading. However, this will 
depend upon how the EP formulates its objections against the act and if it reaches beyond the 
strict assessment of subsidiarity. Furthermore, for the Parliament ‘it is not the veto that is 
important, but the shadow of the veto’ helping to state its preferences before other institutions 
more clearly.158 
Nonetheless, as the ‘orange card’ has never been triggered so far, it is worth looking at other 
options for national parliaments to reach the EP. The EP receives and considers the 
contributions of national parliaments officially transmitted by a national parliament to the 
EP.159 These contributions are then forwarded to the committee responsible for the subject 
matter in question. With regard to subsidiarity specifically, Rule 42 of the EP Rules of 
Procedure focuses on the examination of proposals in this respect. The EP forwards the 
                                                 
157 Barrett argues that ‘(...) under the ordinary legislative procedure the EP has more difficulty in blocking 
legislation. It must act by an absolute majority of its component members in order to prevent a proposal from 
being adopted’. The reference here is made to the absolute majority needed in the second reading to reverse the 
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reasoned opinions of national parliaments to a committee responsible for the subject matter 
and, for information, to the committee responsible for respect of the principle of subsidiarity 
(Committee on Legal Affairs).160 The committee at stake should not finalise its vote on a 
proposal before the expiry of the eight week deadline.161 Moreover, if the reasoned opinions 
of national parliaments meet the ‘yellow card’ threshold, the Rules of Procedure oblige the 
EP to wait for the decision of the sponsor of the criticised proposal.162 Nonetheless, the 
committee responsible for the subject matter plays the decisive role when the national 
parliaments trigger the ‘orange card.’ The relevant committee, after pondering the reasoned 
opinions of the national parliaments and of the Commission and hearing the views of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs, may advise the EP to reject the proposal due to a subsidiarity 
violation, or recommend amendments to the EP with respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity.163 The relevant committee should attach an opinion given by the Committee on 
Legal Affairs to its opinion.164 Next, the EP debates and votes upon the committee’s 
recommendation.165 The legislative procedure is closed if a majority of the votes cast are in 
favour of adopting the recommendation to reject the proposal. If the EP does not reject the 
proposal, the legislative procedure continues, taking on board the EP’s recommendations. 
Moreover, the parliamentary questions166 present another avenue for MEPs to intervene 
where national parliaments signalled a subsidiarity violation, but did not manage to trigger an 
‘orange card,’ which may ultimately involve the EP. Whereas in some cases, MEPs asked 
about the subsidiarity review mechanism and its outcomes in general terms,167 some 
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questions were more specifically asking with regard to specific proposals where a national 
Parliament issued a reasoned opinion.168 For example, the French MEP Rachida Dati 
underlined that with regard to the Commission proposal on roadworthiness tests, the French 
parliament has issued a reasoned opinion outlining a violation of the subsidiarity principle, 
and drafted a report on the lack of adequate subsidiarity justifications in the Commission’s 
proposals.169 The MEP, thus, asked the Commission, if it would take the concerns of the 
French Senate into account.170 In its reply, the Commission highlighted that the compatibility 
of proposals with the subsidiarity principle is an ‘important subject, which is always 
thoroughly considered when proposing legislative initiatives’ and relied on its Policy 
Orientations on Road Safety 2011-2020 and impact assessment to justify its proposal.171 The 
use of parliamentary questions to inquire on the use of the EWS appears to represent a good 
avenue for MEPs to further underline the concerns of national Parliaments with regard to 
subsidiarity.172 
The EP shows awareness of national parliaments’ activity with regard to subsidiarity 
assessments. In its resolution of 13 September 2012 on the Commission report on Better 
legislation, the EP addressed the issue of subsidiarity control by national parliaments.173 The 
EP welcomed the involvement of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, 
remarking, however, that only a small number of national parliaments’ opinions concerned 
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subsidiarity violations. Moreover, with regard to the first ‘yellow card,’ the EP urged the 
Commission to review the draft taking into account the position of national parliaments. 
Additionally, the EP mentioned the lack of subsidiarity justification in Commission 
proposals, which national parliaments often highlight in their reasoned opinions. 
Interestingly, the EP resolution pressed for a review of the eight-week deadline for 
subsidiarity review. Finally, the EP underlined the role of regional parliaments with 
legislative powers, advising national parliaments to consult them with regard to subsidiarity 
concerns, and advising the Commission to take into account their role in its annual report on 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  
3.2 The Council  
In the Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) ensures that 
institutional principles are complied with.174 The participation of the Council in the 
subsidiarity review itself is foreseen first in Article 6(2) of Protocol No. 2. Specifically, the 
President of the Council forwards the reasoned opinions to the governments of those Member 
States, if a draft legislative act originates from a group of Member States.175 The second 
function of the Council under Protocol No. 2 is expressed in Article 7(3)(b) of Protocol No.2, 
within the ‘orange card.’  
Under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Nice Treaty’s ‘qualified majority’ voting 
will no longer rely on weighted votes attributed to each Member State (260 votes cast in 
favour out of 352), but, starting from 1st November 2014 it will contain two thresholds 
(‘double majority’): 55% of the number of Member States (but not less than 15), and at least 
65% of the Union’s population (Article 16 TEU). According to the transitional provisions, 
the new method will be brought fully into force from 1 April 2017; in the interim, a Member 
State can request the application of the ‘qualified majority’ model, emanating from the Treaty 
of Nice. In the ordinary legislative procedure, a qualified majority is required in the first 
reading (Article 16 TEU in connection with Article 294(4) TFUE). In the subsidiarity review, 
                                                 
174 Council Decision 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35, See Article 19(1)(a) stating that Coreper in its 
responsible for preparing the work of all the meetings of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it 
by the Council has to ensure consistency of the European Union's policies and actions and see if the principles 
of legality, subsidiarity, proportionality and providing reasons for acts are observed. This provision is, however, 
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2006/683/EC, Euratom, OJ L 285, 15.09.2006, p. 47). 
175 In 2010 in three cases: Directive on the Rights to Interpretation and to Translation in Criminal Proceedings 
(2010/0801 (COD)), Directive on the European Protection Order (2010/0802 (COD)) and Directive on 
European Investigation Order (2010/0817 (COD)). See Commission report COM (2011) 344, p. 6. 
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in order to stop the legislative procedure, which must be done before the end of the first 
reading, a majority of 55% of the Member States in the Council is required to declare the 
draft as incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity. When compared to the Nice Treaty 
‘qualified majority’ rules, which demanded that a majority of Member States vote in favour 
(at least 15 out of 28), the request that 55% of Member States vote in favour, in fact, also 
demands a similar majority of at least 15 Member States.176 In addition, the ‘orange card’ 
discards the requirement of 65% representation in the Council, which seems to strengthen the 
small Member States.177 The reason behind this might be that because the ‘orange card’ 
demands at least a majority of the votes of the national parliaments, and because the Council 
members would probably follow their parliaments – obviously depending upon national 
systems – it should not be made harder for the Council to state subsidiarity violation.   
In contrast to the Council, the EP has always been perceived as a more integration-friendly 
institution (and thus probably more in favour of the exercise of a competence by the EU) than 
the Council. Hence, for the EP, the subsidiarity review may not be an advantage due to its 
pro-integrationist character, implying the protection of the EU competence, but as the ‘orange 
card’ presents an alternative: a majority of the votes cast in the EP or 55% of Council votes, 
the last word will belong to the Council, if the EP states the compatibility with the principle 
of subsidiarity.  
3.3 The Committee of the Regions 
One of the novelties in the text of Article 5(3) TEU is that it distinguishes between the 
different levels of Member State action: central, regional and local, in comparison to the 
previous formulation of this provision, which referred the Member States in general terms. 
Moreover, Article 6(1) of Protocol No. 2 provides that in the EWS, national parliaments may 
consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers. Further, Article 8 of 
Protocol No. 2 provides for the role of the Committee of the Regions in the subsidiarity 
                                                 
176 Before 1 November 2014 the qualified majority will be counted according to the procedure indicated in 
Protocol No. 36, which is 255 votes in favour meaning that already 13 (out of 27) Member States with the 
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Europarecht 523, 532. 
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review. Finally, the Committee of Regions has a ‘semi-privileged’ standing against 
legislative acts in cases where the TFEU provides for consultation with the Committee.178  
Despite the above, these regions-friendly provisions, first foreseen in the Constitutional 
Treaty were seen as insufficient to ‘provoke acceptance of a formal institutional monitoring 
role conferred on sub-national actors.’179 In addition, the role of the Committee of Regions is 
arguably rather limited in the scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle, due to the practical 
limitations such as lack of legislative powers, diverse methods of members appointment, and 
- in direct connection to the EWS – the lack of a possibility to raise a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange 
card.’180 The Committee of the Regions may, however, adopt opinions, which can concern 
Commission proposals and other acts regarding their compatibility with the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles. For example, in 2013, the Committee of the Regions adopted 72 
opinions, 72% of which referred to the subsidiarity principle,181 while 36% expressed the 
position of the Committee on the compliance with the subsidiarity principle.182 
While Chapter 3 delves into the ways for the regional parliaments to participate in the EWS 
through their national parliaments, this section will briefly look into how the Committee of 
the Regions manages the subsidiarity review. In 2007, even before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Committee of the Regions began operating a Subsidiarity Monitoring 
Network (SMN) for the ‘exchange of information between local and regional authorities in 
the European Union and the Union level regarding various documents and legislative and 
political proposals from the European Commission which, once adopted, will have a direct 
impact on these authorities and the policies for which they are responsible.’183 Network 
partners (parliaments and governments of regions with legislative powers, local and regional 
authorities without legislative powers and local government associations in the European 
Union; the national delegations to the Committee of the Regions) may submit their 
assessments in ‘open consultations.’ These consultations concern all political or legislative 
documents that are the subject of a Committee of the Regions opinion.184 Another venue is 
                                                 
178 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Finding a Role for the Regions in Checking EU’s Competence’ in Stephen Weatherill 
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179 Ibid at 150. 
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181 European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, Rule 51(2). 
182 Committee of Regions, Subsidiarity Annual Report 2013 at 9.  
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‘targeted consultations,’ where the Committee of the Regions’ rapporteur on a specific EU 
act invites the network partners to comment on subsidiarity and proportionality.185 The 
opinions of the network partners might be submitted in form of ‘standard assessment grids’ 
or ‘tailored questionnaires.’186 
The core of the SMN’s functioning is its subnetwork REGPEX, which regional parliaments 
may use ‘as a tool for selecting priorities for subsidiarity monitoring’ by publishing and 
sharing their opinions before the expiry of the eight week period.187 REGPEX was launched 
in February 2012.188 In 2013, 66 contributions were submitted, with the most active bodies 
being the Thüringen State Parliament, the Emilia Romagna Regional Legislative Assembly, 
the Austrian Bundesrat, the Austrian State Governor's Conference and the Baden-
Württemberg State Parliament.189 
Finally, in 2013, the Committee of the Regions launched its first Subsidiarity Work 
Programme, which included five priority areas selected from the Commission Working 
programme for a subsidiarity review.190 New proposals were also selected for 2014. 
4 The ‘Barroso initiative’ 
In contrast to the previous Commissions, the Commission presided by Barroso gave more 
priority to relations with national parliaments in EU policy-making. In February 2005, the 
Commission adopted a new approach to the relations with national parliaments.191 The 
objectives included, inter alia, visits to national parliaments and drafting an annual report on 
relations with national parliaments.192 Furthermore, following on from the European Council 
declaration on ‘the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ of 18 
June 2005 calling for a ‘reflection period’ after the failed French and Dutch referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty, the Commission proposed ‘Plan D’ (for democracy, dialogue and 
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186 See examples at: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/thesmn/Pages/default.aspx. 
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debate), in order ‘to stimulate a wider debate between the European Union’s democratic 
institutions and citizens.’193 In 2006, the Commission presented a developed ‘Plan D’ – a 
‘Citizens’ Agenda’.194 The Citizens’ Agenda foresees a commitment to the respect of the 
subsidiarity principle, which means that the Commission will work with Member States and 
their national parliaments.195 Specifically, the document foresees a closer involvement of 
national parliaments in the ‘development and execution of European policy’. The increased 
participation of national legislatures was, in the view of the Commission,’ a step to ‘make 
European policies more attuned to diverse circumstances and more effectively 
implemented.’196 As a consequence, the Commission committed itself to forward all new 
legislative proposals and consultation papers directly to national parliaments, with an 
invitation to react, in order to enhance the policy making process. This initiative is named the 
‘Barroso initiative,’ after the President of the Commission at the time, and is often also 
referred to as ‘political dialogue.’197 Jančić defines the ‘Barroso initiative’ as ‘a broad 
political dialogue between the Commission and the national parliaments of the Member 
States on all aspects of the former’s political agenda.’198  
The ‘Barroso initiative’ was definitely an improvement in the information and participation 
rights of national parliaments, which at that point in time relied on their national 
governments. Political dialogue limited the dependence of national parliaments on their 
respective governments.199 The Amsterdam Protocol on national parliaments provided only 
that the consultation documents be forwarded ‘promptly’ by the Commission, whereas the 
legislative proposals be ‘made available in good time’ by the government.200 Nonetheless, it 
was clear for the Commission that the balance within ‘the institutional triangle’ – the 
                                                 
193 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
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Commission, the EP and the Council – is not affected by the new approach towards national 
parliaments.201 
The participation of national parliaments in the political dialogue is differentiated. Taking 
into account the same time period as that utilised in the case of the EWS (2010-2013), the 
number of opinions that the Commission received is significantly higher. The number of the 
received opinions was the following: 387 in 2010;202 558 in 2011;203 593 in 2012;204 and 553 
in 2013.205 
The most active parliament in the ‘Barroso initiative’ has been the Portuguese Parliament.206 
The success of this body has been explained as a consequence of a new parliamentary 
procedure in 2006, allowing the chamber to pass written opinions on EU issues which 
touched upon its exclusive legislative competence and give them a practical dimension by 
forward them to the Commission within the newly established political dialogue.207 
Other consistently active participants of the political dialogue include the Italian and Czech 
Senates, the German Bundesrat, the Swedish Riksdag and the Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies.208 On the other side of the spectrum were the Estonian, Hungarian and Slovenian 
parliaments, all often showing no activity at all. 
There are five main differences between the ‘Barroso initiative’ and the EWS: the type of 
acts under the scrutiny, the time frame, the addressees of opinions, the scope of the review 
and the fact there is a positive or negative assessment. First, the opinions issued within the 
political dialogue are not limited to EU draft legislative acts, but also apply to non-legislative 
documents: consultation documents (green and white papers, communications or annual 
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legislative programmes) can be commented on by national parliaments.209 Second, whereas 
Protocol No. 2 rigidly sets the eight week deadline for reasoned opinions, the ‘Barroso 
initiative’ can be triggered at any time during the legislative process. Third, concerning the 
addressees of opinions, while Protocol No. 2 stipulates that the reasoned opinion is forwarded 
to the Commission and the EU legislator, the ‘Barroso initiative’ is much more limited, as it 
operates only between national parliaments and the Commission.210 Fourth, regarding the 
scope of the review, the ‘Barroso initiative’ opinions may assess the conferral, subsidiarity 
and proportionality principles, political accountability (the duty to give adequate justification 
for the action), as well as other political and legal aspects of Commission proposals by 
examining their substance,211 in contrast to the subsidiarity focused EWS.212 Finally, Article 
6 of Protocol No. 2 provides that a reasoned opinion should focus on why the draft legislative 
proposal is not compatible with the subsidiarity principle. With regard to the ‘Barroso 
initiative,’ the assessment of an act can be both negative, as well as positive, stating that no 
violation of the subsidiarity principle is at stake. In addition to these differences, Jančić 
points out the fact that while the EWS is anchored in Protocol No. 2, the ‘Barroso initiative’ 
has an informal character, and could be abolished by the Commission at any time.213 
The opinions of national parliaments within the political dialogue receive responses from the 
Commission, similar to reasoned opinions in cases where no ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’ card has 
been triggered. This is a consequence of the responsibility that the Commission undertook 
when the Lisbon Treaty was entering into force.214 Moreover, at that point, the Commission 
asked national parliaments to ‘distinguish in their opinions as far as possible between 
subsidiarity aspects and comments on the substance of the proposal, and to be as clear as 
possible as regards their assessment on a proposal’s compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity.’215 In fact, as Jančić points out, national parliaments do not send two separate 
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opinions on Commission proposals.216 In truth, as it will be shown in this thesis at several 
points, reasoned opinions contain comments on different aspects of the proposals, not 
exclusively on subsidiarity. This approach is not problematic per se, as long as a ‘yellow’ or 
‘orange’ card is not triggered. When no appropriate threshold has been reached, the 
Commission will reply to national parliaments’ reasoned opinions in the political dialogue in 
any case. Yet, when one of the ‘cards’ is triggered, the content of the reasoned opinion will 
matter, as they should address only the subsidiarity compliance of Commission proposals. 
Because the Commission ‘invited’ national parliaments to differentiate between subsidiarity 
and non-subsidiarity arguments, the Commission must have assumed that opinions invoking 
very diverse arguments would arrive. In this way, the Commission has given national 
parliaments a ‘free hand’ in designing their opinions. Yet, the Commission also created a 
condition, stipulating that the received opinions would undergo a ‘political assessment’ on 
the part of the Commission.217 Hence, if a parliament proceeds with a broad scrutiny of an 
EU legislative proposal, it should be aware of the ‘political assessment’ conducted by the 
Commission after the deadline passes. 
Turning to the question ‘does the ‘Barroso initiative’ have a visible impact at the EU level?’ 
The Commission itself reports that ‘[a]s regards the improvement of policy formulation, it is 
true that it might not always be easy to measure the concrete impact of national Parliaments’ 
opinions on a given final legislative act.’218 Yet, in the early years of the political dialogue in 
a few cases, an influence on the EU legislative process was observed.219 Looking at more 
recent data, the reactions to the proposal for the European Citizens’ Initiative show that the 
political dialogue provided the EU legislators with an option that was retained in the final 
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text.220 In this case, the minimum number of Member States from which signatories of 
citizens’ initiative must come was lowered and the one-year period for collecting signatures 
was established, reflecting the views expressed in the political dialogue.221 This example, 
which in fact focuses on the substance of the proposal, proves that the political dialogue 
presents a valuable alternative for addressing non-subsidiarity related issues relating to 
Commission proposals in the EWS. 
5 The EWS in Inter-parliamentary Cooperation 
The EWS does not operate in a vacuum. It must be viewed against the background of inter-
parliamentary cooperation in general. From the perspective of the EWS, the main reason is 
that some coordination between national parliaments is necessary in order to reach the 
Protocol No. 2 thresholds, as the yellow cards triggered thus far have shown. Beyond that, 
inter-parliamentary cooperation, in which the European Parliament also participates, may 
raise the awareness of MEPs for the contributions and reasoned opinions of national 
parliaments. 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation is also anchored in EU primary law. The Maastricht Treaty 
incorporated two declarations: No 13 ‘on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union’ and No 14 ‘on the Conference of the Parliaments.’ The first declaration called for 
greater involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, especially through the exchange of 
information and regular meetings between national parliaments and the EP. The other 
declaration proposed that the EP and the national parliaments should meet as a Conference of 
the Parliaments (or in the form of ‘Assises’)222 as a consultative body on the ‘main features of 
the European Union.’ The Presidents of the Council and of the Commission were to report on 
the state of the Union to the parliamentary conference. The Amsterdam Protocol on ‘the role 
of national parliaments in the European Union’ elaborated on the Conference (now as the 
Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European 
Union – COSAC), granting it specific functions.223 First, COSAC’s contributions on 
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legislatives acts and other initiatives in the area of freedom, security and justice with a direct 
impact on the rights and freedoms of individuals should inform the EP, the Council and the 
Commission. Second, COSAC was competent to alert these institutions about its own 
contributions concerning: the ‘legislative activities of the Union’, in particular with regard to 
the subsidiarity principle; the area of freedom security and justice; and fundamental rights. 
However, the positions of COSAC did not have a binding force on national parliaments and 
were not prejudicial to their position. Under the Lisbon Treaty, in Protocol No. 1, inter-
parliamentary cooperation is directly mentioned (Article 9). The Lisbon Protocol does refer 
again to the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs.224 The role of the 
conference is further seen as promoting the exchange of information and best practices, with 
a new function of organisation of inter-parliamentary conferences, in particular in the area of 
common security and defence policy (Article 10). Similarly to the position under the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the contributions of the conference have no binding force on national 
parliaments. 
In general terms, Crum and Fossum observe a growing trend of cooperation within the 
‘multilevel parliamentary field’ encompassing national and supranational parliamentary 
institutions participating in the EU decision-making process.225 Crum and Fossum positively 
assess the inter-parliamentary engagement; ‘parliaments are increasingly oriented to one 
another; each is becoming an intrinsic part of the others’ operating environment.’226 The 
existing networks can be divided according to bilateral – multilateral and formal – informal 
lines.227 From the perspective of this chapter, the most important are the multilateral ones, 
including formal networks such as the EU Speaker’s Conference and COSAC, and informal 
networks of the Brussels national parliamentary representatives. 
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5.1 The Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments  
The oldest type of cooperation is the Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments, 
which can be dated as far as 1963.228 The aim of the Conference is ‘safeguarding and 
promoting the role of parliaments and carrying out common work in support of the 
interparliamentary activities.’229 It meets annually and involves the Speakers of parliaments 
of EU Member States and the EP’s President. In 2008, the conference approved guidelines on 
inter-parliamentary cooperation which provide for the following aims: the promotion of the 
exchange of information and best practices between national parliaments and the EP; the 
safeguarding of the effective exercise of the subsidiarity and proportionality control; and the 
advancement of the cooperation with parliaments outside of the EU.230 It decided to establish 
the CFSP/CSDP (2012) and ‘Article 13 TSCG’ (2013) conferences.231 Besides the aims 
defined in Protocol No. 1, the EU Speakers’ conference promotes research activities with 
regard to tools of inter-parliamentary cooperation, such as the Interparliamentary EU 
information exchange, IPEX, which is an information platform and includes a database, 
accessible on the IPEX website (www.ipex.eu). 
5.1.1 Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
This conference was established by a decision of EU Speakers’ Conference in April 2012 in 
Warsaw ‘in the context of interparliamentary cooperation, as per Protocol (1) on the Role of 
National Parliaments in the EU.’232 The aim of this conference is to exchange information 
and best practices between national parliaments and the EP in the area of CFSP and CSDP 
(Article 1) and adopt by consensus non-binding conclusions on these aspects (Article 7). 
Each parliament sends six representatives (seats to be divided in case of bicameral 
parliaments), whereas the EP can delegate 16 MEPs (Article 2). In addition, the EU candidate 
Member States and the Member States of NATO can send four representatives each. The 
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the Common Security and Defence Policy, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/Meetings/IPC%20CFSP%20CSDP/FINA
L%20-%20RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE%20-%20EN.pdf. 
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Conference should also invite the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy to its meetings, which take place twice a year within the parliamentary dimension of 
the Presidency of the Council (Article 3). So far, the topics discussed concerned the ‘Arab 
Spring’,233 conflicts in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa,234 the EU’s energy policy and 
conflict in Syria,235 as well as in the Ukraine.236 Because of the constraints that national 
parliaments face in controlling of the CFSP and CSDP, inter-parliamentary cooperation 
offers, even for the parliaments perceived as strong scrutinisers, ‘the only viable way’ to 
organize the scrutiny in this field.237 
5.1.2 IPEX 
IPEX was created on the basis of recommendations and agreements concluded by the 
Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments in Rome (2000)238 and the Hague (2004).239 The 
IPEX website was launched in 2006, and subsequently amended in 2011.240 The added value 
was the distribution of legislative acts from the Commission to the IPEX database,241 which, 
until the Lisbon Treaty were formally available to national parliaments only via their 
governments, and allowing for exchange information about inter-parliamentary meetings and 
related news.  
IPEX allows for the exchange of information between the national parliaments and the 
European Parliament concerning different issues related to the EU, especially giving an 
overview of the reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments and other aspects of the 
subsidiarity review procedure. IPEX hosts all the conferences of national parliaments: the 
                                                 
233 See Conclusions of the Cyprus Conference in 2012 available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5420d8f4801424cfed945492c 
234 See Conclusions of the Irish Conference in 2013 available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5420d8f48014247d6b6bb424f. 
235 See Conclusions of the Lithuanian Conference in 2013 available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5420d8f480142511f23ac4e55 
236 See Conclusions of the Greek Conference in 2014 available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5429d1eda0142d7aba23941d9. 
237Ariella Huff, ‘Problems and Patterns in Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP’ OPAL Online Paper 
Series <http://www.opal-europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108> at 19. 
238 See the Presidency Conclusions available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5319ee5f60131ae42612204a0. 
239 See the Presidency Conclusions and Guidelines available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5319ee5f60131ae26c80b043c. 
240 Viera Knutelská, ‘Cooperation among national parliaments: an effective contribution to EU legitimation?’ in 
Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum (eds), Practices of interparliamentary coordination in international politics 
(ECPR 2013) at 41. 
241 The Commission obliged itself to ‘transmit directly all new proposals and consultation papers’ at the launch 
of the ‘Barroso initiative’ in 2006. See COM(2006) 211, p. 9. 
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Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments, the CFSP/CSDP Conference and the ‘Article 13’ 
conference.  
IPEX has a Board, which consists of the members representing national parliaments that have 
recently hosted, host or will host as next the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments. 
Other representatives of parliaments that intend to contribute to the conference and the 
representatives of the EP are also included on the Board. Each national chamber may 
nominate up to two national IPEX correspondents, who fulfil such tasks as arranging the 
information concerning their parliaments on the website, keeping the materials on the 
scrutiny procedures up to date, and translating the key issues to English or French.  
Whereas some parliaments see IPEX as ‘an excellent source of information about others’ 
opinions,’ the functioning of IPEX is problematic.242 The House of Lords has highlighted 
problems with translations of the documents uploaded by national parliaments, and advised 
that the IPEX Board could introduce some technological solution, for example ‘automated 
translations.’243 Some delay between the proceedings in national parliaments and the 
information on the website is visible.244 
Improving IPEX could be achieved via the timely electronic publication of reasoned 
opinions, including English translations, and introducing certain ‘warnings’ (e.g. e-mail) in 
cases where a significant number of opinions have been issued. Some parliaments already 
provide ‘courtesy translations’ of their reasoned opinions.245 The conclusions of the EU 
Speakers’ Conference have pointed out that the IPEX guidelines will be amended in order to 
meet the needs of national parliaments.246 
                                                 
242 Mr Edmund Wittbrodt, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, Senat, Poland—Written evidence, at 
313, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-
select/Role%20of%20national%20parliaments/national-parliaments-evidence.pdf. 
243 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, The Role of National 
Parliaments in the European Union, point 141. On this issue see also I. Cooper’s evidence attached to the House 
of Lords report, p. 58. 
244 Knutelská at 42. 
245 Ibid at 43. 
246 See Conclusions on IPEX of the meeting of Secretaries General, 26-27 January 2014, available at 
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do. 
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5.2 COSAC  
The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC) was established in 
1989 on the initiative of the president of the French Assemblée Nationale.247 The idea was to 
provide a palliative to the perceived disconnection of national parliaments from EU affairs 
after the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979.248 As mentioned above, COSAC 
was first acknowledged in the Treaties via the Amsterdam Protocol. Currently, the task of 
COSAC, enshrined in Protocol No. 1, is to ‘promote the exchange of information and best 
practice between national Parliaments and European Parliament.’ COSAC meets twice a 
year, during each Council Presidency.249 Each parliament can decide on its delegation, which 
may include up to six members, both from national parliaments and the EP.250 As stated in 
the Lisbon Treaty, and repeated by the Rules of Procedure, COSAC contributions are not 
binding for national parliaments.251 They should be adopted by consensus and if this is not 
possible, by 3/4 qualified majority, where each delegation has two votes.252 COSAC can also 
adopt conclusions.253  
From the EWS perspective, COSAC played an important role as an institution coordinating 
the first subsidiarity tests, prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.254 This gave 
national parliaments the possibility to exchange information and cooperate on actual 
Commission proposals. The first of these tests took place in 2005.255 Moreover, since 2004, 
the COSAC Secretariat produces bi-annual reports on ‘Developments in European Union. 
Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny.’256 Both the tests and reports 
play an important role from the perspective of the EWS. The tests allowed for an assessment 
of the EWS before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.257 They are in fact positively 
                                                 
247 Preamble to Rules of Procedure of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of 
Parliaments of the European Union, OJ 2011 229/1, 4.8.2011. 
248 History of Cosac at http://www.cosac.eu/documents/ 
249 COSAC Rules of Procedure, Section 2.1. 
250 COSAC Rules of Procedure, Section 3.1. 
251 COSAC Rules of Procedure, Section 1.3. 
252 COSAC Rules of Procedure, Section 7.5. 
253 COSAC Rules of Procedure, Section 10. 
254 For an overview of these tests, see Davor Jančić, ‘Representative democracy across levels? National 
Parliaments and EU Constitutionalism ’ (2012) 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 227, 246 and 
Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical reality at 
76-91 who based his findings on these tests. 
255 See history of COSAC, p. 24, available at http://www.cosac.eu/documents/. 
256 Available at: http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/ 
257 See the assessment of these tests in Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: 
Constitutional theory and empirical reality at 91-101 and Cygan, ‘Regional governance, subsidiarity and 
accountability within the EU’s multi-level polity’, 175 
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assessed by national parliaments as a ‘useful tool in exchanging best practices amongst 
Parliaments/Chambers.’258 The reports also dealt with and gave an overview of the 
adjustments introduced by Member States in this regard and the first evaluations of the 
functioning of the subsidiarity mechanism.259 
The future role of COSAC is currently under discussion.260 It is argued that 
‘interparliamentary communication and co-ordination through COSAC at the centre will only 
be for the benefit of improving subsidiarity monitoring.’261 COSAC, in comparison to other 
bodies of interparliamentary cooperation, is perceived as producing ‘knowledge’ in its reports 
and conclusions.262 Because the aim of COSAC is also to exchange best practices, it seems 
that COSAC is a useful tool in this respect. To this end, the speakers of the workshop on the 
role of COSAC furnished some examples.263 First, the Dutch parliament used one of the 
COSAC reports on the information supply to the national parliaments (2009), which showed 
that some parliaments have better access to the database of the Council. This argument was 
used successfully in the negotiations with the government. Second, the Cypriot parliament 
used the 11th bi-annual COSAC report on the permanent representatives in the Brussels 
parliament to justify establishing its permanent representative.  
Some ideas on improving COSAC were also discussed. It was argued, for example, that 
allowing COSAC to conduct a small number of examinations of Commission proposals every 
six months when the presidency meeting takes place could be beneficial, and should not be 
considered as a risk for the European legislative process. One of the reforms of COSAC 
could be include a more targeted focus in its agenda, as well as a possibility for each of the 
parliaments to signal its own priorities before the COSAC meeting. In addition, it was posited 
that the topics of the questionnaire should be reflected on the COSAC’s agenda.  
                                                 
258 See COSAC 21st Bi-annual Report on EU Practices and Procedures (June 2014) at 11. 
259 See COSAC, 13th Bi-annual Report on EU Practices and Procedures (May 2010); 18th Bi-annual Report on 
EU Practices and Procedures (September 2012); 19th Bi-annual Report on EU Practices and Procedures (May 
2013) and 20th Bi-annual Report on EU Practices and Procedures (October 2013). 
260 See especially COSAC 21st Bi-annual report. See also the points regarding COSAC in the EP Constitutional 
Affairs Committee discussion of on the EP report on the relations between European Parliament and national 
parliaments (A7-0255/2014) on 17.03.2014. 
261 Cygan, ‘Regional governance, subsidiarity and accountability within the EU’s multi-level polity’, 174. 
262 Opinion expressed at the workshop on the occasion of the COSAC Chaipersons meeting at the Italian Senate 
on ‘The role of COSAC in the Europeanisation of national parliaments and in the evolutiion of inter-
parliamentary cooperation,’ at LUISS Guido Carli, 18.07.2014. 
263 Workshop on the occasion of the COSAC Chaipersons meeting at the Italian Senate on ‘The role of COSAC 
in the Europeanisation of national parliaments and in the evolution of inter-parliamentary cooperation,’ at 
LUISS Guido Carli, 18.07.2014. Speakers included: D.A.Capuano (Italian Senate), B. Dias Pinheiro 
(Portuguese Parliament), A. Esposito (Italian Chamber of Deputies), C. Fryda (Permanent Membe of the 
COSAC Secretariat), F. Gomez Martos (EP) and M. Van Keulen (Dutch House of Representatives). 
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5.3 National Parliaments’ Representatives in Brussels 
National parliaments have established their permanent representatives in Brussels to 
represent them at EU level. They are often described as ‘key players’ for the inter-
parliamentary coordination and exchange with EU institutions.264  
National Parliamentary Representatives were already present in Brussels before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. In 1991, the Danish Folketing was the first parliament to establish 
its representative in Brussels.265 Currently all national parliaments, except for the Slovak and 
Bulgarian assemblies, sent representatives. National parliaments with two chambers usually 
send one (for example Poland or the UK) or two representatives (Italian Camera dei 
Deputati) per chamber, similar to unicameral parliaments, which delegate either one (for 
example Slovenia, Austria) or two representatives (Greece).266 The titles of the national 
representatives vary: most of them are ‘the (Permanent) Representatives/Officers to the 
European Union,’ whereas others are styled as ‘(Permanent) Representatives to the European 
Parliament’ or ‘to the EU institutions.’267  
Whereas it can be said that NPRs ‘mostly facilitate informal, day-to-day cooperation,’268 
Högenauer and Neuhold distinguish between the following functions of the NPRs.269 First, 
their role is to provide a link between the EU and national level and thus inform national 
members of the parliament on EU issues. The national representatives may report on EU 
developments and political issues on a regular weekly basis or ad hoc on urgent matters or 
such matters that are interesting only for a limited number of MPs.270 Second, as indicated by 
Högenauer and Neuhold, national representatives play a representational function, by 
building relationships between members of parliaments and EU institutions. These may for 
example include organizing visits of national MPs to the EP, liaising with the national MEPs 
or participating in inter-parliamentary conferences.271 Third, national representatives create 
links between national parliaments by updating each other on the national positions. This last 
function of the national representatives played a role in the triggering of the first ‘yellow 
                                                 
264 Anna-Lena Högenauer and Christine Neuhold, ‘National Parliaments after Lisbon: Administrations on the 
Rise’ OPAL Online Paper Series <http://www.opal-
europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108> at 15. 
265 COSAC 11 th Bi-annual report at 23. 
266 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/18/cache/offonce. 
267 COSAC 11th Bi-annual report at 25. 
268 Knutelská at 38. 
269 Högenauer and Neuhold at 26-27. 
270 COSAC 11th Bi-annual Report at 28. 
271 Ibid at 26-27. 
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card,’ as they kept national parliaments constantly updated about the state of play.272 The 
NPRs meet during the so-called ‘Monday morning meetings’, which were established in 
practice and are not formally regulated. Attendance is not obligatory, unless requested by 
their Member States. In addition, invited representatives of the EP, Commission or Council, 
who usually leave the meeting after the issue at stake is discussed, can attend the meetings. 
5.4 Best practices of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EWS 
The COSAC reports, which are based on questionnaires completed by national parliaments, 
highlight the best practices in inter-parliamentary cooperation, which is helpful from the 
EWS perspective. Looking at inter-parliamentary cooperation from the perspective of 
reaching ‘yellow’ and ‘orange card’ thresholds, the most used tool is a simple email exchange 
between parliaments, with an early notice of adopted reasoned opinions, followed by the use 
of the IPEX platform and the receiving and forwarding of information to national 
parliamentary representatives in Brussels.273 In these cases, usually around half of the 
chambers responding to COSAC’s questionnaire replied that the information was helpful in 
drafting their own reasoned opinions. Other mechanisms of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
included passing or receiving information from the governmental representative, letters from 
chairmen of committees or their members in other parliaments, discussions on the margin of 
COSAC meetings, at EP inter-parliamentary meetings or within the debates between 
parliamentary committees.274 
Specifically with regard to the first ‘yellow card’ reached by national parliaments, the 
COSAC report clearly indicates a ‘complex and intensive’ exchange preceding the deadline 
for issuing reasoned opinions.275 Out of 37 responding parliamentary chambers, 28 admitted 
to exchanging information with the national parliamentary representatives in Brussels, and 25 
chambers used the IPEX database to exchange information on the status of the Commission 
proposal with their counterparts EU-wide, whereas 22 exchanged information with their 
respective national governments.276 Other sources of information included, inter alia, 
                                                 
272 Ian Cooper, A Yellow Card for the Striker: How National Parliaments Defeated EU Strikes Regulation 
(2013), 20. 
273 COSAC 19th Bi-annual report at 28-29. 
274 Ibid at 29. 
275 Ibid at 31. 
276 The bicameral parliaments of Austria, Ireland and Spain submitted one set of replies for both chambers, 
hence the total number of respondents per question was 38, yet 37 responses to the COSAC questionnaire were 
submitted. See COSAC 19th Bi-annual report, at IV. For comparison see also COSAC 17th Bi-annual Report on 
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exchanges between administrative bodies; exchanges with the national government; and 
further exchanges through the COSAC meeting or between parliamentary committees.  
The COSAC report also points out that 60% of responding parliaments would like to improve 
the subsidiarity principle checks in the framework of COSAC by pre-selecting specific 
proposals from the Commission Work Programme to be discussed in COSAC meetings; 63% 
would like to discuss in COSAC meetings the proposals that triggered a ‘yellow card’; and 
90% would like to discuss the Commission’s replies to a ‘yellow card’.277 Some parliaments, 
however, expressly rejected the coordination of subsidiarity checks by COSAC as ‘in 
contradiction to the conferral of relevant responsibilities to individual parliaments, which are 
exercised in accordance with Parliaments’ own procedures and powers.’278 
The success of inter-parliamentary cooperation is rather negatively assessed by the EP, which 
claims that ‘despite efforts (…) national parliaments have not yet managed to establish 
effective forms of cooperation on Protocol No. 2 among themselves.’279 When it comes to the 
specific influence of inter-parliamentary cooperation on the awareness of MEPs of the 
national parliaments’ reasoned opinions or contributions, this is not easy to measure. Beyond 
the conferences, the Joint Parliamentary Meetings, which aim at ‘improving parliamentary 
awareness of the need for oversight and control over decisions taken at EU level’ and the 
Joint Committee Meetings in which corresponding committees discuss matters of shared 
concern, bring together MPs and MEPs.280 Some national parliaments see it as a possibility to 
debate potential subsidiarity concerns with regard to new proposals with other 
parliamentarians.281 The House of Lords, in its recent report, has also recommended that 
national parliaments’ committees contact relevant EP rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs 
with regard to legislative acts which are of interest to them.282 
6 The role of national parliaments in the Eurozone crisis 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
EU Practices and Procedures (April 2012) at 12, which also indicates NPRs as the most used source of 
information on other parliaments. 
277 COSAC 21st Bi-annual report at 18. 
278 Ibid at 21. 
279 European Parliament, Report on ‘Interparliamentary relations between the European Parliament and national 
Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon 2009-2014’, Annual Report 2013/2014 at 18, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/1829. 
280 More on these meetings see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/10. 
281 COSAC 21st Bi-annual report at 24. 
282 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, point 109. 
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The last section of this chapter deals with the new challenges for national parliaments posted 
by the Eurozone crisis from two points of view: the approval of the new legal measures and 
the functions that the new legal measures grant to national parliaments. In addition, this 
section shows that, due to the impact of the new, mostly intergovernmental, measures on the 
competences of national parliaments, safeguarding their role can be accomplished at the 
national level, as in Germany. 
Responses to the Euro crisis had mostly an intergovernmental character, which in turn had 
important consequences for national parliaments.283 Legal acts adopted in this regard only 
partially took the form of EU legislative proposals suitable for review through the EWS. 
These included in particular the so-called Six Pack and Two Pack. Although appropriate for 
the subsidiarity review, these measures did not gain many opinions from national 
parliaments. Indeed, only one of the Two-Pack regulations, on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive 
deficit of the Member States in the euro area284 received a reasoned opinion from the Swedish 
parliament and the French Senate. The French parliament highlighted that the proposal is not 
explicitly motivated with regard to its compliance with the subsidiarity principle.285 The 
subsidiarity principle was also violated, as the composition and functioning of the 
‘independent bodies’ dealing with fiscal rules at the national level should leave a large 
margin of appreciation to the Member States. The parliament also highlighted that granting 
the principle of structural balance a fully binding force in the national budgetary process 
would demand a constitutional amendment. The Swedish parliament, in its reasoned opinion, 
argued that the proposal ‘does not contain sufficient guarantees to safeguard national 
competence as regards fiscal policy.’286 The other Two-Pack Regulation and the Six-Pack 
proposals received a limited number of opinions within the political dialogue.287 
                                                 
283 Arthur Benz, ‘An asymetric two-level game: parliaments in the Euro crisis ’ in Ben Crum and John Erik 
Fossum (eds), Practices of interparliamentary coordination in international politics (ECPR 2013) at 134. 
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285 French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 24.01.2012 on COM(2011) 821. 
286 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 25.01.2012 on COM(2011) 821. 
287 Belgian Chamber of representatives, opinion of 14.02.2012 on COM(2011) 819; Portuguese Portuguese 
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However, beyond the EWS, national parliaments participated in the approval of the Article 
136 amendment, the ESM Treaty and the TSCG at the national level.288 In this respect, some 
parliaments lodged cases at their respective constitutional courts, checking the validity of the 
treaties in question, as was the case for example in Poland and in Germany. 
Out of these measures, the Two-Pack, the TSCG and the ESM involve some functions for 
national parliaments.289 The Two-Pack regulation on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area,290 highlights that the ‘reinforced coordination and 
surveillance should be accompanied by commensurate involvement of the European 
Parliament and of national parliaments as appropriate.’291 However, this involvement is 
limited to a possibility for national parliaments to request that the Commission present its 
opinion on the draft budgetary plan to the parliament in question.292 The Commission’s 
opinion shall be made public and shall be presented to the Eurogroup. Thereafter, at the 
behest of the parliament of the Member State concerned or of the European Parliament, the 
Commission presents its opinion to the parliament making the request. According to the other 
Two–Pack regulation293 national parliaments may invite the representatives of the 
Commission to participate in an ‘exchange of views,’ in cases where a recommendation to 
adopt precautionary corrective measures or to prepare a draft macroeconomic adjustment 
programme has been issued by the Commission with regard to a Member State subject to 
                                                                                                                                                       
opinions sent on the Six-Pack concerned usually the whole package of acts. Cf. Report from the House of Lords, 
The future of Economic Governance in the EU, 12th Report of Session 2010-11; Italian Chamber of Deputies, 
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the Member States in the euro area OJ L 140, 27/05/2013, p. 11–23. 
291 Recital 6 Regulation EU No 473/2013. On the Two Pack and role of national parliaments see also European 
Commission, The Two-Pack on economic governance: Establishing an EU framework for dealing with threats 
to financial stability in euro area member states (2013) at 17.  
292 Art 7(3) EU Regulation No 473/2013. 
293 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability OJ L 140, 27/05/2013, p.1–10.  
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enhanced surveillance, after conducting a regular review mission in that country.294 This 
possibility is also available to national parliaments when the recommendation has been made 
public.295 In addition, national parliaments may invite representatives of the Commission for 
an ‘exchange of views’ on the progress made in the implementation of its macroeconomic 
adjustment programme in the Member State concerned.296 In the same vein, the ESM Treaty 
provides only a very limited role for national parliaments: the Board of Governors should 
allow access for national parliaments to an annual report prepared by the Board of 
Auditors.297 All the competences assigned to national parliaments thus possess an ex-post 
character; they are also ‘soft’ in nature as they are limited to exchanges of views without the 
possibility of a real impact on the act in question. It remains to be researched how these 
mechanisms function in practice and if they will play any role. 
The TSCG seems to be of greater importance for national parliaments. The TSCG refers to 
national parliaments in two aspects. First, the automatic correction mechanism to be triggered 
in cases of observed deviations from the MTO, which should be implemented at national 
level by the Member States ‘shall fully respect the prerogatives of national parliaments.’298 
Second, Article 13 TSCG provides national parliaments with a forum to discuss budgetary 
policies. Article 13 TSCG, relying on the inter-parliamentary cooperation enshrined in 
Protocol No. 1 established that the EP and national parliaments of the contracting parties to 
the TSCG will launch a conference of the relevant committees to discuss budgetary policies 
and other issues covered by the TSCG.299 
The Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliaments held in Nicosia in April 
2013 took the decision to establish the new conference, which was first held in October of the 
same year in Vilnius.300 The Draft Rules of Procedure tabled in Vilnius in October 2013 
foresee that the conference replaces the meetings of the chairpersons of relevant committees 
(economic affairs committees) organised within the Council Presidency, as well as the 
European Parliamentary Week of the European Semester organized by the EP in the first 
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300 See ‘IC Article 12 Speaker’s invitation’ available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
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semester of each year (Section 1.2.).301 The conference is composed of delegations from 
relevant committees of EU national parliaments and of the EP, the number of which is to be 
determined by each parliament (Section 4.1.). The issues to be discussed by the conference 
concern matters relating to EU economic and financial governance, particularly to matters 
covered by the TSCG (Section 5.2). The conclusions should be adopted by consensus, and 
where this is not possible, by qualified majority of ¾ votes cast (Section 3.7). These Rules of 
Procedure are still under discussion, as the disputed elements include issues such as the 
voting mechanisms 302 or the number of MPs in delegations.303  
Crum has expressed the idea that the conference should be ‘more than a mere platform for the 
exchange of opinions’; it should allow for the review of the conditions that are attached to 
financial aid: parliaments could reflect on their ‘reconcilability with the right to democratic 
self government of the state involved.’304 This function seemed for Crum to be a ‘fitting 
extension of the role of subsidiarity guardians that the Treaty of Lisbon has already bestowed 
upon the national parliaments.’305 However, the lack of a decision on the structure of the 
conference, as well as the absence of decision-making powers for the conference, provide a 
rather pessimistic impression of its future. Providing a forum for debate with non-binding 
conclusions presents a ‘serious threat’ to the work of the conference.306 
What appears to be a clear consequence of the Eurozone crisis for national parliaments is 
that, with regard to budgetary competence some parliaments are ‘mere bystanders’, while 
others can ‘actively influence executive policy-making.’307 The German Bundestag belongs 
                                                 
301 See Draft Rules of Procedure proposed by the Lithuanian presidency (2013) and amended by the Hellenic 
presidency (2014) available at: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5428b1a43014298b2999d0f06. 
302 See UK proposals to the Draft Rules of procedure, supported also by the Greek presidency, proposing that 
the conclusions can be adopted only by consensus and the diagreement with the UK and Hellenic changes by the 
French Assemble Nationale and Senat (urging to keep the ¾ majority possibility if the consesuns is not reach) 
available at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5420d8f480142511007da4e18. 
303 See reply from the German Bundesrat and the Irish parliament to Art 13 RoP-debate, criticising the proposals 
put forward by the presiding Hellenic Parliament limiting  the number of MPs to 4 or 6 and a possibility to limit 
this number by the hosting presidency available at: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc5420d8f480142511007da4e18. 
304 Ben Crum, ‘Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 614, 
627. 
305 Ibid at 627. 
306 Kreilinger at 18. 
307 Oliver Höing, ‘Differentiation of Parliamentary Powers. The German Constitutional Court and the German 
Bundestag within the Financial Crisis’ in M. Cartabia, N. Lupo and A. Simoncini (eds), Democracy and 
subsidiarity in the EU (Il Mulino 2013), at 281. Höing shows also a comparison of national parliaments powers 
with regard to decisions on aid packages and tranches within the EFSF. 
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to the latter types of parliaments. This is due to the ‘external’ protection of the German 
Bundestag by the Federal Constitutional Court. 308 Indeed, the position of the Bundestag has 
been strengthened with regard to three aspects of its competence: the approval of financial 
aid, 309  the participation of the MPs in decisions concerning budgetary responsibility310  and 
the stretching of information rights of the Bundestag on intergovernmental measures. 311 It is 
also expected that the Court will protect the Bundestag’s budgetary sovereignty again in the 
OMT case, with the first preliminary question pending before the ECJ.312  
Yet, according to Franz Mayer, the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court on the 
strengthening of the control rights of the Bundestag as a mean of safeguarding the democracy 
principle highlights three major problems.313 First, the Court disregards the role of the EP as a 
provider of democracy at the EU level.314 Second, according to Mayer, the Court’s 
‘patronizing’ perception of what the Bundestag’s role in EU matters should be is overly 
                                                 
308 Cristina Fasone, ‘National Parliaments in the Eurozone Crisis. Challenges and Transformations’ (IX World 
Congress of Constitutional Law) at 7. See also an overview of the German decisions there. 
309 BVergG, 2BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10, judgment of 7 september 2011. The Court ruled that 
federal government is obliged to always obtain prior approval of the Bundestag’s Budget Committee before a 
guarantee will be granted according to the Euro Stabilisation Mechanism Act (Euro 
Stabilisierungsmechanismus-Gesetz). See on this decision Christian Calliess, ‘The Future of the Eurozone and 
the Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 402, 407. 
310 BVerfG, 2BvE 8/11, judgment of 28 February 2012, para 124-125. The Court invalidated national law that 
allowed in cases of particular urgency and confidentiality the consent of the Bundestag to the decisions of the 
German representative to the EFSF to be taken by a decision of committee consisting of a several members of 
the budget committee chosen by the German Bundestag (Sondergremium). In the view of the Court, ‘the 
German Bundestag exercises its function as a body of representation in its entirety and through the participation 
of all of its members, not through individual members, a group of members of the parliamentary majority.’ To 
this end, first, the principle of the mirror image (Spiegelbildlichkeit - the sub-units of the German Bundestag 
must constitute a microcosm of the plenary session) must be respected. See also BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 
BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2BvE 6/12, judgment of 18 March 2014 
(compatibility with the constitution of a number of legal acts including the approval of the Article 136 TFEU 
amendment, the ESM Treaty and the TSCG). 
311BVerfG, judgment of 19 June 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, Leitsatz 2-4. The decision concerned the ESM and the 
agreement on the Euro Plus Pact. The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the Bundestag has to be 
comprehensively informed ‘at the earliest possible time’ so that it can exercise its participation rights.’ The only 
limit to the information rights is the principle of separation of powers: ‘as long as the opinion-forming by the 
federal government did not come to an end, parliament has no right to be informed’. See also BVerfG, 2 BvR 
1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2BvE 6/12, judgment of 12 
September 2012 (temporary injunction with regard to the ESM Treaty) 
312 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, order of 14 January 2014. The Court is expected to ensure that the ECB cannot 
purchase the government bonds as long as the parliament does not approve the OMT programme burdening the 
federal budget. Cf. Dietrich Murswiek, ‘ECB, ECJ, Democracy, and the Federal Constitutional Court: Notes on 
the Federal Constitutional Court's Referral Order from 14 January 2014’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 147, 
163 &165. 
313 See Franz C Mayer, ‘Rebels without a Cause: A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court's OMT 
Reference’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 111, 139-141.  
314 Yet, it has to be observed that the EP plays a rather limited role in the EU economic governance, even though 
strengthened in comparison to its role before the crisis. See C. Cristina Fasone, ‘European Economic 
Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament?’ (2014) 20 European 
Law Journal 164. 
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idealistic and comes from an institution that itself is not directly elected or democratically 
accountable.315 Third, in some cases, executive power is better at safeguarding that urgent 
decisions are promptly taken, or, as in the case of the ECB – its independence excludes 
parliamentary oversight. Other critical points, in addition to those of Mayer, highlight that 
through the protection of the Bundestag’s budgetary rights, the Court also pursues a vision of 
how these rights should be exercised – maintaining a restrictive budgetary policy and 
austerity, although no direct indications are given.316 In addition, the Court’s ‘one-sided’ 
decisions ignore the impact of its decisions on parliaments in the Member States receiving 
the financial assistance.317 
Whereas some scholars do not connect the loss of powers of national parliaments with the 
Eurozone crisis,318 national parliaments themselves express their concern that there is too 
little emphasis on their role, in proposals such as ‘Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union.’319 However, as it is also pointed out, some improvements, the roots of which could 
be traced to the German jurisprudence are visible in the right to information enhancement in a 
number of Member States.320 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide the background for the specific aspects of the EWS 
that will be the subject of the main part of this thesis. Hence, mostly in descriptive terms, it 
traced both the evolution of the role of national parliaments, as well as of the subsidiarity 
principle in the EU. National parliaments were steadily awarded more and more powers, and 
the climax was reached with the introduction of the EWS in the Lisbon Treaty. Specifically, 
Protocol No. 2 allows national parliaments to pursue a new function, namely controlling EU 
legislation against possible violations of the subsidiarity principle. The principle itself, 
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, was explicated by the Edinburgh Declaration and the 
                                                 
315 Mayer, 140. 
316 Henning Deters, ‘National Constitutional Jurisprudence in a Post‐ National Europe: The ESM Ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court and the Disavowal of Conflict’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 204, 214. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Benz at 140. Benz indicated that ‘national parliaments in general have not lost out as a result of the crisis. 
Rather, it is the asymmetry of the parliamentary involvement in the Member States and the degradation of 
multilateral relations among parliaments that has caused a new democratic deficit.’ 
319 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, The Role of National 
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Amsterdam Protocol. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the subsidiarity principle has been enshrined 
in Article 5(3) TEU.  
This chapter has focused on the design of the EWS, its construction, frames and application. 
In this respect, the participation of other EU bodies – the EP, the Council and the Committee 
of the Regions – was also studied. Thereafter, this chapter investigated the other mechanism 
of political participation for national parliaments: the ‘Barroso initiative.’ Its main features 
and the differences between this system and the EWS were indicated. Moreover, it was 
highlighted that this system is much more commonly used than the EWS. In addition, the 
chapter discussed the available mechanisms of inter-parliamentary cooperation in general, as 
well as pointing out those that are specifically useful within the EWS: COSAC and its tool 
IPEX as well as the position of the national parliaments’ representatives in Brussels. Finally, 
the chapter discussed the challenges posed by the Eurozone crisis on the role of the national 
parliaments. 
The following chapter, taking stock of this background knowledge, will explore the details 
and nuances of the EWS. 
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Chapter 2: The Scope of the EWS1 
Introduction 
Paul Craig aptly voiced the main concerns which the freshly initiated EWS procedure 
presented: it was unknown ‘how far the new provisions in the Protocol according greater 
power to national parliaments [will] affect the incidence and nature of EU legislation.’2 In his 
view, its success depended upon the ‘willingness of national Parliaments to devote the 
requisite time and energy to the matter.’ Moreover, Craig argued that to focus reasoned 
opinions on subsidiarity may not constitute an easy exercise for national parliaments. It might 
be even harder for national parliaments to collect the necessary number of reasoned opinions 
for the same draft legislative act in order to require the Commission to review the proposal. 
Four years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we can assess whether the concerns 
expressed by Craig were confirmed in practice. As was shown in the previous chapter, 
national parliaments are actively participating in the subsidiarity review, and two ‘yellow 
cards’ have been triggered thus far. The second aspect mentioned by Craig – the content of 
the reasoned opinions – is more problematic. This chapter will thus focus on the question 
‘what is the scope of the subsidiarity review?’ In this respect, the relationship between the 
Article 5 TEU principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality will be discussed. 
Next, this chapter will put forward the core textual, structural and functional arguments for a 
narrowly tailored subsidiarity scrutiny. The following sections look at the tests involved in 
subsidiarity scrutiny: the national insufficiency test and the EU comparative efficiency test. 
Within the national insufficiency test, it is also pondered upon how many ‘insufficient’ 
Member States are needed for the EU proposal to pass the test. In addition, the supplementary 
tests, such as the cross-border activity and ‘special interest’ tests will be elaborated upon. 
Finally, this chapter also explores the procedural aspect of the subsidiarity principle 
connected to the proof supporting the contention that the two subsidiarity tests are fulfilled. 
The case study of the EPPO proposal aims to examine how the theoretical assumptions about 
subsidiarity apply in practice. By comparing the EPPO proposal to the earlier ‘yellow card’ 
concerning the Monti II directive, it is possible to ponder the prospective future of this 
mechanism. 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter draw upon Federico Fabbrini and Katarzyna Granat, ‘Yellow card, but no foul: The role of 
the national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on 
the right to strike’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 115. 
2 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and treaty reform at 49. 
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1 Scope of the EWS 
The essential question of the EWS concerns the scope of the review that should be exercised 
by national parliaments under Protocol No. 2. In other words, what elements should national 
parliaments assess in their subsidiarity review? Is the EWS only about the strict question as to 
whether a legislative act should be adopted at the EU or national level? Or rather, should 
national parliaments also consider the appropriateness of the legal basis of EU draft 
legislative acts, their proportionality or necessity, and their substance, for example in relation 
to delegations to adopt delegated and implementing acts or fundamental rights standards? As 
Gareth Davies hypothesised in 2003, long before the EWS began to function: ‘would national 
parliaments stick to their narrow brief to make a subsidiarity assessment, or would they ask 
themselves the simpler and more political question, “do we want this law or not?”’, 
predicting that ‘subsidiarity may often be no more than a mask.’3 The Commission’s rebuttal 
of non-subsidiarity arguments may in consequence ‘generate frustration at national level, and 
turn parliaments into adversarial participants in a system premised on a shared willingness to 
compromise.’4  
It can be argued that the distinction between parliaments being able to comment on the 
content of the proposal and on whether it observes the subsidiarity principle is ‘artificial and 
limits parliamentary voice.’5 As Bast and von Bogdandy argue ‘institutional isolation of 
subsidiarity outside the political institutions is unconvincing; the questions whether the 
national level is ‘insufficient’ and whether European level might ‘better’ handle the problem 
are not meaningfully separable from the political questions arising from the issue. The 
evaluation of subsidiarity is, to a large degree, a matter of political discretion, for which the 
political institutions of the EU must be accountable to the EU.’6 Hence, in fact, the EWS 
‘invites national parliaments to dress up any political concern in the guise of a subsidiarity 
claim.’7 
Similarly, Weatherill pondered the question of ‘[h]ow really to decide where subsidiarity – 
and therefore the reasoned opinion – ends?’ and argued that ‘[p]ractice may escape these 
                                                 
3 Davies at 695-696. 
4 Ibid at 696-698. 
5 Damian Chalmers, ‘Democratic Self-Government in Europe: Domestic Solutions to the EU Legitimacy Crisis’ 
Policy Network Paper <http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4399/democratic-self-government-in-
europe> . 
6 Armin  von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in Armin von Bogdandy and 
Jürgen Bast (ed), Principles of European Constitutional Law’ (Hart 2010) at 303. 
7 Ibid at 304. 
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formal bounds. But they need not have been drawn so unnecessarily tightly in the first 
place.’8 
Different understandings of the subsidiarity principle generally perceived as a concept of 
‘high degree of fluidity and vagueness’9 have been put forward by parliamentary committees 
and scholars alike. Parliamentary committees have advanced different answers concerning 
what a subsidiarity test encompasses, ranging from a strict test of subsidiarity violations to a 
broader check of Article 5 TEU.10 The EU legal doctrine dealt especially with the 
understanding of the relationship with other principles of Article 5 TEU (conferral and 
proportionality), which has an impact on the issues that should be tested under Protocol No. 
2, including a three-tier test of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality priniciples 
underlining the integrity of Article 5 TEU.11 The following section will deal with these 
issues. 
1.1 The relationship between the principles of Article 5 TEU 
1.1.1 The principles of conferral and subsidiarity 
The relationship between the principles of conferral and subsidiarity has been elaborated on 
by a number of authors. Calliess justifies the inclusion of the conferral principle in the 
subsidiarity test as ‘pre-question’ demanded by a systematic interpretation of Article 5 TEU; 
competence and subsidiarity cannot be separated.12 Drawing boundaries between these two 
principles is not easy, because subsidiarity ‘as a rule for the exercise of competences […] is 
based on an already existing Union competence.’13 Hence the conferral principle might be 
                                                 
8 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Better competence monitoring’ (2005) 30 European law review 23, 39. 
9 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ at 8. 
10 See e.g. for the German Bundestag 8. Sitzung des Unterausschusses Europarecht, Öffentliches 
Expertengespräch Prüfung des unionsrechtlichen Subsidiaritätsprinzips im Unterausschuss Europarecht des 
Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages am 16. Juni 2010. Compare here opinions of C. Calliess -
favouring of a broad review of Art 5 TEU- and F. Mayer -favouring a narrower review. See also the House of 
Commons discussion on the principle of subsidiarity, House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 
Subsidiarity, National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty, Thirty-third Report of Session 2007-08, published on 
21 October 2008, Oral Evidence taken before the European Scrutiny Committee. (See witness evidence by A. 
Dashwood and S. Hix). 
11 See Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical 
reality at 98-100; Christoph Ritzer, Marc Ruttloff and Karin Linhart, ‘How to Sharpen a Dull Sword-The 
Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 733, 737. 
12 Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union at 64. 
13 von Bogdandy and Bast at 287. 
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labelled as the ‘responsibility criterion,’ in other words, a check on the existence of an EU 
competence to legislate.14 
On the contrary, the ECJ Judge Thomas von Danwitz posits that the Amsterdam Protocol 
provided for ‘tangible contours’ to the concept of subsidiarity, allowing for its legal 
application as ‘a benchmark for the exercise of nonexclusive Community competences in 
specific cases’, in addition to the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘emphasis on the task of separation of 
competences.’15 Von Danwitz concludes from this that subsidiarity cannot settle the question 
of competence, even though that question might be related to the more general idea of 
subsidiarity.16 The relationship between the principles of conferral and subsidiarity and the 
approach of national parliaments taken for their scrutiny is further elaborated upon in Chapter 
6.  
1.1.2 The relationship between subsidiarity and proportionality 
The relationship between subsidiarity and proportionality has garnered particular interest in 
the EU scholarship and requires further elaboration. Two positions are at stake: the first sees 
no relationship between the two principles, while the second perceives a ‘close relationship’ 
between them.17 Accordingly, some scholars see a clear difference between questions of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.18 For example, Toth claims that the proportionality principle 
‘cannot be a manifestation of subsidiarity since it is applied by the Court across the whole 
range of the Treaty, while subsidiarity applies only to certain matters.’19  
An opposite view talks about ‘cannibalization’ of subsidiarity by the proportionality principle 
by tying the ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions together.20 Ziller argues that the subsidiarity principle 
expressed in Article 5(3) TEU contains elements of the proportionality principle, such as 
adequacy, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu.21 Adequacy is expressed by the phrase 
                                                 
14 Cygan, Accountability, parliamentarism and transparency in the EU at 133. Cygan who puts forward a three-
step test of the subsidiarity principle gives a broad understanding of subsidiarity: ‘responsibility criterion’, 
‘necessity requirement’ and ‘efficiency criterion.’ 
15 Thomas von Danwitz, ‘Subsidiaritätskontrolle in der Europäischen Union’ in K. Hansmann K.-P. Dolde, S. 
Paetow, E. Schmidt-Assmann (ed), Verfassung-Umwelt-Wirtschaft Festschrift für Dieter Sellner zum 75 
Geburtstag (Beck 2010) at 40. 
16 Ibid at 41. 
17 Blanke at 253. 
18 Edward at 99-100. 
19 Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1083. Also Barrett excludes objections to the 
proportionality (and the substance of the proposal and) from the review by national parliaments under Protocol 
No. 2. Gavin Barrett, ‘Monti II. The Subsidiarity Review Process Comes of Age... Or Then Again Maybe It 
Doesn't’ (2012) 19 Maastricht journal of European and comparative law 595, 600. 
20 Groussot and Bogojević at 237. 
21 Ziller, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité’ at 529. 
83 
‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level,’ 
whereas the ‘if’ and ‘in so far as’ in the subsidiarity formula enshrined necessity and 
proportionality stricto sensu respectively. Similarly, Louis maintains that subsidiarity takes 
into consideration elements of proportionality – the necessity of action at EU level – ‘without 
exhausting the content of the proportionality principle,’ the latter being excluded from the 
EWS, because it would have involved an assessment of the proposal’s substance.22  
A more complex understanding of the middle position is provided by Lenaerts, who 
maintains that subsidiarity can be understood in sensu stricto (‘if’ question) and lato sensu 
(‘in so far as’ question) terms.23 Subsidiarity lato sensu involves a proportionality 
assessment, which, according to Lenaerts, implies that two expressions of the proportionality 
principle are at stake in Article 3b of the EC Treaty, current Article 5(3) TEU.24 The use of 
‘and in so far as’ with regard to EU action, both in the first version of the subsidiarity formula 
of the Maastricht Treaty as well as in its current Lisbon version, ‘indicates the permissible 
extent of such action’ (emphasis in orginal) and ‘makes it difficult to distinguish sharply 
between subsidiarity and proportionality.’25 Yet, while the proportionality test involved in 
subsidiarity questions concerns only shared competences, the proportionality principle in 
general concerns all types of competence. In addition, the proportionality aspect involved in 
subsidiarity protects the sovereignty of Member States, whereas the general proportionality 
principle applies to values protected under EU law.26 
Against the overview of possible stances on the mutual relationship between principles 
expressed by the legal scholarship, Schütze’s understanding of Article 5 TEU presents the 
most systematized approach. Accordingly, the competence question is a ‘general “whether” 
of Union action’ which is answered by the policy area.27 In other words, the competence 
question asks whether the EU can generally act in the area. In contrast, the focus of 
subsidiarity is on a specific act at stake. Furthermore, as Schütze puts forward, subsidiarity’s 
‘whether’ question and proportionality’s ‘how’ question are tied together, which implies that 
                                                 
22 Jean-Victor Louis, ‘Quelques remarques sur l’avenir du contrôle du principe de subsidiarité’ in Aline De 
Walsche and Laure Levi (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Georges Vandersanden: promenades au sein du droit 
européen (Bruylant 2008) at 291 (own translation). 
23 Lenaerts at 875. 
24 Ibid at 883. 
25 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’ (1994) 1 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 1, 3 and 25. Lenaerts argues that Art 3b contains in fact two expressions of the 
proportionality principle. 
26 Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of 
Federalism’, 884. 
27 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law at 263. 
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subsidiarity has to be understood as ‘federal proportionality’.28 Similar to Lenaerts, cited 
above, Schütze maintains that the distinction between these principles lies in the issues that 
they protect: the private rights of an individual in case of proportionality and the ‘collective 
autonomy’ of a group under subsidiarity.29 From this, Schütze concludes that to draw a 
distinction between subsidiarity and proportionality, the latter, currently expressed in Article 
5(4) TEU, should be restricted to safeguarding private rights against excessive public 
interference.30 Hence, the relevant questions of Article 5 TEU can be summarized as follows: 
‘the enumeration principle will tell us whether the Community can act within a policy field. 
The subsidiarity principle would examine whether a European law disproportionately 
restricts national autonomy; and the principle of proportionality would, finally, tell us 
whether a European law unnecessarily interfered with liberal values.’31  
What is, therefore, the consequence of the Article 5 TEU construction for the EWS? Calliess 
argues that a proportionality violation limits the legislative competences of national 
parliaments in the same way as a subsidiarity encroachment. In his view, the ‘not always 
clean’ division between subsidiarity and proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECJ also 
speaks in favour of the inclusion of a proportionality check within the EWS.32 
In practice, within the EWS, some national parliaments explicitly see proportionality as an 
inherent part of the subsidiarity test: ‘the proportionality aspect in the principle of 
subsidiarity.’33 The Swedish Riksdag, in its analysis of the Commission proposal on the 
European single market for electronic communications, inquired whether the proposal ‘is 
suited to its purpose, and argue[d] instead that there are other and less intrusive ways than 
those considered by the Commission to secure a harmonised market for e-com services.’34 
Other examples show that the review of proportionality can be another, independent step of 
scrutiny. For example, the German Bundestag confirmed a violation of the proportionality 
principle in the Commission proposal on the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
‘because its content and form far exceed[ed] what [was] necessary to achieve the objectives 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 264. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Christian Calliess, ‘Subsidiaritätskontrolle durch Bundestag, Bundesrat und Landesparlamente, § 23’ in 
Winfried Kluth and Günter Krings (eds), Gesetzgebung – Rechtsetzung durch Parlamente und Verwaltungen 
sowie ihre gerichtliche Kontrolle (C.F. Müller 2013) at 580. 
33 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 7.11.2013 on COM(2013) 627. 
34 Ibid p.1. 
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of the treaties.’ 35 The Greek parliament voiced reservations on the Tobacco Products 
directive, as the objective could be achieved by ‘means of milder measures’ rather than by 
banning flavoured or slim cigarettes.36 The Polish Sejm found the Commission proposal on 
‘Women on Boards’ in breach of the principle of proportionality, because ‘in order to achieve 
the directive’s objective it would suffice to adopt EU-wide measures aimed at standardising 
the criteria of appointing members of company boards, without the need to establish binding 
parities.’37 
These examples show that national parliaments understand subsidiarity and proportionality in 
a way that is different from Schütze’s proposal of ‘federal proportionality’: specifically, as a 
question of ‘whether the proposal is necessary to achieve the treaty objective’ or as a ‘less 
restrictive means test.’ It must be however noted that the Commission addresses the 
proportionality violations in its answers to national parliaments within the political dialogue. 
Nonetheless, the Commission maintains that proportionality analysis ‘goes beyond the scope 
of application of Article 6, Protocol No. 2.’38 A similar approach has been taken with regard 
to cases in which the ‘yellow card’ was triggered.  
1.2 Arguments in favour of a narrow reading of the EWS 
The question posed by Weatherill on how to decide where reasoned opinions should end, 
invoked at the beginning of this chapter, about the scope of subsidiarity review, is normative 
in nature, but can be answered through a textual, structural and functional interpretation of 
the Treaties. This thesis advances a narrow understanding of the scope of the review that 
national parliaments ought to exercise in the framework of the EWS. It is argued that national 
parliaments should restrict their review of draft EU legislation under Protocol No. 2 
exclusively to the control of the principle of subsidiarity; the concerns about the legal basis, 
proportionality or political merits of an EU legislative proposal should not be a part of the 
subsidiarity scrutiny. 
                                                 
35 See, for example, German Bundestag, Reasoned opinion of 12.12.2012 on COM(2012) 617. 
36 Greek parliament, Reasoned opinion of 21.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, similarly as in the opinion on 
COM(2013) 472 of 4.09.2013, p.4. 
37 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 4.01.2013 on COM(2012) 614. 
38 For example, Commission reply to Austrian Bundesrat of 13.2.2014 on COM(2013) 620, p.2.  
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1.2.1 Textual argument 
First, a textual interpretation of Protocol No. 2 clearly shows that national parliaments may 
review the compliance of proposals solely with regard to the principle of subsidiarity.39 
While the preamble and the title of Protocol No. 2 refer to establishing the conditions for the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the EWS, anchored in Article 
7 of Protocol No. 2, refers exclusively to the principle of subsidiarity. Specifically, Article 1 
of Protocol No. 2 provides that ‘[e]ach institution shall ensure constant respect for the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,’40 while Article 7 states that a national 
parliament shall specify ‘why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity.’41 In turn, the Commission should answer to national parliaments by 
explaining ‘why it considers that the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.’42 
In consequence, a textual interpretation of Protocol No. 2 indicates that national parliaments 
were granted a competence solely to review the compatibility of draft legislative acts with 
subsidiarity, and not to assess whether they are proportional, whether their legal basis is 
correct, or whether their political merits are sound.  
1.2.2 Structural argument 
Second, a structural argument backs the view that the function of national parliaments under 
Protocol No. 2 should be restricted to the control of the subsidiarity principle. The Lisbon 
Treaty did not grant national parliaments the position of a third legislative chamber in the EU 
structure, next to the European Parliament and Council. Indeed, while during the post-Nice 
period, a number of propositions regarding an independent role for national parliaments were 
discussed, these were discarded, both for national and EU-related reasons.43 
From the national level perspective, it was perceived that ‘[g]iven the increased importance 
of EC/EU affairs any stronger and direct participation of national parliaments on the EU level 
would affect the basic way national governments and parliaments function in general.’ Such 
                                                 
39 For a similar view see Schima at  373. 
40 Protocol No. 2, Art 1 (emphasis added). 
41 Protocol No. 2, Art 7(2) and 7(3) (emphasis added). 
42 Protocol No. 2, Art 7(3)(2) (emphasis added). On the contrary, Davies’ textual interpretation that the ‘obvious 
conclusion’ from the wording of Protocol No. 2 (that Commission must provide justification on both 
subsidiarity and proportionality in the legal acts) is that ‘proportionality is an element of subsidiarity’, in 
addition, ‘two concepts are obvious analogues – but might be useful, since proportionality is surrounded by 
more clarity and more accepted methodology than subsidiarity is; perhaps now one can learn from other.’ See 
Davies at 693. 
43 See for example an overview in Maurer and Wessels, National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers 
or Latecomers? at 23. 
87 
an involvement of national parliaments was expected to ‘erode traditional patterns of policy 
making in our polities.’44  
From the EU-level perspective, the proposal of granting a co-legislative role to national 
parliaments was rejected, as it would have added another level of decision making, 
complicating even further the already complex EU law-making system.45 The rejection of the 
idea of a ‘red card’ procedure, allowing national parliaments to veto EU legislation,46 reflects 
the intent of the treaty framers to grant national parliaments only a narrow position in the EU 
legislative process, rather than broad powers of participation.47 In fact, it was explained 
during the European Convention that the new mechanisms for subsidiarity scrutiny ‘should 
not make decision-making within the institutions more cumbersome or lengthier, nor block 
it.’48 Indeed, the structure of the Treaties demonstrates a substantial ‘scepticism of the virtues 
of deeper direct involvement by national Parliaments in transnational law making.’49 In 
consequence, it would be surprising if national parliaments could apply a broad review of 
Commission proposals under Protocol No. 2 to intervene in the EU law-making process; they 
were deprived of this function during the debates on treaty reform.50 The works of the 
Convention could thus be seen as a historical argument elucidating the structural 
interpretation of the EWS and speaking in favour of a strict subsidiarity assessment.51 Indeed, 
Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity proposed a narrowly defined EWS, without 
mentioning in its report a scrutiny of the aspects of proposals other than subsidiarity.52 As 
Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty embraced the EWS without major changes to the 
respective Protocol of the Constitutional Treaty, the position of the original drafters about a 
                                                 
44 Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players?’ at 
464. 
45 Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack and Andrea Edenharter, ‘Subsidiaritätsklage als parlamentarisches 
Minderheitsrecht?’ (2009) 44 Europarecht 313 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing 
structure of European law at 261. 
46 Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘A Constitution for the European Union? A Letter from Home’ (2004) 10 European 
Public Law 57, 73. 
47 See Barber, ‘Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution’, 204. 
48 CONV 286/02, Point I (2). 
49 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Using national parliaments to improve scrutiny of the limits of EU action’ (2003) 28 
European law review 909, 910 & 912. 
50 For analysis of the discussions of the role of national parliaments in the Convention on the future of Europe 
see Afke Groen and Thomas Christiansen, ‘National Parliaments in the European Union: Conceptual Choices in 
the EU’s Constitutional Debate’ in Claudia Hefftler and others (eds), The Palgrave Handbook on National 
Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 2015 forthcoming). 
51 See F. Mayer, Stellungnahme zum öffentlichen Expertengespräch Prüfung des unionsrechtlichen 
Subsidiaritätsprinzips im Unterausschuss Europarecht des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages am 
16. Juni 2010 (2010). 
52 CONV 286/02, Section II (b). 
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limited role for national parliaments with a narrowly defined EWS seems a reliable basis for 
interpretation of the scope of the EWS.53  
1.2.3 Functional argument 
Third, a functional interpretation, based upon a comparative institutional analysis, seems to 
guide in favour of a restrictive understanding of the role of national Parliaments under 
Protocol No. 2.54 According to this approach, specific functions should be allocated among 
alternative institutions on the basis of their relative capacity to carry out the task. This 
approach does not exclude a situation in which a number of institutions fulfil one task.55 
National parliaments seem better suited than EU institutions for controlling the subsidiarity 
of a legislative proposal.56 They are more eager to address the technical and political matters 
involved in the subsidiarity scrutiny. Since subsidiarity scrutiny ‘involve[s] a considerable 
margin of discretion for the institutions (considering whether shared objectives could ‘better’ 
be achieved at European level or at another level), monitoring of compliance with that 
principle should be of an essentially political nature.’57 Since national parliaments are closer 
to citizens, ‘it was only natural to give them a role when it came to deciding whether 
                                                 
53 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (O. J. 2004, C 310/207) did 
not foresee the ‘orange card’. Additionally, national parliaments had only six weeks to prepare a reasoned 
opinion (Article 6 of the proposed Protocol). 
54 For an introduction to comparative institutional analysis see Neil K Komesar, Imperfect alternatives: 
choosing institutions in law, economics, and public policy (University of Chicago Press 1994). Komesar 
compares institutions (market, courts and the political process) to choose which one among them is better able 
to decide on a specific social goal. This thesis applies Komesar’s analytical framework to decide which 
institution – the national political process, the EU political process or the EU adjudicative process – can 
comparatively better scrutinize legal and political aspects of EU legislative proposals. 
55 For example, as is argued below the correctness of legal basis is safeguarded ex ante by the Council and the 
EP and ex post by the ECJ. 
56 Allocation of the subsidiarity control to national parliaments was criticised by Davies, but for reasons 
connected to the weakness inherent in this principle. Garreth Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 63, 68-84.  Davies labelled subsidiarity ‘the 
wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time.’ The ‘wrong idea’ argument meant that subsidiarity ‘instead 
of providing a method to balance between Member State and Community interest, which is what is needed, it 
assumes the Community goals, privileges their achievement absolutely, and simply asks who should be the one 
to do the implementing work. The ‘wrong place argument’ focused on the comparison between the Catholic 
church subsidiarity and the EU subsidiarity, claiming that in contrast to the former with its ‘clear hierarchy and 
common, undisputed goals’, in the latter we have two levels of legitimate law-makers with occasionally 
conflicting policies and interest. Hence, in contrast to the Catholic subsidiarity, it is not easy to decide on which 
objectives should take precedence. The ‘wrong time’ argument concerns the idea behind subsidiarity as fighting 
against over-detailed harmonization, whereas the ‘issues of the day’ are the EU powers encroaching on sensitive 
national areas, such as criminal law or economic policy. In the view of Davies, a mechanism more apt to deal 
with the competence creep was ‘true proportionality’ to be adjudicated by the ECJ, involving ‘an intelligent 
balance’ between Community and national interests/values. For the criticism of this approach see Craig, 
‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’, 82-84.  
57 CONV 286/02, point I(5). 
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legislation was best adopted at national or supranational level.’58 In addition, the European 
Court of Justice is blamed for ‘not taking subsidiarity seriously’ and the ‘low-intensity of 
judicial review’ of that principle is highlighted.59  
In contrast to the suitability of national parliaments for conducting subsidiarity review, other 
institutions participating in the EU law-making process are more apt than national 
parliaments to evaluate the content of a legislative draft, its proportionality or whether it has 
the correct legal basis.  
To start with, it seems unquestionable that the EU legislative institutions can assess the merits 
of a legislative proposal better than the national parliaments. The EU political process, by 
involving multiple institutions (the Commission, the Council and, usually, the EP) guarantees 
a more comprehensive consideration of all the interests involved. In contrast, national 
parliaments, because of their local focus, may reflect a ‘minoritarian bias,’ failing to take into 
account the broad problems at stake.60 The reasoned opinion of the Maltese parliament on the 
European single market for electronic communications illustrates this point well.61 Arguing 
under the EWS against the Commission proposal, this chamber raised its concerns about the 
principle of subsidiarity, as ‘[f]or various reasons, such as the size of the country, its 
geographical legislation and the level of competition based on infrastructure, the Maltese 
market is different from markets in other Member States, and thus may require different 
measures.’62 In sum, leaving the discussion on the merits of the Commission’s proposal to the 
EU legislator avoids the drafting of reasoned opinions focusing on the local situation in the 
Member State, instead of looking for the level which can better exercise the treaty objectives. 
Similarly, EU institutions seem more apt than national parliaments in protecting the 
proportionality principle. A proportionality assessment involves an assessment of the 
necessity of a measure, its adequacy to achieve a desired goal and its conciliation with 
                                                 
58 European Convention, Working Group IV on National Parliaments, Summary of the meeting held on 19 July 
2002, CONV 204/02, 16.07.2002, point 2. 
59 Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’, 80; Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Dating Cinderella: On 
subsidiarity as a political safeguard of federalism in the European Union’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 649; 
Andrea Biondi, ‘Subsidiarity in the Courtroom’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU 
law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012). 
60 Komesar approaches the political process through a two-force model of majoritarian and minoritarian 
influences. The former one tends to produce public policies that are less narrow than the once resulting from the 
latter. The overrepresentation of one of the forces results in a majoritarian or minoritarian bias which has a 
serious impact on the outcomes of the political process. 
61 COM(2013) 627. 
62 Maltese House of Representatives, Reasoned opinion of 7.11.2013 on COM(2013) 627, point 2. 
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competing interests (the ‘least restrictive means’ test).63 Identifying and balancing these 
interests ascribes them some values.64 Likewise in this case, since the EU political process 
allows for the voicing of multiple interests (including the interests of the Member States, as 
represented by their ministers in the Council) it seems that the proportionality oversight can 
be better conducted through an interaction between the various EU institutions, rather than 
via individual evaluation by each national parliament. In addition, because the judicial 
process is characterised as an independent institution, the ECJ is fitter to conduct value 
assessments involved in the proportionality test without a single national bias.65  
Third, the functional interpretation shows that EU institutions are better equipped than 
national parliaments in reviewing the legal basis of a legislative measure.66 The legal basis 
question asks whether the Union possesses the powers that it seeks to exercise.67 The ECJ - 
the final interpreter of the EU Treaties - with an explicit function of reviewing the legality of 
EU legislative acts, seems better endowed with the technical expertise concerning EU law 
which is needed to review whether the EU has the power to act within a certain domain.68 
The argument that national parliaments should scrutinize the principle of conferral under the 
subsidiarity review because the ECJ has not constituted a sufficient safeguard, can be 
rejected, since in a number of significant decisions ‘the ECJ has adjudicated on the vertical 
competences, and not always favourably for the Union’ as was the case in the Tobacco 
Advertising judgment.69 In order to avoid single-institutionalism and provide for an ex-ante 
check on the legal basis, alongside the ECJ, the EP and the Council often provide expertise in 
this respect. This power has been granted to them directly by the respective rules of 
procedure, which also contrasts with the lack of such a function in Protocol No. 2, as 
presented by the textual argument.70 
                                                 
63 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia journal of transnational law 72. 
64 Paul Craig, EU administrative law (Oxford University Press 2012) at 592. 
65 Komesar indicates three distinctive aspects of the adjudicative process: competence (ability to assess complex 
cases), scale (ability to review cases) and independence (ability to be take even-handed decisions). Komesar, at 
123. 
66 Also on this issue, see Chapter 6. 
67 Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of 
Federalism’, 866. 
68 See Art 263 TFEU. 
69 Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The European Union's vertical order of competences: The current law 
and proposals for its reform’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 227, 257. 
70 According to Rule 37 of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure, first the committee responsible for the 
subject-matter verifies the legal basis of a legislative act and in case when it is the validity or the 
appropriateness is disputed an opinion of the committee responsible for the legal affairs should be requested, 
which may also conduct such a scrutiny on its own motion. In the Council, it is the task of the COREPER to 
safeguard the observance of the principle of legality (Article 19 (1) Council Rules of Procedure). 
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1.3 National insufficiency test and the comparative efficiency test 
All of the arguments raised above support a narrow subsidiarity review. Thus, national 
parliaments, in the exercise of their powers under Protocol No. 2, should limit themselves to 
the subsidiarity scrutiny of draft legislative acts. In particular, the content of such restrictive 
scrutiny should consist of two aspects: the material and the procedural dimensions of the 
principle of subsidiarity.71 The material dimension of subsidiarity can be verified from two 
angles, labelled by Schütze as the national insufficiency test and the comparative efficiency 
test. The first test – the Union shall act ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’ – means that a Member State 
has ‘inadequate means at its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed action.’72 
The second test demands that the Union shall act if the objectives of the proposed action can 
rather ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.’ Hence, the EU should not act ‘unless it could better achieve the objectives of the 
proposed action.’73  
Calliess, similarly, calls the two tests the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ criteria, respectively.74 The 
‘negative criterion’ concerns the insufficiency of Member State action, whereas the ‘positive 
criterion,’ to be checked only if the first is confirmed, implies a comparative cost-benefit 
analysis at the different levels of government (including the ‘null option’ of EU inaction).75 
Chalmers et al. have also reflected on the two subsidiarity tests, and indicated that the first 
part of Article 5(3) TEU concerning the insufficiency of national action refers to the 
‘Member State’s sense of self-government, and what it believes it can do itself. This goes to 
wider issues than legal effectiveness such as how far a measure forms part of a wider valued 
tradition.’76 The second test inherent in the subsidiarity principle is a ‘federal’ one: ‘whether 
one central measure would be more effective than twenty-eight different ones.’77  
                                                 
71 Estella De Noriega at 105. The material and procedural criterion was developed by Estella in the context of 
the Amsterdam Protocol, but could be also applied for the Treaty of Lisbon as there were no major textual 
changes from one to the other. 
72 Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’, 22. 
73 Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law at 250. 
74 Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union at 104. Relates to Maastricht 
formulation of Article 5. 
75 Ibid at 104 & 116. 
76 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union law: cases and materials (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) at 395. 
77 Ibid. 
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National parliaments have adopted their own labels for the parts of the subsidiarity test. The 
UK House of Commons78 in its reasoned opinions conducts a subsidiarity test, the first limb 
of which consists of a ‘necessity test’ (whether the EU Commission has established that 
legislative action at EU level is necessary at all) and ‘insufficiency of Member State action 
test’, which requires the Commission to prove that the action proposed cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States.79 The second limb is whether the ‘action is better achieved at 
EU level’, which requires the Commission to provide evidence that the objective of the 
proposal ‘would be better achieved, by reason of its scale or effects, by action at EU level.’ 80 
The Irish parliament indicates that Article 5(3) TEU constitutes a ‘comparative efficiency 
exercise’, involving a ‘necessity test’ and a ‘greater benefits test.’81 Within the necessity 
limb, the parliament attempts to answer the question whether ‘the action by the EU [is] 
necessary to achieve the objective of the proposal’ and whether ‘the objective of the proposal 
[can] only be achieved, or achieved to a sufficient extent, by EU action.’ The ‘greater 
benefits test’ asks, in turn, whether the objective would be better achieved at EU level – ‘i.e. 
would EU action provide greater benefits than action at Member State level?’ In addition, 
every new draft legislative act should be ‘supported by a sufficiently “detailed statement”’ on 
compliance with subsidiarity, and should be compatible with Article 5(2) TEU.82 
The problem of labelling the ‘national insufficiency test’ as a ‘necessity test’ is that it may 
cause confusion with the ‘necessity test,’ which is a part of the proportionality principle 
expressed in Article 5(4) TEU. This provision states that ‘the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’ For 
example, the Irish parliament, asks as a first part of its subsidiarity test, the following 
question: ‘[i]s action by the EU necessary to achieve the objective of the proposal?’83 Such 
questions should be dealt with only in the sense of ‘federal proportionality’ as suggested by 
Schütze: whether the EU law disproportionately restricts national autonomy, but not whether 
the action is necessary to achieve a Treaty objective. 
Besides the possible confusion with the ‘necessity test’ inherent in the proportionality 
principle, a question as to whether any action is ‘necessary at all’ is often addressed as a 
                                                 
78 The UK government sees necessity and proportionality as tests different to that of subsidiarity See 
correspondence between Lord Boswell and the Secretary of State for Justice C. Grayling of 20.01.2014. 
79 UK House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 12.02.2014 on COM(2013) 893, point 17 and 19. 
80 Ibid point 21. 
81 Irish Houses of Oireachtas, Reasoned opinion of 6.11.2013 on COM(2013) 627. 
82 Ibid p.1. 
83 Ibid. 
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subsidiarity issue. However, this is not a question about the right level of governance, 
because at the subsidiarity level, we assume that some kind of action must be taken, and we 
decide on the more appropriate level of government. For example, the UK House of 
Commons, which notoriously checks the necessity of Commission proposals, states that 
‘necessity is a pre-requisite both for action at EU level and for conformity with the principle 
of subsidiarity.’84 However, the ‘necessity’ question in the meaning implied by the House of 
Commons comes before subsidiarity, and is decided upon by the Commission. It is a policy 
question, and one that is not to be answered within the subsidiarity test.85  
The question is also how many Member States in which the achievement of an action would 
be ‘insufficient’ is necessary to fulfil the ‘national insufficiency test.’ In fact, national 
parliaments often underline in their reasoned opinions that the proposal violates the 
subsidiarity principle because they can achieve the objective on their own or that they already 
have some mechanisms implemented in this regard. For example, in reaction to the 
Commission proposal on periodic testing for motor vehicles and their trailers, the Swedish 
Riksdag underlined in its reasoned opinion that the system operating in Sweden is ‘well 
organized and adapted to maintain high levels of road safety among the various vehicles used 
on the roads.’86 In the same vein, both the Dutch Tweede and Eerste Kameren argued that 
this Commission proposal ‘intervenes in well functioning systems of the Member States.’87  
While these examples may show that the periodic testing for motor vehicles and their trailers 
works well in Sweden or in the Netherlands, how many Member States’ opinions do we need 
in order to prove that ‘the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States’? Edward argues that the smaller Member States ‘may not have 
financial and other resources ‘sufficient’ to achieve the objective in question,’ and in such 
cases, limiting of the autonomy of larger Member States in order to achieve an objective 
Union-wide is ‘presumably’ justified.88 Lenaerts sees it in a much more straight-forward way: 
‘a necessary condition for Community action is that at least one Member State has inadequate 
means at its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed action.’89 Calliess applies a 
                                                 
84 UK House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 22.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
85 See however N. Emiliou, who argues that ‘proportionality is concerned with the question whether Community 
action is necessary at all.’ (emphasis added). Nicholas Emiliou, ‘Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against" the 
Enterprises of Ambition"?’ (1992) 17 European law review 383, 402. 
86 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 17.10.2012 on COM(2012) 380, p.1. 
87 Dutch Tweede Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 9.10. 2012 and Eerste Kamer of 11.10.2012 at 4 on 
COM(2012)380.  
88 Edward at 100. Edward sees the Court as not ‘well equipped’ to anwer this question. 
89 Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’, 22.  
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textual interpretation of Article 5(3) TEU – which refers to Member States (in the plural) –
hence the potential to perform the objective by two or more Member States must be 
objectively insufficient in order for the EU to act.90 It needs to be checked independently 
whether the objective of the measure can be achieved through the unilateral action of a 
single, multiple or all the Member States (acting independently).91 In practice, the test 
proposed by Calliess appears to be consistent with that of Lenaerts if the objective of the 
measure is such that it cannot be achieved unless all Member States take action. This seems 
to be the case for many EU proposals. For example, the objective of the proposal on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present 
at trial in criminal proceedings92 states as its objective ‘common minimum rules for certain 
aspects of the right to presumption of innocence.’ If a single Member State did not adopt 
these standards, the overall objective would be violated. 
Another question is if the subsidiarity principle bars the EU from acting when Member States 
could achieve the objective by acting in a form of an intergovernmental cooperation. 
According to Toth, the textual interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty permitted the 
conclusion that the EU should not act in such a case; however such an approach would 
present ‘a major step backwards in the process of integration.’93 The Treaty of Lisbon 
abolished the three pillar structure, in favour of creating the EU, yet the intergovernmental 
method is maintained for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in the area of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters where Member States still posess significant 
powers. However, Toth’s argument remains valid with regard to boosting the process of EU 
integration. For example, the Lisbon Treaty provides that enhanced cooperation can be 
undertaken only as ‘a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such 
cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole.’94  Hence 
to answer the initial question of whether the EU should not act when Member States could 
proceed in a form that is binding only for a group of them, it seems that this is only a further 
possibility in cases allowed by the Treaty where Member States could not agree in the 
Council. 
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93 Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1099. 
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1.4 Cross-border activity test 
Furthermore, the subsidiarity assessment can be enriched by the ‘cross-border activity’ test. 
The Amsterdam Protocol indicated this test as a guideline to justify action at the EU level.95 
In practice, as indicated in Chapter 1, the Amsterdam criteria are still applied by the 
Commission and some national parliaments. A prominent example of the application of the 
‘cross-border test’ in the subsidiarity review is the Vodafone case.96 According to Advocate 
General Maduro, action should be taken at EU level whenever the EU has ‘a special interest 
in protecting and promoting economic activities of a cross-border character,’ and ‘the 
national democratic process is likely to fail to protect cross-border activities.’97 Generally 
speaking, the EU should take action in cases where the transnational dimension of an issue 
which national process may fail to regulate, which will in turn increase the added value of EU 
legislative intervention.98 
However, this test is less helpful in the assessment of proposals which do not regulate a 
cross-border situation. For example, as Chapter 8 on the application of the EWS to the 
‘genuine’ fundamental rights proposals (meaning those that pursue a fundamental rights 
objective) shows, the transnational element might not be present. Nonetheless, in such cases, 
the subsidiarity principle will still apply. Yet, because the focus of fundamental rights 
protection is on safeguarding values, conducting an efficiency test involved in subsidiarity 
reasoning might not be easily applicable, as such tests reduce fundamental rights to bare 
economic calculations. Issues such as the local boundaries of the political process, the 
political legitimacy of one of the government levels, and the willingness to act, must be taken 
into account within the subsidiarity assessment in this case. It is hence still the ‘special 
interest’ that should be protected, as in the Vodafone case, but not necessarily involving a 
cross-border element. 
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1.5 Procedural subsidiarity 
Finally, the procedural aspect of the subsidiarity principle relates to the motivation of a 
legislative proposal, and can be regarded as instrumental to the evaluation of the material 
subsidiarity.99 As Article 5(3) TEU states, in the subparagraph which is cited less often, ‘[t]he 
institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol 
on the applications of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments 
ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out 
in the Protocol.’ In other words, this provision indicates that it is for the EU institutions to 
apply subsidiarity and for national parliaments to control it.100 In accordance with Article 
5(3) TEU, the ‘application’ of subsidiarity by EU institutions is further elaborated upon in 
Article 5 of Protocol No. 2. Therefore, draft legislative acts ‘should contain a detailed 
statement’ allowing for the appraisal of ‘compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.’101 Such a statement should contain the following parts: an ‘assessment of the 
proposal's financial impact’; and ‘in the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to 
be put in place by Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation.’ In 
addition, the ‘[t]he reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at 
Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative 
indicators.’ Interestingly, reference is thus made only to the ‘comparative efficiency test.’ 
It is therefore visible that the ‘onus to justify’ legislative proposals rests on the EU 
institutions.102 In fact, Groussot and Bogojević perceive the obligation for the Commission to 
justify its proposals with regard to compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality as ‘the 
second competence-based tool’ in the subsidiarity monitoring procedure, next to the 
subsidiarity scrutiny by national parliaments in the EWS.103 Accordingly, the Commission 
evaluates the compatibility of its proposals with the principle of subsidiarity in the roadmaps 
prepared for major initiatives, in the impact assessments, explanatory memorandums and 
recitals of the proposal preamble.104 However, Wyatt argued that the Commission has never 
been ‘sympathetic to the principle of subsidiarity,’ and has had a ‘desire to minimalize the 
                                                 
99 See Estella De Noriega at 132. 
100 This view presented also by the UK House of Commons, see House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 
11.11.2013 on COM(2013) 618, 619, point 11. 
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practical effect of subsidiarity.’105 This is why, in his view the assessments of the 
compatibility of the legal act with the principle of subsidiarity are ‘often perfunctory, in many 
cases simply stating that the requirements of subsidiarity are complied with.’106 The 
justifications given by the Commission are more ‘a statement of the rationale of the 
legislation itself,’ than a justification for compliance with subsidiarity.107  
Despite such critical voices the increased use of the impact assessments in the pre-legislative 
phase has been seen as a ‘move towards proceduralization’ in the subsidiarity monitoring.108 
Impact assessments are rooted in the ‘second-competence based tool.’109 However, national 
parliaments also refer to impact assessments in their reasoned opinions, which would show 
some overlap between the two tools presented by Groussot and Bogojević – the EWS and the 
impact assessments.110  
As impact assessments are not translated into all languages, national parliaments may have to 
rely on the explanatory memorandum included in the draft legislative acts; the latter being far 
shorter and less elaborative than the former. In consequence, national parliaments may 
consider the justifications given in explanatory memoranda as not constituting a sufficient 
qualitative and quantitative substantiation of the compliance with the subsidiarity principle as 
foreseen by Protocol No. 2.111 Moreover, the EP has proposed a few improvements to the 
Commission impact assessments, asking the Commission to analyse its methodology and 
insisting that the principle of multilingualism should apply to impact assessments relating to 
vital aspects of public and political opinion.112 
While the onus probandi weighs upon EU institutions, it would be desirable if national 
parliaments’ criticism were substantiated by pointing out the loopholes in the Commission 
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argumentation.113 Good reasoned opinions not only argue that the national level is sufficient, 
but show why the national level is sufficient or even better than the Union one.114 
2 The second ‘yellow card’ on the EPPO proposal 
After Section 1 elaborated on different aspects of the EWS, especially its scope and the 
specific tests involved, Section 2 will explore in detail how these theoretical aspects of the 
EWS apply to real cases. In the following part, I will explore in detail the second ‘yellow 
card’ triggered by national parliaments. First, I briefly explain the background of the 
Commission proposal. The second section provides the content of the proposal. Next, I 
summarise the main concerns of national parliaments with regard to the Commission 
proposal. Finally, in the last section, I comment on the outcome of the second ‘yellow card’ 
comparing it with the first one. There, I re-assess the scope of the subsidiarity review and its 
consequence for this procedure in the light of this example. 
2.1 Background 
The idea of the European Public Prosecutor (EPP) has been discussed since the 1990s, and 
received renewed interest with the financial crisis; the issue of the management of public 
money and the duty to bolster the EU budget emerged during the course of the debates on the 
Office.115 The first ideas concerning the EPPO were connected to the Corpus Juris, a project 
of experts, academics and practitioners, carried out independently from EU institutions, 
which set a model for substantive and procedural criminal law, focusing solely on the 
protection of the financial interests of the EU, and included provisions on the Public 
Prosecutor.116 
The Commission already supported the idea of an EPPO at the Intergovernmental Conference 
in Nice in 2000. However, due to a lack of time and detailed study concerning the topic, it did 
not make it into the Nice Treaty. 117 The Eurojust proposal, which was seen as an 
intergovernmental ‘Trojan Horse,’ cast the ‘more integrationist’ EPPO in the shadows.118 In 
face of its failure, the Commission prepared a Green Paper in order to launch a larger debate 
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on the EPPO prior to the next treaty changes.119 The Corpus Juris project not only ‘provided 
a direct impulse for the drafting of the Green Paper,’ but also ‘can be seen in all of the 
formulations and proposals [of the Commission], which are often very similar, and 
sometimes identical [to the Corpus Juris].’120 The Green Paper provoked a broad response 
from practitioners and scholars, which the Commission addressed in the ‘Follow-up report on 
the Green Paper,’ with a view to the forthcoming revision of the treaties.121 Nonetheless, as 
Article III-274 of the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporated the EPP, never entered into 
force, it was only the Lisbon Treaty that included a legal basis enabling the creation of the 
office. Article 86 TFEU should be hence seen as a ‘major success, signifying a genuine step 
towards the creation of a European Public Prosecutor.’122 
Article 86(1) TFEU provides that: 
‘In order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by 
means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may 
establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust. The Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.’ 
As explained by Peers, the expression ‘from Eurojust’ means that ‘there would have to be a 
link between the two bodies, although in the absence of more precise Treaty rules there is a 
degree of discretion as to how close the link would have to be.’123 Nonetheless, taking into 
account the entangled history of both proposals, establishing the EPP ‘from Eurojust’ might 
be seen as ironic.124 
The Lisbon Treaty allows the EU Legislator to grant the EPPO powers to investigate, 
prosecute and bring to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the 
Union's financial interests.125 Where suitable, the EPPO should act in liaison with Europol. In 
addition, the EPPO exercises the functions of a prosecutor in the competent courts of the 
Member States in relation to offences against the EU’s financial interests. 
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The functioning of the EPPO is to be regulated by an EU regulation mentioned in Article 
86(1) TFEU. This regulation should aim to create ‘general rules applicable to the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the conditions governing the performance of its functions, the 
rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the admissibility of 
evidence, and the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in 
the performance of its functions.’126  
The EPPO can be established via the special legislative procedure, with the Council acting by 
unanimity, and with the consent of the EP.127 Within EU criminal law, it is the only case of 
use of the special legislative procedure.128 In case there is no unanimity in the Council on the 
establishment of the EPPO, the regulation can be referred to the European Council, where the 
proposal shall be discussed, while being suspended in the Council.129 If the European Council 
reaches consensus on the draft within four months of the suspension, it must to be forwarded 
to the Council for adoption. 
A ‘particular feature’ of the EPPO provision is the enhanced cooperation procedure that may 
be launched by a group of at least nine Member States when the Council does not reach a 
unanimous decision.130 It should be launched on the basis of the proposed regulation within 
four months after the suspension of the procedure in the Council and notified to the EP, the 
Council and the Commission. 
In addition, the European Council may unanimously extend the EPPO’s powers to cover 
‘serious crimes affecting more than one Member State,’ with the consent of the EP and 
following consultation with the Commission.131 
Before the Commission introduced its proposal, EU scholarship criticised the necessity of the 
EPP proposal. Peers described the EPP as a ‘fundamentally flawed’ means of defending EU 
financial interests, together with securing the fundamental rights of criminals.132 Accordingly, 
there are ‘more limited measures which can achieve the same objective;’ such as the 
development of the European Arrest Warrant, which help to protect fundamental rights and 
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the departure from the dual criminality principle in cases of crimes against the EU’s financial 
interests. Moreover, Peers branded the EPP model as ‘half baked’; investigation and 
prosecution should not be separated from trial; centralization of the first and decentralization 
of the latter may compromise the protection of fundamental rights of criminal defendants.133 
2.2 Content of the EPPO proposal 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission proposal that would establish 
a European Public Prosecutor's Office was first mentioned in the Stockholm Programme.134 
In July 2013, the Commission proposed the draft Council regulation ‘on the establishment of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.’ The introduction of the draft proposal was 
perceived as a move from an ‘if,’ in the sense that ‘it is no longer a taboo for national policy 
makers and practitioners to explore establishing such an office,’ to a ‘how’ question focusing 
on ‘what the EPPO should look like.’135 
The ‘how’ of the EPPO draft proposal is presented in the following section, highlighting the 
issues that were picked up by national parliaments. Hence, the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the proposal first highlights the compliance with Article 5 TEU: conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles. Concerning the substance of the proposal, the central parts concern 
the structure of the EPPO; the appointment of the Office; legal principles central to the 
activities of the office; the competences of the EPPO; rules of procedure on investigations, 
prosecutions and trial proceedings; procedural safeguards; judicial review and relations with 
other institutions, especially Eurojust. 
With regard to the legal basis of the proposal, the Commission stated that it is anchored in 
Article 86 TFEU, citing the text of the provision without further explanations.136 Probably 
because the EPPO is explicitly foreseen in the TFEU, the Commission saw the legal basis 
issues as self-explanatory. On subsidiarity, the proposal elaborated more, and specified that 
‘the foreseen action has an intrinsic Union dimension’ which entails ‘Union-level steering 
and coordination of investigations and prosecutions of criminal offences affecting its own 
financial interests, the protection of which is required both from the Union and the Member 
States by Articles 310(6) and 325 TFEU.’137 This objective, in the view of the Commission, 
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‘can only be achieved at Union level by reason of its scale and effects.’ In consequence, 
according to the Commission, the current situation where national authorities are solely 
responsible for the prosecution of offences against the Union’s financial interests ‘is not 
satisfactory and does not sufficiently achieve the objective of fighting effectively against 
offences affecting EU budget.’ Whereas in fact the Commission argues in the earlier section 
of the Explanatory Memorandum that Member States are ‘unable to achieve an equivalent 
level of protection and enforcement,’ no qualitative or quantitative data is cited in support of 
this claim.138 Finally, with regard to compliance with the proportionality principle, the 
Commission argued that the measures are ‘least intrusive for the legal orders and the 
institutional structures of the Member States.’139 
With regard to the institutional set-up of the proposal, the Commission designs the EPPO as a 
‘decentralised structure,’140 specifying in the Explanatory Memorandum that EPPO is a 
decentralised integrated office.141 The EPPO consists of the European Public Prosecutor 
(EPP) assisted by four Deputies.142 The investigations and prosecutions are however 
conducted by European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) under the ‘direction and supervision’ 
of the EPP.143 The EDPs will wear a so-called ‘double hat.’ On the one hand, every Member 
State will have one European Delegated Prosecutor, who will remain an ‘integral part’ of the 
EPPO and will act under the ‘exclusive authority of the EPP, remaining ‘fully independent 
from the national prosecution bodies.’144 On the other hand, the EDPs can also fulfil the 
function of national prosecutors.145  
The Council, by a simple majority, appoints the EPP for a single eight-year term.146 The 
candidate should be chosen in an open call for candidates, his or her independence should be 
beyond doubt, and she should possess the qualifications for appointment to high judicial 
office, as well as having relevant experience as a prosecutor.147 The candidates for the EDPs 
are appointed for a renewable term of five years by the EPP from the candidates proposed by 
                                                 
138 Ibid point 1. See however more elaborated susbidiarity statement in the Impact Assessment Commission 
Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, SWD(2013)274, 17.7.2013, at 25-27. 
139 Explanatory Memorandum, point 3.2. 
140 Art 3(1) of the proposal. 
141 Explanatory Memorandum, point 2. [emphasis added] 
142 Art 6(1), (2) of the proposal. 
143 Art 6(3) of the proposal. 
144 Art 6(5) of the proposal. 
145 Art 6(6) of the proposal. 
146 Art 8(1) of the proposal. 
147 Art 8(2)-(3) of the proposal. Similar rules apply to the Deputies of the European Public Prosecutor. See also 
Art 9 of the proposal. 
103 
Member States.148 Similarly to the EPP, the candidates for EDPs should be qualified to serve 
at a high judicial office and have relevant prosecutorial experience. Moreover, if at the time 
of the appointment, the EDP is not a prosecutor under national law, the Member State will 
have to appoint the candidate to that position.149 
The basic principles that are fundamental to the activities of the EPPO include: respect for 
fundamental rights as provided by the EU Charter; guidance by the principle of subsidiarity 
in the application of individual investigative measures; and the exclusive competence of the 
EPPO to investigate and prosecute EU fraud.150 Whereas the proposed regulation is 
applicable to the activities of the EPPO, national law is relevant for cases not covered by the 
regulation, in such a case, the law of Member State where the investigation or prosecution 
takes place will apply.151 In cases where both national law and the regulation are applicable, 
the latter takes precedence. 
The central provisions concern the competences of the EPPO. The first competence is to 
investigate and prosecute ‘criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union.’152 
The second one is an ancillary competence to pursue criminal offences ‘inextricably linked’ 
with EU fraud and ‘their joint investigation and prosecution are in the interest of a good 
administration of justice.’153 For the EPPO to have an exclusive competence in these two 
cases, the offence has to be ‘wholly or partly committed’ either on the territory of one or 
several Member States, or by one of their nationals; Union staff members or members of the 
institutions.154 
Chapter III of the Commission proposal regulates in detail the rules of procedure on 
investigations, prosecution and trial proceedings. The core provisions concern the initiation 
of investigations: the EPP, or the EDP acting on its behalf, initiates the investigations 
concerning crimes against EU budget, which are later led by the EDP under the instructions 
of the EPP.155 The EPP and the EDP have the same power as a national public prosecutor to 
prosecute and bring the case before a court.156 
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The draft legislative act provides procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons.157 
The rights of suspects and accused persons include those provided for by EU legislation, such 
as right to interpretation and translation or access to case materials and to a lawyer, as well as 
those granted in accordance with national law: the right to remain silent and the presumption 
of innocence; the right to legal aid; and the right to present evidence.   
The proposal leaves the judicial review of the EPPO’s acts of investigation and prosecution 
in the hands of national courts. This is so because under the draft regulation, the EPPO ‘is 
considered as a national authority for the purpose of judicial review’.158 In other words, the 
EPPO is not ‘a body, office or agency of the Union’, which means that the EU courts are not 
competent to adjudicate on the acts of the EPPO in the action of annulment (Article 263 
TFEU), Treaty infringement proceedings (Article 265 TFEU) and actions for failure to act 
(Article 268 TFEU).159 Hence, only national courts may review acts of investigation and 
prosecution on the part of the EPPO. In addition, national courts may direct a preliminary 
question to the Court of Justice according to Article 267 TFEU, including questions on the 
interpretation of the EPPO regulation.160  
Finally, because the EPPO is created ‘from Eurojust,’ the proposal underlines that the EPPO 
‘shall establish and maintain a special relationship with Eurojust based on close cooperation 
and the development of operational, administrative and management links between them.’161 
These links include sharing information, such as, for example, personal data.162 
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2.3 The reasoned opinions of the national parliaments 
Fourteen chambers of national Parliaments have issued reasoned opinions within the 8-week 
deadline. The reasoned opinions came from unicameral parliaments: the Cypriot House of 
Representatives, the Hungarian National Assembly, the Maltese House of Representatives, 
the Slovenian National Assembly, the Swedish Riksdag; both chambers of the Irish 
Oireachtas, the Dutch and the UK parliaments; and from chambers of bicameral parliaments, 
specifically the Czech and French Senates, and the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.163 
Whereas the necessary number of opinions to trigger a ‘yellow card’ is one quarter in the 
case of a draft legislative act submitted on the basis of Article 76 TFEU on the area of 
freedom, security and justice, in the case at hand, reasoned opinions represented 18 votes out 
of 56.164  
Despite the fact that some national parliaments welcomed the creation of the EPPO in their 
reasoned opinions165 or considered that the EPPO would be able to be ‘assimilated’ in the 
national judicial system and that it contributed to the objective of the proposal,166 the message 
from the reasoned opinions was negative: the proposal is ‘unnecessary, excessive and 
insufficiently justified.’167 The main arguments of national parliaments concerning the 
competence of the EU to act, subsidiarity, proportionality and the merits of the proposal 
(especially the structure of the Office and fundamental rights protection) will be examined in 
turn.  
Many national parliaments voiced their concerns regarding the lack of competence of the EU 
to act in the area at stake. Namely, national parliaments opined that penal legislation is a 
matter of national sovereignty;168 in other words, criminal law is ‘primarily a national 
competence.’169 In the view of the Hungarian parliament, the ‘supranational model’ of the 
Office limits the existing national sovereignty in the field of criminal law.170 For example, 
Articles 11(4) and Article 14 of the proposal ‘exceed the authorization enshrined in Article 
86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since the latter doesn’t provide 
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exclusive competence to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.’171 The Romanian 
Chamber of Deputies argued rather that the extent of EPPO’s competences goes beyond the 
objective of Article 86 TFEU: the notion of ‘the Union’s financial interest’ does not allow for 
a clear line to be drawn between the offences that concern only the EU’s budget and those of 
national systems, which, in consequence, leads to an overlap between the two jurisdictions 
and the impossibility to pursue the prosecution at national level.172 In the same vein, the 
Dutch chambers claimed that there is a possibility that the prosecution of national offences 
will be restrained, ‘partly because it remains unclear how far the definition of “the financial 
interest of the Union” stretches.’173 Finally, the Slovenian parliament suggested that the far-
reaching exclusive competence of the EPPO runs counter to Slovenian constitutional law. 
With regard to the subsidiarity principle, the reasoned opinions focused on its procedural 
aspect, in the sense that the Commission did not provide ‘a detailed statement making it 
possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity,’ ‘substantiated by 
qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative criteria.’174 Accordingly, the House of 
Commons argued that the draft legislative acts should incorporate a detailed statement on the 
subsidiarity and proportionality of a measure in the explanatory memorandum, which is 
available in all official languages of the EU, in contrast to an impact assessment, which 
usually contains only an executive summary in the Member State’s official language.175 In 
consequence, the House of Commons concluded that there had been a violation of the 
procedural requirement of Article 5 Protocol No. 2.176 In the view of the House of Lords, 
options other than the EPPO, for example strengthening the powers of Eurojust, were not 
sufficiently examined by the Commission.177 The Cypriot parliament argued that ‘key parts 
of the proposal are based on assumptions or scenario approaches,’ for example there is no full 
set of data assessing the performance of Member States’ judicial systems, but the 
Commission still argued that EU action is indispensable.178 In the view of national 
parliaments, the Commission did not prove that ‘Member States take fraud against the 
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financial interests of the EU any less serious than fraud committed against anyone else.’179 
The Impact Assessment ‘lacks a solid basis’ in arguing that Member States’ actions are not 
sufficient.180 
Turning now to subsidiarity tests, in the view of national parliaments, the proposal did not 
fulfil the ‘national insufficiency test.’ The Slovenian parliament stated that the national 
authorities in that Member State were successful in the investigation and prosecution of 
offences affecting the EU’s financial interests, and that improvements should rather be sought 
in the cooperation between the competent national authorities and the already existing EU 
bodies. The House of Lords concluded that the Commission’s ‘assessment of the improved 
rates of prosecution and recovery to be gained by the establishment of the EPPO’ is too 
optimistic and that Member States are in a position to fight EU fraud by means of national 
criminal law.181 Likewise, Sweden stated that the Commission did not show that the national 
level measures together with Eurojust could not better achieve the objectives of the 
proposal.182 The idea of improving existing mechanisms, the Eurojust and OLAF,183 and their 
cooperation with Member States, was also echoed in the opinions of other parliaments. 184  
Moreover, in the view of national parliaments, the Commission did not fulfil the second 
dimension of the subsidiarity principle, namely the ‘comparative efficiency test.’ For 
example, the Czech Senate argued that insufficiencies in the prosecution of criminal offences 
against the financial interests of the Union at national level are caused by ‘different laws and 
also generally by the functioning of their judicial and administrative systems’ and ‘general 
difficulties with uncovering various types of financial criminality.’185 In the view of the 
Czech parliament, the EPPO proposal does not solve these problems. The objectives of the 
proposal, thus, can not be better achieved at EU level.  
National parliaments also highlighted the violation of the proportionality principle, stating 
that the proposal goes beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties. For instance, the Cypriot parliament argued that the restriction of the national 
competence for the investigation and prosecution of PIF (‘protection of financial interests’) 
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offences, by allowing the EPPO an exclusive competence in this regard, goes beyond what is 
necessary to achieve EU objectives.186 One of the specific examples given by the Cypriot 
parliament is Article 13 of the proposal on the ancillary competence, extending the EU 
competence at the cost of national level action. Similarly, the Maltese parliament underlined 
that the way in which the competences of the EPPO are drafted is ‘not necessarily the least 
intrusive and not the best way of achieving the reasonable stated objectives.’187 Similarly, the 
Swedish Riksdag concluded that ‘the proposal is so far-reaching that the question must be put 
as to whether the proposed measures exceed what is necessary to achieve its objective,’ 
which constitutes a violation of ‘the proportionality criterion that is included in the 
subsidiarity check.’188 
Regarding the merits of the Commission proposal, national parliaments addressed two main 
issues; the structure of the EPPO and the protection of fundamental rights. Regarding the 
former, the French and Romanian chambers maintained that the EPPO should have a 
collegial character (a chosen president with a rotation), which would anchor the EPPO better 
in the national systems.189 Concerning fundamental rights protection, some legislative 
chambers argued that the proposal does not provide for the necessary level of protection of 
rights, offering standards that are lower when compared to the national level. Such an issue 
was raised for example with regard to the rights of suspects, since not all investigative 
measures listed in the Commission’s proposal are foreseen under national law.190 In the same 
vein, the House of Commons argued that the Commission’s proposal does not provide for a 
high enough level of protection of suspects’ rights: for example, ‘the lack of detail on 
arrangements for judicial review undermines the proposal’s compliance with the Rule of 
Law.’191 Moreover, the reasoned opinion of the Czech Senate highlighted a possible violation 
of a number of fundamental rights: ‘the right to a lawful judge, which may be touched upon 
by the broad discretion of the European prosecutor in the choice of the competent national 
court, and the right to fair trial, which may be touched upon by the single-instance decision-
making of the Office, the absence of appellate procedures against decisions regulated in 
detail in the proposal, as well as absence of any procedure for adjudication on the objection 
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of prejudice of the European prosecutor, with the exception of judicial review.’192 The 
infringement of these rights protected under the Czech constitution and under the ECHR may 
in consequence compromise the fundamental rights protection under the EU Fundamental 
Rights Charter.  
In addition, some parliaments issued opinions within the political dialogue (‘Barroso 
initiative’). Many of them, like the Italian Senato, claimed compatibility with the subsidiarity 
principle due to the efficacy of the proposal, which cannot be achieved by single Member 
States;193 similarly the Portuguese parliament underlined the ‘intrinsic European dimension 
of the EPPO.’194 The Romanian Senate’s opinion did not perceive a subsidiarity violation, 
except for the provision concerning the delegated prosecutors automatically becoming 
national prosecutors, as this would interfere with the judicial organization of the state.195 
Other parliaments, acting within the ‘Barroso initiative’ commented rather on the contents of 
the proposal. The French Assemblée Nationale and the Croatian parliament issued opinions 
which generally support the creation of the EPPO, yet with necessary changes to the 
structure, proposing an office ‘composed of national members embedded in their respective 
judicial systems and electing among themselves a president, and not under a single European 
public prosecutor assisted by deputies and delegates to whom he would send his 
instructions.’196 In the same vein, the Polish Senat backed the proposal, though appending a 
criticism concerning the exclusive competence of the EPPO in financial crimes and its 
ancillary competence.197 The German Bundestag also welcomed the proposal, especially after 
the draft has been discussed in the Council, however pointing out some necessary changes.198 
The Grand Committee of the Finnish Eduskunta, similarly to the Spanish Parliament,199 
stated in its opinion that the EPPO proposal does not violate subsidiarity, however, the 
ancillary competence creates problems from the perspective of the Finnish Constitution 
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(provisions on sovereignty and the public prosecution service).200 The German Bundesrat 
issued an opinion that was generally supportive of the proposal, positioning itself against a 
possible enhanced cooperation. The Bundesrat proposed inter alia that the exclusive 
competence of the EPPO in the investigation of the PIF crimes is returned to national 
authorities depending on factors such as the amount of damage; circumstance where only one 
Member State is concerned, or adequate enforcement by national authorities.201 
On the margin, it can be noted that the Commission proposal has been also assessed for its 
compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity by academics. Mitsilegas and Ligeti gave 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union. Mitsilegas argued 
that the question at stake is not a sovereignty question on competence, as this is explicitly 
provided in the treaty, but rather one about who can best protect the EU budget.202 Ligeti 
stated that ‘there was substantial evidence showing that national authorities in the past were 
not the best protectors of the European Union’s budget’ and hence ‘it is fair to argue that that 
can be done best at EU level.’203 
2.4 Outcome 
In the letters addressed to national parliaments, the Commission confirmed that the ‘yellow 
card’ had been triggered.204 Shortly afterwards, on 27 November 2013, the Commission 
communicated to national parliaments its decision to maintain the EPPO proposal. In the 
view of the Commission, the proposal complied with the principle of subsidiarity; hence 
there was no need to withdraw or amend it.205 The Commission, while examining the 
reasoned opinions, decided to distinguish between ‘arguments relating to the principle of 
subsidiarity, or that could be interpreted as subsidiarity concerns, and other arguments 
relating to the principle of proportionality, to policy choices unrelated to subsidiarity, or to 
other policy or legal issues.’206 As arguments on subsidiarity, the Commission qualified: 
those that concern the sufficient substantiation of the compatibility with the subsidiarity 
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principle; the alleged sufficient character of existing mechanisms; the added value of the 
proposal; issues relating to the structure of the EPPO; and issues relating to the nature and 
scope of its competences.207 The Commission rebutted the arguments assessing the proposal 
as ‘too far reaching,’ stating that the regulation ‘goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
objective;’ alleged fundamental rights violations and the lost capacity of Member States to 
prioritize activities of their own criminal justice systems.  
The arguments of the Commission, which show that there is no subsidiarity violation, are the 
following. With regard to procedural subsidiarity, the Commission argued that the 
explanatory memorandum and the accompanying legislative financial statement, together 
with the more detailed impact assessment make the proposal ‘sufficiently substantiated with 
regard to the principle of subsidiarity.’208 
Concerning the ‘national insufficiency test,’ the Commission maintained, basing its 
assessment on OLAF’s annual statistics that the ‘[sufficient] situation in particular Member 
States is therefore not decisive in itself, as long as it can be shown that action at the level of 
Member States is generally insufficient, and that Union action would generally better achieve 
the policy objective.’209 In addition, the Commission, referring to the arguments proposing 
the strengthening of OLAF, Eurojust and Europol instead of introducing the EPPO, argued 
that ‘none of the existing mechanisms or bodies at Union level can address the shortcomings 
identified in view of their limited powers.’210 Likewise, the proposed PIF directive,211 which 
harmonises definitions of offences and sanction levels with regard to crimes against the 
Union’s financial interests, has no impact on the compatibility of the EPPO proposal with 
subsidiarity. In sum, the Commission restated that Member States cannot sufficiently achieve 
the objective of the EPPO regulation. 
With regard the ‘EU’s comparative efficiency test,’ labelled as the ‘added value’ of the 
proposal, the Commission underlined that the common Union-level prosecution will 
compensate for the differences between Member States on investigation and prosecution of 
Union fraud, in addition preventing forum shopping by perpetrators.212 Moreover, the 
likelihood of discovering cross-border links in EU fraud crimes will increase in comparison 
to exclusively national level investigations. Other ‘added-value’ elements concern the 
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simplification of procedures in obtaining information and evidence; the unconstrained 
admission of evidence lawfully collected in other Member States except for situations 
affecting fairness of the procedure and defence rights; and the merging of expertise on EU 
fraud. Taking into account these grounds, the Commission stated that the proposal fulfils the 
‘comparative efficiency test.’ 
Next, still within the subsidiarity test, the Commission elaborated on the concerns of national 
parliaments with regard to the structure of the EPPO and its competences. With regard to the 
former, the Commission stated that the arguments more concern the proportionality principle 
than subsidiarity. Specifically, the choice of a decentralized model and the collegial structure 
favoured by national parliaments is not a question of preference of action at national over EU 
level, but ‘a comparison between two possible modes of action at the Union level’ and hence 
does not concern subsidiarity.213 In the view of the Commission, the EPPO’s structure is 
however pertinent to the subsidiarity principle with regard to the comparative efficiency of 
EU level action. Indeed, a collegial structure would ‘hamper [the EPPO’s] efficiency, 
rendering its decision-making less efficient.’ Nonetheless, the Commission proposal allows 
for a ‘quasi-collegial’ approval in some cases because of their ‘operational importance,’ 
without diminishing the EPPO’s efficiency.  
With regard to to the arguments concerning the competence of the EPPO, the Commission 
focused its reply on the situation when the EPPO is competent to deal with all cases of fraud, 
including the non-cross-border cases and on the ancillary competence allowing the EPPO to 
intervene in criminal offences inextricably linked with those affecting the EU’s financial 
interests. On the former issue, the Commission argued that taking into account not only 
cross-border cases will guarantee ‘consistent investigation and prosecution policy across the 
Union and avoid parallel action at Union and national level, which would lead to duplication 
and a waste of precious resources.’214 Regarding the ancillary competence of the EPPO, the 
Commission underlined that the principle of subsidiarity is not violated, because it allows for 
an efficient engagement in anti-fraud activities and does not violate the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
While some MPs might see the possibility for the Commission to assess whether the 
threshold has been met as allowing the Commission to judge its own decision,215 the division 
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of arguments of the Commission should be welcomed, as an attempt to re-establish a ‘healthy 
limit’ on the capacity of national parliaments to criticize EU legislative proposals.216 It also 
follows the view promoted in this thesis that subsidiarity review should be a narrowly 
tailored mechanism. Perhaps the criticism of national parliaments concerning the structure of 
the EPPO should be seen more as an argument on the merits.  
The reply of the Commission was negatively assessed in the parliamentary chambers, both 
because the Commission decided to keep the proposal, but also because of the content of 
Commission’s reply. For example in the evidence session of the House of Lords with 
Commissioner Maroš Sefčovič, the House criticised the very prompt reply of the 
Commission, which failed to study the reasoned opinions, the exclusion of non-subsidiarity 
arguments and the Commission’s persistence in maintaining the proposal.217 In the House of 
Commons, the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee reacted to the plan of the 
Commission to go further with the proposal presented condemning it as ‘complete contempt 
for our Parliament and the others.’218 The Croatian parliament which did not issue a reasoned 
opinion itself maintained that the Commission reply of 27 November 2013 was unsatisfactory 
– it did not give concrete explanations for the rejection of the arguments of national 
parliaments.219 The Finnish parliament, which issued an opinion during the political dialogue, 
used it as an opportunity to express its discontent about the functioning of the EWS in 
general.220 It stated that the EWS ‘is a singularly ineffective way to affect European 
legislation,’ the Commission replies come delayed and do not respond to the substantive 
arguments of national parliaments. The parliament also maintained that the reasoned opinions 
have no impact on legislative outcomes, except for cases where the views of parliaments are 
supported by those of national governments in the Council. More positive was the Romanian 
chamber, which, in its opinion within the political dialogue issued after the Commission 
reply, recognised ‘in principle the validity of the European Commission's arguments for 
maintaining the proposal’ while making some additional observations.221 
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In March 2014, the Commission sent individual replies to each of the parliaments, which are 
presented in the annexed table. 
2.5 The current state of play 
Since the introduction of the draft proposal, in has been discussed at a number of the Council 
meetings due to its perceived importance and impact on EU criminal justice.222 The first 
revision of the text took place in March 2014, with a view to reflecting these discussions as 
well as ‘tak[ing] account’ of the views expressed by national parliaments in their reasoned 
opinions.223 The revised draft specifically focuses on the structure and competence of the 
EPPO. Regarding the structure of the EPPO, a model based on a college from all 
participating Member States has been approved.224 With regard to the exclusive competence 
of the EPPO, it was proposed by the Greek Presidency that it be exchanged for a concurrent 
competence.225 This means that both the EPPO and national prosecution authorities are 
competent to investigate and prosecute crimes against the EU budget, yet if the EPPO decides 
to exercise its competence, national authorities may not exercise theirs. At the same time, the 
EP, whose consent is necessary for the establishment of the EPPO under Article 86(1) TFEU, 
debated226 and approved the resolution on the EPPO.227 While giving a positive assessment of 
the proposal as reinforcing the fight against EU fraud, the EP called upon the Council to 
involve it more in its legislative work (via a better flow of information and continuous 
consultations with the EP).228  
2.6 Comparison with the first ‘yellow card’ 
As mentioned earlier, the EPPO was not the first proposal to receive a ‘yellow card’ from 
national parliaments. On 6 June 2012, the Commission acknowledged that enough votes (19 
out of 54) had been cast by national parliaments, and the first ‘yellow card’ was triggered 
with regard to the Monti II proposal, which aimed at balancing fundamental freedoms with 
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the right to strike.229 The Commission, following Protocol No. 2, announced its intent to 
review the proposal. On 12 September 2012, in contrast to the EPPO proposal, the 
Commission communicated the withdrawal of the proposal for a regulation on the exercise of 
the right to strike.230 Interestingly, in a letter to national parliaments, the Commission stated 
that it still considered the proposal as compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. By 
assessing the arguments put forward by national parliaments in their reasoned opinions, 
which concerned ‘the added value of the draft Regulation, the choice of the legal basis, the 
EU competence to legislate on this matter, the implications of the general principle included 
in Article 2 of the draft Regulation and the reference to the principle of proportionality in 
Article 3(4) and in recital 13 of the draft Regulation, equal access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms and the alert mechanism,’ the Commission ‘has not found based on this 
assessment that the principle of subsidiarity has been breached.’231 In consequence, the 
reason for the withdrawal was that the ‘proposal is unlikely to gather the necessary political 
support within the European Parliament and Council to enable its adoption.’232  
However, the decision to withdraw the Monti II proposal could have had a negative effect on 
the institutional balance in the EU. Despite the justification that the withdrawal was caused 
by the likely lack of appropriate majorities in the Council and the EP in the future, some 
national parliaments quickly reacted to the Commission’s decision arguing that, in fact, their 
reasoned opinions were the cause of the Commission’s action. For example, the French Sénat 
in its press release stated that the ‘parliamentary control shows its effectiveness at EU level’ 
and highlighted the pioneering role played by the chamber in mobilizing national 
parliaments.233 The reaction of the Latvian Saeima was even bolder: ‘Saeima makes the EU 
withdraw its proposed regulation.’234 The decision to withdraw the proposal could have 
unintentionally encouraged national parliaments use the EWS to assess aspects that go 
beyond the control of the subsidiarity principle. Since this chapter has suggested that a broad 
review applied by the national parliaments is not compatible with the function assigned to 
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them by the Lisbon Treaty, it seemed that the Commission has taken a strategically wrong 
decision.  
In fact, national parliaments in the reasoned opinions to the EPPO proposal again voiced 
concerns on the competence, proportionality and merits of the proposal, but this time clearly 
also assessed subsidiarity. In both cases, the Commission did not acknowledge a subsidiarity 
breach, but only in the EPPO case did it decide to continue the legislative process. Why was 
that? 
In both cases, unanimity in the Council was a prerequisite for the proposal to become binding 
law. The legal basis of the Monti II proposal, namely Article 352 TFEU, demands that ‘[i]f 
action by the [EU] should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in 
the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the [EU] Parliament, shall adopt the 
appropriate measures.’ In the same vein, Article 86 TFEU, the legal basis for the EPPO 
proposal requests that ‘[t]he Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament.’  
There seem to be two explanations of the inconsistency of the Commission’s approach 
concerning the Monti II and the EPPO proposal ‘yellow cards,’ which also shed light on the 
Commission’s future reactions to the ‘yellow card’ procedure. The first reason is connected 
with how important the proposal is on Commission’s agenda. Second, if other ways of 
pursuing the objective exist, for example, enhanced cooperation, the Commission will be 
willing to stay firm on its position and move forward with its ‘plan B’ in case the proposal 
fails to achieve the necessary support with the EU legislator.235  
Regarding the first explanation; the EPPO proposal has enjoyed support within the 
Commission since the beginning.236 However, this does not seem to be the case with the 
‘right to strike’ proposal. Not only was the text of the regulation very brief and ambiguous,237 
but the EP debate also seems to show that the idea of the proposal stems from the criticism of 
the EP socialists. The debate on the Statement by the President-designate of the Commission 
in September 2009 appears to show that even though Barroso confirmed that the right to 
strike and the right of association are ‘sacred rights,’ he added ‘[a]t the same time, we are 
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committed to the freedom of circulation in Europe.’ Concluding this point, Barroso referred 
to the ideas of the Socialist Group with regard to the respect of fundamental rights of 
workers: 
‘[t]hat is why I proposed here a way forward inspired by many of your suggestions and I am 
ready to work in loyalty with all the Members of this Parliament to achieve it so that we have 
a stronger Europe, keeping our internal market, but respecting fully the social rights of our 
workers.’238 
The position of the President-delegate of the Commission underlines that the idea of 
safeguarding the right to strike was demanded by the Socialist Group and from the beginning 
it was visible that the Commission would not accord it absolute priority, but had to provide a 
compromise solution. As Barrett points out, the Commission seemed to stick to the group of 
several Member States which welcomed the ECJ rulings in the Viking and Laval cases, but 
‘nonetheless attempted to soothe feelings on all sides’ with its Monti II regulation.239 The 
‘yellow card’ ‘provided an occasion’ for the Commission to abandon its proposal.240 
Second, whereas lack of unanimity in the Council or lack of the EP’s consent was a clear 
threat to the future of the Monti II proposal after the ‘yellow card’ triggered by national 
parliaments, Article 86(1) TFEU allow such proposals to be re-started in the form of 
enhanced cooperation; the ‘emergency accelerator’ can be started.241 Accordingly, if the 
regulation on the EPPO does not find unanimity in the Council, a group of nine Member 
States may request that the proposal is referred to the European Council, while the procedure 
in the Council is suspended. If within four months, Member States will agree to the proposal, 
it is referred back to the Council for adoption. If, however, within these four months, Member 
States did not reach an agreement, nine Member States may establish enhanced cooperation 
on the basis of the EPPO proposal;242 only a notification to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission is necessary; authorisation to proceed with enhanced 
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cooperation ‘shall be deemed to be granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall 
apply.’ In contrast, enhanced cooperation under Article 20(2) TEU and Article 329(1) TFEU 
demands an authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation ‘granted by the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.’ 
The difference between the ‘general scheme’ of enhanced cooperation and ‘particular rules’ 
such as in Article 86(1) TFEU reflects the ‘sensitivity of the subject matter.’243 In fact, the 
‘particular rules’ of enhanced cooperation apply only vis-à-vis provisions on judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
It follows from the above that it is very likely that the Commission will continue its efforts to 
introduce the EPPO on the basis of the existing text of the proposal, and this is why the 
proposal remained intact.244 The perspective of enhanced cooperation seems compelling; yet, 
there are also difficulties inherent in this structure such as the limitation of the territorial 
powers of the EPPO to Member States participating in the cooperation; further, the EPPO 
provisions will need to regulate the relationship between the participating and non-
participating Member States.245 Moreover it is uncertain which Member States would be 
interested in enhanced cooperation, though Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain 
‘have expressed interest recently,’ which makes enhanced cooperation ‘the most likely.’246 
Similarly, Klip states that ‘[g]iven the current political situation, it is most likely that the 
EPPO would initially commence operations only for a limited number of Member States.’247 
In any case it would be impossible to include all the Member States in the EPPO project, 
because of the UK and Danish opt-outs.248 
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Would the launch of the EPPO in the form of enhanced cooperation, however, be less 
justifiable from the perspective of the subsidiarity principle? Indeed, it has been argued by 
the Commission that an action at the EU level, covering all the Member States is necessary 
due to the cross-border character of EU fraud crimes.249 Starting an enhanced cooperation of 
a limited number of Member States seems to go against the need for the action at EU level. 
Yet, it could be argued that it is a legitimate expectation that with time other Member States 
will start joining the initiative. Moreover, the regulation implementing the enhanced 
cooperation on the EPPO will have to pass the subsidiarity test. Article 3 of Protocol No. 2 
includes in the notion of ‘draft legislative acts’ not only proposals from the Commission, but 
also, among others, initiatives from a group of Member States.250 
The comparison between the two ‘yellow cards’ higlights that the willingness of the 
Commission to move on with a proposal depends on two issues, notwithstanding the possible 
majorities that the proposal needs to gain within the EU legislative process. First, it is the 
importance of the draft act for the Commission’s agenda. Second, it is the possibility to re-
launch it in another form, such as enhanced cooperation, in case of defeat before the Council 
or the EP. 
Conclusion 
In sum, Paul Craig’s concerns about the role of national parliaments in the subsidiarity 
scrutiny seem to be confirmed only partially. National parliaments participate in the 
subsidiarity review, and two ‘yellow cards’ have been triggered thus far, but the focus of 
reasoned opinions is often far from subsidiarity issues.  
Assigning only a limited role to national parliaments by focusing their review on subsidiarity 
only has been criticised from the start as ‘virtually unenforceable, and depend[ing] for its 
                                                                                                                                                       
abstentions are not an obstacle to unanimity.) Council of the European Union, 6267/14, 7.02.2014, point 6 and 
10. 
249 COM(2013) 534, Explanatory Memorandum at 2. 
250 As a comparable example see the Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of financial transaction tax, 14.2.2013, COM(2013) 71, in which case the lettre de saisine (SG-
Greffe(2013) D/1947, 19.2.2013) clearly stated that the EWS applies and the reasoned opinion of the Swedish 
Riksdag of 11.04.2013 on COM(2013) 71. In the case of the EPPO an authorisation of the Council on the 
proposal of the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the EP is not necessary to proceed with the 
enhanced cooperation, according to Art 329(1) TFEU and as provided by Art 86(1) subparagraph 3 TFEU such 
an authorisation is deemed as granted. Hence in this case national parliaments will not assess the Commission 
proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation, as exemplified in the case of Proposal for a 
Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection 
COM(2010) 790 and the political dialogue opinion of the Italian Senato. 
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effectiveness on the restraint of the national parliaments.’251 More recently, after the EWS 
came into force, this version of narrowly tailored subsidiarity has been criticised as ‘rather 
idealistic,’252 and as a missed opportunity ‘to politicise the dialogue between the Commission 
and national parliaments.’253 It has been argued that subsidiarity is more significant as a 
political principle, and national parliaments, which are political institutions, should be 
granted a possibility to interpret subsidiarity in a way that they find appropriate.254 Goldoni 
proposes the ‘political interpretation of the subsidiarity review’ of the EWS as a 
‘commitment to enhance representative democracy’ in line with Article 10 TEU and giving 
national parliaments a role similar to that of constitutional courts, namely as ‘protectors of 
constitutional essentials’ in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU. In his view, reducing 
subsidiarity to a ‘technical exercise of competence review (…) betrays, by institutional 
design, a pro-European centripetal prejudice.’255 In Goldoni’s view, the EWS is ‘an invitation 
to national parliaments and to their EACs in particular, to investigate, judge, influence and 
censure the legislative proposals of the Commission.’256 
The argument that ‘more parliamentary involvement brings more democratic legitimacy’ 
seems to be prima facie morally plausible. Yet, in normative terms, there is a set of 
arguments speaking against a broad subsidiarity review. First, the aforementioned textual, 
structural and functional arguments explain ‘why not.’ In addition, the practice shows that in 
the case of the first ‘yellow card,’ the withdrawal of the proposal where the Commission did 
not find convincing subsidiarity arguments caused a misunderstanding within the national 
parliaments about their role in the EU legislative process. This was also confirmed, by the 
major discontent of some national parliaments to the fact that the Commission did not 
withdraw the EPPO proposal. Although Protocol No. 2 provides that the Commission may 
withdraw its proposal in the case of a ‘yellow card,’ this could reasonably be expected in a 
case where the Commission itself is persuaded by the subsidiarity arguments expressed in a 
reasoned opinion. The outcome of the first ‘yellow card’ was hence closer to a ‘red card’ and 
in the second ‘yellow card,’ national parliaments expected a ‘red card’ effect again.  
                                                 
251 Barber, ‘Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution’ at 203. 
252 Wojciech Gagatek, ‘Polityczne i prawne znaczenie zasady pomocniczości w UE (po 20 latach od wejścia w 
życie Traktatu z Maastricht)’ [2013] Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 31, 38. 
253 Marco Goldoni, ‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political 
Interpretation’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 90, 101. 
254 Gagatek at 38. 
255 Goldoni at 102. 
256 Ibid at 106. 
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As argued by Convention Working Group I, which set the principles of the subsidiarity 
scrutiny, ‘these improvements should not make decision-making within the institutions more 
cumbersome or lengthier, nor block it.’257 The possibility to allow a ‘red card’ procedure 
would have been ‘an enormous concession to the supposed wisdom of national Parliaments at 
the expense of efficient problem solving initiated by the Commission and carried forward by 
the Council and European Parliament.’258  
Another question concerns the subsidiarity scrutiny where there are not enough opinions for a 
‘yellow card.’ Why not allow a broad review? First, it would mean marrying the role already 
played by the ‘Barroso initiative,’ which has also had some effect on EU policy-making as 
was shown in the previous chapter. Second, the amount of the opinions sent within the 
political dialogue outnumbers those within the EWS. Hence, it means that allowing broadly 
drafted reasoned opinions would also have probably increased their total number. For the 
Commission, to go through these within a reasonable time and highlight subsidiarity 
arguments would have involved certain concessions concerning the speed and efficiency of 
the legislative procedure. Currently, some national parliaments draft broad reasoned opinions, 
but it could be assumed that, with a general concession in this regard, the number of reasoned 
opinions would grow. In consequence of ‘excessive and unfocussed’ use of the subsidiarity 
review, as was argued by Franz Mayer before the German Bundestag, the expected effect of 
the EWS to raise more subsidiarity awareness (Subsidiaritätsbewusstsein) among EU 
institutions would be ‘significantly weaken[ed].’259 This speeks against the ‘intermediate’ 
view (one that is between narrow and broad scrutiny) that national parliaments should not be 
stopped from commenting on all sorts of issues, in the framework of their EWS reasoned 
opinion, but that their formal reasoned opinion (or rather, the conclusions of their opinion) 
should be restricted to subsidiarity issues. 
                                                 
257 CONV 286/02, Point I (2). 
258 Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’, 44. 
259 Deutscher Bundestag, Protokoll der 8. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses-Unteraussschuss Europarecht, 
‘Öffentliches Expertengespräch zu dem Thema: “Prüfung des unionsrechtlichen Subisidiaritätsprinzips”’, 
16.06.2010, see expertise of Franz Mayer, p. 12 (own translation). 
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Chapter 3: 
Design of the ex ante subsidiarity review at the national level 
Introduction 
The process of European integration imposes new challenges on the national parliaments of 
Member States of the European Union. However, national legislative bodies are, according to 
Wessels and Maurer, ‘slow and retarding adapters’ in response to changes in the EU system.1 
At the beginning of the European integration process, national parliaments were supposed to 
adopt two main functions regarding EU affairs: transposition of EU law into the national 
legal order and, depending on the constitutional system, scrutiny of the position taken by 
respective national governments in the Council. With the Treaty of Lisbon, further reforms of 
national parliaments were needed, especially for the most vital new function: subsidiarity 
review. 
Against this background, this chapter reviews whether national parliaments are prepared to be 
‘responsible for integration.’2 This responsibility derives from the observation that in the EU 
‘the legitimization of supranational secondary acts cannot be directly constructed (...) the 
institution with the greatest base of legitimacy should be involved.’3 Such institutions are, 
primarily, the national parliaments. Adjustments for subsidiarity scrutiny at the national level 
indicate the readiness of national parliaments to accept their new role and to improve their 
effectiveness at the EU level. Specifically, the internal organization for subsidiarity scrutiny 
is a crucial point to be developed in the debate about the new role of national parliaments in 
the EU. Because the adaptation of the internal legislative organization for the EWS is in 
hands of the Member States, the effectiveness of national parliaments’ largely relies on how 
these procedures are designed at the national level. 
This chapter is structured as follows: first, in Section 1, I review the institutional changes of 
national parliaments related to the process of European integration. I explore whether the 
structures of national parliaments have undergone an ‘active institutional Europeanization’ by 
‘implement[ing] a variety of institutional reforms to enhance their participation in European 
affairs,’ as had taken place in the pre-Lisbon Treaty period with regard to information rights, 
                                                 
1 Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players?’ at 
461. 
2 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30.6.2009, para. 245 (English version). 
3 Frank Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the 
Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1219, 1235. 
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the creation of EU affairs committees and resolutions on EU draft legislative acts.4 Section 2 
of this chapter will focus on constitutional jurisprudence, and more specifically, on recent 
judgments of constitutional courts in Europe urging national parliaments to adjust provisions 
to accommodate new functions. Next, I categorize various types of parliamentary adjustments 
to the innovations brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon (Section 3). I limit the scope to ex 
ante review (the preparation of reasoned opinions), whereas the ex post review (actions 
before the ECJ) is discussed in the next chapter. Both types of review seem to be the biggest 
challenge of all the Lisbon related reforms for national parliaments, both at national and 
regional level. The core of this chapter deals with the review of all of the national systems of 
subsidiarity review, which opens my methodological ‘accordion,’ to show all possible types 
of scrutiny a global examination of all the national systems is necessary. Due to space 
constraints, only some of the procedures are reconstructed in detail in this chapter in order to 
capture how differences, even those that are seemingly inconsequential at first sight, are 
crucial for the effectiveness of the procedure. The remaining procedures are discussed in the 
annexed table. Additionally, in Section 3, I consider the role played by regional parliaments 
in some of the Member States included in this comparison. In Section 4, I compare the 
institutional adjustments for ex ante review based on the following variables: the moment of 
detection of a subsidiarity violation, the initiative to draft a reasoned opinion, the role of the 
government, and the role of the plenary session. My review of different types of ex ante 
scrutiny is followed by a study of the latest Commission reports on the activity of national 
parliaments concerning subsidiarity scrutiny (Section 5). At this point, I explore whether the 
choice of the scrutiny procedure has an impact on the activity of a parliament in the EWS. 
The chapter concludes with a short summary of national parliament adjustments for the ex 
ante review, and counsels in favour of further assessment of the content of the reasoned 
opinions issued by national parliaments, which is provided for in Chapters 6 and 7. 
1 Institutional evolution of national parliaments under European integration 
Under the original treaties establishing the European Communities, most legislative bodies of 
the original six Member States did not alter their internal structures in response to the process 
of European integration. National parliaments neither had nor were in search of a formally 
                                                 
4 Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz, ‘The politics of adaptation: The Europeanisation of national parliamentary 
systems’ (2005) 11 The Journal of Legislative Studies 372, 373. 
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ascribed function in EU affairs.5 At the time, governments were in a strong position at the EU 
level, and although some national parliaments (namely, the German, Belgian, Italian and 
Dutch) had established European Committees, such committees wielded only marginal 
influence.6 Subsequently, the parliaments in the UK and Denmark established EU Affairs 
Committees, in order to safeguard the strong constitutional position of such parliaments after 
accession to the EC.7  
The institutional design of national parliaments underwent changes during the process of 
treaty reform, which shifted many national competences to the EU level. The Commission 
White Paper on the Single Market and the Single European Act mark an important stage in 
this process, because it moved some of the more essential competences from the national to 
the EU level. Subsequently, three major changes in the attitude of national parliaments 
towards European integration can be identified. Both Norton and Maurer and Wessels note,8 
first, the greater specialisation of parliamentarians concerning policy areas and functions of 
parliaments, especially due to the establishment of EC Committees. Second, committees 
became more involved in the management of European affairs, as indicated by the increase in 
time dedicated to the analysis of documents for Council meetings and the implementation of 
directives. Third, parliamentary bodies underwent segmentation and fragmentation 
(developments connected to the greater involvement of specialised committees on European 
affairs) and Members of the European Parliament became involved in the work of advisory 
committees. 
Later, the Maastricht Treaty brought about a need for further adjustments at the national 
level, strengthening the participation rights of parliaments, especially regarding information 
rights. For example, in 1992, France and Germany regulated the position of the national 
parliament in EU affairs at the constitutional level.9 Concomitantly, specialised committees 
became more involved in EU affairs, particularly as a result of the growing workload of EU 
Affairs Committees.10 The remaining treaties, while referring to national parliaments, did not 
have the same effects as earlier EU reforms. For example, the Amsterdam Treaty, even 
                                                 
5 Philip Norton, ‘Introduction: Adapting to European integration’ in Philip Norton (ed), National parliaments 
and the European Union (Frank Cass 1996) at 23. 
6 Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players?’ at 
437. 
7 Norton at 24. 
8 Ibid at 25; Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National 
Players?’ at 435. 
9 Art 4 La loi constitutionnelle n° 92-554 du 25 juin 1992; Art 1 Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes v. 
21.12.1992 BGBl. I 92, 2086. 
10 O'Brennan and Raunio at 12. 
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though it contained a Protocol on the role of national parliaments, did not affect national 
institutional design to the same extent as the Maastricht Treaty.11 Likewise, Declaration No. 
23 attached to the Nice Treaty did not have a substantial impact, although it placed national 
parliaments on the agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. With the 
Constitutional Treaty, some parliaments saw an incentive to reform their internal organisation 
in order to accommodate new powers; however that treaty did not come into force.12 
National parliaments finally gained new powers through the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the changes to national institutional design it triggered. Adjustments specifically 
allowed for the participation of national legislative bodies in future treaty changes and in 
subsidiarity review. In 2008, Germany and France amended their constitutions to 
accommodate the participation rights of national parliaments in subsidiarity scrutiny.13 This 
level of reform reflected the importance of national parliaments’ participation in the EU 
legislative process for national constitutional systems. In addition to the amendment of 
constitutions, most Member States introduced reforms of infra-constitutional law, especially 
to the rules of procedure, in order to accommodate subsidiarity review. 
Before exploring the newly established procedures for ex-ante scrutiny, the next section looks 
at the constitutional case law, which stressed the role of national parliaments in European 
integration, and the necessity of adapting national provisions in order to reflect their 
significance. 
2 Analysis of Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Some constitutional courts have emphasised the importance of participation of national 
parliaments in EU affairs and demanded constitutional or infra-constitutional adjustments for 
this purpose. This section examines the decisions of the German, French and Polish 
constitutional courts concerning the new functions of national parliaments. 
2.1 Germany 
The judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in June 2009 held that the new 
institutional role of national parliaments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon does not 
                                                 
11 Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players?’ at 
462. 
12 See for example the UK House of Commons, Modernisation Committee Second Report, Session 2004- 2005, 
para. 113-118. 
13 Art 1 Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes Artikel 23, 45 und 93 v. 08.10.2008 BGBl. I 2009, 1926; Art 
43 and 47 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve 
République. 
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compensate the legitimacy deficit based on the EP elections, and does not rectify the 
legitimacy deficit in the EU, as the reduced number of decisions demanding unanimity and 
supranationalisation of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters diminishes the role 
played by national parliaments in the EU decision making process.14 In the view of the 
Constitutional Court, only the national parliaments, and not the EP, may safeguard 
democracy at the European level. In this respect, the Court introduced the new concept of 
‘responsibility for integration’ (Integrationsverantwortung), applicable to all state organs, 
which are obliged to ensure that the political systems of Germany and the EU remain in 
compliance with the principle of democracy according to the German Basic Law.15 The 
‘responsibility for integration’ should be understood as a counterbalance to the dynamic 
developments of European integration and the lack of direct legitimacy of secondary 
legislation.16 In such a situation, the national parliament, as the state organ with the most 
legitimacy, should take over the responsibility for integration. The responsibility for 
integration guarantees the participation of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat not only for 
treaty changes, but also compels these parliamentary chambers to ‘politically accompany’ 
decisions taken by the EU.17 
Changes of national provisions had to be introduced in order to meet the obligation of ‘the 
responsibility for integration.’ Even though the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that both 
the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon18 and the Act Amending the Basic Law (Articles 23, 
45 and 93)19 were compliant with the Basic Law, it ruled that the Act Extending and 
Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat,20 regulating the participation of 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in EU affairs, contradicts Article 38.1 in connection with 
Article 23.1 of the Basic Law. The act did not sufficiently safeguard the participation rights 
of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, a new 
legal act should ‘take into account that [the Bundestag and the Bundesrat] must exercise their 
responsibility for integration in numerous cases of dynamic development of the treaties.’21 
                                                 
14 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30.6.2009, para 293-294.  
15 Ibid, para 238 - 245. 
16 Schorkopf at 723. 
17 Martin Nettesheim, ‘Die Integrationsverantwortung-Vorgaben des BVerfG und gesetzgeberische Umsetzung’ 
(2010) 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift: NJW 177. 
18 Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon, Gesetz v. 8.10.2008 zum Vertrag von Lissabon v. 13.12.2007 
BGBl. II 2008, 1038. 
19 Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes Artikel 23, 45 und 93 v. 08.10.2008 BGBl. I 2009, 1926. 
20 Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, BT-Dr 16/8489. 
21 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30.6.2009, para 411. 
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The Court indicated how to shape the new provisions: to fulfil their role, the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat should be equipped with appropriate powers at the national level.22 Regarding 
the subsidiarity review, the Constitutional Court specifically stated that the effectiveness of 
the EWS ‘depends on the extent to which the national Parliaments will be able to make 
organisational arrangements that place them in a position to make appropriate use of the 
mechanism within the short period of eight weeks.’23 The Court also expressed concern 
regarding the scope of the subsidiarity action, specifically whether the action of the national 
parliaments and of the Committee of the Regions will be extended to assessing ‘whether the 
European Union has competence for the specific lawmaking project.’24  
During the summer of 2009, after the Federal Constitutional Court issued its judgment, 
Germany introduced new laws regulating the participation of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat. Nevertheless, these changes, according to some scholars, do not satisfy the core 
idea of the responsibility for integration.25 Moreover, since three different laws regulate the 
matter, the procedure is not sufficiently transparent26 and for this reason, some propose that 
the parliament should draw up a ‘German Code on European Law.’27  
2.2 France 
In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel considered, in response to a request from the President 
of the Republic pursuant to Article 54 of the Constitution (on references concerning the 
constitutionality of international treaties), whether the authorization to ratify the Treaty of 
Lisbon required prior revision of the Constitution. In its decision, the Council recognized the 
new role of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union.28 However, it was 
essential to analyse whether these new competences could be applied within the framework 
of the current provisions of the Constitution. The ‘important role given to the national 
                                                 
22 Ibid, para 411-419. However, the failure of the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat was connected with the treaty amendment procedures and not on the subsidiarity review. 
23 Ibid, para 305.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Nettesheim at 182. The changes are limited to the direct consequences of the judgment and do not include, 
e.g., the parliament oversight in the application of energy competence by the EU (Article 194 TFEU). 
26 Ibid at 183. 
27 Christian Calliess and Tim Beichelt, ‘The Europeanization of the Bundestag: From Observer to Player?’ 
<http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-BDF67703-
3D1034DF/bst/xcms_bst_dms_39243_39244_2.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014 at 31. 
28 Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2007-560 DC, 20 January 2007 (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community) p. 28-32. The Council invoked the 
principle of subsidiarity stating that: ‘implementation of this principle may not suffice to preclude any transfers 
of powers authorized by the Treaties from assuming a dimension or being implemented in a manner such as to 
adversely affect the fundamental conditions of the exercising of national sovereignty.’(at p. 16). 
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parliaments by the Lisbon Treaty’ – the power of the French parliament to oppose certain 
aspects of family law subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, and to ensure compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity – required a revision of the Constitution in order to allow 
the parliament to exercise its functions.29 As a consequence, France added Article 88-6 to 
Title XV on the European Union in order to provide for the subsidiarity check.30 
2.3 Poland 
In Poland, as early as 2005, the Constitutional Court stressed the need to ensure that both the 
Sejm and the Senat participate in the process of EU law drafting.31 However, until the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the necessary changes to Polish law were not introduced, due to a lack of political 
will.32 As a consequence, in its Lisbon Treaty judgment, the Constitutional Court emphasized 
the significance of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 which foresees that national parliaments may 
issue reasoned opinions on EU draft legislative acts and enables the Polish parliament to 
shape the content of EU law ‘to the extent (…) that it is possible to narrow down the scope of 
its “external character” in relation to the Polish state.’33 In this respect, the Constitutional 
Court left it to the legislature to take the legal measures to accommodate this procedure, and 
to establish the principles shaping the cooperation of government with the Sejm and the Senat 
in EU affairs.34 
The decisions of constitutional bodies in Germany, France and Poland underlined the 
importance of national parliaments for the participation of these Member States in the affairs 
of the European Union. Whereas the role of national parliaments, including their scrutiny of 
the subsidiarity principle, was elevated to the level of a constitutional amendment in 
                                                 
29 Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: a legal and political analysis (Cambridge University Press 2010) at 
128. 
30 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République 
31 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, K 24/04 judgment of 12.01.2005, inequality in competences of Sejm and Senat 
committees in respect of European Union legislative proposal. The Court stated that influencing the position of 
the government is in fact a legislative function. As long as the bi-cameral Parliament is to be maintained, both 
chambers should be guaranteed equal participation in activities concerning the shaping position of Poland in the 
field of adopting EU law. Cf. Adam Łazowski, ‘The Polish parliament and EU affairs: an effective actor or an 
accidental hero?’ in John O'Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National parliaments within the enlarged 
European Union: from'victims' of integration to competitive actors? (Routledge 2007) at 212-214. 
32 Aleksander Fuksiewicz, ‘Sejm i Senat rok po wejściu w życie Traktatu Lizbońskiego-dostosowanie do 
reformy instytucjonalnej’ <http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/1827766553.pdf> at 11. 
33 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, K 32/09 judgment of 24 November 2010, p. 31. The Court, following the Polish 
doctrine, sees EU law as an order that is ‘partially external’ to Polish law. Even though the Polish legal system 
is generally seen by the Court as ‘multicentric’ meaning that EU legal acts have a legal force in Poland, the 
Court underlines that EU primary law comes into force as accepted by all Member States, while EU secondary 
law by the national representatives in the Council and the representatives of European citizens (including 
Polish) in the EP. The element of ‘externality’ is hence that it is not the Polish legislator who constitutes EU 
law. 
34 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, K 32/09, p. 31. 
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Germany (albeit only for ex-post scrutiny) and France, in Poland this procedure remained at 
the level of infra-constitutional law, probably due to the inflexibility of the Polish 
Constitution.35 In the next Section, I will explore the details of Member States’ institutional 
design concerning subsidiarity scrutiny. 
3 Overview of scrutiny types 
Kiiver argues that national parliaments retained autonomy with regard to internal procedures 
for the subsidiarity scrutiny, and that the only requirement that these procedures need to fulfil 
is that, under the national law they must be regarded as adopted by the parliament or a 
chamber thereof.36 Following this view, in this section, I will categorize scrutiny systems 
utilized by parliamentary committees when assessing the compatibility of EU draft legislative 
acts with the principle of subsidiarity.37 For each of the categories, I provide a detailed review 
of the mechanism; similar systems are then listed and elaborated in an annexed table.  
An analysis of Member States indicates the existence of four types of scrutiny of the principle 
of subsidiarity: centralized, mixed, decentralized and ‘subsidiarity-focused’. First, a single 
dominant committee, the EU Affairs Committee, characterizes the centralised system; there 
is no delegation to specialized committees (this is the case for the Polish Sejm, both Austrian 
chambers, as well as the Maltese, Croatian and Hungarian parliaments). The scrutiny system 
may also be double-centralized, in the sense that there is one joint committee for two 
parliamentary chambers (as is the case in Spain). Another type includes subcommittees of the 
EU Affairs Committee on specialized EU affairs disciplines (the UK).  
Second, subsidiarity scrutiny may have a mixed character, including a few subcategories: 
a) The domination of the EU Affairs Committee with the approval of specialized 
committees (French Senate, Estonia) 
b) The domination of the EU Affairs Committee with the prior consultation of 
specialised committees (Finland, Bulgaria, Greece, Italian Camera dei 
Deputati, Latvian Seima, Lithuanian Seimas, Portugal, Cypriot Czech and 
Danish parliaments, French Assembly) 
                                                 
35 Art 235 of the Polish Constitution. 
36 Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical reality 
at 25. 
37 P. Kiiver adopts similar categories with regard to the parliamentary committees that scrutinize EU affairs in 
general: centralized, decentralized systems and ‘middleway models’ such as: system of delegated scrutiny with 
centralised briefing or system of coordination. Cf. Philipp Kiiver, The national parliaments in the European 
Union: A critical view on EU constitution-building, vol 50 (Kluwer law international 2006) at 47-54.  
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c) The domination of specialized committees with a sifting role of the EU Affairs 
Committee (Luxembourg, Belgian Chambre des Représentants) 
d) The domination of specialized committees with final approval of the EU 
Affairs Committee (German and Romanian parliaments) 
Third, a scrutiny system may take a decentralized form, where only a specialized committee 
conducts scrutiny (the Netherlands, Eerste Kamer, Belgian Sénat, both Irish chambers and the 
Italian Senato).  
The fourth ‘subsidiarity focused’ form includes a committee that deals exclusively with 
subsidiarity issues; such an organ has only functioned for a certain period in the Netherlands.  
From the pool of all the chambers, I have chosen representative examples for each category 
in order to present a closer description of each type of scrutiny. The scrutiny procedures of 
the remaining chambers are listed in the table annexed to this chapter.38 The parliaments 
selected for the overview have adopted one of the scrutiny types: centralised; mixed; 
decentralised; or subsidiarity-focused.  
3.1 Centralised Scrutiny System 
3.1.1 Poland (Sejm) 
The Polish parliament, which consists of the Sejm (lower chamber) and the Senat (upper 
chamber),39 was involved in EU affairs even prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, mainly in 
relation to the approximation of national law to EU law.40 Nonetheless, the constitutional 
provisions do not provide for any important role in EU affairs, due to the leading role of the 
Council of Ministers and the President in this respect.41 Currently, the Cooperation Act42 and 
the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm43 and the Senat44 regulate subsidiarity review. The 
                                                 
38 All the procedures in detail see Claudia Hefftler and others (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of National 
Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 2015 forthcoming). 
39 Article 96 of the Constitution. 
40 Łazowski at 207. 
41 Article 146 and Article 133 of the Constitution. 
42 Ustawa z dnia 8 października 2010 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach 
związanych z członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, Dz. U. Nr 213 Poz. 1395. 
43 Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 lipca 1992 r., Regulamin Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, M.P. 1992 nr 26 poz. 185. 
44 Uchwała Senatu z dnia 23 listopada 1990 r., Regulamin Senatu, M.P. 1991 nr 2 poz. 11. 
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Constitution does not provide for a subsidiarity review in its text; moreover, planned 
constitutional changes also do not explicitly mention subsidiarity review.45 
For subsidiarity scrutiny, the lower chamber utilizes the centralized model,46 whereas the 
upper chamber uses a mixed one, where the EU Affairs Committee and specialized 
committees work together on formulating a reasoned opinion.47 As a consequence, the 
purpose of this section is to present the centralized subsidiarity scrutiny of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Sejm, which was established in 2004.48 
The Cooperation Act and Rules of Procedure regulate the subsidiarity review of the Sejm. 
Article 148cc par. 1-5 of the recently adjusted Sejm Rules of Procedure provides that either 
the EU Affairs Committee or a group of fifteen MPs can bring resolution in response to 
subsidiarity violations, with a reasoned opinion attached to a motion stating the grounds.49 
Additionally, the first reading of this resolution takes place within the EU Affairs Committee, 
without the possibility of attaching an amendment thereafter. If adopted, the Marshall of the 
Sejm will forward the resolution to the relevant EU institution. 
Furthermore, the new Cooperation Act obliges the government to cooperate with the Sejm 
and the Senat in ‘affairs connected to the membership in the EU.’50 In particular, the 
Cooperation Act states that the Council of Ministers must forward an opinion on draft 
legislative acts from EU institutions no later than fourteen days after receipt thereof.51 The 
opinion of the Council of Ministers should contain an impact assessment of legislative acts 
on the Polish legal, social, economic and financial systems and information on the type of EU 
legislative procedure. The statement on compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity is also 
an indispensable component of the opinion.52 Moreover, the appropriate Sejm organ (in this 
                                                 
45 The recent development concerning the participation of the Polish parliament in EU affairs contains the 
project of the constitutional amendment, so-called ‘European-Chapter’. Before the elections in 2011, the project 
of the President foresaw new Article 227h par. 2. This provision guaranteed the exercise of the Sejm and the 
Senat’s powers in the form and scope defined by the EU treaties. A similar provision (Art. 227 d par. 1), 
however with a reference to infra-constitutional act (on the cooperation) contained the project proposed by one 
of the political parties Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Projects available at: 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki6ka.nsf/0/0FA39CE6B812715AC12577E400489FEF/$file/3598.pdf and 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki6ka.nsf/0/AC1310990AB3FCA7C12577F9003C7668/$file/3687.pdf 
46 However, see the written evidence from the EU Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm to the House of Lords, 
which pointed out that the Sejm’s sectoral committees are now more involved in scrutiny work and that joint 
meetings between the EU affairs committee and sectoral committees are sometimes held.  
47 Procedura Badania Pomocniczości w Sejmie, 
http://oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/badanie_pomocniczosci/subsidiarity_sejm_table_pl.pdf 
48 Art 1 pkt 1 Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
49 Art 1 pkt 1 Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
50 Art 1 and 2 Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
51 Art 7 Cooperation Act. 
52 Art 7 par. 3, n. 3 Cooperation Act. 
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case, the Committee on EU affairs) may issue an opinion on a draft act within forty-nine days 
of receipt of the draft act by the Council of Ministers.53 If the period provided by the 
Commission is shorter than fifty-six days, then the Council of Ministers is obliged to present 
its opinion to parliament within one-quarter of the time provided by the European 
Commission.54 Although the Council of Ministers does not issue statements concerning other 
draft acts, it will still prepare an opinion at the request of the committees of the Sejm or the 
Senat. 
3.1.2 Spain 
The Spanish parliament, Cortes Generales, consists of two chambers: the Senado (upper) and 
Congreso de los Diputados (lower). The parliament participates in EU affairs through the 
Joint Committee for the EU (Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea), which controls EU 
affairs on the basis of Ley 24/2009, introduced in December of 2009 to implement the Lisbon 
Treaty’s provisions, and amending the already existing Ley 8/1994.55 Moreover, as of 2010, 
the resolution of presidiums of both chambers regulates subsidiarity review.56 These reforms 
are a ‘fundamental change’ for Spain, as the government previously limited the activity of the 
Joint Committee of EU affairs by not immediately forwarding relevant documents.57  
The Bureau of the Speaker and the Joint Committee constantly monitor documents received 
from EU institutions. The Joint Committee may also request additional information from the 
government or a note concerning EU documents, including information on the principle of 
subsidiarity.58 The government has a maximum of two weeks to submit such an evaluation.59 
The initiative to start a subsidiarity review may come from the Bureau of the Speaker or that 
of the Joint Committee; in such case, they shall appoint a rapporteur to prepare a proposal for 
a reasoned opinion.60 Two political groups, or one-fifth of the members of the Joint 
                                                 
53 Art 7 par. 4 Cooperation Act. 
54 Art 7 par. 5 Cooperation Act. 
55 Ley 24/2009, de 22 de diciembre, de modificación de la Ley 8/1994, de 19 de mayo, por la que se regula la 
Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, para su adaptación al Tratado de Lisboa de 13 de diciembre de 2007. 
For the history of this regulation see Sonia Piedrafita, ‘The Spanish Parliament and EU Affairs in the Post 
Lisbon Treaty Era: All Change?’ (2014) Journal of Legislative Studies 18.  
56 Resolución de las Mesas del Congreso de los Diputados y del Senado, de 27 de mayo de 2010, sobre reforma 
de la Resolución de las Mesas del Congreso de los Diputados y del Senado, de 21 de septiembre de 1995, sobre 
desarrollo de la Ley 8/1994, de 19 de mayo, por la que se regula la Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, para 
su adaptación a las previsiones del Tratado de Lisboa y de la Ley 24/2009.  
57 Silvia Delgado del Saz, ‘Die Rolle der nationalen Parlamente nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon - ein Vergleich 
zwischen spanischem und deutschem Recht’ Berliner Online-Beiträge zum Europarecht <http://portal-
europarecht.de/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=viewcategory&catid=5&Itemid=12> at 22. 
58 Art. 3 j), Ley 24/2009 and Resolución, Séptimo, par. 3. 
59 Resolución, Séptimo, par.3. 
60 Resolución, Octavo, par. 1. 
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Committee, may also initiate a subsidiarity review within four weeks after the parliament 
receives an EU draft legislative act.61 Their request must already be accompanied by a 
reasoned opinion.62 An application for an urgent hearing with a representative of the 
government (or other authority or public official) to explain the position of the government, 
or regarding some aspect of the European proposal, may also accompany the request.63 The 
Bureau of the Joint Committee must approve this request, effectively determining whether 
the hearing is held before the Joint Committee or a working group created for the matter in 
question.64 Next, the opinion is distributed to the members of the Joint Committee, and 
members, if they so desire, may propose alternative opinions or changes within five days.65 
Afterwards, MPs debate and vote on the opinion in the Joint Committee according to the 
procedure provided for non-legislative decisions.66 At this time, discussions of the reasoned 
opinion may take place in the presence of government representatives, who explain the 
position of the government.67 During the discussion of a reasoned opinion, the MPs may 
make minor amendments of a technical or grammatical character.68 In fact, however, thus far, 
the Committee has adopted the reasoned opinions by means of the ‘“silent” consent of the 
committee members, with no debate or voting.’69  If the Joint Committee adopts a reasoned 
opinion, opinions issued by the parliaments of autonomous communities are attached.70 
The plenaries of both chambers may participate in the procedure.71 In such a case, the 
presidiums of both chambers have two days to propose alternative projects or amendments to 
the existing project. Each chamber then separately takes a decision. The President of one of 
the chambers forwards the approved reasoned opinion (either by Joint Committee or the 
chambers) to EU institutions, as well as informing the government.72 
3.1.3 The United Kingdom 
The British parliament consists of the House of Commons (lower chamber) and the House of 
Lords (upper chamber). In the UK, parliamentary control over the EU legislative process is 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Resolución, Octavo, par. 2. 
64 Resolución, Octavo, par. 1. 
65 Resolución, Octavo, par. 4. 
66 Resolución, Octavo, par. 5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Piedrafita at 16. 
70 Resolución, Octavo, par. 6. 
71 Art 5.2. Ley 24/2009, Resolución, Octavo, par. 7. 
72 Art 5.3 Ley 24/2009. 
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political rather than legal or constitutionalized, in the sense that the focus is on political 
control over ministerial accountability.73 EU Affairs committees have existed in both 
chambers since the 1970s: the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) in the House of 
Commons and the Select Committee on the EU in the House of Lords.74 Over time, the 
parliament has altered procedures in both committees to control expanding EU competences. 
Nowadays, parliamentary scrutiny in the UK consists of two basic elements: the analysis of 
EU documents and the application of scrutiny reserve resolutions, meaning that a Minister 
cannot agree to an EU proposal that is still under scrutiny.75 The latter feature in particular 
had a bearing on the UK parliament’s position in Working Group I of the Convention; British 
MPs argued for improvements concerning the political accountability of ministers in the 
context of subsidiarity.76 
The House of Commons has a European Scrutiny Committee, with ad hoc specialist 
European Committees.77 However, also the House of Commons’ ‘Departmental Select 
Committees may inquire into relevant EU policy and legislation.’78 The EU Committee of the 
Lords functions ‘in an entirely different context within its House as there is no separate 
Departmental Select Committee system.’79 The House of Lords has a ‘central’ EU 
Committee, which appoints six subject-specialist sub-committees, in a way in ‘which policy 
expertise and familiarity with the workings of the EU can be combined.’80 
In the House of Commons, the same procedure as indicated in Standing Order No. 143 for 
the motions relating to EU documents applies for subsidiarity scrutiny. The provisions do not 
establish the organ responsible for identifying noncompliant proposals and drafting reasoned 
                                                 
73 Christopher Kerse, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny in the United Kingdom parliament and the changing role of 
National Parliaments in European Union Affairs’ in Gavin Barrett (ed), National parliaments and the European 
Union: the constitutional challenge for the Oireachtas and other member states legislatures (Clarus Press 2008) 
at 352. Also Adam Cygan, ‘EU Affairs before the United Kingdom Parliament; A Case of Scrutiny as Substitute 
Sovereignty?’ in Olaf Tans, Jit Peters and Carla M Zoethout (eds), National parliaments and European 
democracy: a bottom-up approach to European constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing 2007) at 81. 
74 Kerse at 353. 
75 Ibid at 354. See also: Adam Cygan, National parliaments in an integrated Europe: An Anglo-German 
perspective (Kluwer law international 2001) at 49-77; Adam  Cygan, ‘The EU Constitutional Treaty from the 
Perspective of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; An Improved Framework for Parliamentary Scrutiny?’ in 
Philipp Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Europa law 
publishing 2006) at 19-21.  
76 Cygan, ‘The EU Constitutional Treaty’ at 24. 
77 House of Commons,  European Scrutiny Committee, Reforming the European Scrutiny System in the House 
of Commons, Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2013-14, Volume I, point 22. It is the ESC proposes reasoned 
opinions for decision in plenary. (See page 128 of the report). 
78 Ibid, point 23. 
79 Ibid, point 28. 
80 House of Lords, The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, 
point 30. 
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opinions. Nonetheless, the ESC already systematically examines EU documents.81 In this 
respect, the ESC receives assistance from one of its European Committees, which are highly 
specialized in particular areas of EU activity.82  
The procedure begins when the ESC receives and debates an Explanatory Memorandum 
(EM) from the government, and then delivers a report to the House of Commons. The report 
typically lists reasons for the alleged breach of the principle of subsidiarity, and includes a 
reasoned opinion and recommendation of a resolution to rectify such a breach. In the next 
step, the ESC specifies to which of the three European Committees the draft resolution 
should be referred.83 The debate on the reasoned opinion may take place either in the 
European Committee or on the floor of the House.84 At the beginning of the debate, the 
motion on the reasoned opinion is put forward by a minister,85 followed by questions to the 
minister and a discussion of the proposal.86 The motion agreed is referred to the House for 
adoption. In the last phase, the Minister must forward the motion to EU institutions 
regardless of the position of the government concerning the view of the ESC. 
In the House of Lords, the Committee Orders of Reference regulate the scrutiny procedure.87 
Draft EU legislative acts may be challenged through a procedure initiated by the EU 
Committee. The Chairman of the Lords Scrutiny Committee may raise the problem of 
subsidiarity during general scrutiny or in advance due to the examination of the Commission 
                                                 
81 Reasoned opinions on subsidiarity under the Lisbon Treaty, House of Commons, Procedure Committee, 
Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, (London: The Stationery Office Limited), HC 1440, para 10. 
82 The ESC can refer a motion for consideration on cases concerning European Union documents to three 
general European committees (A, B, C), called European Committees. Standing Order No. 119 (7). 
83 Standing Order No. 119 (7). 
84 If the debate has taken place on the floor of the European Committee, the question on the reasoned opinion 
will be put on the floor of the House without a debate. This took place with regard to the reasoned opinions on 
COM(2010) 371 (Investor Compensation Schemes), COM(2012) 130 (Right to Strike), COM(2013) 893 (Food 
from Cloned Animals). 
85 The report of the House of Commons Procedure Committee illustrates a case where a minister had to move 
forward with a motion even though it did not share the view of ESC, para 14. Standing Order No. 119 provides 
that only Ministers of the Crown may make motions, therefore motions containing the reasoned opinion, 
although reflecting the view of the ESC is made in the name of a Minister. One of possible solutions suggested 
by the report is that a motion should be in the name of the Chairs of the ESC or another member of the 
Committee. 
86 One of the problems indicated in Report of Session 2010-12, Procedure Committee, para 28-29 concerns time 
limits of a motion for a reasoned opinion, which should be debated in a European Committee or on the Floor of 
the House. The ESC preferred debates on the Floor of the House, as they are more time constrained. However, 
as it is an established principle that the European Committee discusses delegated legislation and motions 
relating to EU, the Procedure Committee was in favour of maintaining both possibilities.  
87 Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide to the Proceedings of the House of Lords, (The Stationery 
Office), para. 11.52 establishes the Scrutiny Committee. The subsidiarity scrutiny is regulated in House of 
Lords, Procedure Committee, 3rd Report 2009-10, para. 10-12. 
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annual policy strategy or the annual legislative and work programme.88 Devolved assemblies 
or another national parliaments may also alert the Chairman. If the Chairman marks a draft 
with the label ‘subsidiarity control,’ the usual procedure may be changed.89 As a result, the 
draft is fast-tracked; however it cannot be forwarded without an EM from the government. In 
such a case, the government may have to, if requested, submit ‘a prompt EM or part-EM 
dealing with the subsidiarity issue.’90 Once forwarded to one of the seven subcommittees, a 
committee examines a draft act and then publishes a report on the subsidiarity violation and a 
resolution, which is then debated.91 Nonetheless, any Member may submit his or her own 
motion for a resolution containing a reasoned opinion. Furthermore, the Chairman of the 
Scrutiny Committee is authorised in urgent cases to present the report of a subcommittee to 
the House on behalf of the committee.92 The reasoned opinion might be debated in the Grand 
Committee, which can be attended by every Lord, or on the floor of the House.93 The 
Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee first makes a motion to ‘take a note’ of the 
report of the EU Committee on a EU draft legislative act, and at the end of the debate, a 
‘motion to resolve’ that the EU draft legislative act at stake violates subsidiarity is agreed 
upon. Afterwards, an EU Liaison Officer will notify other national parliaments and maintain 
communication with chambers expressing a similar position. The government, supporting an 
act in the Council of Ministers that is the subject of a reasoned opinion, must first notify the 
parliament and explain its position.94 
3.2 Mixed scrutiny system 
3.2.1 Domination of the EU Affairs Committee with the approval of specialized 
committees (French Senate) 
The French legislative bodies, the Assemblée nationale (lower chamber) and the Sénat (upper 
chamber), have a rather weak position in the national political system, as the Constitution has 
                                                 
88 House of Lords, How will the Lords EU Committee operate these new powers?, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/subsidiarity/use-new-powers.pdf. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The EU Select Committee is assisted by seven Sub-Committees specializing in different policy areas: 
Economic and Financial Affairs and International Trade, Internal Market, Energy and Transport, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Development Policy, Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment, Justice and Institutions, 
Home Affairs, Social Policies and Consumer Protection. 
92 House of Lords, Companion to the Standing Orders, para 10.51. 
93 If the debate has taken place in the Grand Committee, the reasoned opinion is then approved without a debate 
on the floor of the House. See for example the debate in the Grand Committee on the Fund to the Most 
Deprived. 
94 House of Lords, Companion to the Standing Orders, para 10.66. 
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transferred all of the essential competences to the executive branch.95 Nonetheless, Article 
88-4 of the Constitution guarantees participation rights of the French parliament in EU affairs 
by creating a committee in charge of European affairs in each of the chambers. In the 
Assemblée nationale and the Sénat, the Commission des affaires européennes has recently 
replaced the Délégation de l’Assemblée nationale pour l’Union européenne, created in 
1979.96 The recent alteration of the position of the French parliament is the consequence of 
the judgment of the Constitutional Council, as well as the addition of Article 88-6 concerning 
subsidiarity scrutiny.97 The alteration allows both chambers to issue reasoned opinions, which 
the President of the chamber addresses and then forwards, and also notifies the government 
of such actions, to the proper EU institutions. 
On the infra-constitutional level, the Rules of Procedure of the Assemblée nationale have 
been adjusted to accommodate subsidiarity review.98 Article 151-9 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assemblée nationale determines that for subsidiarity tests, the procedure applicable to 
draft resolutions tabled as in Article 88-4 of the Constitution is applicable. First, the EU 
Affairs Committee is responsible for the preliminary consideration of a draft resolution.99 
Concurrently, the government participates by sending a simplified impact assessment within 
three weeks.100 Second, the committee must table its report within fifteen days in response to 
a request from the government, the chairman of a standing committee or the chairman of a 
group.101 In the report, the committee proposes either the rejection or the adoption of a draft 
resolution with possible amendments.102 Third, the EU Affairs Committee can refer an 
adopted draft resolution to the relevant standing committee.103 If within fifteen days, the 
                                                 
95 Carina Sprungk, ‘ The French Assemblee Nationale and the German Bundestag in the European Union. 
Towards convergence in the ‘old’ Europe?’ in John O'Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds), National parliaments 
within the enlarged European Union: from'victims' of integration to competitive actors? (Routledge 2007) at 
133; Arthur Dyevre, ‘The French Parliament and the European Integration’ (2012) 18 European Public Law 
527; Davor Jančić, ‘The French Parliament: A European Scrutineer or National Actor?’ (2013) 19 European 
Public Law 129. 
96 Act of 6 July 1979. The delegations had a statutory character, and played a sifting role, whereas the six 
standing committees were guaranteed by the Constitution. The creation of a committee for EU affairs was 
discussed already in 1990s, but did not succeed: Anais Lagelle, ‘Le rôle des parlements nationaux dans le 
processus législatif européen à l'aune du traité de Lisbonne’ [2011] Revue française de droit constitutionnel 25, 
33; Sprungk at 140. 
97 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République. 
98 Résolution n° 292 du 27 mai 2009. 
99 Art 151-5, Le Règlement de l’Assemblée nationale. 
100 Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 relative à la participation du Parlement national au processus décisionnel 
européen, JORF n°0142 du 22 juin 2010 page 11232, III (la fiche d'impact simplifiée). 
101 Art 151-5 in connection with Article 151-9-3, Le Règlement de l’Assemblée nationale. 
102 As example, see the reasoned opinion of the Assemblée on the COM (2011) 169. In fact, the EU committee 
nominates one of its members, who prepares a report (Rapport d'information) with a draft resolution and a 
reasoned opinion. 
103 Art 151-6, Le Règlement de l’Assemblée nationale. 
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leading standing committee has not tabled a report, the text of the EU Affairs Committee 
shall be deemed to be adopted by the leading standing committee.104 Fourth, the President of 
the Assembly sends a resolution containing a reasoned opinion to the EU institutions, and 
informs the Government about such an action.105 
The Rules of Procedure in the Sénat106 have also been adjusted in order to accommodate 
subsidiarity review. Article 73 octies par. 1-8 of the Rules of Procedure, added in December 
2010, provides for the participation of the Sénat.107 The Constitutional Council ruled in 2011 
that this provision is compatible with the Constitution.108 The procedure consists of several 
steps. In the first step, a working group on subsidiarity, established within the EU Affairs 
Committee and composed of senators from all political groups, preliminarily examines the 
EU documents every 15 days.109 Within three weeks, the government also sends a simplified 
impact assessment.110 In the second step, a senator can file a project of a reasoned opinion, 
always in the form of a resolution.111 In the next step, the EU Affairs Committee adopts that 
resolution or a resolution on its own initiative.112 Later, the committee responsible receives 
the transmitted resolution and rejects or adopts the proposal.113 If the relevant committee does 
not respond in due time, the Sénat will consider the reasoned opinion adopted,114 and the 
President of the Sénat will then immediately submit it to the EU institutions.115 Moreover, at 
any time during the procedure, the president of a group can continue with the request for 
review of the project in a public session.116 Finally, the President of the Sénat informs the 
government of the transmission of the reasoned opinion.  
                                                 
104 Art 151-6, Le Règlement de l’Assemblée nationale. 
105 Art 151-10, Le Règlement de l’Assemblée nationale. 
106 Résolution du 20 décembre 2010. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Décision n° 2010-621 DC du 13 janvier 2011 (Résolution tendant à adapter le chapitre XI bis du règlement 
du Sénat aux stipulations du traité de Lisbonne concernant les parlements nationaux) - conformity with the 
constitution The reason was formal, as the Rules of Procedure of parliamentary chambers have to referred to the 
Constitutional Council to check their conformity with the Constitution (Art 61 of the Constitution). 
109 Laetitia  Guilloud-Colliat, L’action normative de l’Union européenne (Brulyant 2014) at 280. See for 
example French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 14.02.2014 on COM (2013) 894 and the role of the group: 
http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppr13-309.html. 
110 Circulaire du 21 juin 2010. 
111 Art 73 octies par. 2., Le Règlement du Sénat. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Art 73 octies par. 3., Le Règlement du Sénat. 
114 Art 73 octies par. 3 and par. 4. However, unlike resolutions based on article 88-4, if the standing committee 
does not consider the draft opinion of the Committee in Charge of European Affairs in the time limit laid down, 
then it is considered as adopted. 
115 In the form prepared by the EU Affairs Committee. Art 73 octies par. 6, Le Règlement du Sénat. 
116 Art 73 octies par. 5., Le Règlement du Sénat. 
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3.2.2 Domination of the EU Affairs Committee with a prior consultation of the 
specialized committees (Finland) 
The Finnish Parliament is one of the strongest EU policy-influencers amongst Member State 
parliaments.117 In the Eduskunta (unicameral parliament), the Grand Committee, created in 
1995, is the body in charge of EU Affairs.118 However, specialized committees also play a 
role by preparing reasoned opinions.  
For the subsidiarity review, the Eduskunta adjusted its Rules of Procedure in 2009,119 with 
Section 30 par. 3 making the Grand Committee the receiver of documents from EU 
institutions. First, this committee sends EU documents to appropriate special committees, as 
well as the Legislative Assembly of Åland (without any previous filtering of documents that 
may concern only this assembly). Second, a specialized committee, or the Legislative 
Assembly of Åland, may, by majority decision, request that the Grand Committee examine the 
draft act for compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.120 Third, the Grand Committee has the 
freedom to decide whether to open a dossier (also by majority decision), unless suggested by the 
Legislative Assembly of Åland, which entails an obligatory examination by the Grand 
Committee.121 Moreover, the Grand Committee requests the opinion of the government regarding 
an activated procedure.122 As a result, the Grand Committee may report the lack of a violation of 
the principle of subsidiarity or prepare a draft text of a reasoned opinion.123 Consequently, MPs 
                                                 
117 Maurer and Wessels, ‘National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players?’ at 
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make the final decision in the plenary by means of a simple majority vote,124 and then send the 
reasoned opinion and the Grand Committee report to the EU institutions.125 
3.2.3 Domination of specialised committees with a sifting role of the EU Affairs 
Committee (Luxembourg, Belgian House of Representatives) 
The unicameral Luxembourg Chambre des Députés regulates its competences in European 
affairs via its Rules of Procedure. The permanent Commission on Foreign and European 
Affaires, Defence, Cooperation and Immigration conducts the preliminary subsidiarity 
examination. Thereafter, the President of the Chambre des Députés forwards the documents 
to specialized committees for scrutiny.126 Four weeks after the receipt of an EU draft 
legislative proposal, each specialized committee decides by means of a majority vote if there 
is a breach of the principle of subsidiarity.127 Each political or technical group and individual 
MP may present a project for a reasoned opinion.128 If the committee confirms a violation of 
subsidiarity, it submits a project for a resolution to the chamber, which it adopts without a 
debate unless the presidium (Conférence des Présidents) decides otherwise.129 Forgoing a 
public session in order to meet the eight-week deadline, the presidium decides by a majority 
of its members whether to send the reasoned opinion.130 The chamber is informed about the 
decision during the next public session.131 Finally, the Chambre des Députés informs the 
government about its reasoned opinion.132 
Interestingly, the procedure also provides a possibility for active participation of the 
government in subsidiarity review.133 The Chambre des Députés may demand government 
research assistance concerning EU draft legislative acts and compatibility with the principle 
of subsidiarity.  
The Chambre des Députés is a ‘low profile’ parliament, due to its limited number of MPs, 
limited capacities, limited role throughout Luxembourgish history and lack of in-depth 
                                                 
124 Section 30, par. 4 of Rules of Procedure. 
125 Even if the Eduskunta does not find a breach, the report is sent due to informative grounds. 
126 Art 169 (4), Reglement de Chambre des Députés. 
127 Art 169 (5) par 1, Reglement Chambre des Députés. 
128 Art 169 (5) par 2, Reglement Chambre des Députés. 
129 Art 169 (5) par 3, Reglement Chambre des Députés. 
130 Art 169 (5) par 4, Reglement Chambre des Députés. 
131 Art 169 (5), Reglement Chambre des Députés. 
132 Annexe 2, part II point 7 to Reglement Chambre des Députés (Aide-Mémoire sur la coopération entre la 
Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg en matière de politique 
européenne). 
133 Annexe 2, part III point 3. 
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knowledge of European affairs of parliamentarians.134 It is thus surprising how active the 
chamber is with regard to the application of subsidiarity review. Detailed codification of the 
subsidiarity scrutiny procedure also seems atypical for this Member State, as Luxembourg 
has in general a ‘highly informal’ scrutiny procedure with a ‘very low degree of 
institutionalization’ when compared with other Member States.135 
The Belgian Chambre des Représentants’ mechanism of subsidiarity scrutiny is also mixed, 
with a sifting role accorded to the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs.136 The 
Belgian Chambre des Représentants has a procedure that starts with a review of draft 
legislative acts by the secretariat of the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs.137 
The chairman of the Chambre des Représentants or one-third of the members of a specialized 
committee may request a report regarding the subsidiarity and proportionality of a 
Commission proposal. The secretariat of the Federal Advisory Committee on European 
Affairs may also prepare such report upon its own initiative.138 These reports are both sent to 
the specialized committees, as well as to the Federal Advisory Committee on European 
Affairs,139 and a member of any of these committees may request to put the report on the 
committee’s agenda.140 On the basis of a demand of one-third of members of a specialized 
committee, it may designate a europromoteur, who will draft a project for the reasoned 
opinion.141 If a specialized committee adopts a draft resolution (subsidiarity opinion) 
outlining a subsidiarity violation, it is considered as the resolution of the chamber. Otherwise, 
if one third of the members of the specialized committee find it necessary, the draft resolution 
is forwarded to the plenary.142 After adoption, the subsidiary opinion is sent to the European 
Commission and the Belgian government. 
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3.2.4 Domination of specialised committees with final approval by the EU Affairs 
Committee (Germany) 
In Germany, the Bundestag (directly elected chamber) and the Bundesrat (federal council 
representing the Länder) fulfil the legislative functions at the federal level. Both of these 
chambers are active in the European decision-making process. Since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, when Germany added Article 23 (the ‘Europa-Artikel’) to the Basic Law, there 
has been a regulated participation of the Bundestag in EU Affairs.  Furthermore, Article 45 of 
the Basic Law provided for the establishment of a permanent committee in the Bundestag 
known as the EU Affairs Committee. Finally, the constitutional reform added Articles 50 and 
52 in the Basic Law concerning the participation of the Länder in EU affairs and the creation 
of the Europakammer in the Bundesrat.143 At the infra-constitutional level, Germany 
introduced two laws at the time of the Treaty of Maastricht, concretizing cooperation 
between the federal government and the Bundestag (EUZBBG)144 and between the federal 
state and the Länder (EUZBLG).145 
The essential increase of the powers of national parliaments at the EU level due to the Treaty 
of Lisbon motivated further amendments at both constitutional and infra-constitutional levels. 
The Federal Constitutional Court declared the legislation that was initially introduced as 
unconstitutional. As a consequence, new laws regulating the participation of the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat came into force.146 The Basic Law, however, does not refer to the ex ante 
subsidiarity, in contrast to the subsidiarity action (Article 23 para. 1a of the Basic Law).147 
Currently, the Rules of Procedure as indicated by the new Responsibility for Integration Act 
(Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz, hereafter IntVG)148 and the amended EUZBBG149 play 
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would construct a minority vote, cf. Ingolf Pernice and Steffen Hindelang, ‘Potenziale europäischer Politik nach 
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the most important role vis-à-vis the subsidiarity review in the Bundestag. The EU Affairs 
Committee of the Bundestag is a so-called ‘cross-section committee,’ since scrutiny is 
divided among specialized committees with a possibility to consult the EU Affairs 
Committee, which then expresses the final position to the government.150 After the Bundestag 
receives EU draft legislative acts from EU institutions, the government is obliged to forward 
a comprehensive appraisal of the competence of the EU to issue an act and compatibility with 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to the committees within two weeks or 
before the start of Council negotiations.151 Specialized committees then scrutinize EU draft 
legislative acts by taking into account the compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.152 If the specialized committee finds a violation, it may prepare a document 
stressing its opinion and recommendation of a resolution.153 Immediately on being informed, 
the EU Affairs Committee can also take a position.154 In the meantime, other committees 
may, within a limited period, complete or prepare a new position. The whole chamber will 
only be informed if the EU Affairs Committee finds a subsidiarity violation, regardless of 
whether a specialized committee does so or does not.155 The Rules of Procedure allow a 
general eight-week period provided in the Protocol No. 2 to conduct scrutiny.156 The 
Bundestag or the EU Affairs Committee takes the final decision, if authorized by the 
Bundestag.157 The President of the Bundestag then transmits the reasoned opinion to the 
relevant EU institutions.158 
Accordingly, the rights of the Bundesrat in the EU decision-making process, nowadays 
anchored in Article 23 (2) of Basic Law, are gradually expanding.159 This provision states 
that the Länder participate in matters concerning the EU through the Bundesrat. Moreover, 
according to Article 23 (4), the Bundesrat takes part in the decision-making process to the 
same extent as with a comparable domestic matter, or if the subject falls within the domestic 
competences of the Länder. According to §11 (1) IntVG, the Bundesrat may set rules 
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regarding subsidiarity review in its Rules of Procedures. However, there are no recent 
developments in that respect, indicating that the general rules for scrutinizing EU documents 
apply.160 Nonetheless, the Bundesrat critically scrutinized EU drafts, taking into account 
subsidiarity violations, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.161  
The procedure in the Bundesrat is thus as follows: the President of the Bundesrat decides 
which documents will be reviewed according to the principle of subsidiarity, or a Land may 
request that scrutiny takes place.162 Next, specialized committees receive EU draft legislative 
acts. The EU Affairs Committee also deliberates on the documents sent by EU institutions, 
but bases its expertise on the opinions forwarded by the specialized committees. The EU 
Affairs Committee issues a report and submits it to the plenary, recommending a 
resolution.163 At the last stage, committee members present the said report to the plenary with 
a recommendation for a resolution.164 Due to the infrequent meetings of the Committee (once 
or twice per month only) and the plenary sessions (once per month), the European Chamber 
(Europakammer) of the Bundesrat, as established in Article 52 (3a) Basic Law, may play an 
important role in accelerating the subsidiarity review.165 The members of the Europakammer 
can gather within a week upon notice from the President of the Bundesrat.  
3.3 Decentralized scrutiny (the Netherlands, Eerste Kamer; Belgian Sénat) 
The Dutch parliament consists of two chambers: the Tweede Kamer (lower) and the Eerste 
Kamer (upper). Both of these chambers have EU Affairs Committees, respectively created in 
1986 and 1970,166 which currently go by the official names of the Standing Committee on 
European Affairs in the Tweede Kamer167 and Standing Committee on European Cooperation 
Organisations in the Eerste Kamer. However, the latter does not participate in subsidiarity 
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review, as only the specialized committees conduct scrutiny. Hence, only the proceedings in 
the Eerste Kamer will be presented herein. 
The European Affairs Committee of the Eerste Kamer adopted a new working method in 
2009 coordinating scrutiny. Consequently, various standing committees can select documents 
for scrutiny on the basis of the Commission’s annual programme, instead of waiting for 
governmental fiches.168 In the Eerste Kamer, the subsidiarity scrutiny procedure for handling 
EU proposals is anchored in the letter to the government from 2010 and based on the primary 
involvement of all the specialized committees.169 Each committee selects proposals from the 
annual legislative programme of the Commission or through the weekly overview of newly 
published European proposals presented by Eerste Kamer staff.170 Afterwards, proposals are 
placed on the annual European Work Programme of the Eerste Kamer, and divided according 
to policy fields.  
MPs in the Netherlands scrutinize EU draft legislative acts in a manner similar to national 
bills.171 If a committee has classified a European proposal as a priority (included in the 
European Work Programme) it is automatically put on the committee agenda for discussion. 
A proposal selected by a member from the weekly overview of proposals is put on the agenda 
by request.  The committee may also decide to not consider an initially chosen proposal, 
instead deciding to only ‘take note’ thereof.172 Prior to any discussion, the committee 
determines if there are any subsidiarity issues, and if a reasoned opinion shall be prepared. In 
such a case, the committee convenes a meeting for the submission of comments. Moreover, 
committees in the Eerste Kamer may simultaneously consult the Dutch government about a 
draft legislative act and decide if they will rely on the government in the pursuit of a 
subsidiarity breach.173 Finally, the committee approves a reasoned opinion in a plenary 
session. Chambers may cooperate, as the reasoned opinion may be sent in the name of both 
the Tweede and Eerste Kameren. 
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A similar decentralized scrutiny takes place in the Belgian Sénat.174 The Secretariat of the 
Senate delegation to the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs receives all of the 
draft legislation from the Commission.  Selected documents are then sent to the selected 
specialized committees, without any specific report on subsidiarity.175 Any senator from such 
a committee may request a discussion of a Commission proposal. If a reasoned opinion is 
issued, it is next discussed in the plenary. If the plenary approves the reasoned opinion, it is 
sent to the secretariat of the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs, which 
forwards it to the European Commission. 
3.4 Subsidiarity-focused scrutiny 
Subsidiarity-focused scrutiny differs from other categories, as this type of scrutiny aims at 
establishing a single committee exclusively focused only on the assessment of the principle 
of subsidiarity. Accordingly, the Netherlands has only once created such a committee, which 
may suggest that concentrating subsidiarity scrutiny in a single institution is not effective. 
The functions of the Dutch Joint Committee on the Application of Subsidiarity will be 
presented in this section to underline the drawbacks of this type of scrutiny system. 
As early as 2003, a Joint Committee on the Application of Subsidiarity, renamed the 
Temporary Joint Committee for Subsidiarity Review in 2006, was established in the Dutch 
parliament, arousing parliamentary interest in the European decision-making process.176 The 
aim of the Joint Committee was to accelerate the system of scrutiny, to have more influence 
on European decision-making. The Joint Committee was supposed to forward proposals 
among sectoral committees, to which then had three weeks to respond. On this basis, the 
Joint Committee advised both chambers on how to vote.177 Thus, the specialized committees 
assessed subsidiarity, while the Joint Committee functioned as a coordinator. 
In 2009, the Netherlands again established a Joint Committee composed of members from 
both chambers. Nonetheless, such a constellation raised concerns about the primacy of the 
Tweede Kamer, which is arguably more important in terms of power and political 
influence.178 Again, the procedure was identical to the previous committee.179 Unexpectedly, 
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however, the Eerste Kamer assessed the work of the committee negatively due to work 
delays.180 Afterwards, the Tweede Kamer created its own Subsidiarity Committee, but this 
was not reestablished after elections in 2010.181  
3.5 Regional Parliaments  
The adjustments of the regional parliaments with legislative powers are assessed in the 
following section. There are 75 regional parliaments with legislative powers in eight EU 
Member States.182 They may participate in the EWS in two ways: through their national 
parliaments or through the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the Council of Regions.183 
Examples of procedures adopted for subsidiarity scrutiny in the chosen federal, regionalised 
and devolved regional parliaments are presented below.  
Looking at the specific provisions, in federal Germany, the Basic Law does not provide for 
the direct participation of regional parliaments in EU affairs, including subsidiarity review.184 
German regional parliaments may participate only through their governmental representatives 
in the Bundesrat (Article 23.2 Basic Law). Thus, Länder’s power concerning subsidiarity 
scrutiny depends on relations with the regional executive power.185 There have thus been 
divergent types of adjustments of regional parliaments to the EWS; some State constitutions 
were revised (Baden-Württemberg, Bremen), while elsewhere, the rules of procedure were 
amended (Brandenburg). Besides this, some Länder parliaments concluded agreements with 
ther respective governments with regard to receiving EU draft legislative acts.186 In some 
Länder, the executive briefs the parliament on EU drafts that are important for the Land.187 
Moreover, in some cases, the regional government provides any technical support necessary 
for the subsidiarity scrutiny, for example by filtering out relevant proposals.188 The 
procedures also differ in respect of the committee that takes the decision, and concerning the 
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187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid at 53. 
153 
involvement of the plenary. 189 In addition, the Bavarian parliament sends its opinions 
directly to the EU Commission.190 In case of the Baden-Württemberg parliament, the opinion 
of the parliament is binding for the regional government.191 
In regionalized Spain, Article 6 of Ley 24/2009 requires the national parliament to transmit 
any EU draft legislative act to one of the 17 regional parliaments without prejudging the 
existence of a regional competence for a matter.192 From the moment of the receipt of the 
draft legislative act from Cortes Generales, regional parliaments have four weeks to submit 
an opinion.193 However, the Joint Committee is not obliged to discuss an opinion of a 
regional parliament after this period has elapsed.194 Nonetheless, a reasoned opinion 
submitted in due time shall be incorporated to the reasoned opinion of the national 
parliament, if the Cortes Generales decides to issue one.195 Neither ‘convincingly represented 
in Senado,’ due to its composition, nor possessing essential powers in subsidiarity review 
through the national law, the position of the regions in the Early Warning System is very 
limited.196 
Finally, in asymmetrically regionalized states such as Finland, where the Åland Islands have 
an autonomous status, parliament is eligible to participate in subsidiarity review. All the EU 
draft legislative proposals are sent to the Åland Parliament and the Autonomy Committee 
takes the decision whether an opinion on subsidiarity is necessary.197 However, the 
Eduskunta should receive any opinion, which is not binding, from the Åland Legislative 
Assembly within six weeks.198 In addition, a reasoned opinion of the Åland Islands is an 
obligatory incentive for the Eduskunta to start subsidiarity review at the national level.199 
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Furthermore, the three devolved UK legislative bodies (Scottish Parliament,200 National 
Assembly for Wales201 and the Northern Ireland Assembly) participate in subsidiarity review 
in the United Kingdom. These parliaments may issue their own reasoned opinion, but neither 
of the Houses is bound by their requests.202 The House of Commons, however, can ask 
devolved legislatures to comment on its own reasoned opinions, and it may take into account 
the opinions of these legislatures in its own scrutiny.203 In the assemblies of the Northern 
Ireland and of Wales, a committee in charge of, inter alia, subsidiarity review was 
established.204 Further, only the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly 
introduced subsidiarity review procedures.205  
The examples reveal that the roles of regional parliaments are all similar, insofar as their 
opinions are not directly binding on the national parliaments. Nevertheless, regional 
recommendations may incentivize the closer examination of some of the EU draft legislative 
acts. Finland has the strongest regional parliament of the examples provided in this chapter, 
because a reasoned opinion causes a ‘snow-ball-effect’ and obliges the Eduskunta to pursue 
subsidiarity review. The lack of a vote in the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure 
characterises the weak role of regional parliaments in Germany, Spain, Finland and the 
UK.206 This raises questions concerning the added value of the participation of regional 
parliaments in subsidiarity review. First, regional parliaments might be burdened by all the 
EU draft legislative acts on which they have to elaborate. Second, national parliaments may 
still have additional work to consider even if not bound by the reasoned opinion of a regional 
parliament. 
                                                 
200 On the discussion concerning the subsidiarity scrutiny in Scotland under the Constitutional Treaty cf. Gordon 
Heggie, ‘The Scottish Parliament and the EU Constitution; Moving Beyond the Principle of Partnership?’ in 
Philipp Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Europa law 
publishing 2006). 
201 European and External Affairs Committee, Discussion paper: Implications for the National Assembly for 
Wales of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Protocol No.2) contained in the Lisbon Treaty, 
EUR(3)-03-10: Paper 2: 12 January 2010, available at: http://www.cynulliadcymru.org/en/bus-home/bus-
committees/bus-committees-previous-committees/bus-committees-second-eur-home/bus-committees-second-
eur-agendas.htm?act=dis&id=165407&ds=2/2010. 
202 Committee of the Regions, The Subsidiarity Early Warning System of the Lisbon Treaty at 95. 
203 Ibid at 98. 
204 Ibid at 95. 
205 Ibid. 
206 On the contrary, in Belgium for the legislative proposals that deal with ‘mixed-affairs’, the votes in the EWS 
are divided between the federal and regional parliament. Even one regional parliament stating a subsidiarity 
breach by the EU draft legislative act may take one of the two votes assigned to the Belgian parliament. Where 
the EU draft legislative act encroaches on the exclusive regional competence the regional parliaments have both 
of the votes. From five regional parliaments it is enough, if two of them find a subsidiarity breach. However, 
these votes need to come from different language administrations. Cf. Patricia Popelier and Werner 
Vandenbruwaene, ‘The Subsidiarity Mechanism as a Tool for Inter-Level Dialogue in Belgium: On ‘Regional 
Blindness’ and Cooperative Flaws’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 204, 222.  
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4 Comparison of procedures 
In the following section, I will study the types of scrutiny indicated in the previous section, 
taking into account the following variables: the detection of the breach; the initiative to draft 
a reasoned opinion; the function of the government, and the role of the plenary. Subsidiarity 
review is a relatively new competence of national parliaments, and this is reflected in the 
variety of approaches taken across these dimensions. 
4.1 The initial detection of subsidiarity breaches 
The first element of procedure I will consider is the question as to whether there is an a priori 
examination process, or whether the detection of breaches is largely random. The national 
parliament scrutiny systems explored in this chapter reveal that different possibilities for 
identifying problematic draft legislative acts are in use. These can be roughly grouped into 
‘ex ante’ and ‘ongoing’ sections. 
Some parliaments detect subsidiarity violations ex ante through an analysis of the annual 
legislative programme of the Commission. On this basis the annual European Work 
Programme of the Dutch Eerste Kamer presents a list of potentially problematic proposals 
that acts as an ex ante device to help focus work.  
By contrast, the identification of potentially controversial acts in parliament is also possible 
on an ongoing basis. Many national legislative bodies, such as the Polish chambers, the 
Finnish Eduskunta, the Belgian Sénat and the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés pursue this 
approach with continuous and ongoing oversight of received draft legislative acts. For 
example, the UK House of Lords’ Chairman of the EU Committee examines all EU 
documents on a weekly basis to identify which of them demand further scrutiny.207 Spain is 
similar, insofar as the parliament’s legal service sends a list to the Joint Committee for the 
EU which includes, inter alia, EU legislative proposals that may create problems from the 
point of view of subsidiarity, as well as those against which the subsidiarity action could be 
brought.208 
When utilizing the latter approach for the identification of subsidiarity violations, problems in 
Commission proposals may come as a surprise to national parliaments. Thus, the analysis of 
the annual legislative programme of the Commission by parliaments may be more 
advantageous than relying only on the ongoing scrutiny of EU draft legislative acts. 
                                                 
207 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, point 33. 
208 Piedrafita at 15.  
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Moreover, the ‘early warning’ ex ante approach may help to ensure that parliaments have 
sufficient time to submit a fully developed reasoned opinion within the eight-week period 
allotted. Nevertheless, the significance of the annual legislative programme of the 
Commission should not be exaggerated, since the proposed initiatives often have a very 
broad character at that stage, and it may be difficult to assess compatibility with the principle 
of subsidiarity on the basis of the programme itself. If engaged at this stage, national 
parliaments may tend to challenge the idea of the proposal itself, rather than acting according 
to the vision of national parliament participation in the EU decision-making process.  
4.2 The initiative to draft a reasoned opinion 
The next component of parliamentary procedures I consider concerns the right to take the 
initiative to draft a reasoned opinion. This is a particularly important issue within the 
implementation of the EWS, since limitations in a chamber’s right to take the initiative may 
constrain the effectiveness of subsidiarity scrutiny. Likewise, excessive freedom given to 
parliaments to issue reasoned opinions may hinder the work of a parliament by crowding out 
discussion of other vital aspects of EU affairs. 
We observe a variety of possible hurdles for taking the initiative for a reasoned opinion in the 
practices of the different Member States: some national legal systems confer the initiative 
rights to a single MP (House of Lords, French Sénat, Belgian Sénat), others a group of MPs 
(fifteen MPs for the Polish Sejm), a Committee (Polish Sejm, French Assemblée, Finland), 
the Chairman of a Committee (French Assemblée) or a political group (Luxembourg), the 
chairman of a political party (French Assemblée) or a number of political parties (Spain). 
Moreover, this implies that a group representing a minority in a chamber may enjoy the 
initiative right – having one fifth of the seats is sufficient in Spain. 
Despite the discrepancies regarding the details of these rules, some parallels between them 
are visible. The initiators tend to be a relatively small group, which allows coordination and 
increases the possibility that reasoned opinions will be prepared on time, relative to having to 
coordinate across a larger share of the chamber. Nonetheless, an even better result may be 
achieved when an expert prepares a reasoned opinion (as is the case in the Tweede Kamer or 
in the Belgian lower chamber, where one-third of members of a specialized committee may 
designate a europromoteur, who will draft a project of the reasoned opinion). Indeed, it can 
be argued that the most important aspect of a reasoned opinion is that it be of high quality 
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and subsidiarity-oriented drafting, given the Commission’s dismissive attitude towards non-
subsidiarity arguments.  
4.3 The role of the government in subsidiarity review 
Regarding the degree of involvement of the government, at one end of the spectrum, some 
subsidiarity scrutiny systems rely heavily on the government. For example, both British 
chambers receive explanatory memoranda from the government for all EU documents that it 
receives from the Commission. Other parliamentary chambers likewise receive the opinion of 
the government on any EU draft legislative act, thanks to recent reforms, as is the case in 
Poland209 and in Germany (Bundestag).210 In both the Polish and British cases, the 
government has fourteen days after the receipt of a draft legislative act or until the start of 
Council negotiations (in the case of Germany) to deliver an opinion. In Finland, a 
government opinion will be requested as a matter of course. At the other end of the spectrum 
are systems where the government is less involved: neither the French nor the Dutch systems 
require the government to issue an opinion. However, in France, the Prime Minister in a 
recent circulaire committed the government to submitting a simplified impact assessment 
within three weeks of the transmission of any draft proposal. Intermediate approaches include 
a possibility for national parliaments to request an opinion of the government (Spain)211 or 
assistance from the government to assist in the chamber’s efforts to assess a possible 
violation of subsidiarity (Luxembourg). 
The obligation of governmental participation at an early stage may be somewhat surprising as 
it runs counter to the fact that subsidiarity review is a competence specifically created for 
national parliaments. In addition, governments already dispose of a possibility to state their 
views on the principle of subsidiarity through participation in the discussions on draft EU 
acts in the Council. On the other hand, there are two reasons (one practical and one political) 
in favour of governmental opinions. First, the executive body may possess greater research 
resources, in particular when parliaments are small such as the Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés. Second, an early signal of a subsidiarity breach by the government may provide an 
incentive for weak EU Affairs scrutinizers to examine a proposal more closely. 
                                                 
209 Art 9 of 2004 Cooperation Act did not indicate that government’s opinions should assess the compatibility 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
210 §13 (6) IntVG, § 7 (2) EUZBBG comprehensive appraisal (umfassende Bewertung). 
211 Art 3 j), Ley 24/2009. 
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4.4 The role of the plenary 
The analysis of Member States’ regulations implies two different attitudes towards the 
involvement of an entire parliamentary chamber in subsidiarity scrutiny: the plenary session 
may have a facultative or an obligatory character. The former approach in which the 
regulations leave the point and degree of involvement of the plenary relatively unspecified is 
adopted in the Spanish chambers.212 Similarly, an early draft of reasoned opinions may be 
reviewed in public session at any time during the scrutiny process in the French Sénat. In 
contrast, participation of the plenary is compulsory in the UK House of Lords and the House 
of Commons and in the Belgian Sénat, as well as in both Dutch chambers concerning 
motions for the adoption of reasoned opinions. By the same token, the Finnish Eduskunta and 
German Bundestag (or the EU Affairs Committee with the prior authorization by the plenary) 
must decide upon the issuing of reasoned opinions in plenary session. The Luxembourgish 
chamber can adopt a draft of a resolution without debate, similar to the Belgian Chambre des 
Représentants.213 It may also happen, however, that national provisions do not provide for a 
plenary session for subsidiarity at all, as is the case, for example, in the Polish Sejm and the 
French Assemblée nationale. Nonetheless, debates still take place under general 
parliamentary rules for taking resolutions. 
The plenary plays an important role concerning the subjects eligible for reasoned opinions. 
Article 6 of Protocol No. 2 states that ‘any national Parliament or any chamber of a national 
Parliament’ may forward a reasoned opinion. Thus, it is disputable if a reasoned opinion 
forwarded by a committee without being voted on in plenary session may even be valid. 
However, some parliamentary committees possess the authority conferred by parliament to 
represent parliament in external functions, including issuing reasoned opinions. This 
approach is adopted in Germany, where the Bundestag always votes on a reasoned opinion 
except when it previously authorizes the EU Affairs Committee in this regard. 
Plenary sessions on subsidiarity and reasoned opinions have positive and negative features. 
On the one hand, plenary discussion of subsidiarity issues raises and demonstrates the 
awareness of MPs of current EU affairs. On the other hand, the involvement of the entire 
chamber, especially if the plenary session includes a debate, creates additional demands on 
                                                 
212 Art 5.2., Ley 24/2009. 
213 For the Belgian case, a plenary vote is triggered if one-third of the committee requests it. 
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time and may paralyze a parliament’s work.214 National parliaments often criticize the strict 
eight-week rule, but do not reduce obstacles to the timely submission of reasoned opinions. 
In addition, as underlined by a British MP, discussing subsidiarity in committee rather than in 
the plenary, allows ‘go[ing] into considerable detail, which has been highly advantageous for 
an understanding of all the issues that have come up.’215 
In sum, each of the different systems mentioned has its advantages and disadvantages. Kiiver, 
in his study of the different approaches of Member States in parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs, makes a number of valid points, which also apply with regard to the specificities of 
the subsidiarity review mechanism.216 The main benefit of a centralized scrutiny system is the 
‘efficiency of the deliberation process,’ EU-related expertise, confidentiality and 
promptitude.217 Conversely, specialized committees, even when lacking profound knowledge 
of EU affairs, may competently contribute in their specific policy areas, such as agriculture or 
the environment. Nonetheless, there can be an evident level of disregard of European 
documents by MPs in the decentralized scrutiny system.218 A mixed system may be the most 
appropriate form to connect the expertise of general EU Affairs Committees and specialized 
committees. However, the issue of time requirements and the possibilities of conflict between 
different committees represent two significant drawbacks of the mixed system. One solution 
may be to confer scrutiny power to a EU Affairs Committee within which EU subcommittees 
focus on specific policies. 
Overall, from a theoretical perspective, it is unclear which approach may perform best. In the 
following section, I will therefore examine the impact of the different scrutiny models on the 
actual participation in the subsidiarity review procedure by national parliaments. 
5 The impact of the ex ante subsidiarity review design on the number of reasoned 
opinions 
In the following section, I will analyse the reports of the Commission concerning the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity. These reports provide a thorough survey of the 
                                                 
214 Ziemowit Cieślik and Bartosz Pawłowski, ‘Zmiana roli parlamentów narodowych w Unii Europejskiej 
(według Traktatu reformującego Unię Europejską, przyjętego w Lizbonie, w dniach 17-18 października 2007 
r.), Mozliwosc badania zasady pomocniczosci w polskim parlamencie’ (2007) 16 Zeszyty Prawnicze, 4 (16), 37. 
215 See the statement of MP J. Rees-Mogg in House of Commons European Committee: Communication 
Networks, 20.05.2013, Column 19. 
216 Kiiver, The national parliaments in the European Union: A critical view on EU constitution-building. 
217 Ibid at 49. 
218 Ibid at 51. 
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application of ex ante review.219 What are the implications of institutional design decisions 
by national parliaments regarding subsidiarity scrutiny processes on the outcomes of such 
activity? 
The institutional design for subsidiarity scrutiny can be very complex, as this chapter shows. 
The three main scrutiny types - centralised, mixed and decentralised - may not play the 
pivotal role for the amount of the reasoned opinions issued by chambers. What we observe is 
that between 2010 and 2013 parliaments applying mixed scrutiny issued the highest number 
of reasoned opinions, with 118 out of a total of 256, while centralised and decentralised 
chambers issued 65 and 73, respectively. However, once we control for the fact that 
chambers applying miexed scrutiny also account for the largest share of chambers in 
Members States in total, a different picture emerges. Each mixed chamber on average issued 
only about 5 reasoned opinions, while Centralised and Decentralised chambers were almost 
twice as active (8 and 10 reasoned opinions per chamber, respectively). However, some of 
these results are sensitive to the exclusion of individual chambers. For example, amongst the 
decentralised chambers, the Swedish Riksdag issued 43 of the 73 reasoned opinions of this 
type. It is thus hard to draw any robust conclusions about the relationship between the type of 
chamber and its activity in the EWS. 
My findings here are connected to the results in the paper by Gattermann and Heftler, who 
study a sample of 342 Commission legislative acts and investigate the variation in national 
parliaments’ decisions to act or not to act. They find that it is not institutional capacity, but 
rather the political motivation of chambers that explains whether a reasoned opinion is issued 
or not. They point in particular to the degree of contestation over EU integration amongst 
parties in the national system as a predictor for EWS action and whether a Commission 
proposal is contentious and highly visible.220 
Moreover, it may not necessarily be the best idea to assess the efficiency of national systems 
through the lens of the number of reasoned opinions issued. It is the scrutiny of EU 
documents itself that counts, rather the amount of opinions issued. Additionally, some recent 
                                                 
219 COSAC also prepared one of the early reports on the activity of national Parliaments. However, in this 
thesis, I rely on the reports provided by the Commission that gather the most up-to-date information. 
220 Katjana Gattermann and Claudia Hefftler, ‘Political Motivation and Institutional Capacity: Assessing 
National Parliaments’ Incentives to Participate in the Early Warning System’ OPAL Online Paper Series 
<http://www.opal-europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108>  
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studies look at other aspects of Europeanisation of national parliaments.221 Factors such as the 
increasing transnational interaction among parliaments or technical expertise and 
administrative support are currently taken into account. These elements may also play an 
important role for the subsidiarity scrutiny: more cooperation between parliaments can raise 
the possibility of raising a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card,’ whereas bureaucratic, expertise-oriented 
assistance may increase the quality of reasoned opinions. 
Summarising the analysis of this section, the mechanics of the control mechanisms may 
influence the activity of national parliaments less than the content of proposals and their 
salience. We will therefore return to this aspect in Chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the internal legislative organisation for ex 
ante subsidiarity scrutiny in different EU Member States. EU institutional reforms have 
always demanded reforms in national level scrutiny, yet the major change in the position of 
national parliaments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty required entirely new suitable 
procedures. Constitutional courts supported this view, and recognized the new role of 
national parliaments in the EU legislative process. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
even conferred upon the German parliament the responsibility for further European 
integration. Thus, as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty and constitutional jurisprudence, 
constitutional and infra-constitutional changes had to be introduced in order to accommodate 
the process of subsidiarity review. 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, Member States have offered different models for the 
regulation of their respective subsidiarity review processes: while some parliaments have 
entrusted EU Affairs Committees with this task, others have delegated responsibilities to 
specialised committees or both types of committees. These procedures differ on such points 
as the moment of detection of a breach, the initiative to draft a reasoned opinion, the role of 
the government and the role of the plenary session. Regional bodies with legislative powers 
are also encouraged to participate in the subsidiarity review, but their powers tend to be 
marginal. 
                                                 
221 Cf. Thomas Christiansen, Anna-Lena Högenauer and Christine  Neuhold, ‘National Parliaments in the post-
Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratization rather than Democratization?’ OPAL Online Paper Series 
<http://www.opal-europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108> . 
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Beyond this fragmented picture, however, the impact of the adjustments for subsidiarity 
scrutiny is becoming increasingly significant. National parliaments actively participate in the 
subsidiarity review process. Yet, the divergence in activity of parliaments applying the same 
type of scrutiny leads to the conclusion that the form of scrutiny may not be the decisive 
point in assessing participation. 
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5.1.1 Reasoned Opinions by Chamber 
Country Chamber Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria  Bundesrat Centralised 2 1 3 6 
Austria  Nationalrat Centralised 1 0 1 0 
Belgium  Chambre des 
Représentants 
Mixed 0 1 3 1 
Belgium  Sénat  Mixed 0 1 0 1 
Bulgaria  Narodno Sabrania Mixed 0 2 0 0 
Cyprus  House of 
Representatives  
Mixed 0 1 1 1 
Czech Republic Poslanecká 
sněmovna 
Mixed 1 0 0 2 
Czech Republic Senát  Mixed 1 0 0 2 
Denmark Folketinget Mixed 2 1 3 1 
Estonia  Riigikogu Mixed 0 0 0 1 
Finland  Eduskunta Mixed 0 1 1 1 
France  Assemblée 
Nationale 
Mixed 0 1 0 1 
France  Sénat Mixed 3 1 7 4 
Germany Bundesrat Mixed 1 1 5 3 
Germany Bundestag Mixed 1 1 1 0 
Greece  Chamber of 
Deputies 
Mixed 0 0 0 3 
Hungary  Országgyülés Centralised 0 0 0 1 
Ireland  Dáil Eireann Decentralised n.a. 1 0 0 
Ireland  Oireachtas1 Decentralised 0 n.a. 0 3 
Italy  Camera dei 
Deputati 
Mixed 0 2 0 0 
Italy  Senato della 
Repubblica  
Decentralised 1 3 1 2 
Latvia  Saeima Mixed 0 0 1 1 
Lithuania Seimas Mixed 2 0 1 6 
Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés 
Mixed 3 7 3 2 
Malta  Kamra tad-
Deputati 
Centralised 0 2 1 5 
Netherlands Both Chambers Decentralised 2 2 1 0 
Netherlands Eerste Kamer 
Staten Generaal 
Decentralised 0 0 2 3 
Netherlands Tweede Kamer 
Staten Generaal 
Decentralised 0 1 3 5 
Poland  Sejm Centralised 2 5 3 2 
Poland  Senat  Mixed 4 4 1 2 
Portugal  Assembleia da 
Republica 
Mixed 0 1 1 1 
Romania Both Chambers Mixed 0 1 n.a. 0 
Romania Camera 
Deputaţilor 
Mixed 0 2 0 2 
Romania Senatul Mixed 0 2 0 3 
Slovakia  Národná rada Mixed 0 2 1 0 
Slovenia  Državni svet  Not participating 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia  Državni zbor  Mixed 0 0 0 1 
                                                 
1 For 2010, the Commission Report refers to ‘Oireachtas (both chambers)’. 
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Country Chamber Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Spain  Congreso de los 
Diputados and  
Senado (both 
chambers)  
Centralised 0 2 2 5 
Sweden  Riksdagen Decentralised 3 11 20 9 
United Kingdom House of 
Commons  
Centralised 3 3 3 5 
United Kingdom House of Lords Centralised 2 1 1 3 
  Total 34 64 70 88 
Source: Own compilation of Commission Reports for 2010-2013  
5.1.2 Reasoned Opinions by Chamber Type 
 Number of 
Chambers 
2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Centralised 8 10 14 14 27 65 
Decentralised 7 6 18 27 22 73 
Mixed 25 18 32 29 39 118 
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Chapter 4: 
Status and Design of the ex post subsidiarity review1 
1 Introduction 
The decision to grant national parliaments the power to review the compliance of EU draft 
legislative acts with the subsidiarity principle was partially motivated by dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the ECJ in securing its observance. Indeed, with the introduction of the subsidiarity 
principle in the Maastricht Treaty, the principle became subject to the ECJ’s jurisdiction, which was 
initially expected to ‘open the floodgates to constant litigation.’2 While the ECJ’s jurisprudence on 
subsidiarity has its supporters, who argue that the ECJ applied subsidiarity, but under a different 
heading of review,3 the majority view is that the ECJ did not become an effective guardian of 
subsidiarity.4 Its jurisprudence on the subsidiarity principle has been widely criticised by scholars, 
in particular, the Court’s unwillingness to ‘deal with subsidiarity frontally’ and its ‘misleading 
interpretation’ of the principle, because of a focus on its procedural nature, instead of a cost/benefit 
test for the necessity of EU action.5 Moreover, the Court’s case law might be easily described as a 
‘drafting guide,’ which means that, as long as EU institutions use the Court’s vague vocabulary and 
draft the EU legislation accordingly, the Court has no ground to annul such an act on the basis of a 
subsidiarity violation.6  
Despite this criticism, and the fact that the Court has never annulled an EU act because of a 
subsidiarity violation, Ziller adopts the view that it would be ‘quite erroneous’ to conclude that it is 
not necessary to invoke subsidiarity before the Court.7 Two new sources of reviving the ECJ 
approach to subsidiarity have recently gained focus in academic circles. First, an argument was 
made that the impact assessments prepared by the Commission in the pre-legislative phase will 
‘facilitate’ judicial review of subsidiarity.8 The use of this ‘process-based tool’ in the Court’s 
                                                 
1 This chapter draws upon and extends my contribution ‘Institutional Design of the Member States for the ex post 
subsidiarity scrutiny’ in: Democracy and subsidiarity in the EU. National parliaments, regions and civil society in the 
decision-making process, M. Cartabia, N. Lupo and A. Simoncini (eds), Il Mulino 2013. 
2 Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1101. 
3 Thomas Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?’ (2012) 
50 Journal of Common Market Studies 267, 270. 
4 See ECJ’s cases: Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:431. 
 (Working Time Directive); Case C-233/94 Germany v. Parliament and Council [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:231. 
 (Deposit-Guarantee Schemes); and Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco 
[2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:741. These cases are discussed in Estella De Noriega, de Búrca, ‘The principle of subsidiarity 
and the Court of Justice as an institutional actor’, 223-226 and Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time’, 72-75 
5 Martinico at 655. 
6 Cf. Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827. 
7 Ziller, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité’ at 533. 
8 Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’, 78. 
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jurisprudence was seen for the first time in the Vodafone case.9 Second, subsidiarity requests may 
now come from national parliaments, according to Article 8 of Protocol 2, which foresees ECJ 
jurisdiction ‘in actions on ground of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative 
act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union by Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order 
on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber thereof.’ This procedure will be the focus of this 
chapter. It will be shown that national parliaments have adjusted their national rules of procedure to 
participate in the mechanism of ex post subsidiarity scrutiny under Article 8 of Protocol 2.  For 
example, in the UK, the House of Commons and the House of Lords have signed two linked 
Memoranda of Understanding with the government, concerning the procedure of lodging the 
subsidiarity action and its financing.10 The two chambers gained powers regarding the conduct of 
proceedings as well as concerning the choice of and instructions issued to Counsel; the chambers 
will have to agree to the written statements and submissions with the UK Agents.11  
This chapter will first briefly outline the on-going criticism of the Court of Justice and its 
subsidiarity analysis, also taking into account the judgments issued after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty.12 Next, Section 2 will discuss the status of the subsidiarity action. An analysis of 
national procedures for the ex post scrutiny follows in Section 3. The methodological ‘accordion’ is 
open in this chapter to show different designs of ex post scrutiny (see annex); I reconstruct some of 
them in detail to illustrate the main differences between them. 
2 Subsidiarity jurisprudence of the ECJ 
Paul Craig indicates that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty subsidiarity challenges 
played a role in fewer than 20 cases, with some of them repeating previous challenges. Hence, the 
overall number adds up to little above ten cases over 20 years.13 EU scholars have attempted to find 
reasons for the scarcity of relevant jurisprudence and its marginal scope with regard to the 
subsidiarity principle.14 Estella explained it first via the character of the subsidiarity principle itself, 
which, according to him, is a ‘catch-all formula of good government and common sense, rather than 
                                                 
9 Yet, it was used to discuss proportionality. Groussot and Bogojević at 235 and 246.  
10 See House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 16th Report, Session 2013-14. 
11 See Memorandum of Understanding on Implementing Article 8 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, point 7 in House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 16th Report, Session 
2013-14. 
12 This chapter looks only at the use of the subsidiarity principle by the ECJ in reviewing acts of other institutions,but it 
does  not elaborate on the impact of subsidiarity on the Court’s exercise of its own powers. In this respect cf. de Búrca, 
‘The principle of subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an institutional actor’ and Horsley. 
13 Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’ at 80. 
14 For an overview of the ECJ’s subsidiarity jurisprudence and its analysis see Tridimas. 
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a well-defined political or philosophical principle,’ and is without ‘clear legal content.’15 A second 
possible explanation of the Court’s approach in Estella’s view, is the political agenda of the Court. 
Specifically, the Court is guided by the ‘idea of integration,’ which may be endangered by the ‘anti-
integration’ character of the subsidiarity principle, directed specifically against the growth of EU 
competences.16 Yet, as the Court depends on the arguments of the parties; when these are raised by 
the parties, the Court must adjudicate on this basis. In consequence, there is not be much space for 
Court’s own agenda, yet such room is left in the case of interpretation of the subsidiarity principle. 
The third explaination, in the view of Biondi, is the ‘bipolar ethos’ inherent in the subsidiarity 
principle, specifically the preservation of national autonomy and comparative efficiency of 
centralisation, that explains the adherence of the Court to the separation of powers: the Court tried 
to avoid ‘substituting its own judgment for that of the institutions, in assessing a choice which was 
ultimately perceived as political.’17 Fourth, Craig explains the low number of subsidiarity 
judgments with the argument that if Member States adopted a legislative act via QMV, it implied 
that there were enough Member States that thought that a given EU action fulfilled the subsidiarity 
test. Bringing proceedings before the ECJ would then necessarily engender legal opposition from 
the Member States that voted in favour of the proposal.18 
Some scholars expected that the Court would not ‘push the extent of its judicial review, as far as 
subsidiarity principle is concerned, any further than is absolutely necessary for ensuring and 
respecting the Rule of Law.’19 This transpired to be the case: currently, some urge the Court to 
insist ‘more sternly on transparency and reason-giving in support of legislative choices made’20 and 
to give up on the manifest-error doctrine. In this respect, Kumm argues for a ‘doctrinal framework’ 
for subsidiarity and proportionality,21 whereas others see a new opportunity for the Court by trying 
to connect subsidiarity and sincere cooperation22 or in the subsidiarity action provided for by 
Article 8 of Protocol No. 2.23 In the next section, I will concentrate on this new action.   
                                                 
15 Estella De Noriega at 96 & 139.  
16 Ibid at 7. This approach of the members of the Court Estella drew from their doctrinal writings.  
17 Biondi at 213 & 220. Similar view was expressed at the moment of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty by 
A.G. Toth. Cf. Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, 1102. 
18 Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis’, 81. 
19 Emiliou at 405. 
20 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Case 
Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 859. 
21 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the 
European Union’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 503. Such a ‘S&P Framework’ consists of the following three 
prongs: ‘federal intervention has to further legitimate purposes, has to be necessary in the sense of being narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose, and has to be proportionate with regard to costs or disadvantages relating to the loss of 
Member States’ regulatory autonomy.’ 
22 Martinico at 658. 
23 See Biondi at 223.  
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The judgments of the Court issued after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon neither cast 
more light on the subsidiarity principle, nor provide for its strengthening. To start with, in Case C-
176/09, brought by Luxembourg against the EU Legislator, the former requested the annulment of 
the directive on airport charges, which imposes airport charges on commercial airports located in 
Member States the annual traffic of which is over five million passenger movements, and to the 
airports with the highest passenger movement in each Member State.24 The latter part of the 
provision – concerning main airport of the Member States – was the problematic one in the case at 
stake. Luxembourg saw the directive as discriminatory towards Luxembourg Airoport Findel, 
which serves fewer than five million passenger a year, but which is Luxembourg’s main airport. In 
consequence, in the view of Luxembourg, the directive treats Findel differently from the Belgian 
Charleroi or German Hahn airports, which serve more passengers than the Luxembourg airport, yet 
still fall below the five million mark, and which are not the main airports in the respective Member 
States. With regard to a possible subsidiarity violation, Luxembourg argued that the directive is 
unnecessary for airports serving fewer than 5 million passengers a year; especially as the directive 
exempts many airports larger than Findel Airport.25  
Advocate General Mengozzi in his opinion stated that the directive does not violate subsidiarity, as 
allowing Member States with main airports of less than 5 million passengers per year to regulate 
airport charges on their own ‘would give rise to the divergent development of national rules,’ which 
in the future ‘would lead to inefficiency, and in the immediate present also make it easier for 
airports to adopt abusive conduct to the detriment of the airlines,’ and last but not least, air traffic as 
an ‘international matter’ in its nature is ‘ill suited for being regulated at the level of individual 
Member States.’26 The Court followed the assessment of the Advocate General. Accordingly, 
Luxembourg did not show how national rules could sufficiently achieve the objective pursued by 
Directive in cases where the main airport does not reach the minimum amount of passengers 
indicated by the directive.27  
One of the other recent ECJ cases on the subsidiarity principle concerned its applicability to the 
action of the Court of Auditors in case C-539/09, Commission v Germany. In this regard, Advocate 
General Trstenjak stated that the only limitation to the scope of the subsidiarity principle is the 
‘nature of the competences exercised by the European Union Institutions.’28 Accordingly, the 
                                                 
24 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:290. 
25 Ibid, para 33. 
26 Case C-176/09, Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi in Luxembourg v Parliament and Council [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:776, para 109. 
27 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:290, para 81. 
28 Case C-539/09 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Commission v Germany [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:345, para 
81. 
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principle of subsidiarity binds the Court of Auditors, except where it exercises an exclusive 
competence.29 The ECJ decided that it was not necessary to adjudicate whether subsidiarity should 
be relied on in relation to audits for the purposes of deciding between the interventions of the Court 
of Auditors and national audit bodies. However, the Court assumed that even if the principle of 
subsidiarity were applicable, the cross-border dimension of the administrative cooperation would in 
any event lead to the conclusion that the audit at stake was consistent with that principle. Moreover, 
in the view of the ECJ, as such audit ensures the proper cooperation of the Members States’ 
authorities, it is necessarily better carried out centrally at EU level by the Court of Auditors, since it 
extends to all of the Member States, unlike the power of the national courts of auditors.30 
The conclusions from these two judgments are the following. Both AGs and the Court indulge in a 
‘national insufficiency’ and  ‘EU comparative sufficiency test,’ partially enriched by a ‘cross-border 
activity test;’ yet they do not check, like AG Maduro in the Vodafone case, whether the national 
democratic process is likely to fail to protect cross-border activities due to a lack of special 
interest.31 In the first case, Luxembourg v. EP and Council, the Court shifted the burden to prove 
such an interest onto the plaintiff. In the second case regarding the Court of Auditors, the sole cross-
border dimension of the audit was enough to adjudicate compatibility with the subsidiarity 
principle. Simply, the Court did not engage in an examination of the relevant interests at stake. 
There are also two new pending actions of annulment concerning some provisions of the CRD-IV 
package (Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU and Capital Requirements Regulation) 
concerning the so-called ‘cap on bankers’ bonuses’ and granting the European Bank Authority 
some tasks in this respect.32 While the UK contested, inter alia, whether these provisions comply 
with the subsidiarity principle, Estonia argued a breach of essential procedural requirements, as the 
obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU was allegedly not fulfiled by the adopted 
directive. 
3 Status of the subsidiarity action 
Whereas some claim that with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, subsidiarity, as a part of 
the Treaty, became ‘justiciable’ – ‘capable of judicial resolution’ – before the Court of Justice, 
allowing for its review under the action or annulment or preliminary ruling on the basis of a referral 
                                                 
29 Ibid, para 85. On the application of subsidiarity principle only to the shared competence, see also Case C-288/11 P 
Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:821, para 79. 
30 Case C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:733, para 85. 
31 Case C-58/08 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Vodafone and others [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:596, 
para 34. 
32 Case C-507/13 Action brought on 20 September 2013 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council; case C-508/13 
Action brought on 23 September 2013 Estonia v Parliament and Council. 
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by a national court,33 others argue that only since the advent of the new subsidiarity action created 
by the Lisbon Treaty, can ‘subsidiarity [leave] its current status of dubious justiciability, and 
[become] a ground of judicial review.’34  
Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, in its report for the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, proposed a system in which a national parliament that has issued a reasoned opinion under 
the EWS could bring an action for violation of the principle of subsidiarity before the Court.35 The 
majority of Working Group I, however, rejected the possibility for the regions of Member States 
with legislative capacities to lodge a similar action. It was argued that ‘the degree of and 
arrangements for the involvement of regional and local authorities in the drafting of Community 
legislation should be determined solely in the national framework.’36 In addition, the idea of 
establishing an ad hoc ‘subsidiarity chamber’ or an ex ante judicial mechanism (between the 
adoption of the Community act and its entry into force), similar to the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel, was rejected.37 Other ideas included the possibility of giving national parliaments 
the right to bring subsidiarity actions to the ECJ via COSAC. 38 
The final outcome of the Convention with regard to the subsidiarity principle – Protocol No. 2 –
provided for a subsidiarity action, yet without the requirement of a prior reasoned opinion for such 
an action.39 The possibility of lodging an action on subsidiarity violations was also granted to the 
Committee of the Regions in areas in which an obligation to consult this body existed.40 
Protocol No. 2 attached to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union borrowed the subsidiarity action from its Constitutional Treaty counterpart. 
According to Article 8 of Protocol No. 2, national parliaments may lodge an action notified by 
Member States in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national parliament or a 
chamber thereof. This new avenue of bringing a subsidiarity action applies the ‘ordinary’ procedure 
                                                 
33 Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 272-277. Within the preliminary ruling procedure, according to Toth there are two 
possible ways. First, an individual may argue that an EU act upon which the case depends is invalid, for example 
because the act was adopted contrary to the subsidiarity principle. If convinced of this argument, national court may 
refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Second, in the national proceedings a question might arise that a specific 
measure is ultra vires; if relevant for the proceedings national court has to refer to the ECJ. For example the Vodafone 
case has been adjudicated in the preliminary reference proceedings, in which the applicant claimed that a EU regulation 
was invalid, as offending against, among others, the subsidiarity principle. See para 29. 
34 Davies, ‘The post-Laeken division of competences’, 692 
35 CONV 286/02, Point II c. 
36 Ibid. 
37 As Advocate General Jacobs explained at one of the meetins of Working Group I,‘the Court did not think it necessary 
for the time being to have a special chamber for matters concerning the principle of subsidiarity (however, where the 
need arose, the necessary organisational steps would be taken).’ European Convention, Summary of the meeting on 25 
June 2002, CONV 156/02, 28.06.2002, pages 3-4. 
38 CONV 210/02 at 2. 
39 Art 8 (1), Protocol No. 2. 
40 Art 8 (2), Protocol No. 2. 
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of the action for annulment enshrined in Article 263 TFEU. In addition, similarly to Protocol No. 2 
to the Constitutional Treaty, Article 8(2) provides for an action on grounds of subsidiarity violation 
for the Committee of the Regions against legislative acts on which the Committee of the Regions is 
consulted. 
Weatherill argued that the subsidiarity action ‘does nothing more than state the current position,’ 
presumably with the intention of placing an obligation upon the Member State when a national 
parliament makes a decision about a subsidiarity violation.41 To test this argument, starting with the 
analysis of Article 263 TFEU, to which Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 refers, I discuss the standing and 
grounds for subsidiarity action in light of the action for annulment. Additionally, I furnish an 
example of the indirect participation of national parliaments in the procedure for an action for 
annulment prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.42 
Regarding the standing rules of Article 263 TFEU, three types of applicants may lodge an action for 
annulment. In the EU legal literature they are labelled as ‘privileged’ (Member States, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission), ‘semi-privileged’ (the Court of Auditors, the European 
Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions) and ‘non-privileged’ (natural or legal persons).43 
‘Privileged applicants’ represent public interest that require judicial protection, ‘semi-privileged’ 
applicants protect their own institutional competences, whereas, as stated in Article 263(4) TFEU, 
‘non-privileged applicants’ must prove that an act is addressed to them or is of direct and individual 
concern or is a regulatory act, which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing 
measures. Trying to fit national parliaments into the scheme of ‘privileged’, ‘semi-privileged’ and 
‘non-privileged’ applicants, national parliaments could be considered ‘indirect semi-privileged 
applicants.’44 The notion of ‘indirect’ means that national parliaments do not bring the action 
themselves but through their governments, and ‘semi-privileged’ indicates that the violation touches 
upon only one of their institutional prerogatives, specifically the supervision of the observance of 
the principle of subsidiarity by EU institutions. Yet, it must be highlighted that national parliaments 
do not have an independent standing in the ECJ; thus the Treaty of Lisbon did not introduce any 
legally important changes in respect of standing. 
In accordance with Article 8(1) of Protocol No. 2, Member States bring an action in response to an 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of their national parliament or its chamber in 
accordance with national rules. The question is, whether subsidiarity infringements should be seen 
                                                 
41 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Case 
Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 852. 
42 See Committee of the Regions, Practical Guide on the infringement of the subsidiarity principle, No 47, avialble at 
https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/Publications/Documents/Guide%20on%20SubsidiarityFINAL.pdf. 
43 Derrick Wyatt and Alan Dashwood, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Community Law (Hart 2011) at 155. 
44 Thanks to Robert Schütze for pointing this to me. 
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as a new ground for an action for annulment. For all of the applicants, Article 263(2) TFEU enlists 
four general grounds for annulment: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law related to their application, or misuse 
of powers. A subsidiarity violation clearly falls within the scope of the infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement understood as the requirement of ‘EU legal acts to provide an adequate 
statement of the reasons on which they are based’ or of an infringement of the Treaty, meaning that 
‘an act contravenes a provision of the Treaty or is inconsistent with a parent measure.’45 In the first 
case, the ground includes breaches of the procedural dimension of the subsidiarity principle, 
whereas the second concerns breaches of the material aspect of subsidiarity principle.46 Therefore, a 
violation of the subsidiarity principle is not an additional ground under the Article 263 TFEU 
procedure. In addition, the text of Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 directly refers to ‘actions on grounds 
of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act,’ which implies that in 
subsidiarity actions, national parliaments should focus exclusively on subsidiarity. The textual 
interpretation of this provision thus implies that cases where national parliaments would like to 
extend the scope of their action and embrace, for instance, a competence violation by the legislative 
act are excluded. Nonetheless, the explicit indication of the scope of subsidiarity action may not 
please national parliaments. While Article 6(1) of Protocol No. 2 only mentions violations of the 
principle of subsidiarity in the ex ante form of subsidiarity scrutiny, national parliaments tend to go 
beyond this limitation, which was illustrated in the EPPO case in Chapter 2. In sum, a subsidiarity 
violation as a ground for an action is already included in the grounds listed in Article 263(2) TFEU, 
and national parliaments should not extend their actions beyond subsidiarity infringements, relying 
on a simple reference to Article 263 TFEU by Protocol No. 2. 
As was shown above, Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 makes subsidiarity action accessible for national 
Parliaments, but only indirectly. No new special procedure has been created.47 In fact, there is no 
separate standing for national parliaments, but their position, as mentioned before, may be viewed 
as ‘indirect semi-privileged applicants.’ Moreover, as Article 8(1) of Protocol No. 2 does not set out 
the details of the subsidiarity action, but refers to the rules laid down in 263 TFEU, the deadline for 
submission of a subsidiarity action is two months from the publication of the legislative measure, in 
line with Article 263(6) TFEU.  
                                                 
45 Wyatt and Dashwood at 180. Also Toth qualified subsidiarity violation as ‘infringement of the Treaty’ under Article 
173 EC, current Article 263 TFEU. Cf. Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 274.  
46 Cf. Estella De Noriega at 106-114. 
47 See the same view in Louis, ‘Quelques remarques sur l’avenir du contrôle du principe de subsidiarité’ at 303. 
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The ex post subsidiarity scrutiny formally introduces national parliaments into the system of EU 
judicial review; however an unofficial avenue was already used in the past.48 In fact, before the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, national parliaments could induce governments into pursuing a 
subsidiarity violation in the ECJ. In the case C-377/98, the Netherlands brought an action seeking 
the annulment of Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions.49
 
This 
directive was based on Article 100a EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU) and aimed at protecting 
biotechnological inventions through the patent laws of the Member States. While lodging its action 
against the directive, the Dutch government stated openly that it was acting upon the ‘express 
request’ of the Dutch Parliament, which was against genetic manipulation of animals and plants and 
issuing patents for the products of biotechnological procedures liable to promote such 
manipulation.50 Specifically, one of the pleas of the Dutch action was a violation of the subsidiarity 
principle by that directive. Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the action of the Netherlands, applying 
the tests of ‘national insufficiency’ and ‘comparative efficiency.’ As regards the first, the Court 
maintained that the objective of the directive ‘to ensure smooth operation of the internal market by 
preventing or eliminating differences between the legislation and practice of the various Member 
States in the area of the protection of biotechnological inventions, could not be achieved by action 
taken by the Member States alone.’51 The second test was argued by stating that ‘[a]s the scope of 
that protection has immediate effects on trade, and, accordingly, on intra-Community trade, it is 
clear that, given the scale and effects of the proposed action, the objective in question could be 
better achieved by the Community.’52 
The case of the Dutch parliament seems to show that national parliaments already used their powers 
to influence the action of annulment prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, the 
question concerning the novelty of Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 remains. It seems that the part of 
Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 which reads ‘or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on 
behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber thereof’ – demanding the establishment of national 
procedures for subsidiarity action – is the crucial and new issue. Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 does 
not formally oblige Member States to adjust national level procedures for the purposes of bringing a 
subsidiarity action. Yet, Protocol No. 2, by granting to national parliaments the possibility of 
participating in the ex post subsidiarity scrutiny, informally forces the Member States to take 
legislative steps in order to enable this new competence of national parliaments. The mentioning of 
                                                 
48 Thanks to Takis Tridimas for reminding me of this case. 
49 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:523. 
50 Ibid para 4. 
51 Ibid para 32. 
52 Ibid para 32. 
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the national legal order by Protocol No. 2 should represent a motivation for Member States to 
incorporate the subsidiarity action within their national provisions and practice.  
4 Design of the subsidiarity action 
While the EU level leaves much leeway to enable a connection between national parliaments and 
the ECJ, some national regulations tend to limit access to the Court and therefore diminish the role 
that national parliaments might have played. Accordingly, the examples below depict the more or 
less generous provisions on access to the Court, in the sense that they make the submission of the 
action easier or harder. The first subsection gives an overview of these procedures, while the second 
conducts a more detailed comparison of their specific elements. 
4.1 Overview of national provisions on ex post scrutiny 
The majority of national parliaments have received powers to lodge subsidiarity actions. However, 
in some Member States, these powers are quite limited (Luxembourg, Spain). No measures have 
been taken in Cyprus and Greece. The annexed table gives a full overview of the relevant 
procedures. Here I will discuss some selected countries in detail. 
Recent amendments of the Rules of Procedure in Finland state that the Grand Committee decides on 
the Eduskunta position regarding an action before the ECJ by handing in a report and 
recommendation in the plenary session.53 If the Grand Committee finds a breach of subsidiarity, the 
parliament instructs the government to take action before the ECJ.54 Likewise, in Denmark, on the 
recommendation of the European Affairs Committee, a majority in the Folketing may decide to 
bring an action before the ECJ.55 
In Germany, the Basic Law, the new Responsibility for Integration Act and the Rules of Procedure 
of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat contain the necessary provisions for the subsidiarity review. 
First, the federal government, according to §13 (7) IntVG, informs both the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat as quickly as possible of the finalisation of the EU legislative process. This information 
includes an assessment of compatibility with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Second, the right to bring an action to the ECJ for both of the chambers is anchored in the Basic 
Law, Article 23 (1a). For the Bundestag, an initiative requires one-fourth of its members,56 whereas 
                                                 
53 Reforming Law 1023/2009; Section 30 of the Rules of Procedure. 
54 Annex to the 13th Bi-annual Report on Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny at 136. 
55 Report on Consideration of EU matters by the Folketing in relation to subsidiarity checks, 9th April 2010, European 
Affairs Committee 2009-10 EUU alm. del – Bilag 460 (annex 460) Public. 
56 Article 23 (1a) Basic Law, §12 (1) IntVG, § 93d (2) of Rules of Procedure.  
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the provisions remain silent on a comparable threshold in the Bundesrat.57 Some authors point out 
that the one-fourth threshold is highly disputable since it does not express the right of the Bundestag 
as a chamber but in fact a right of a minority (Minderheitsrecht).58 Thus it entitles a minoritarian 
opposition to file an action. It is an issue whether the threshold only concerns initiatives to discuss 
bringing an action or whether it results in bringing an action itself.59 Moreover, the idea of the 
minority initiative in German law is traditionally connected with situations where the majority does 
not have an interest in being active (e.g. in the interrogation committee - Article 44 I S.1 Basic 
Law). Further, the literature underlines the constitutional issues involved in the minority right.60 
Namely, Article 42 (2) S.1 and Article 52 (3) S.1 Basic Law prescribe a general rule of majority 
vote, whereas Article 23 (1a) S.3 provides the possibility of a minority threshold, regulated in 
details through an infra-constitutional act. Finally, another view stresses that a lower threshold is 
helpful in cases where the federal government aims at avoiding the national parliament by bringing 
a proposal to the Commission and deciding on it in the Council.61 
Third, returning to procedure, there are detailed regulations of the Bundestag initiative. The 
initiative should encompass the essential grounds for an action,62 and, interestingly, also the view of 
MPs who do not support the action, as long as they represent at least one-quarter of the 
Bundestag.63 Fourth, the EU Affairs Committee is responsible for drafting an action and carrying 
out procedures in the Court.64 Fifth, the Bundesrat may issue its own opinion on a Bundestag’s 
action.65 Finally, if the deadline to raise the action falls in the period outside of the Bundestag 
working plan, the Basic Law (Article 45) authorises the EU Affairs Committee to file an action.66 In 
the last step, the federal government immediately forwards the application to the ECJ.67 At this 
point, the role of the government is complete, and unlike in other Members States, the parliament 
representative continues the procedure.68 
                                                 
57 § 12 (2) IntVG. This provision delegates to the Bundesrat to decide on the treshold in its Rules of Procedure. 
However, the regulations have not been adjusted yet. Cf. Bickenbach at 532. Hence, the decision on issuing a 
subsidiarity action will be taken by a majority vote (Cf. Peter Becker and Daniela Kietz, ‘Zwischen Brüssel, Berlin und 
Karlsruhe: Bundestag und Bundesrat als Vorzeigemodell parlamentarischer Mitwirkung in der Europapolitik?’ 
<http://www.boell.de/downloads/parlamentarischemitwrikungineuropa.pdf > at 20).  
58 Uerpmann-Wittzack and Edenharter at 313. 
59 The Bundestag would be obliged to take a resolution about bringing an action, Cf. Ibid at 314. 
60 Melin at 672. 
61 Pernice and Hindelang at 408. 
62 § 93d (2) of Rules of Procedure. 
63 §12 (1) IntVG, § 93d (3) of Rules of Procedure. 
64 §12 (4) IntVG, § 93d (1) Rules of Procedure. 
65 §12 (5) IntVG. This provision gives a possibility to the Bundestag to issue a reasoned opinion, if the Bundesrat has 
issued its own.  
66 However, a specialized committee may contradict: §93d (4) and §93b (2) Rules of Procedure. 
67 §12 (3) IntVG. 
68 §12 (4) IntVG. The ECJ Statut (Art 19 par. 1) indicates that an Agent has to represent Member States and EU 
institutions before the ECJ. The Agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer.  Hence, as the Bundestag will not 
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In the UK House of Lords, a subsidiarity action first requires a report of the EU Committee, which 
the chamber will debate together with a resolution to pursue the action.69 The chamber will then call 
on the government to bring this action before the ECJ.70 The House of Commons’ Standing Order 
does not directly foresee subsidiarity action.71 However, the parliament and the government adopted 
a Memorandum of Understanding about the implementation of Article 8 of Protocol No. 2.72  
The French parliament’s powers to launch an action before the ECJ are regulated at the 
constitutional level in Article 88-6. First, Article 88-6 of the Constitution obliges the government to 
refer an action to the Court. Second, a resolution declaring a need for an action may be passed by a 
minimum of sixty members of the Assemblée, even when the parliament is not in session.73 In the 
Assemblée, draft resolutions are admissible within a period of eight weeks after publication of the 
legislative act.74 The procedure in the Sénat seems broader at the first glance:75 any senator may 
initiate an action against a European act for violation of the subsidiarity principle within eight 
weeks following its publication,76 but sixty senators still need to support the action.77 The President 
of the Sénat transfers the resolution to the government.78 
In Belgium, the ex post subsidiarity scrutiny is anchored in the inter-parliamentary cooperation 
agreement.79 In very general terms, it prescribes that, before any assembly initiates an action, other 
assemblies, within one week, may contest the competence of that parliament to proceed with the 
action. If this happens, the Council of State is consulted. 
In Poland, the Cooperation Act and Rules of Procedure of both chambers include regulations on 
subsidiarity action. The Sejm Rules of Procedure indicate that the EU Affairs Committee or a group 
of fifteen MPs may bring a project of an opinion attached to a resolution.80 Furthermore, the first 
reading of the said resolution takes place within the committee, after which there is no longer a 
possibility for amendments; this probably aims at safeguarding an efficient procedure. Provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                  
have an independent standing before the Court, it may probably arrange with the government to choose its own agent or 
lawyer on the basis of §12 (4) IntVG. 
69 Companion to Standing Orders (2010), para 10.65.  
70 Ibid para 10.64. 
71 Standing Orders of the House of Commons (2012). 
72 Memorandum of Understanding on Implementing Article 8 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 16 th Report, Session 2013-14. 
73 Also Article 151-11 Rules of Procedure repeats that the government receives from the President of the Assemblée 
nationale an action lodged by at least sixty MPs. 
74 Résolution n° 292 du 27 mai 2009 adjusted the Rules of Procedure for the subsidiarity review, Article 151-9 Rules of 
Procedure. 
75 Résolution du 20 décembre 2010 adjusted the Rules of Procedure for the subsidiarity review. 
76 Article 73 nonies 1-2 Rules of Procedure. 
77 Article 88-6 of French Constitution. 
78 Article 73 octies 7 Rules of Procedure. 
79 Delreux and Randour at 6. 
80 Article 148cd par 1-6, Regulamin Sejmu. 
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are comparable for the Senat, since the Rules of Procedure indicate that each committee may bring 
a project of a resolution (together with an action).81 Afterwards, the Marshall of the Senat forwards 
the project to the appropriate committees, including the EU Affairs Committee. To complete the 
proceedings, the Marshall of the Sejm or the Senat sends the resolution (with the action) from the 
appropriate chamber to the Prime Minister, who immediately forwards the action to the ECJ.82 The 
Marshall of the Sejm or the Senat authorizes the government to represent the chamber before the 
ECJ. 
Spain and Luxembourg seem to impose high hurdles on subsidiarity action originating from 
parliamentary chambers. Despite the detailed provisions concerning the action for annulment in 
Spain,83 the system reflects the generally weak position of the Spanish parliament, where the 
control of the Spanish government by the Cortes Generales relies mainly on hearings, which do not 
ensure much control. Accordingly, where two parliamentary fractions or one-fifth of the members 
of the chambers initiate an action within two weeks of the publication of an act,84 the Joint 
Committee, within six weeks, discusses and decides on the initiative.85 However, the government 
can dismiss the action without stating any reasons. In this instance, the Presidium of the Joint 
Committee, two parliamentary fractions or one-fifth of the members of the chambers may only 
demand that the government explains its decision during one of the Joint Committee meetings.86 
Next, the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés may launch a subsidiarity action only if its reasoned 
opinion is not taken into account.87
 
In such circumstances, the majority of MPs in a public session 
adopt a motion to begin proceedings.88 Moreover, some measures are also provided for in cases 
when there is no planned public debate, so that the two-month limit may be respected. In such a 
case, the presidium of the Chambre des Députés takes the decision89 and invites individual members 
                                                 
81 Art 75e, Regulamin Senatu. 
82 Art 17, Cooperation Act. 
83 Art 7, Ley 24/2009, de 22 de diciembre, de modificación de la Ley 8/1994, de 19 de mayo, por la que se regula la 
Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, para su adaptación al Tratado de Lisboa de 13 de diciembre de 2007 and the 
Resolución de las Mesas del Congreso de los Diputados y del Senado, de 27 de mayo de 2010, sobre reforma de la 
Resolución de las Mesas del Congreso de los Diputados y del Senado, de 21 de septiembre de 1995, sobre desarrollo de 
la Ley 8/1994, de 19 de mayo, por la que se regula la Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, para su adaptación a las 
previsiones del Tratado de Lisboa y de la Ley 24/2009. 
84 Art 7.2. Ley 24/2009, Resolución, Noveno, par. 1. 
85 The chambers may, however, decide within four weeks to take over the debate for a plenary session, Resolución, 
Noveno, par. 2 and par. 3. Additionally, alternative proposals for an action are also foreseen, as in the ex ante review. 
Resolución, Noveno, par. 2 in connection with Octavo par. 4-5. 
86 Art 7.3, Ley 8/1994, as amended by Ley 24/2009, Resolución, Noveno par. 4. 
87 Art 169 (6) par. 1 Reglement de Chambre des Députés. 
88 Art 169 (6) par. 2 Reglement de Chambre des Députés. 
89 Art 169 (6) par. 3 Reglement de Chambre des Députés. 
184 
to participate in the drafting of an action.90 Consequently, the presidium informs the chamber about 
the decision during the next public session.91 
Surprisingly, neither the Tweede Kamer nor the Eerste Kamer of the Netherlands has issued any 
formal regulations concerning subsidiarity actions in their respective Rules of Procedure. Likewise, 
the Act of Approval concerning the Lisbon Treaty does not regulate this matter. Even though it 
appears that the government does not want to create a legal obligation to bring actions to the ECJ, 
the Netherlands have announced that they will act upon a legally non-binding resolution or a 
decision of the chambers to bring an action for annulment on behalf of one chamber or both 
chambers jointly.92 However, it remains the responsibility parliament to decide upon the content of 
an action.93 
In 2012, the Italian parliament approved the Act on Italian participation in the EU, which 
significantly enhances the role of the Italian chambers in scrutinizing government action at the EU 
level, especially through extensive information rights and scrutiny reserve.94 Above all, the new 
regulation specifies conditions for subsidiarity action. Accordingly, the government must submit 
actions issued by of one of the chambers without any delay.95 Most probably, however, the details 
of the ex post subsidiarity procedure will be incorporated into the Rules of Procedure of the 
chambers.96  
To close this overview, it is worth mentioning that the participation of regional parliaments in the ex 
post subsidiarity scrutiny is characterised by even fewer regulations, or, indeed, no regulations at 
all.97 In Germany, a political agreement of the Ministerpräsidenten-Konferenz from 2005 decided 
that the action of one Land will be supported by all the other Länder.98 It seems that the Bundesrat 
may, however, represent the interest of a Land in this matter.99 This is important, as the right of one 
Land or the Länder as a group to bring an action may be seen as contrary to Article 8 of Protocol 
                                                 
90 Art 169 (6) par. 3 Reglement de Chambre des Députés. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Besselink and van Mourik at 47. It will have a form of a resolution in the Tweede Kamer and ‘a decision of the 
chamber’ in the Eerste Kamer. 
93 Ibid. It is a political decision, as the government is not legally bound due to lacking provision in the Act of Approval. 
94 Art 4 and Art. 10 Legge 24 dicembre 2012, n. 234 Norme generali sulla partecipazione dell'Italia alla formazione  e 
all'attuazione della normativa e delle politiche dell'Unione europea.  
95 Art 42.4 Legge 24 dicembre 2012, n. 234 Norme generali sulla partecipazione dell'Italia alla formazione e 
all'attuazione della normativa e delle politiche dell'Unione europea.  
96 Currently, the Rules of Procedure do not grant the Camera dei Deputati the right to initiate subsidiarity action. 
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Senato do not address subsidiarity action at all. Cf. Camera dei Deputati, 
Giunta per il regolamento, 12.12.2013, p. 159. 
97 Spanish, Finish and British laws do not provide for a role of the regional legislative bodies in the subsidiarity action. 
98 Becker and Kietz at 20. 
99 In a case where the Länder are affected by the action or omission of an EU institution in matters in which they have a 
legislative power, or where the federation does not have the legislative power, the federal government brings an action 
to the Court on the behalf of the Bundesrat. This is a general rule, not provided exclusively for subsidiarity violations, 
§7 (1) EUZBLG. 
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No. 2, if this is understood as listing an exclusive circle of applicants.100 Similarly, §12 (1)-(2) 
IntVG provides a subsidiarity action for each of the chambers only. The additional value of this 
mechanism is that the Bundesrat, acting for the Länder without the intermediary government, 
‘underpins the independent character of the action and corresponds with the structural difference 
between the action and the hitherto available possibility.’101 In Italy, the government may file 
actions to the ECJ on request of the Italian Regions and Provinces of Bolzano and Trento against 
illegitimate EU legislative acts concerning matters within the legislative competence of these 
bodies, if requested so by majority of their votes in the State-Regions Conference.102 It might be 
assumed that Regions and Provinces of Bolzano and Trento will consider subsidiarity violations as 
illegitimate EU legislative acts. 
4.2 Comparison of Subsidiarity Action Provisions  
Keeping in mind the differences between the national level regulations as indicated in the previous 
section, the following section will compare national provisions according to factors such as the 
number of parliamentarians required to lodge an action, and the role of the government in the 
transmission and representation of the interests of the national parliament before the ECJ. This 
analysis aims to identify the most vital aspects of national procedures and to highlight the obstacles 
involved in ex post scrutiny. 
In some of the Member States, subsidiarity action is the right of a minority. In other words, the 
government will have to lodge an action on behalf of the parliament for a certain non-majoritarian 
number of the MPs. In France, the government is obliged to act when sixty members of Assemblée 
nationale or sixty members of the Sénat request it. Further, one-fourth of the members of the 
German Bundestag are needed to lodge an action in the ECJ. Accordingly, it must be underlined 
that leaving the initiative to the minority, which is most commonly the governmental opposition, 
improves the democratic control over the government during the EU decision-making process. 
Thanks to such a minoritarian tool, the opposition gains easier access to the scrutiny of the 
government. As the German Constitutional Court underlined, the subsidiarity action allows a 
minority ‘to assert the rights of the German Bundestag also where the latter does not wish to 
exercise its rights, in particular in relation to the Federal Government sustained by it.’103 
However, national legal systems only benefit if the action is appropriate, namely when detecting a 
subsidiarity violation. Otherwise, the ECJ may face an enormous inflow of actions from opposition 
                                                 
100 Melin at 675. 
101 Ibid, own translation. 
102 Notes to Art 42 Legge 24 dicembre 2012, n. 234. 
103 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30.6.2009, para 403. 
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parties using subsidiarity actions as a tool to fight with the government outside of the national 
arena, thus bringing internal conflicts to the EU level. This might be the rationale behind the 
Spanish scenario. Even though two parliamentary fractions or one-fifth of the members of the 
chambers in Spain may initiate an action within two weeks of the publication of an act, the 
government still decides if the action will be lodged. 
Regarding the minoritarian action, it must finally be pointed out that it is difficult to imagine a 
minority directly submitting an action to the Court without any previous parliamentary discussion. 
Such a situation could contradict Article 8 of Protocol No. 2, identifying the subject eligible to 
bring the action. Article 8 foresees only a parliament or a chamber thereof (and the action is in fact 
submitted by a Member State on their behalf) as eligible to lodge an action. As the discussion 
within the German doctrine tries to establish, Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 seems to be against 
shaping the action as a minority right, as it provides for standing for national parliament and not a 
group of MPs or a party. Another problem is that, in order to avoid that the action will be submitted 
under Article 263(4) TFEU (dealing with standing for natural and legal person), it should be seen as 
an action of the whole parliament.104 
Where the subsidiarity action is designed as a majority decision, it means, in fact, that the governing 
party or coalition determines the fate of the action. Accordingly, the whole parliament in Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Poland decides upon the fate of an initiative. If the debate takes place in 
the plenary, it may encourage more discussion of the principle of subsidiarity or even EU affairs in 
general. Yet, the majoritarian decision may also diminish the possibility of bringing an action 
within the prescribed time. Plenary debates are also less profound than committee discussions.  
In sum, both the minoritarian and majoritarian types of subsidiarity action have their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Subsidiarity action should raise the issue of a subsidiarity violation in a legislative proposal. It is, 
however, possible that the launch of the proceedings before the ECJ, especially where an action by 
a minority is allowed, aims rather at the contestation of a decision taken by the national government 
in the Council, which voted in favour of the legislative proposal. It was thus decided in all Member 
States analysed, with the exception of Spain, that the national government serves only as a ‘courier’ 
for the subsidiarity action. This shows that even though Member States might have some objections 
vis-à-vis reserving subsidiarity action rights to a minority, they left it to the ECJ to decide on the 
admissibility of an action. The Court will filter out actions purely directed against the government 
and those that do not raise subsidiarity violations.  
                                                 
104 Cf. arguments raised by Uerpmann-Wittzack and Edenharter at 317. 
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Finally, self-representation before the ECJ is directly foreseen for the German Bundestag, Czech 
chambers and Romania, whereas the Italian provisions rightly refer to the rules of representation.105 
In reality, national parliaments and governments will have to agree to representation by an agent, as 
foreseen by the ECJ Statute. Such representation may help national parliaments to overcome 
resource and expertise problems. Since governments have experience in actions for annulment 
proceedings, their assistance may play an essential role. The direct right of the Bundestag to have 
its own representative, on the one hand, is a step forward because it grants the national parliament 
some choice, distinguishing subsidiarity action within the action for annulment framework, but on 
the other hand, the ECJ Statute provisions limit this right. Another option, represented by Denmark, 
is that the government presents the case, but the delegation consists of participants from the 
Folketing, concerned governmental departments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also 
chairs the delegation. Thus, even if national parliaments may not have locus standi before the ECJ, 
Member States might shape their national provisions in a way that will allow the parliament more 
influence on the procedure. 
4.3 Outcome 
The more general analysis of subsidiarity action, as well as the detailed description of the national 
procedures for subsidiarity action, seem to suggest a causal link with the categories of national 
parliaments outlined by Maurer and Wessels depending on their position vis-à-vis the government 
in EU affairs: ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ parliaments.106 Visibly, parliaments categorised as weak EU 
affairs scrutinisers also remain in this position with regard to subsidiarity action. The national 
provisions create obstacles for national parliaments (Spain, Luxembourg), regulate it in very 
general terms (Belgium) or do not provide for procedure at all until very recently (Italy). The 
decision to lodge the action by the majority vote of MPs in Denmark and Finland might have its 
roots in the multiparty political system of those Member States: a subsidiarity action designed as a 
minority action could be seen as a tool to fight against a government that does not have a single-
party majority or a stable coalition. Yet, the fact that the government will lodge the action without 
any margin of appreciation and the Danish possibility for the parliament to be a part of the 
delegation before the ECJ indicate that the provisions allowing for a strong impact of Nordic 
national parliaments on EU affairs do not foresee any obstacles on the part of the government. 
Similarly, the strong German parliament, the Bundestag and to some extent the Bundesrat, have 
firm, constitutionally guaranteed rights to apply ex post subsidiarity scrutiny: minority action and 
the possibility of self-representation before the ECJ. Furthermore, France and the UK have 
                                                 
105 Art 42 par. 4 Legge 24 dicembre 2012, n. 234. 
106 See Chapter 1, Literature review. 
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differentiated regulations for subsidiarity action. In France, minority action in particular is a big 
advantage for the French parliament. This might be a consequence of the decision of the 
Constitutional Council to strengthen the role of the parliament. In the case of the UK, the 
Memorandum of Understanding elaborates upon the subsidiarity action in the House of Lords and 
provides the House of Commons with a similar right. For Poland, the provisions on ex post scrutiny 
are quite detailed and similar to those on ex ante scrutiny. The exhaustive regulation of this 
procedure in Poland is a consequence of the major reform conducted in 2010 to adjust the role of 
the Polish parliament to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Conclusion 
Summing up, this chapter has argued that Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 did not grant national 
parliaments independent standing before the ECJ. For the purpose of their categorisation among the 
different types of applicants who can bring an action of annulment in accordance to Article 263 
TFEU, national parliaments can be seen as ‘indirect semi-privileged applicants.’ The notion of 
‘indirect’ points to the fact that national parliaments do not bring the action themselves but via their 
governments, while ‘semi-privileged’ highlights that the violation touches upon only one of their 
institutional prerogatives, specifically supervision of the observance of the principle of subsidiarity 
by EU institutions. Moreover, this chapter has maintained that subsidiarity violations clearly fall 
within the scope of Article 263 TFEU as an infringement of an essential procedural requirement 
(‘procedural subsidiarity’) or as an the infringement of the Treaty (‘material subsidiarity’). 
This chapter has also inquired into the design of the subsidiarity action at the national level. The 
procedures have been compared according to factors such as the number of parliamentarians 
required to lodge an action, and the role of the government in the transmission and representation of 
the interests of the national parliament before the ECJ. The analysis of these aspects pointed 
towards a causal link between the parliaments categorised as weak EU affairs scrutinisers and the 
national provisions: the design of the subsidiarity action in such jurisdictions does not facilitate the 
participation of national parliaments in the ex post subsidiarity review. In comparison, parliaments 
that are perceived as strong scrutinisers have been granted much more independence in the 
subsidiarity action. In other cases individual circumstances explain the position of parliament in the 
subsidiarity scrutiny. 
The question remains whether national parliaments should have gained an independent standing 
before the Court. Stephen Weatherill raised an argument in favour of allowing national parliaments 
to bring cases before the Court on their own, as a logical consequence of the fact that ‘the problem 
addressed by the crafting of a novel direct role for national Parliaments in EU lawmaking lies in the 
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periodic failings of national executives to reflect the concerns of national Parliaments in Council 
negotiations.’107 In fact, an argument could be made that, already now, the national design of the 
rules on subsidiarity action, sometimes allows national parliaments a lot of independence in the 
subsidiarity action.  
Since the ex post review procedure has not yet been applied, it is difficult to predict whether and 
how national provisions will be enforced. It remains to be seen whether national parliaments are 
well equipped to challenge EU legislative acts before the Court. As I have demonstrated in this 
chapter, Member States have offered different models for the regulation of the ex post subsidiarity 
review. Whether the subsidiarity action will evolve from a science-fiction instrument into a hard 
system of ex post control of subsidiarity, however, depends on the determination of parliaments. In 
comparison to ex ante subsidiarity review, the ex post scrutiny might be not that well known. 
However, the UK Memorandum of Understanding seems to try to provide an answer to this issue, at 
least in the UK.108  
One may claim that the new subsidiarity review mechanism by national parliaments is a sufficient 
safeguard for the principle of subsidiarity because it is actively used – it fulfils its function as 
national parliaments actively participate in the EWS. Hence, an increased legal role of the Court 
should not be expected. Or, as the ECJ Judge Bay Larsen pointed out, subsidiarity will be taken out 
of the ECJ’s ‘judicial toolbox’ and applied where appropriate, but ‘probably [will] not often be 
deployed as a single and separate instrument.’109 
Yet, it might be also argued to the contrary, that the Court will engage itself to a greater extent in 
subsidiarity scrutiny. Specifically, in this vein, Azoulai and Maduro argue that the Court is under 
much stricter public scrutiny than beforehand due to the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
in the broadening of EU competences and the extension of majoritarian decision-making.110 This 
will ‘require the Court to increasingly control how and when the Union exercises its competences’ 
and ‘increasingly plead for the Court to also develop a more traditional counter-majoritarian 
                                                 
107 Weatherill, ‘Better competence monitoring’, 40. Because Weatherill’s point raised was raised at the time of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the action, in Wetherill’s view was to cover matters already signaled in the ex ante reasoned 
opinion procedure.  
108 ‘We are publishing this short report in order to draw the possibility of the House challenging EU legislation on the 
grounds that it is in breach of the principle of subsidiarity to the attention of the Procedure Committee, Departmental 
Select Committees, and Members of the House.’ Cf. House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 16th Report, 
Session 2013-14, point 10. 
109 Lars Bay Larsen, ‘The Judicial Review of the Principle of Subsidiarity at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’ (6th Subsidiarity Conference 18 December 2013) at 14. 
110 Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai, ‘Introduction’ in M Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and 
The Future of EU Law The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome (Hart 2010) at 
XIX. 
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approach in reviewing the actions of the EU political process.’111 More attention to the subsidiarity 
question on the part of the ECJ could be expected where the subsidiarity principle is tested via the 
subsidiarity action lodged by a Member State on behalf of a national parliament, especially as the 
subsidiarity action highlights a specific subsidiarity problem. The Court might be more willing to 
follow the view of national parliaments, as they are more apt than other institutions to assess the EU 
action against subsidiarity standards. However, this does not mean that a subsidiarity violation 
highlighted by one Member State will make the Court automatically decide that the EU should not 
act; as highlighted out by Lenaerts, ‘a necessary condition for Community action is that at least one 
Member State has inadequate means at its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed 
action.’112 This does not work the other way round: adequate means to achieve the objectives 
possessed by the Member State that lodged the action do not imply that the action should be left to 
the national authorities.  
A normative question that remains to be answered is whether we need more profound subsidiarity 
scrutiny by the Court, or whether the current hands-off approach is an appropriate safeguard of 
subsidiarity. One can agree with Toth that the Court’s powers should be restricted to uncovering a 
manifest error in the economic evaluation; misuse of powers or exceeding the limits of the 
discretion by institutions, by taking into account the statement of reasons (subsidiarity justification) 
and the legal basis of the act.113 The impact assessments also facilitate the examination of 
subsidiarity arguments with regard to the costs and benefits of EU action,114 as well as allowing the 
plaintiffs to collect information in this regard.115 Yet, ‘the Court is not entitled to enter the actual 
area of the discretion itself.’116 The exercise of power, especially with regard to economic policies 
implicates an evaluation of complex economic data and a decision concerning the appropriate 
action, which should be taken by the Commission and the Council. The Court lacks ‘in terms of 
staff, facilities and expertise to undertake necessary research to make complex economic and 
political judgments of this kind.’117 While ‘[a]djudicating subsidiarity is (…) a difficult task for any 
court’ because of the test at stake, for the ECJ to determine a subsidiarity breach is even more 
complicated than in case of other courts, as it means a different decision than that assumed by three 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’, 22.  
113 Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 284. 
114 While impact assessments may help to uncover manifest errors in the EU legislation, the methodology applied in the 
impact assessments might be questioned by the Court. See Werner Vandenbruwaene, ‘The ambivalent methods of 
subsidiarity review’ in Marta Cartabia, Nicola Lupo and Andrea Simoncini (eds), Democracy and subsidiarity in the 
EU (Il Mulino 2013) at 396-397. 
115 Groussot and Bogojević at 243. According to them, procedural subsidiarity does not make the Court to substitute the 
decision of the EU  legislator, in turn it allows the Court to ‘take subsidiarity seriously.’ (at 251) 
116 Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 283. 
117 Ibid. 
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supporting EU institutions.118 In fact, by making its own assessment, the Court ‘would assume the 
role of the supreme legislature in the Community,’119 possibly deciding ‘against the will of the 
qualified majority of the Member States in Council and (very often also) the majority of the 
representatives of European citizens in Parliament.’120 Finally, because the additional, political 
safeguard of the subsidiarity principle is now the hands of national parliaments in the form of the 
EWS, which can aptly control for the best level to adopt a piece of legislation, the subsidiarity 
scrutiny of the ECJ can remain of low intensity, in contrast to the period that preceded the Lisbon 
Treaty, when the Court was the only safeguard of subsidiarity.  
 
                                                 
118 Chalmers, Davies and Monti at 396. 
119 Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 2.83. 
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Chapter 5: 
The EWS within national political systems 
Introduction 
This thesis has thus far focused on the design of the Early Warning System at EU 
level – its scope, operation and consequences – and at national level, by analysing 
how national procedures accommodate the subsidiarity review. No attention has thus 
far been devoted to the debates and voting on the reasoned opinions in the 
parliamentary chambers. This aspect has also not yet been studied in the relevant 
literature.  
In this chapter, I will hence analyse three questions regarding the interaction between 
national executive and legislative bodies in the EWS. First, I consider to what extent 
the EWS has allowed the national parliamentary chambers to act independently from 
their respective governments. Second, I study whether the decision to pursue 
subsidiarity violations through the EWS reflects the division between the 
parliamentary majority (coalition) and the minority (opposition), or whether there is a 
general unanimity between the parties on reasoned opinions. Third, I analyse to what 
extent the EWS permits the expression of regional interests, independently from such 
institutions as the Committee of Regions.1 
This chapter takes the parliamentary chambers of the UK, Germany, Poland and 
Belgium as case studies. Although not fully representative of all political and 
constitutional configurations within the EU, this will enable us to inquire into a 
number of relevant features of the parliamentary process. First, the Member States 
that are subject to comparison exhibit both federal and centralised structures. Second, 
these Member States contain both two-party coalitions as well as coalitions with a 
much more dispersed political spectrum. Third, both majoritarian (Westminster 
model) and consensus models of executive-legislative relations are reflected in the 
study. Finally, the parliamentary systems of the chosen Member States are bicameral, 
with the lower chambers directly elected in all four cases, as well as with variously 
composed upper chambers. The sample can be hence used to look into how the EWS 
operates in different political structures. 
                                                 
1 See in Chapter 1. 
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Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the arguments raised in the 
parliamentary debates while scrutinising Commission proposals to which national 
parliaments later issued a reasoned opinion. The points mentioned in the debates on 
the redistributive character of EU policies or those concerning idiosyncratic national 
interests might shed some additional light on why national parliaments go beyond 
scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle.  
1 Research Approach 
I study the questions listed above by collecting data on all the issued reasoned 
opinions of four Member States and analysing the debates and the decision and voting 
patterns. The study is limited to the debates and voting in which the respective 
parliaments decided to issue a reasoned opinion. The countries that I selected are 
Belgium, Germany, Poland and the UK. While not fully representative of all possible 
political and constitutional configurations across Member States, the sample 
nonetheless allows me to cover substantial ground regarding my research questions. 
1.1 Justification of the sample choice 
First, the sample includes both centralised and federal constitutional systems. The 
national parliaments of the chosen Member States operate in federal (Germany, 
Belgium) or centralised Member States (Poland), while in the UK, the parliaments 
have been governed via the devolution principle since 1999.2 The varying degree of 
centralisation may be expected to correlate with the degree to which regional interests 
are captured and reflected within the EWS where possible.   
Second, the Member States I study reflect different party systems, with different 
levels of cross-party consensus formation. In the period of research, in the UK, 
Germany and Poland, the government majority was a two-party coalition, whereas in 
Belgium six political parties formed the parliamentary majority, reflecting a high 
degree of fragmentation. Notably, the current configuration of a Conservative-Liberal 
coalition in the UK represents a significant deviation from the traditional two-party 
system with a single party government that dominated post-war politics in Britain. A 
                                                 
2 Devolution means a transfer of power to a subnational authority (Scotland, Wales or Northern 
Ireland) in a unitary system of government. In contrast to federalism, the powers of subnational 
authorities can be withdrawn by the central government at any time. See Caitríona A Carter, 
‘Rethinking UK Parliamentary Adaptation in EU Affairs: Devolution and Europeanisation’ (2013) 19 
The Journal of Legislative Studies 392; Robert Hazell, ‘Westminster as a Three-in-One Legislature for 
the United Kingdom and its Devolved Territories’ (2007) 13 Journal of Legislative Studies 254. 
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more fragmented political process may be expected to lead to fewer instances of 
consensus in actions taken under the EWS. 
Third, and closely linked to the above, the sample contains representatives of both 
majoritarian (Westminster model) and consensus models of executive-legislative 
relations. In the former, the executive tends to dominate the legislative; the latter 
model presents a more balanced relationship.3 Dominance by the government in the 
relationship between the two arms of government may be expected to lead to less 
independence in the reasoned opinions issued by parliament.  
In addition, the division between the ‘debating’ and ‘working’ chambers, as proposed 
by Max Weber is reflected in the selection of countries I study. Traditionally, the 
House of Common is a ‘debating’ chamber, while the House of Lords represents a 
‘working’ chamber. I study this distinction and its possible implications in greater 
detail below. 
Fourth, my selection allows me to examine both elected and unelected chambers, at 
least with regard to upper houses. While the Lords are appointed or hereditary, the 
members of the Bundesrat represent regional entities. The senators in the Polish Senat 
are directly elected and, finally, the members of the Belgian Sénat are selected in a 
combination of appointment and election. The expectation is that elected chambers 
will act more politically, suggesting that the majority will align more with the 
government, while unelected chambers may act more independently. In addition, 
political cleavages between parties can be expected to be more prominent in elected 
chambers, and such conflicts may also be reflected in the views expressed on 
reasoned opinions under the EWS, if there is no party discipline rule (in contrast to 
Belgium with the high level of party discipline).4 
1.2 Data collected on debates and votes in the EWS 
The next section presents the data on the reasoned opinions issued by the different 
chambers in the Member States in my sample. I start with a summary of the main 
parliamentary features and current political situation in the UK, Germany, Poland and 
                                                 
3 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries 
(Yale University Press 2012) at 105. 
4 Tom Delreux and François Randour, ‘Belgium: Institutional and administrative adaptation but limited 
political interest’ in Claudia Hefftler and others (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments 
and the European Union (Palgrave 2015 forthcoming). 
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Belgium. Next, in four tables, I present the votes of the coalition and the opposition to 
the Commission proposals, with the opinion of the government, if available. The 
content of the tables is drawn from records of debates in parliamentary committees 
and chambers, and explanatory memorandums issued by governments (UK), or their 
position, as stated in committees or plenaries (Germany, Belgium, Poland). In 
addition, for Germany, where the protocols, voting outcomes, and government 
position are not always accessible, some of the data presented here is interpreted from 
protocols that available or from reasoned opinions.  
1.2.1 The UK 
Starting with the analysis of the British parliament, since May 2010 the Conservatives 
have formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, with the Labour Party as the 
main opposition party in the House of Commons. As almost all ministers are 
members of the House of Commons, the British system is characterised by a 
‘significant merging of the executive and legislative branches,’5 or, in other words, a 
‘fused nature of the government/Commons relationship.’6 House of Lords members, 
on the contrary, are not popularly elected. The House’s members include hereditary 
peers (whose titles are inherited),7 life peers (appointed for their lifetime), and 
archbishops and bishops of the Church of England.8 The House of Lords has less 
party discipline, partially because it is not elected and peers are often in the twilight of 
their careers. Nowadays, the House of Lords functions as a ‘revising chamber with 
more time available and in many cases, more expertise to perform this task.’9 In 
particular, the ‘working peers’ (mainly the life peers) regularly and actively 
participate in select committees, working in a much more ‘non-partisan, technical, 
expert’ manner than members of the House of Commons.10 Life peers, formerly 
politicians from the House of Commons or the government, provide more ‘useful 
                                                 
5 Ian Loveland, Constitutional law, administrative law, and human rights: a critical introduction 
(Oxford University Press 2012) at 124. 
6 Ibid at 129. 
7 The latest most important reform of the House of Lords, House of Lord Act 1999, reduced the 
number of hereditary lords. 
8 Membership as of 1.02.2013: Conservative – 213 Peers, Labour – 222 Peers, Liberal Democrat – 86 
Peers, Crossbench 178, Bishops – 25 Peers, Other -32 Peers. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/lords/lords-by-type-and-party/. 
9 Peter Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (Constitutional 
Systems of the World) (Hart 2012) at 127. 
10 Dawn Oliver, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Parliament ’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), 
The changing constitution (Oxford University Press 2011) at 180. 
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experience.’11 Table 1 presents the Commission proposals that the House of 
Commons and House of Lords assessed as contrary to the subsidiarity principle. The 
government expressed its opinion on the compatibility of the proposal with the 
subsidiarity principle in Explanatory Memorandums, which I cite accordingly. The 
votes of the majority and opposition were reconstructed on the basis of debates in the 
chambers.12 
The table shows that the House of Commons and the House of Lords have also issued 
reasoned opinions in cases where the government did not believe that the Commission 
proposal was in violation of subsidiarity. Moreover, in the House of Commons, in the 
case of the food from animal clones proposal (COM(2013)893) the views of the 
majority and opposition diverged, similarly to the case of the right to strike 
(COM(2012)130), where Labour supported the reasoned opinion not due to the 
subsidiarity violation, but to support the position of the trade unions. 
Table 1 
Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
House of Commons 
COM (2010) 371 (–)13 (+) (+)14 
COM (2011) 121 (+)15 (+) (+)16 
                                                 
11 Leyland at 138. 
12 Note that during a debate in the House of Commons on a reasoned opinion, where a question is ‘put 
and agreed to’ it means that the Chair has ‘put’ the question, and those present have generally shouted 
‘Aye’ in response. So when the Chair then says ‘I think the Ayes have it, the Ayes have it’ noone has 
then challenged the decision and called a vote (known as a division). So there is no count or 
registration of votes in these cases. See House of Commons, Standing Orders 2013, No. 38. Similar 
rules apply in the House of Lords when a motion is ‘moved and agreed to’. There is no vote unless a 
division takes place. See House of Lords, Standing Orders 2013, No. 53. 
13 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by HM Treasury of 17 September 2010, pt. 24. The EM of the 
government is in general negative, but ‘based on national sovereignty, rather than specifically on 
subsidiarity,’ as the government’s representative explains in the House of Commons European 
Committee Debate of 21.10.2010, Column 9. 
14 The Labour party members supported issuing a reasoned opinion at the Committee stage. Cf. House 
of Commons European Committee: Investor Compensation Schemes of 21.10.2010. Column 12. The 
House agreed to the motion without a debate. Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 25.10.2010, 
Column 26. 
15 Explanatory Memorandum Supplement 7263/11, pt. 6.  
16 The opposition was pointing out that the coalition partner – the Liberal Democrats - had a different 
position in its party programme on the corporate taxation (in favour). Yet, the Conservatives argued 
that the position of the coalition is uniform. Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 11.05.2011, 
Column 1288. 
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Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
COM (2011) 452 (+)17 (+) (+)18 
COM (2011) 635 (–)19 (+) (+)20 
COM (2011) 895 + 
COM (2011) 896 
(+)21 (+) (+)22 
COM (2012) 130 (–)23 (+) (+)24 
COM (2012) 617 (+)25 (+) (+)26 
COM (2012) 614 (+)27 (+) (+)28 
COM (2013) 147 (+)29 (+) (+)30 
COM (2013) 534 (+)31 (+) (+)32 
COM (2013) 619, 618 (+)33 (+) (+)34 
                                                 
17 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by HM Treasury of 5.09.2011, pt. 59.  
18 Cf. Positions of the Labour Party Members in House of Commons Hansard Debates for 8.11.2011. 
19Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Justice of 31.10.2011, pt. 23. However, cf. 
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 07.12 2011, Column 315, where the Government agrees with 
the parliament on the lack of necessity of the proposal. 
20 Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 07.12.2011, Column 322. 
21 Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 06.03.2012, Column 755. (EM not found) 
22 Id. 
23 Cf. House of Commons European Committee: Right To Take Collective Action on 21.05.2012, 
Column 5. According to the government the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the balance between fundamental 
freedoms and the right to strike is clear and the regulation only repeats that. 
24 The opposition is in favour of the reasoned opinion but due to another reason than coalition: the 
proposal does not safeguard the rights of trade unions sufficiently. Cf. House of Commons European 
Committee: Right To Take Collective Action on 21.05.2012, Column 8. 
25 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Work and Pensions of 23.11.2012, pt. 
14-15. 
26 Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18.12.2012, Column 813. 
27 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 
4.12.2012, stating that the UK government is ‘still considering’ the compatibility with subsidiarity, pt. 
23. In the Government’s reply to the House of Lords on 20.12.2012, the Minister agreed in this context 
that the Government should consider ‘adherence of any legislation to the principle of subsidiarity in the 
light of the extensive efforts made domestically’ and ‘oppose any such measure strongly.’  
28 The opposition supports the motion, but does also criticise the government’s reforms on equality in 
companies’ boards. Cf. House of Commons Hansard Debates for 07.01.2013, Column 60. 
29 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Culture, Media, Sport on 22.04.2013, 
points 17-18. 
30 The opposition supports the motion, but does also criticise the government’s actions with regard to 
infrastructure sharing. Cf. House of Commons European Committee: Communication Networks, 
20.05.2013, Column 12. 
31 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by Home Office on 7.08.2013, Point 45. 
32 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 22.11.2013, Column 265. 
33 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Home Office on 8.10.2013 point 19. Additional 
explaination in the letter from the Minister for Crime Prevention, Norman Baker MP, to Bill Cash MP, 
Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee (11.11.2013). 
34 The opposition supports the motion, but does also criticise the government failure in response to 
‘legal highs.’ House of Commons Hansard Debates for 11.11.2013, Column 764.  
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Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
COM (2013) 641 (+)35 (+) (+)36 
COM (2013) 821 (+)37 (+) (+)38 
COM (2013) 893 (+)39 (+) (-)40 
COM(2014) 221 (+)41 (+) (+)42 
House of Lords 
                                                 
35 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by HM treasury in October 2013 states that ‘[t]he Government 
is concerned that this proposal and its scope may raise subsidiarity issues.’ (point 14). In its letter to the 
Chairman of European Scrutiny Committee (7.11.2013), the Financial Secretary to the Treasury further 
explained that ‘[a]fter further consideration, I consider that this proposal does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity under Article 5(3) of the TEU.’ This view was confirmed in the House of 
Commons, European Committee B, Financial Services Benchmarks debate of 28.11.2013. 
36House of Commons, European Committee B, Financial Services Benchmarks, 28.11.2013, p. 6. 
37 The initial position of the government changed under the influence of the parliament. Explanatory 
Memorandum submitted by Ministry of Justice on 09.01.2014 states no subsidiarity violation (pts 18-
19). The UK government states however that ‘there is limited statistical quantifiable evidence of 
insufficient mutual trust which may rise a question about the necessity of the proposal.’ In the letter of 
20.01.2014 to W. Cash, Chairman of European Scrutiny Committee, C. Grayling, Secretary of State for 
Justice states that the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity (p. 4). In a later letter of 
6.02.2014 to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, the government seems to agree with 
the opinion of the House of Commons and admits that the Commission has failed to satisfy Art. 5 of 
Protocol No. 2 requirement of a detailed statement on subsidiarity and proportionality (p. 2). In the 
House of Commons debate (House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10.02.2014) on the reasoned 
opinion the opposition underlined that ‘[t]he Government, taxed by the European Scrutiny Committee, 
have fallen in line with that view at the eleventh hour’ (Column 671), whereas the coalition 
‘welcome[d] the fact that in that letter the Government have belatedly accepted that “a lack of evidence 
of necessity renders a proposal in breach of subsidiarity principle.’” (Column 673). 
38 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10.02.2014, Column 672. 
39 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
on 14.01.2014, point 6 states no subsidiarity violation. The UK government does not believe however 
that the proposal is necessary, ‘given the absence of human health concerns associated with cloning 
and the protection already offered by the existing EU animal welfare and novel food regimes.’ This 
position of the government has however changed and it supported the Committee in the view that the 
proposal does not meet the subsidiarity requirements. Cf. European Committee A of the House of 
Commons on 11.02.2014, Column 11. 
40 The reasoned opinion was agreed to without debate on the floor of the House of Commons on 
12.02.2014 (Business without Debate). The reasoned opinion was discussed in the European 
Committee A of the House of Commons on 11.02.2014. Even though the Coalition claimed that there 
was ‘almost’ a cross party coalition on the subsidiarity issue (See further Column 11), the position 
presented by two Labour representatives clearly indicated that the issue should be approached at EU 
level (See MP Huw Irranca-Davies and MP Geraint Davies, Columns 10 and 12). 
41 Explantory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 
30.04.2014, point 12.  See however that the UK government had less certainty on the subsidiarity 
violation since the proposal have been negotiated and the only obligatory requirement would remain to 
attend the platform, whuilst taking action would be voluntary. But in the end the UK government was 
in favour of sending the reasoned opinion. See: Commons Hansard Debates for 9.06.2014, Undeclared 
work, Columns 379-380. 
42 The opposition agreed with issuing a reasoned opinion. House of Commons Hansard Debates, 
9.06.2014, Column 377. 
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Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
COM (2010) 379 (–)43 (+) (+)44 
COM (2010) 486 (+)45 (+) (+)46 
COM (2011) 634 (+)47 (+) (+)48 
COM (2012) 617 (+)49 (+) (+)50 
COM (2012) 614 (+)51 (+) (+)52 
COM (2013) 534 (+)53 (+) (+)54 
COM (2013) 618, 619 (+)55 (+) (+)56 
Notes: (+) – subsidiarity violation; (–) – no subsidiarity violation 
1.2.2 Germany 
German electoral law57 combines a plurality voting system with a proportional one: 
half of the Bundestag members are elected directly and half from party lists.58 
                                                 
43 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Home Office on 20.07.2010, pt. 13. The UK 
government agrees that in regard to situations where decision of one Member States on the rights of the 
third country nationals affects other Member States and distorts migratory flows the subsidiarity 
principle is met. Same argument was raised in the House of Lords debate, See further Lords Hansard 
text for 20.10.2010, Column 879. 
44 Labour Party and UK Independence Party Lords were in favour of a reasoned opinion. Cf. Lords 
Hansard text for 20.10.2010, Column 873-875. 
45 The Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs of 4.10.2010, pt. 7 under title ‘subsidiarity’ states that ‘the government remains unconvinced as 
to the merits or appropriateness of the proposal’; ‘social measures should be taken by Member States’. 
The debate seems to point at a clearer position of the government. Cf. Lords Hansard text for 
3.11.2010, Column 1689. 
46 Lords Hansard text for 3.11.2010, Column 1684, 1686. 
47 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
on 17.10.2011, pt. 9. Confirmed later also in the letter of the Minister of State for Agriculture and Food 
to the House of Lord on 15.11.2011, EM 15054/11. 
48 Lords Hansard text for 28.11.2011, Column 91. 
49 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Work and Pensions of 23.11.2012, pt. 
14-15. 
50 Lords Hansard text for 13.12.2012, Column 406. 
51 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 
4.12.2012, stating that the UK government is ‘still considering’ the compatibility with subsidiarity, pt. 
23. In the Government’s reply to the House of Lords on 20.12.2012, the Minister agreed in this context 
that the Government should consider ‘adherence of any legislation to the principle of subsidiarity in the 
light of the extensive efforts made domestically’ and ‘oppose any such measure strongly’.  
52 Lords Hansard text for 10.01.2013, Column 342, 349-350. 
53 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by Home Office on 7.08.2013, point 45. 
54 Lords Hansard text for 28.10.2013, Column 1404. 
55 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Home Office on 8.10.2013, point 19. Additional 
explaination in the letter from the Minister for Crime Prevention, Norman Baker MP, to Bill Cash MP, 
Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee (11.11.2013). 
56 Lords Hansard Text for 11.11.2013, Column 583. 
57 In general, as provided by Art 38 I BL, members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in 
general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. 
58The recent reform of the electoral law of 21.02.2013 changed the ‘Überhangmandate’ into 
‘Ausgleichmandate,’ which means that for every ‘hanging mandate’ for one party, the other will be 
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Between 2009 and 2013 the composition of the Bundestag allowed the formation of a 
coalition government of the liberal-conservative Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands and the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) with the 
liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), while the social-democratic Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), democratic socialist Die Linke and the greens Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen remained in opposition.59 The Bundesrat consists of members of the 
Länder governments, thus its composition changes via elections in the Länder.60 
During the period analysed in this chapter, the SPD had a majority in the Bundesrat. 
Therefore, the governing majority at the central level differed from that at the level of 
the Länder. Each of the Länder in the Bundesrat votes through its representative 
(‘Stimmführer’) in order to avoid situations when during the vote two ministers from 
the same Land present two contrary votes.61 A more important issue is that the 
Bundesrat provides a means for the Länder to represent their territorial interests and 
influence federal government policy.62 Hence, the representatives of two different 
Länder that are governed by the same party may vote differently in the Bundesrat. 
Table 2 illustrates, where obtainable, the position of the federal government for each 
of the Commission proposals where the chambers issued a reasoned opinion and the 
stance of the majority and opposition accordingly. I established the views of the 
government, the majority and the opposition on the compatibility of the proposals 
with subsidiarity by analysing the protocols of Bundestag and Bundesrat sittings. 
Closer examination of the Bundestag shows that the opinion of the government is not 
always available. In the Bundesrat, it seems, based on the available information63 that 
                                                                                                                                           
compensated. With the reform, voters will be better represented, as the ‘Überhängmandate’ 
differentiated the value of votes, Cf. Wahlrechtsreform (17/11819). 
59 CDU/CSU- 237 MPs, SPD - 146 MPs, FDP- 93 MPs, Die Linke - 76 MPs, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – 
68. MPs. 
60 Art 51 I Basic Law. 
61 Konrad Reuter, Praxishandbuch Bundesrat: Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen, Kommentar zur 
Geschäftsordnung, Praxis des Bundesrates (C.F. Müller 2007) at 508. 
62 Meg Russell, ‘The territorial role of second chambers’ (2001) 7 Journal of Legislative Studies 105, 
110. 
63 Proceedings in the main chamber are recorded in the Plenarprotokoll (protocol of the plenary).  
For the reasoned options listed here, the protocols record rarely a substantial discussion in the plenary. 
Results of votes are recorded by simply stating acceptance by majority without listing votes of 
individual Länder consistent with §29 GO BR (see Reuter at 508). Representatives can elect to submit 
their votes or statements to the protocol and in some cases did so on the matters discussed here. 
Detailed discussions appear to take place in the committees. Proceedings in the committees of the 
Bundesrat are as rule confidential unless otherwise determined by vote of the committee (§37 (2) GO 
BR). In cases of urgency and in cases where confidendiality needs to be preservered the specific 
Europakammer is used §45 d GO BR. Proceedings are confidential if the Europakammer was used for 
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the Bundesrat has issued several reasoned opinions on proposals where the federal 
government did not see such a violation. Yet, as is further elaborated upon in Section 
2.3, the reactions to one of the proposals show a division between different Länder, 
depending on their regional interests and the protection of their own prerogatives. 
Table 2 
Commission Proposal Opinion of the Federal 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
Bundestag 
COM (2012) 617 (+)64 (+) (–)65 
COM (2011) 635 (-)66 (+) (+)67 
COM (2010) 368 (?) (+)68 (-)69 
Bundesrat 
COM (2010) 368 (?) (+)70 (?) 
COM (2011) 654 (?) (+)71 (?) 
COM (2011) 793 (?) (+)72 (?) 
COM (2011) 828 (?) (+)73 (?) 
COM (2011) 897 (–)74 (+)75 (?) 
                                                                                                                                           
that reason §45 f GO BR. If the chairman of the Europakammer considers discussion unnecessary the 
procedure allows for a simplified Umfrageverfahren without discussion (§45 i GO BR). 
64 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 13.12.2012, Plenarprotokoll 17/214, p. 26500. 
65 SPD and Die Linke were against. Die Grünen abstained. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer 
Bericht, 13.12.2012, Plenarprotokoll 17/214, p. 26427. 
66 Berichtsbogen gemäß Anlage zu § 7 Absatz 1 EUZBBG und Ziffer II. 3. der Anlage zu § 9 
EUZBLG, Landtag von Baden-Württenberg, Drucksache 15/848, 7.11.2011, p.6. 
67 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 1.12.2011, Plenarprotokoll 17/146, p. 17507. 
68 Die Linke joined the coalition. Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 7.10.2010, 
Plenarprotokoll 17/65, p. 6871. 
69 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 7.10.2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/65, p. 6866.  
70 See Deutscher Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 24.09.2010, Plenarprotokoll 874, p. 307-309. The 
representative of the Bayern government (CSU) and Baden-Württenberg government (CDU) supported 
issuing a reasoned opinion while the representative of Nordrhein-Westfallen government (SPD) voted 
against. Similarly, the Landtag von Baden-Württenberg, Drucksache 15/1323, 1.03.2012, found a 
subsidiarity breach. 
71 No information on the votes, but the reasoned opinion has been issued. 
72 The Thüringer Landtag dominated by the CDU found a subsidiarity breach. See Unterrichtung durch 
die Präsidentin des Landtags, 20.01.2012, Drucksache 5/3932. The Europakammer of the Bundesrat 
issued the reasoned opinion in this case. The record of voting was not public. See Bundesrat, 
Europakammer, 24.01.2012, Umfrage 19 
73 The Europakammer of the Bundesrat issued the reasoned opinion in this case. The record of voting 
was revealed on the motion of the State Hessen. Cf. Bundesrat, Europakammer, 7.02.2012, Umfrage 
21. The CDU and FDP motion in the Hessen Landtag pointed at a violation of subsidiarity by Art 10 of 
the proposal. See Hessischer Landtag, 17.01.2012, Drucksache 18/5154. 
74 Stenografischer Bericht, 2.03.2012, Plenarprotokol 893, p. 110. 
75 The opinions of regional parliaments underlined that there is a subsidiarity breach. Bayerischer 
Landtag, 26.01.2012, Drucksache 16/11067 on COM (2011) 897; Landtag von Baden-Württemberg, 
3.02.2012, Drucksache 15-1323; Thüringer Landtag, 17.02.2012, Drucksache 5/4082 (all CDU/CSU). 
The SPD Minister of Rheinland-Pfalz expressed support for the Bundesrat’s reasoned opinion at a later 
stage. Cf. Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 30.03.2012, Plenarptokoll 895, p. 175. 
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Commission Proposal Opinion of the Federal 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
COM (2012) 10 (–)76 (+)77 (?) 
COM (2012) 11 (–)78 (+)79 (?) 
COM (2013) 133 (?) (+)80 (?) 
COM (2013) 721 (+)81 (+)82 (?) 
COM (2013) 173 (?) (+)83 (?) 
Notes: (+) – subsidiarity violation; (–) – no subsidiarity violation; (?) – position 
unknown 
1.2.3 Poland 
The Polish parliament consists of the Sejm and the Senat, which are not equal 
chambers: whereas Art. 95 of Polish Constitution (PC) confers the legislative 
competence upon both chambers, only the Sejm fulfils a controlling function over the 
government. Hence the doctrine often describes Polish bicameralism as unequal or 
incomplete, with the Senat as a chamber of reflection.84 Nonetheless, both chambers 
                                                 
76 Berichtsbogen gemäß Anlage zu § 7 Absatz 1 EUZBBG und Ziffer II. 3. der Anlage zu § 9 
EUZBLG, Landtag von Baden-Württenberg, Drucksache 15/1302, 20.02.2012, p. 12. 
77 Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 30.03.2012, Plenarptokoll 895, p. 178-180. Also the Bayerischer 
Landtag, 01.03.2012, Drucksache 16/11706 (CSU, SPD, FDP, Freie Wähler), Thüringer Landtag, 
16.03.2012, Drucksache 5/4206, Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag, 12.03.2012, Drucksache 17/2413 
(CDU, SPD, FDP voted in favour) found a subsidiarity breach. 
78 Berichtsbogen gemäß Anlage zu § 7 Absatz 1 EUZBBG und Ziffer II. 3. der Anlage zu § 9 
EUZBLG, Landtag von Baden-Württenberg, Drucksache 15/1302, 20.02.2012, p.7. 
79 Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 30.03.2012, Plenarprotokoll 895, p. 178-180. Also Thüringer 
Landtag, 16.03.2012, Drucksache 5/4207; Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag, 07.03.2012, Drucksache 
17/2350 (CDU, FDP); Bayerischer Landtag, 01.03.2012, Drucksache 16/22705 (CSU, SPD, FDP, Freie 
Wähler); Hessischer Landtag (Dricksache 18/5396), 13.03.2012 (motion of CDU and FDP) pointed out 
subsidiarity concerns and instructed their respective governments to argue for a reasoned opinion in the 
Bundesrat. 
80 Only the SPD Ministerpräsident of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern did directly support the reasoned 
opinion. Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 3.05.2013, Plenarprotokol 909, p. 252. However, the 
Thüringer Landtag (Drucksache 5/5987), 19.04.2013 and the Bayerischer Landtag (Drucksache 
16/16592) of 24.04.2013 (moved by CSU, Freie Wähler, Die Grünen, FDP) pointed out subsidiarity 
concerns and instructed their respective governments to argue for a reasoned opinion in the Bundesrat. 
The Thüringer Landtag underlined that even though the Land is not directly affected by the 
Commission proposal, the EU does not have a competence to act. 
81 Berichtsbogen gemäß Anlage zu § 7 Absatz 1 EUZBBG und Ziffer II. 3. der Anlage zu § 9 
EUZBLG, Landtag von Baden-Württenberg, Drucksache 15/4328, 13.11.2013, p.5. 
82 Positions taken in the Bundesrat unknown. Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 29.11.2013, 
Plenarprotokol 917, p. 551. However, the Thüringer Landtag (Drucksache 5/6905), 15.11.2013 and the 
Bayerischer Landtag (Drucksache 17/121), 26.11.2013 (moved by SPD, CSU, Freie Wähler, Die 
Grünen) pointed out subsidiarity concerns and instructed their respective governments to argue for a 
reasoned opinion in the Bundesrat. 
83 Positions unknown. Bundesrat, Stenografischer Bericht, 7.06.2013, Plenarprotokol 910, p. 320. 
However, the Thüringer Landtag (Drucksache 5/6114), 17.05.2013; Landtag of Baden-Württenmberg 
(Drucksache 15/3555), 05.06.2013; and the Bayerischer Landtag (Drucksache 16/16956), 04.06.2013 
(moved by CSU, SPD, Freie Wähler, Die Grünen, FDP) pointed out subsidiarity concerns and 
instructed their respective governments to argue for a reasoned opinion in the Bundesrat. 
84 Cf. Leszek Garlicki, Polskie Prawo Konstytucyjne: Zarys Wykadu (Liber 2006) at 199. 
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are elected in universal, equal, direct and secret ballot elections,85 though only those 
to the Sejm are proportional. Since 2007, the governing coalition consists of the 
liberal-conservative Platforma Obywatelska (PO) and the centrist Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe (PSL), a force reflected in the composition of the Sejm and Senat. The 
opposition includes the conservative Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), liberal Ruch 
Palikota (RP), social-democratic Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) and right-
wing Solidarna Polska.86 Drawing on committee and plenary protocols and the 
register of votes, Table 3 reflects the views of the coalition and the opposition on 
Commission proposals violating the subsidiarity principle, and the position of the 
government when it was under the legal obligation to present it to the parliament.87 It 
seems that especially the Sejm has issued reasoned opinions even though the 
government did not see a subsidiarity violation. Moreover, Table 3 shows a major 
convergence of views on subsidiarity violations between the majority and the 
opposition in the Sejm, and complete agreement between them in the Senat. 
Table 3 
Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition88 
Sejm 
COM (2012) 130 (+)89 (+)90 (+) 
COM (2012) 369 (-)91 (+)92 (+) 
                                                 
85 Art 96 and Art 97 PC. While it comes as natural that elections are conducted by a secret ballot, I 
mention it in the description of the Polish electoral system, as that of Sejm is traditionally labeled by 
‘five adjectives’: universal, equal, direct, by secret ballot and proportional. 
86 Ruch Palikota and SLD have no representatives in the Senat, similarly in the period of 2007-2011. 
87 Until the new cooperation law was introduced in February 2011, there was no obligation for the 
government to inform the chambers of its position regarding compatibility of Commission proposals 
with subsidiarity principle. Art. 7 par. 3 no. 3 of Ustawa z 8.10.2010 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z 
Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach związanych z członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej (Dziennik Ustaw 2010 r., nr 213, poz. 1395), in force since 13.02.2011.Hence the 
reasoned opinions on the following proposals: COM(2010) 537, COM(2010) 539, COM(2010) 728, 
COM(2010) 738, COM(2010) 799 did not demand official assessment of the government. 
88 Because the number of MPs who usually abstained or voted against in both the Sejm and Senat, even 
though from opposition parties, was relatively low in relations to the total number of votes and also did 
not represent the position of the party at stake, I qualified the reasoned opinion as taken consensually. 
89 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 14. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej, 10.05.2012, p. 252. 
90 Unanimity. Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 14. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
11.05.2012, p. 323. 
91 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 23. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 10.10.2012, p. 8.  
92 Unanimity. Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 23. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
10.10.2012, p. 11. 
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Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition88 
COM (2012) 372 (-)93 (+)94 (+) 
COM (2011) 121 (-)95 (+)96 (+) 
COM (2010) 799 097 (+)98 (+) 
COM (2011) 127 (+)99 (+) (-)100 
COM (2010) 537 0101 (+) (+)102 
COM (2010) 738 (+)103 (+) (+)104 
COM (2010) 728 0105 (+) (+)106 
COM (2010) 539 0107 (+) (+)108 
COM (2012) 614 (-)109  (+) (-)110 
COM (2013) 296 (+)111 (+) (+)112 
Senat 
                                                 
93 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 23. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 11.10.2012, 
p. 243.  
94 445 in favour, 4 abstained (2 Ruch Palikota, 2 Solidarna Polska, 1 against (PSL)). Sejm, 
Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne 23. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 12.10.2012, p. 331.  
95 According to the government there are transparency problems, which the directive will resolve. Cf. 
Pełny zapis przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 26.09.2012, p. 5. 
96 419 in favour, 2 against (1 PiS, 1 Socjaldemokracja Polska). Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne 92. 
Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 13.05.2011, p. 204. 
97 The government does not assess subsidiarity, but expressed critiscism in regard to merits similar as 
the parliament. Cf. Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 18.02.2011. 
98 Unanimity. Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 86. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
4.03.2011, p. 238. 
99 Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 11.05.2011, Biuletyn nr 5035/VI. 
100 379 in favour, 41 against (SLD), 3 abstained (2 PO, 1 PiS). Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 
93. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 27.05.2011, p. 238. 
101 The government did not take a specific stance on subsidiarity, yet criticised the lack of precision of 
delegation. Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 05.11.2010, Biuletyn Nr 4349/VI. 
102 369 in favour, 1 against (PO). Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 93. Posiedzenia Sejmu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 25.11.2010, p. 135. 
103 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne Sejmu z Stenograficzne z 84. Posiedzenia Sejmu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 3.02.2011, p. 285. 
104 428 in favour, 1 against (PO), Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 84. Posiedzenia Sejmu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 4.02.2011, p. 379. 
105 No position of the government on subsidiarity, but it seconds the EU Affairs Committee in the 
criticism of extensive implementation powers to the Commission. Komisja do Spraw Unii 
Europejskiej, 21.01.2011, p. 7. 
106 418 in favour, 2 against (PiS). Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 84. Posiedzenia Sejmu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 3.02.2011, p. 259. 
107 The government did not take a specific stance on subsidiarity, yet criticised the lack of precision of 
delegation. Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 05.11.2010, Biuletyn Nr 4349/VI. 
108 Unanimity. Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 93. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
25.11.2010, p. 135. 
109 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 31. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
03.01.2013, p. 86. 
110 333 in favour, 60 against (3 PO, 24 Ruch Palikota, 23 SLD), 35 abstained (31 PO, 3 PSL, 1 indep.). 
Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 31. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 04.01.2013, p. 
133. 
111 Pełny zapis przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji, Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej Nr 169, p. 4. 
112 448 in favour, 1 abstained (1 indep.). Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 46 posiedzenia Sejmu, 
26.07.2013, p. 438. 
210 
Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition88 
COM (2012) 48 + 49 (+)113 (+) (+)114 
COM (2011) 127 (+)115 (+) (+)116 
COM (2010) 799 (+)117 (+) (+)118 
COM (2012) 614 (-)119 (+) (+)120 
COM (2010) 537 0121 (+) (+)122 
COM (2010) 539 0123 (+) (+)124 
COM (2010) 745 0125 (+) (+)126 
COM (2010) 379 (+)127 (+) (+)128 
COM (2010) 738 (+)129 (+) (+)130 
COM (2013) 133 (+)131 (+) (+)132 
COM (2010) 61 (+)133 (+) (+)134 
Notes: (+) – subsidiarity violation; (–) – no subsidiarity violation; 0 – position not 
demanded 
                                                 
113 Cf. 19. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 13.03.2012, p. 8. 
114 85 in favour, 2 against (PO), 2 abstained (1 PO, 1 indep.). Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 8. 
Posiedzenia Senatu, 29.03.2012, p. 75. 
115 Cf. Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 77. Posiedzenia Senatu, 26.05.2011, p. 28. 
116 67 in favour, 1 against (1 indep.). Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 77. Posiedzenia Senatu, 
26.05.2011, p. 63. 
117 Zapis stenograficzny, 135. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 8.02.2011, p. 10.  
118 Unanimity. Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 71. Posiedzenia Senatu, 3.03.2011, p. 237. 
119 The government’s representative states that the position of the government is favourable to the aim 
of the directive, but the way to achieve this aim should be more flexible. No stance on subsidiarity. Cf. 
Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 25. Posiedzenia Senatu, 9.01.2013, p. 151. 
120 80 in favour, 6 against (1 PO, 3 indep., 2 PSL), 3 abstained (3 PO). Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 
25. Posiedzenia Senatu, 9.01.2013, p. 172. 
121 The government did not take a specific stance on subsidiarity, yet criticised the lack of precision of 
delegation. Zapis stenograficzny, 122. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 16.10.2010, p. 
12. 
122 80 in favour, 1 abstained (PiS), 1 against (PiS). Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 66. Posiedzenia 
Senatu, 25.11.2010, p. 29. 
123 The government did not take a specific stance on subsidiarity, yet criticised the lack of precision of 
delegation. Zapis stenograficzny, 122. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 16.10.2010, p. 
12. 
124 Unanimity. Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 66. Posiedzenia Senatu, 25.11.2010, p. 29. 
125 Not specified. Zapis Stenograficzny, Wspólne posiedzenie Komisji Rolnictwa I Rozwoju Wsi oraz 
Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 3.02.2011. 
126 88 in favour, 2 abstained (1 PO, 1 indep.), Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 70. Posiedzenia Senatu, 
4.02.2011, p. 108. 
127 Zapis Stenograficzny, 117. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 6.10.2010, p. 19.  
128 84 in favour, 1 abstained (PiS), Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 63. Posiedzenia Senatu, 21.10.2010, 
p. 149. 
129Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 70. Posiedzenia Senatu, 03.02.2011, p. 73. 
130 87 in favour, 2 abstained (1 PO, 1 indep.), Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 70. Posiedzenia Senatu, 
4.02.2011, p. 108. 
131 63. Posiedzenie Komisji Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 17.04.2013, p. 8. 
132 80 in favour, 2 against (1 PO, 1 ide[.), Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 32. Posiedzenia Senatu, 
25.04.2013, p.94. 
133 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 53. Posiedzenia Senatu, 28.04.2010, p. 49. 
134 80 in favour, 1 abstained (PO). Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 53. Posiedzenia Senatu, 29.04.2010, 
p. 59. 
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1.2.4 Belgium 
The Belgian federal system consists of two different types of units: three communities 
(Flemish, French and German) and three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels).135 
The Belgian parliamentary system reflects this architecture of the state. It represents a 
weak type of bicameralism, as both chambers are very similar in composition, and the 
second chamber has very limited powers. The 150 members of the Chambre des 
Représentants are elected directly, whereas the senators are both elected and 
appointed, representing the language division in Belgium. Seventy one senators are 
elected by a number of bodies. The Flemish electoral college elects twenty five 
members in direct elections; the French electoral college elects fifteen members.136 
The other senators are appointed from within the existing parliaments: the Flemish 
and French community parliaments appoint ten senators each, whereas the German 
community designates one. The other senators are co-opted: language groups in 
Flemish and French communities designate six and four senators each.137 The 
Chambre des Représentants has the exclusive legislative initiative in some matters138 
and the ministers are only accountable to the lower chamber.139 Belgian bicameralism 
is non-egalitarian and specialized,140 in the sense that the Sénat cannot examine laws 
adopted by the Chambre des Représentants, except for cases where 15 senators issue a 
declaration of intent. 
The composition of the government reflects the language group division of the 
Chambre des Représentants and its characteristically high level of political 
fragmentation, caused by the number of parties involved in the decision-making 
process and the size inequalities between these participants. Indeed, Belgium 
represents one of the most fragmented party systems in modern democracy.141 The Di 
Rupio government (December 2011 - May 2014) was supported by a coalition of the 
Dutch-speaking parties, the social-democratic Socialistische Partij Anders (SP.A), the 
liberal Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD) and the Christian-
                                                 
135 Cf. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008) at 43; 
André Lecours, ‘Belgium’ in Ann Griffiths (ed), Handbook of Federal Countries (McGill-Queen's 
Press-MQUP 2005) at 58. Moreover, it should be noted that Brussels Region is weaker than the two 
others in terms of autonomy and competences. 
136 Since 2014, the members of the Sénat are not elected directly anymore. 
137 Art 67 par. 1 of Belgian Constitution. 
138 Art 74 of Belgian Constitution. 
139 Art 96 and 101 of Belgian Constitution. 
140 Yves Lejeune, Droit constitutionnel belge: fondements et institutions (Larcier 2010) at 351. 
141 Lijphart at 35. 
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democratic Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V), and their French-speaking 
counterparts, le Parti Socialiste (PS), the conservative-liberal Mouvement 
Réformateur (MR) and the Centre démocrate humaniste (CDH). The biggest party in 
opposition was the centre right, nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA). For the 
electoral term during the period studied here (June 2010 - May 2014), the parties that 
formed the government controlled a total of 96 of 150 seats in the Chambre des 
Représentants (with the N-VA having 27 seats during that time) and of 44 of the 71 
seats of the Sénat (with the N-VA having 14 seats during that time). 
Table 4 illustrates the views of the government and the votes of the majority and the 
opposition on Commission proposals, as interpreted on the basis of reports. First, with 
regard to the relationship between government and parliament, the opinion of the 
government was similar to that of the majority in the Chambre des Représentants. In 
contrast, the Sénat has thus far issued two reasoned opinions, despite the fact that the 
government did not find the Commission proposal contrary to the subsidiarity 
principle.142 Furthermore, in both the Chambre des Représentants and the Sénat there 
is some disagreement on subsidiarity issues between the majority and opposition, yet 
the latter usually only abstains, rather than objecting directly. 
  
                                                 
142 In the other case (COM(2013) 133) the position of the government was not specified. 
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Table 4 
Commission Proposal Opinion of the 
Government 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
majority/coalition 
Vote of the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
Chambre des Représentants 
COM(2011) 778 +779  (+)143 (+)144 (-)145 
COM  (2012) 10 + 11 (+)146 (+) (-)147 
COM (2013) 173 (+)148 (+) (+)149 
COM (2012) 130 (+)150 (+) (-)151 
Sénat 
COM (2013) 133 (?) (+/-) (+/-)152 
COM (2011) 635 (-)153 (+) (+)154 
Notes: (+) – subsidiarity violation; (–) – no subsidiarity violation 
                                                 
143 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission charge des problèmes de droit commercial et économique 
16.02.2012, DOC 53 2068/001, p. 11, 14. 
144 The coalition seem to be supported by the Greens (Ecolo Groen, p. 12-13). 
145 10 in favour, 4 abstained (one of them was a N-VA MP). Rapport fait au nom de la Commission 
charge des problèmes de droit commercial et économique 16.02.2012, DOC 53 2068/001, p. 16. 
Because the MP from the biggest opposition party N-VA abstained I treat it as a lack of consensus on 
th reasoned opinion. 
146 The Minister spoke in favour of the reasoned opinion proposed by the coalition, explaining that it is 
similar to the negotiating position of the government. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la 
Justice, DOC 53 2145/001, p. 12. 
147 8 in favour, 1 against, 2 abstentions. Presumably 2 N-VA MPs abstained, whereas an MP from 
Ecolo-Groen was against. Cf. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, DOC 53 2145/001, 
p. 13. Because the 2 MPs from the biggest opposition party N-VA abstained and 1 MP voted against I 
qualify it as a lack of consensus on th reasoned opinion.  
148 The Representative of the Vice-Prime Minister and of the Internal Affairs and Equality Minister 
advocated caution in the formulation of the reasoned opinion, as the Belgian government is a strong 
supporter of Europol: the reasoned opinion should not be interpreted as a sign of mistrust in the agency. 
It was however underlined that the government will support the ‘legitimate concern’ of the parliament 
that national parliaments should have a possibility to scrutinize Europol. Rapport fait au nom de la 
Commission de l’Intérieur des Affaires Générales et de la Fonction Publique, Doc 53 2910/001, 
26.06.2013, p.6-7. 
149 Unanimity. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l’Intérieur des Affaires Générales et de la 
Fonction Publique, Doc 53 2910/001, 26.06.2013, p. 7. 
150 Annex to the Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Sociales, DOC 53 2221/001, 
30.05.2012, p. 8. 
151 10 votes in favour, 1 abstained (N-VA). Rapport fai au nom de la Commission des Affaires Sociales, 
DOC 53 2221/001, 30.05.2012, p. 6. Because the MP from the biggest opposition party N-VA 
abstained I treat it as a lack of consensus on the reasoned opinion. 
152 The reasoned opinion has been issued by the Flamish Parliament, which has an equal position as the 
parliamentary chambers to issue a reasoned opinion on behalf of the Senate. Vlaams Parlement, 85 in 
favour (Open VLD , CD & V , N -VA et LDD), 8 against (2 SP.A, 6 Greens), 17 abstained (16 SP.A, 1 
UF). Plenaire vergadering nr. 34 (2012-2013), 8 mei 2013, Stemming nr.3, p. 66.  One of the governing 
parties (SP.A) voted against adoption of the reasoned opinion proposal; whereas two opposition parties 
Open VLD and LDD voted in favour of the adoption of the reasoned opinion. 
153 Cf. Sénat de Belgique, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, 6.12.2011, p.3. 
154 45 in favour, 2 abstained (1 Open VLD, 1 CD&V). Séances plénières, 12.12.2011, Annales n° 5-39, 
p. 5. Because it was the members from the coalition that abstained I qualified the reasoned opinion as 
supported by the opposition. One of the abstaining members, P. Van Rompuy, pointed at the 
problematic differentiation between subsidiarity review and political dialogue (l’estimation de 
l’opportunité de la réglementation européenne) as the reason for his vote. The other member, pointed 
out that there is no subsidiarity violation as the proposal has a cross-border character.  
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2 Analysis of the data 
In this section, I revisit the questions listed at the beginning of the chapter in light of 
the data presented above.  
2.1 Independence of parliaments from the governments 
First, I consider to what extent the EWS has allowed the national parliamentary 
chambers to act independently from their respective governments. The starting point 
is the oft-repeated argument that ‘it is hard to imagine that a national parliament’s 
majority would take a different position from that of the government’ on the issue of 
subsidiarity.’155 The results from the countries in the sample clearly show that this is 
not universally true. There are at least 13 instances in which parliaments took a view 
different from the government on the question of the subsidiarity violation.  
There appear to be no clear distinctions between the different chambers analysed 
concerning their propensity to act independently from the government. Indeed, the 
analysis of the positions of the government and the parliament in the UK, Germany, 
Poland and Belgium shows that the division between the Westminster and consensus 
models seems to disappear. It is only the lower chamber of the Belgian parliament 
that has always followed the line of the federal government on the subsidiarity 
violation, which could be explained by strong party discipline. Hence, except for this 
case, every upper and lower chamber displays at least one instance of acting 
independently. Therefore, neither the model of relations between the government and 
legislature, nor the differences between the upper and lower chambers seem to 
strongly influence the independence of parliaments in the EWS.  
Specifically analysing the power-sharing models, the legislatures have gained an 
independent voice on EU affairs from the national level perspective in both the 
executive-dominated Westminster model and the power-sharing consensus model. 
Within the Westminster model, as many as three differences between the position of 
the government and the parliament are visible in the case of the House of Commons, 
                                                 
155 Franz C Mayer, ‘Competences-Reloaded-The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New 
European Constitution’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 493, 502. See also de 
Wilde stating that ‘[g]overnment frequently cajole their backbenchers into supporting them using the 
possible loss of a parliamentary majority as a threat. Given such a situation, it seems unlikely that 
parliament will send a reasoned opinion to the Commission without the consent of its government.’ 
Pieter de Wilde, ‘Why the Early Warning Mechanism does not Alleviate the Democratic Deficit’ 
OPAL Online Paper Series <http://www.opal-
europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108> at 9. 
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which managed to issue reasoned opinions where the government did not see a 
subsidiarity violation. A very clear case concerns the Commission proposal on the 
right to strike:156 according to the government, the proposed regulation only repeated 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, which was sufficiently clear according to the 
government’s explanatory memorandum. Nonetheless, the House of Commons issued 
its reasoned opinion. Moreover, the total number of opinion differences could even 
rise by two, because in the case of the Commission proposal on the presumption of 
innocence157 and on food from cloned animals,158 the government changed its initial 
position that there is no subsidiarity violation (expressed in a submitted Explanatory 
Memorandum) only after discussion with parliament.159 However, the findings about 
the increased independence of the House of Commons must be qualified, as is the 
case, for example, with regard to the Commission proposal on investor compensation 
schemes.160 In this case, the government, similarly to the House of Commons, took a 
negative stance on the Commission’s proposal, but for a different reason: the 
government argued that the Commission’s proposal infringed ‘national sovereignty.’ 
Nonetheless, the relative independence of the UK parliament under the EWS might be 
explained by the fact that, under the current political circumstances of coalition 
government, the domination of the executive is not possible to the same extent as in 
the classic situation of one-party government. 
With regard to the consensus model, it is also surprising that, for example, the Polish 
or German lower chambers have gained some independence and that the position of 
the parliament is not automatically adjusted to that of the government with regard to 
subsidiarity. 
There is a difference between the position of the federal government and the 
Bundesrat on subsidiarity issues. As Table 2 shows, where the data was available, the 
federal government did not find a subsidiarity breach, while the Bundesrat did.  
Because the Bundesrat consists of representatives of the Länder, its ‘independence’ 
                                                 
156 COM(2012) 130. 
157 COM(2013) 821. 
158 COM(2013) 893. 
159 Hence I qualified the position of the government as stating a subsidiarity violation, even though the 
EM stated that there is no subsidiarity violation. In contrast to that, in case of COM(2011) 635, even 
though the government agreed with the House of Commons during the debate that there is a violation 
of necessity, a direct statement on violation of subsidiarity did not take place as in cases COM(2013) 
821 and COM(2013) 897. 
160 COM(2010) 371 
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from the subsidiarity views of the federal government can result from different 
majorities than that of the federal government. In particular, during the period studied, 
the governmental majority was formed by a coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP, while 
the Bundesrat was dominated by the SPD. 
The question remains: how can we explain the great degree of consistency of the 
views of the Belgian lower chamber and the Belgian government? One explanation 
might be that the fragmentation of the political system in Belgium forces the 
government to consider the coalition view already at the stage of formulating its own 
view on a Commission proposal. Another explanation might be the general weakness 
of the Belgian parliament in EU affairs and a greater obedience to the government’s 
lead,161 following the general institutional weakeness of the Belgian parliament162 and 
the fact that the coaliations adopt a ‘déclaration gouvernementale’ at the beginning of 
a period of legislature.163 Finally, an overall strong control by the political parties on 
both the government and the parliament could provide an explaination for the 
consistency of views of the Belgian lower chamber and the government. 
2.1.1 Consequences of different subsidiarity views at EU level 
Some governments, like the Belgian executive, see the subsidiarity review 
predominantly as a prerogative of the national parliament; it is for the parliament to 
decide whether an EU proposal is compatible with the subsidiarity principle.164 
However, at the same time, the Belgian government has its own view on the 
subsidiarity position of EU legislative proposals.165 Such a disagreement between the 
government and parliament on subsidiarity issues might have either positive or 
negative consequences within the EU arena. 
Some see the independence of parliaments under the EWS as a negative issue in the 
further negotiation of proposals in the Council. While the House of Commons 
                                                 
161 Jan Karlas, ‘National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement’ 
(2012) 35 West European Politics 1095, 1102. 
162 Delreux and Randour. 
163 See for example http://premier.fgov.be/fr/d%C3%A9claration-gouvernementale. 
164 Cf. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission charge des problèmes de droit commercial et 
économique 16.02.2012, DOC 53 2068/001, p. 11, 14. The representative of the minister stated that the 
subsidiarity control is a function of parliaments and did not opine compliance with subsidiarity. 
However, at a later stage she admitted that the introduction of single supervisory authority is not 
consistent with principles of subsidiarity. 
165 Cf. Sénat de Belgique, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, 6.12.2011, p.3, where 
the Minister favoured an introduction of the proposal, as it would ensure more protection of consumers. 
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European Scrutiny Committee, for example, considers its role in subsidiarity review 
as not only trying to protect its parliamentary sovereignty but the interests of the 
country, its suggestions would ‘back up’ arguments of the government in the 
Council.166 In fact, the UK government confirms that the reasoned opinion of the 
parliament may ‘help strengthen the Government’s hand in negotiation with 
Brussels,’ yet a different position on the proposal expressed by the government and 
the reasoned opinion would put the former in a ‘strange position.’167 According to 
some opposition MPs, a reasoned opinion also aims to erect a ‘significant hurdle’ for 
the government if it is unwilling to follow the position of parliament.168  
In addition, the government might also use the disagreement on subsidiarity to justify 
its negative position on the Commission proposal in the Council. For example, in the 
debate on the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on the Commission regulation on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, the government’s representative 
explained its stance as being in favour of the proposal, because ‘[the government] 
does not want to be seen as blocking all the initiatives.’169 It could thus be 
hypothesised that a national government might be willing to shift the blame for the 
lack of support for a proposal onto a reasoned opinion of the national parliament. 
Against this negative background, in a case where the Bundesrat issued a reasoned 
opinion on the Commission proposal on the award of concession contracts, the 
government committed itself to take into account the position of the Bundesrat in 
future negotiations, even though it did not find it contrary to the subsidiarity 
principle.170 
2.1.2 The ‘debating’ and ‘working’ features of parliaments in the EWS 
The procedure of subsidiarity scrutiny may be an additional forum for a critical 
assessment of the governing majority and the government by the opposition. The 
                                                 
166 House of Commons European Committee: Financial Services: Prudential Requirements, 
14.03.2012, Column 15. 
167 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 08 Nov 2011, Column 212, 196. 
168 House of Commons European Committee: Investor Compensation Schemes, 21.10.2010, Column 
12. 
169 In response, one of the MPs proposed that the consequence of the reasoned opinion should change 
the position of the government in the future. Cf. Pełny zapis przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji do Spraw 
Unii Europejskiej, 29.08.2012, p. 12. 
170 Stenografischer Bericht, 2.03.2012, Plenarprotokol 893, p. 110. 
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notions of a ‘debating’ as opposed to a ‘working’ parliament illustrate this situation 
well. 
Max Weber first applied the notion of a ‘working’ parliament in his criticism of the 
German Reichstag. He preferred reform in the direction of a working type of 
parliament, which he contrasted with parliaments described as ‘talking shops.’171 In 
the view of Weber, the parliament should have stronger control of the executive 
(‘officialdom’); it should possess ‘specialist knowledge’ received in the course of 
‘cross-examination (under oath) by experts before a parliamentary commission with 
powers to summon the relevant departmental officials’ and obtain ‘official 
information,’ normally protected by government officials.172 Weber contrasted the 
Reichstag with the status of the British parliament. For Weber, the House of 
Commons represented the best characteristics of a working parliament: the sole 
existence of parliamentary inquiry kept the public constantly well informed and 
officials under its control. Moreover, Weber advocated the introduction of 
parliamentary committees to the German Reichstag for greater oversight of officials 
through the right to enquiry. Finally, according to Weber, a working parliament 
demanded ‘cooperation between specialist officials and professional politicians.’173  
Winfred Steffani elaborated on the Weber model and added the notion of the 
‘debating’ parliament, describing it as ‘the most important forum of public 
opinion.’174 According to Steffani, the debates serve to justify decisions taken, 
criticise the choices of the other party, to publicly scrutinise the government and to 
obtain information. The ‘working’ parliament, on the contrary, relies on the work of 
committees with its experts, who pose questions to experts representing the 
government. 
The differences between ‘debating’ and ‘working’ chambers in general seem to 
diminish in the current parliamentary world.175 Nonetheless the subsidiarity scrutiny 
                                                 
171 Max Weber, Weber: political writings (Cambridge University Press 2003) at 177-196 & 181. 
172 Ibid at 178. 
173 Ibid at 182. 
174 Winfried Steffani, ‘Amerikanischer Kongreß und Deutscher Bundestag ’ in Winfried Steffani (ed), 
Parlamentarische und präsidentielle Demokratie (Westdt. Verlag 1979) at 333 (own translation). 
175 Philipp Dann, ‘Looking through the federal lens: The semi-parliamentary democracy of the EU’ 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/02 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/02/020501.html> at 22. Dann who applies 
Weber’s notions of ‘debating’ and ‘working’ parliament to assess the EP, points out that these notions 
are ‘ideal types.’ Dann labels House of Commons as a debating parliament with a ‘fusion of majority 
party and government,’ use of the plenary by the opposition to attack the government and put forward 
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mechanism manages to marry the ‘working’ style, visible especially in reports high-
level reports and reasoned opinions of committees, with the ‘debating’ style of 
scrutiny and criticism of the government during committee or plenary sittings in both 
chambers. This is quite evident in the debates preceding agreement on a reasoned 
opinion.176 The opposition uses it as an opportunity to criticise the government. 
Especially, in the case of proposals on the Aid to the Most Deprived People or gender 
balance on corporate boards,177 in the House of Commons, the UK Labour opposition 
singled out the lack of appropriate action to improve the situation in the UK by the 
government.178 Similarly, while scrutinising this proposal, the German opposition in 
the Bundestag attacked the government for not paying enough attention to the social 
problems in the EU.179 
Finally, the ‘debating’ features of the Sejm and Senat, where the opposition has 
opportunities to criticise the coalition and the government while discussing reasoned 
opinions, are much less visible than in the UK. In the Sejm, even in those debates 
where the opposition did not support the reasoned opinion, such as on the proposal 
regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, the criticism was 
marginal.180 Hence, at least for the review of subsidiarity, the Sejm turns out to be 
more of a ‘working’ chamber. This is visible to an even greater degree in the Senat, 
with a high consistency of views on reasoned opinions between the coalition, 
opposition and the government; no major criticism of the government was visible.  
In sum, it can be said that the notion of ‘debating’ and ‘working’ parliaments offers 
an additional point of view on the question of independence of national parliaments in 
the EWS. The central features of the ‘debating’ parliament – the debates and criticism 
                                                                                                                                           
own proposal. The US Congress is an example for the working parliament, due to its ‘fair’ separation 
from the government and counterbalancing it and incompatibility of membership in the government 
with that of the legislature, as well as with its specialized committees. In addition, some chambers as 
the French lower chamber cannot even qualify under any of them.  
176 I refer here only to those Member States where the full stenographic protocols of the debates are 
accessible. 
177 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18.12.2012 (especially on food banks), House of 
Commons Hansard Debates for 07.01.2013 (e.g. Column 60). 
178 Nonetheless, quite similar, but less intensive disputes might be observed in the House of Lords, 
despite more often described as a ‘working’ chamber. See for example, Lords Hansard text for 10 Jan 
2013, Column 350.1, also the debates on EPPO or Broadcasting networks. 
179 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 13.12.2012, Plenarprotokoll 17/214, p. 26502. For 
the opposition’s criticism of the EU politics of the German governments, see also: Deutscher 
Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 7.10.2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/65, p. 6866. 
180 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 93. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
25.05.2011, p. 92. 
220 
of the government – are especially visible in the debates on the reasoned opinions, 
while the reasoned opinions themselves, which are often an overall assessment of the 
proposal, and not only of the subsidiarity question, seem to underline the ‘working’ 
side of the parliaments in the EWS. 
2.2 Division between the coalition and opposition on subsidiarity issues 
Second, I study whether the decision to pursue a subsidiarity violation through the 
EWS reflects divisions between the parliamentary majority (coalition) and the 
minority (opposition) or whether it is to a large extent a unanimous decision. 
Starting with the UK, as Table 1 shows, the coalition and opposition in both Houses 
tend to vote together against Commission proposals and, in consequence, issue 
reasoned opinions. The only one case where the majority and opposition differed on 
the subsidiarity issue concerned the proposal on food from animal clones in the House 
of Commons, while in the case of the right to strike proposal, Labour supported the 
reasoned opinion, but in order to protect trade unions, rather than on subsidiarity 
grounds. 
Also in Poland (Table 3), there is a striking convergence between the coalition and 
opposition in both the Sejm and the Senat.181 Nevertheless, the underlining principle 
is that, as long as the coalition is willing to pursue a reasoned opinion, it will be 
submitted to the EU institutions. The example of a reasoned opinion sponsored by one 
of the opposition parties (PiS) regarding the Commission proposal for the programme 
FISCUS, which supports cooperation between the customs and tax authorities and 
other parties concerned, but at the same time, safeguards the particularities of customs 
and taxation of Member States,182 confirms this argument. The party argued that the 
proposal was unlawfully based on Article 114 TFEU, which excludes the 
harmonisation of taxes, claiming also that it would deeply interfere in the national 
fiscal system.183 The government, the coalition and some of the opposition parties 
rejected this argument as invalid, and hence the parliament did not send the reasoned 
opinion. 
                                                 
181 For the purposes of the study on the Polish parliament, I disregarded single votes of MPs or 
Senators that were not in favour of issuing a reasoned opinion. However, they are marked accordingly 
in voting results in the Table 3. 
182 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an action 
programme for customs and taxation in the European Union for the period 2014-2020 (FISCUS) and 
repealing Decisions N°1482/2007/EC and N°624/2007/EC, COM (2011) 607. 
183 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 5. Posiedzenia Sejmy, 13.01.2012, p.238. 
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Germany (Table 2) represents a less clear case. The information on the discussions 
and votes in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat is much more limited than in the other 
cases discussed in this chapter, mainly due to the internal rules of the German 
chambers.184 In the Bundestag, nevertheless, analysis of available information allows 
for the highlighting of only one case, namely the Common European Sales Law 
proposal, in which both sides of the Parliament unified their stance against the 
Commission proposal. In the case of the reasoned opinion on the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes, the convergence was only partial, as only one opposition party – Die Linke 
– joined the coalition, explaining their support as dependent upon the content of the 
reasoned opinion and not the party sponsoring it.185 Finally, there was no convergence 
in the case of the Fund for the Aid to the Most Deprived, where the reasoned opinion 
was not supported by the SPD or Die Linke, while the Greens abstained. 
In the German Bundesrat, the vote usually takes place by raising of hands, and only 
the fact that there was a necessary majority is reflected in the protocol. Hence, an 
analysis of whether there is a convergence of views between the majority and 
opposition is not easy, unless one of the Länder pushes for a vote to be recorded 
publicly. One such vote took place on the reasoned opinion on the Commission 
proposal on the introduction of noise-related restrictions at Union airports.186 It shows 
that the representatives of the Länder do not vote according to their party lines, in the 
sense that two Länder governed by the CDU may vote differently on the subsidiarity 
issue.187 A contrario, it could be argued that the representatives vote in the Bundesrat 
primarily according to the interest of their respective Länder. In fact, the reasoned 
opinion of the whole Bundesrat specifically pointed out that Article 10 of the proposal 
may confer upon the Commission a direct influence on all planned operating 
restrictions in airports in Member States and allow it to demand changes to these 
restrictions.188 Interestingly, the Länder voting in favour of issuing the reasoned 
opinions especially included those with big airports on their territory, for example 
Hessen, which contains Frankfurt Airport. Moreover, an important political issue in 
                                                 
184 § 69 BT Geschäftsordnung, § 34, § 37 BR Geschäftsordnung. 
185 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 7.10.2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/65, p. 6868. 
186 COM(2011) 828. 
187 See regarding COM(2011) 828, Bundesrat, Europakammer, Umfrage 21, 7.02.2012, 
Abstimmungsverhalten der Länder zu BR-Drucksache 799/1/11, Ziffer 1. 
188 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 7.02.2012 on COM(2011) 828. 
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Hessen was the night flight limits imposed by the Hessen Administrative Court and 
confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig.189   
Finally, in the Belgian Sénat (Table 4) two possibilities are visible. First, one 
reasoned opinion was almost unanimous, while with regard to the other, there was no 
common position within the governing coalition. The opposition parties in the 
Chambre des Représentants usually abstain. Yet, it seems that most of the criticism 
concerns the formal aspects of reasoned opinions.  
To sum up, there is a major convergence of views between the political parties with 
regard to subsidiarity violations regardless of the fragmentation of the domestic party 
system. Only in the Bundestag, where data is admittedly limited, does it seem hard to 
argue for convergence on the subsidiarity issue between the majority and opposition 
parties, let alone convergence by the various parties themselves. Rather, the interest of 
the Land involved may lead it to a vote in favour of a reasoned opinion, instead of 
following a party line. In the next two points, I will elaborate on the cases where there 
was a discrepancy between positions adopted by the coalition and opposition in 
issuing the reasoned opinions. In this regard, I will look at the party positions on 
European integration and the right-left and socioeconomic cleavage. 
2.2.1 Party positions on EU integration 
The last aspect of this study is the position of the citizens in the chosen Member 
States concerning the EU. In 2011 the question ‘generally speaking, do you think that 
(your country’s) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is…?’ 
was replied to by selecting the statement ‘a good thing’ in Belgium (65%), Germany 
(54%), Poland (53%) and in the UK (26%).190 Against this background, it will be 
analysed whether the cleavage between the majority and opposition in voting on the 
reasoned opinions can be explained by their positions concerning EU integration. 
The party divide on European integration is uneven in the four Member States under 
review. However, very often all political parties share the negative assessment of the 
compatibility of a Commission proposal with the subsidiarity principle. This leads to 
a conclusion that parties that have a generally positive approach to European 
                                                 
189 BVerwG 4 C 8.09, judgment of 4 April 2012. 
190See results from the Eurobarometer available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=5&nationID=1,3,24,15,&startdat
e=2011.05&enddate=2011.05 
223 
integration also do not always see the need for the EU to act. Nonetheless, only in one 
case did an opposition party underline that one of the reasons why it did not support 
the reasoned opinion was the message that such an action sends to Brussels. 
Specifically, a Member of the Belgian pro-European N-VA in the Chambre des 
Représentants stated that issuing the reasoned opinion creates a negative image of 
Belgium at the European level, which should be avoided, in particular, as there would 
not be enough opinions from national parliaments for the Commission to change its 
proposal in this case.191 In other cases, the lack of consent of the opposition to the 
subsidiarity review rather concerned its formal character, namely that it was not an 
appropriate tool in the circumstances in question.192  
In the committees of the Belgian Chambre des Représentants, which may issue 
binding reasoned opinions in the name of the whole chamber, the relations between 
political parties differ to the extent that the opposition (N-VA and Ecolo Groen) 
usually abstains, except for one case, which ended with a vote against the proposal. 
Their arguments are, however, mostly formal; for example the opposition MPs who 
abstained from voting in favour of a reasoned opinion on right to strike proposal also 
saw a violation of the subsidiarity principle; yet, they favoured a shorter version of the 
reasoned opinion.193 
Notwithstanding these marginal cases, even those parties who generally sympathise 
with European integration are often in favour of the submission of reasoned opinions 
to the Commission. Hence, the political party’s particular approach to the EU does not 
seem to impact on how the subsidiarity review is seen at national level. 
Yet, a pro-European approach seems to be more visible in the general participation of 
national parliaments in the EWS. In my sample, the chambers of the Belgian 
parliaments are much less active than the UK parliament. However, the German and 
Polish parliaments are rather closer to the UK than the Belgian parliament in their 
                                                 
191 Cf. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission charge des problèmes de droit commercial et 
économique 16.02.2012, DOC 53 2068/001, p. 16. 
192 Cf. Debates in the Bundestag and Bundesrat on the proposal COM(2010) 368. 
193 Rapport fai au nom de la Commission des Affaires Sociales, DOC 53 2221/001, 30.05.2012, p. 6. 
Similarly, some opposition MPs in the Bundestag perceive reasoned opinions as an ultimate tool, 
which hence should be used only in exceptional circumstances. For example, in the discussion on the 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes, the SPD and die Grünen approved a subsidiarity violation, but did not 
think that issuing of the reasoned opinion is an appropriate tool. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer 
Bericht, 7.10.2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/65, p. 6866. 
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activity within the subsidiarity review procedure, even though they are much more 
pro-European than the UK in general.194 
2.2.2 The right-left divide and socioeconomic cleavage 
Despite the fact that the political party views on European integration in the cases 
discussed do not have a major impact upon the subsidiarity review mechanism, their 
positions on specific policy issues tend to play a more important role.195 That is to 
say, the cases where opinions whether to issue a reasoned opinion differed across the 
parties prove that the members of lower and upper chambers tend to follow their 
general party programme, rather than the specific party stance on EU affairs. The 
cleavages between the majority and the opposition in the parliaments from my sample 
have a two-fold character: a right-left division and a socioeconomic one.  
The examples from the Polish Sejm depict the traditional right-left cleavage. First, the 
social-democrats did not support the reasoned opinion on the Commission proposal 
on registered partnerships, as ‘it is in line with the plans or program of the SLD that 
supports the legalisation of partnerships in Poland.’196 Second, the majority of the 
governing coalition and the conservative MPs of the opposition (PiS, SP) voted in 
favour of the reasoned opinion, outlining a violation of subsidiarity by the 
Commission’s proposal that introduced more women to non-executive boards of 
companies, whereas the liberal opposition (SLD, Ruch Palikota) voted against it, 
underlining the need for gender balance and the lack of national means that can 
safeguard this interest.197 Interestingly, a reasonable number of the governing 
majority MPs abstained;198 however, enough MPs still supported the reasoned 
opinion, which the chamber later sent to the EU institutions.  
                                                 
194 The finding that higher levels of political contestation over EU integration increase the chance of a 
reasoned opinion submission has been recently confirmed by a comprehensive study by Gattermann 
and Heftler, at 17. 
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against EU legislative proposals. 
196 Own translation. Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 93. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, 25.05.2011, p. 92. 
197 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 31. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
03.01.2013, p. 83. 
198 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 31. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
04.01.2013, p. 133. 
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The socioeconomic cleavage is visible in the Bundestag debate on the Commission 
proposal on the Fund for the Aid to the Most Deprived Persons. The social democrats 
did not support the reasoned opinion proposed by the coalition, and voted against 
sending it to the EU institutions. As one of the SPD MPs underlined, ‘[i]t was always 
a matter for the social-democrats, to support the ideas and actions in science and 
society that aim at strengthening of the principles of sustainability and solidarity. In 
securing the nutrition, we see a safeguard of basic human right.’199 Die Linke sided 
with the SPD, and in a similar vein, underlined its party position, which supports 
social rights.200 Die Grünen also saw the Commission proposal as constituting support 
for social solidarity, yet abstained, due to the administrative costs connected with the 
creation of the fund.201 
The only direct division between the coalition and the opposition in the UK 
parliament concerned the Commission proposal on the food from cloned animals. 
While the coalition argued that the proposal is not necessary, the relevant EU 
legislation already exists and there is no potential risk to human health or risk of 
commercial animal cloning, the Labour opposition MPs underlined that such issues as 
consumers protection, animal health and welfare, and food safety – uncovered by the 
horsemeat scandal in the UK – are best dealt at the EU level.202 
Finally, another possibility is that the party may support the reasoned opinion, but still 
underline its party preference. For example, the opposition in the House of Commons 
was in favour of the reasoned opinion on the Commission proposal on the right to 
strike, but for another reason than the coalition: the Commission right to strike 
proposal did not safeguard the rights of trade unions to a sufficient degree.203 
2.3 Reflection of regional interests 
Third, I analyse to what extent the EWS permits the expression of regional interests 
independently of national governments. This is against the background of the fact 
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11. 
203 Cf. House of Commons European Committee: Right To Take Collective Action on 21.05.2012, 
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that, in particular the German Länder, saw the subsidiarity mechanism as ‘enhanced 
protection against interference with their own legislative and enforcement powers.’204 
2.3.1 Germany 
In Germany, not only the reasoned opinions of the Bundesrat should be explored, but 
also instructions issued by Länder Landtage,205 which take resolutions on 
Commission proposals and instruct their respective governments to argue for a 
reasoned opinion in the Bundesrat.206 Yet, the competences that the Länder highlight 
and that are later expressed in the Bundesrat do not necessarily concern only the 
infringement of their own competences by a Commission proposal. The reasoned 
opinions issued in the Bundesrat can reflect both encroachment at federal and at 
Länder levels of activity.  
Hence, as some examples show, the focus is often on the protection of a federal 
competence. For instance, the Thüringer Landtag and the Bayerischer Landtag, 
instructed their governments to highlight subsidiarity issues and influence the 
decision of the Bundesrat in that direction, as the Commission proposal on the EU 
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training,207 affected the national 
training of police officers, which falls within the ‘national sovereignty’ of the 
Member States.208 This view was later reflected in the opinion of the Bundesrat.209 In 
fact, the Landtage, which instruct their ministers in the Bundesrat, underlined that 
even though the Land is not directly affected by the Commission proposal, the EU 
does not have a competence to act.210 
Another example, on the Data Protection package, shows that the competences of 
both the Länder and the federal state may be violated by the Commission’s proposals. 
                                                 
204 von Bogdandy and Bast at 276, see fn. 7 there. 
205 Available on Regipex. 
206 The opinions of Landtage may influence the position of the regional government during its vote in 
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The Landtage argued that Germany offers a much higher level of protection than the 
EU proposal, a point later reflected in the reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat. 211 
Moreover, the Bundesrat argued that the Commission’s Data Protection package 
proposal extends EU substantive competences in a way ‘particularly detrimental to 
the sovereignty of the federal states (Länder) in matters pertaining to the police.’212  
Similarly, with regard to the Commission proposal amending the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes, which already set the coverage level of deposits at €100,000, but now 
required all banks to join the Deposit Guarantee Schemes, the Bundesrat stressed the 
specificities of the German banking system, connected to its regional and local 
dimensions. In the view of the Bundesrat, the proposed directive especially affected 
these banks, which already participated in the institutional warranties scheme 
(institutions provide security to associated institutions), and which have strong roots 
in the regions.213 In the same case, members of the Bundestag emphasised that 
‘Europe has to take into account the inherent structures and specificities of Member 
States.’214 Finally, the German Bundestag negatively opined on the draft directive, 
which aimed at introducing clear legal rules governing the award of concessions 
contracts.215 The chamber maintained that, in particular, the provisions of the proposal 
could infringe on the competence of the Länder to grant service concessions for 
services of general economic interest. Specifically, the proposal affected the exclusive 
competence of the Länder regarding emergency services, a vital guarantee of internal 
security, and may thus violate the principle of regional and local self-
administration.216  
In sum, the reasoned opinions of the Bundesrat are not aimed only at the protection of 
regional competences, but also that of federal competences, against EU intervention. 
                                                 
211 See especially Hessischer Landtag, opinion of 13.03.2012 on COM(2012) 11, Drucksache 18/5396, 
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2.3.2 Belgium 
In federal Belgium, the Flemish parliament issued its own reasoned opinion, 
which seems to show that the EWS may give more voice to regional issues. 
Specifically, the Flemish parliament issued a reasoned opinion on the Commission 
proposal for ‘a framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal 
management,’ taking stock of its right under Declaration No. 51 to the Lisbon Treaty 
by the Kingdom of Belgium on national parliaments.217 Indeed, Declaration No. 51 
foresees that, in accordance with Belgian constitutional law, the parliamentary 
assemblies of the communities and the regions act should be conceived of as 
‘components of the national parliamentary system or chambers of the national 
Parliament.’218 The fact that this mechanism was used only once seems to show that 
interests of the regional entities do not play much of a role in the subsidiarity scrutiny 
procedure. This may not be surprising, taking into account the pro-European 
consensus among Belgian political parties. Another explanation might be the fact that 
the EU affairs administrative units in Brussels and Wallonia are much smaller than 
that of the Flemish parliament. 
2.3.3 The UK 
Finally, the application of the EWS in the UK, governed by the devolution principle, 
has provided some protection to the prerogatives of the devolved Welsh and Scottish 
territories, as for example, in the case of two draft directives regarding public 
procurement and procurement by public entities, which aimed at establishing a single 
national authority in charge of procurement oversight and empowered with reviewing 
the decisions of contracting entities. 219 Hence, in the view of the House of Commons, 
the Commission proposal, by obligating the UK to create a single body merging 
‘administrative, regulatory and judicial functions, with the power to take over, in 
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particular cases, the jurisdiction which currently rests, in England and Wales and 
Northern Ireland, with the High Court’, did not pay ‘respect [to] the diversity of legal 
traditions among Member States.’220 
Similarly, in the view of the House of Commons, the EPPO ignores ‘the deliberate 
separation of decisions on investigation from decisions to prosecute in England and 
Wales, which is a long-standing element of (…) system.’ 221 In addition, the powers to 
conduct direct prosecutions create a situation not possible under the current legal 
system in England and Wales, but only in Scotland.  
Finally, the opinion of the Scottish parliament has been directly taken into account in 
the reasoned opinion of the House of Commons on the Commission proposal on 
strengthening of the principle of the presumption of innocence.222 The Scottish 
parliament questioned the necessity of EU action to ensure that the judicial authorities 
cooperate, by highlighting that there was ‘no evidence of any reluctance in co-
operation between other Member States and Scottish authorities.’223 
Conclusion 
This chapter tackled three questions regarding the interaction of executive and 
legislative bodies in the EWS. In this regard, I studied a sample of four Member 
States, namely the UK, Germany, Poland and Belgium. Despite the fact that this 
sample is not fully representative of all possible political and constitutional 
configurations within the EU, it allowed an inquiry into a number of significant fields. 
First, the chosen Member States had federal and centralised structures. Second, the 
Member States in question had both two-party coalitions, as well a much more 
dispersed political spectrum. Third, both majoritarian (Westminster model) and 
consensus models of executive-legislative relations were taken into account. Finally, 
the study took into account both the lower chambers, which are in all four cases 
directly elected, as well as the variously composed upper chambers. 
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The analysis of the data collected on the debates and votes on reasoned opinions in 
the eight parliamentary chambers provided some preliminary indications with regard 
to the questions posed in this chapter. First was the question whether the EWS 
increases the independence of legislature vis-à-vis the executive. The study of activity 
in the Member States showed that, in a number of cases, a reasoned opinion was 
issued, even though the government did not find a subsidiarity violation.224 This was 
the case in both the executive-dominated Westminster model and the power-sharing 
consensus model. Only the lower chamber of the Belgian parliament always followed 
the line of the federal government on subsidiarity violations, which was explained by 
its generally weak position vis-à-vis the government in EU affairs. Also, the upper-
lower chambers cleavage did not seem to have much effect in this respect; each of the 
upper chambers took part in issuing reasoned opinions despite the acquiescence of the 
executive. This may not be a surprise, taking into account the fact that the upper 
chambers tend not to have such strong political links to the executive as the lower 
chambers. 
On this point, I have also highlighted that the overriding of the government by 
parliament concerning subsidiarity issues may have negative consequences for the 
further negotiations of Commission proposals (it might be a significant hurdle for the 
government) or might constitute an instrument to justify the government’s negative 
position vis-à-vis the Commission proposal. In addition, I have pointed out that the 
EWS has combined the ‘working’ and ‘debating’ features of parliaments. Debates on 
the reasoned opinions were often used to criticise the governments, with the reasoned 
opinions on Commission proposals going beyond the strict scrutiny of subsidiarity 
and assessing all the legal elements of Commission proposals uncovered the 
‘working’ character of parliaments under the EWS. 
The differences between the two-party coalitions and more dispersed political systems 
played a role in the assessment of the voting patterns on reasoned opinions. In the 
two-party coalitions systems, in the UK and in Polish chambers, as well as in the 
German Bundestag, we can note a convergence of views on subsidiarity. A similar 
assessment with regard to the Bundesrat is not easy due to lack of data, but it is quite 
clear that the members of the Bundesrat do not follow the federal party line and there 
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is no cross-party convergence on subsidiarity issues. Furthermore, the multiparty 
system of Belgium has an impact on the lack of convergence of views on issuing 
reasoned opinions, especially in the lower chamber. The party positions on EU 
integration may, however, have an impact on the votes of on the reasoned opinions in 
the Belgian lower chambers, where MPs often abstain from a vote on a reasoned 
opinion. Finally, against the background of the large extent of agreement between the 
majority and opposition on the need to issue a reasoned opinion, the cases of a 
disagreement show a clear right-left and socioeconomic cleavage. Matters such as the 
position of women in society, and the rights of registered partnerships, help for the 
most deprived or food from cloned animals, and to some extent also the protection of 
the right to strike on which political parties usually disagree, made some parties put 
on hold their vote in favour of a reasoned opinion.  
Finally, I analysed to what extent the EWS permits the expression of regional 
interests, independently from institutions such as the Committee of Regions. In fact, 
as expected, the protection of the prerogatives of the Länder played an important role 
in the reasoned opinions of the German Bundesrat. However, it is important to point 
out that the members of the Bundesrat, often following the instructions of the state 
Landtage, also raised questions of federal importance. In sum, the reasoned opinions 
reflect the protection of both regional as well as federal matters. In Belgium, the 
Flemish parliament has also made use of its prerogative, in accordance with 
Declaration No. 51, to issue a reasoned opinion. This, per se can be seen as a 
reflection of a regional matter in the EWS. Finally, in the UK, the Scottish parliament 
and the Welsh Assembly have scrutinised Commission proposals. Although the 
number of cases in which the reports of these devoluted entities were taken into 
account in the reasoned opinions of the House of Commons is low, to some extent at 
least these entities managed to raise issues significant for them. 
Outlook 
The study of the debates that led to issuing a reasoned opinion highlighted two main 
ideas on why a reasoned opinion against a proposal was necessary. While these 
arguments are not always expressly stated in the reasoned opinions, they may 
nonetheless explain why national parliaments participated in the EWS. As argued by 
Vlad Constantinesco, while the new powers of national parliaments in the EWS have 
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the advantage of granting additional validation to EU legislative acts, they also brings 
some risks. Constantinesco claimed that under the cover of the subsidiarity principle, 
other motives, such as for example protection of the national situation or national 
production will be defended. This may lead to ‘instrumentalization of this principle 
for other purposes than its own, and its use by pressure groups, passed on by 
parliaments, which are more concerned with defending national positions than 
fighting against excessive EU legislation.225 
Indeed, the risk of cloaking other motives underneath alleged violations of the 
principle of subsidiarity, especially those of protectionism, is visible in the reasoned 
opinions. The two points raised by parliamentarians concern the redistributive 
character of EU policies and the idiosyncratic interests of Member States, which 
speak against Commission proposals. 
The redistributive character of EU policies  
Current EU policies and the dominating majoritarian form of decision-making bring 
forth redistributive effects that exceed the notion of the European Union as a 
regulatory authority.226 National parliaments strongly react in the committee or 
plenary debates on Commission proposals, even if this is not directly voiced in the 
reasoned opinions that are issued.227  
A clear example of this problem is a series of Commission proposals regarding the 
distribution of food products to the most deprived persons in the Union, which aimed 
at formalising CAP funds to purchase goods not only from intervention stocks but 
also on the open market.228 While discussing the Commission’s initiatives, some of 
the Lords stressed the fact that the UK has not benefitted from the aid in recent years, 
with its contribution to the EU budget later being used for this scheme.229 The latest 
proposal in this series, creating a Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived,230 
designed to promote social cohesion and no longer based on agricultural policy, 
makes the participation of the Member States obligatory. It imposed a requirement on 
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Member States to set up a single national programme to implement the scheme, where 
the EU will contribute 85%. As was underlined in the House of Lords by one of the 
Ministers, ‘[not] only is this fund inconsistent with subsidiarity, it will use resources 
that would be better deployed at national or local level. It is worth pointing out that if 
this fund were removed from the proposals, the UK could argue for an equivalent 
reduction of €2.5 billion from the EU budget over the seven years of the multiannual 
financial framework.’231 The Lords did not comment on this statement, and focused 
more on the administrative burden connected to the operation of the Fund in its 
reasoned opinion;232 further, the redistributive character of the proposal might have 
influenced the attitude of the House towards the Commission proposal. 
With regard to the same proposal, the coalition in the Bundestag also raised analogous 
objections about the financing of the Fund. According to the Bundestag, the €2.5 
billion might have been used in the framework of the existing Social Fund, which 
would have also provided for a democratic supervision by national parliaments.233 
Finally, in the same vein, some of the Polish senators raised concern about the 
methods of the division of means for specific actions in CAP, a significant issue for 
Poland.234 
Idiosyncratic national interest 
The members of chambers are often very straightforward in stating why a reasoned 
opinion should be issued. As one of the MPs in the House of Commons summarised 
with regard to a Commission proposal on prudential requirements: ‘Britain therefore 
has a unique interest in financial services, in the same way the French have a unique 
interest in agriculture and the Germans have a unique interest in automotive 
industries.’235 Hence, any encroachment on the ability of the UK to manage financial 
services should be fought against, in the view of the UK MPs.  Similarly, in the House 
of Commons in another debate on issuing a reasoned opinion it was argued that ‘[i]s it 
not possible that, because of their inertia, the other Member States will simply go 
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along with the Commission position and, however strongly we protest, Britain will be 
outvoted? Others do not have a particular national interest and they will tend to go 
along with whatever the Commission suggests.’236 This fact that ‘Britain has by far 
the largest financial services sector in the European Union should carry more 
weight.’237 Finally, the House of Commons presented a similar argument concerning 
the Common European Sales Law proposal, namely that is ‘an attempt to undermine 
the universality of English contract law, which is used in transactions not only 
between businesses within the EU but across the world, where, alongside New York 
law, it is the predominant way in which international trade is regulated.’238  
Further, the number of reasoned opinions of both Polish chambers concerning 
Commission proposals in the field of CAP is quite remarkable (six out of eleven in 
the Sejm and five out of ten in the Senat). Accordingly, in the discussion of these 
reasoned opinions, a lot of emphasis was placed on the national interest of agriculture, 
calling it the Polish ‘apple of the eye.’239 The members of the parliament very often 
underlined that Poland is the biggest producer in their area of Europe, or the most 
agriculture-oriented Member State of those that have recently acceded.240 Hence, 
conferral of essential powers to the Commission in this sphere seems extremely 
unfavourable,241 and Poland’s aim should be to defend the influence of Member 
States on this policy.242  
While these two sections – on the redistributive character of EU policies and on 
idiosyncratic national interests – may shed some light on why the chambers in 
question decided to issue a reasoned opinion, it also signals that the members of 
national parliaments do not necessarily think in subsidiarity terms when conducting 
scrutiny under the EWS.  
Beyond the issues signalled here, further points raised by national parliaments will be 
analysed in the forthcoming chapters. They include the scrutiny of the competence for 
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the EU to act and the analysis of delegations to adopt delegated and implementing 
acts. These two aspects of Commission proposals, as will be argued, go beyond the 
strict understanding of the subsidiarity principle under the EWS. 
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Chapter 6: 
Scrutiny of the Principle of Conferral under Protocol No. 2 
Introduction 
As described by Loïc Azoulai, ‘[t]he penetration of EU law into all areas of Member 
States competence is seen as perhaps the most disturbing phenomenon in the last 10 
years.’1  The ‘federal order of competence’ enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty was 
designed to provide ‘a stable set of rules for determining the existence of and co-
ordinating the exercise of the respective powers’ for the EU.2 Some portray the 
Lisbon Treaty as characterised by an ‘overabundance of provisions’ limiting the 
Union’s competences.3 Article 5(1) TEU prescribes that ‘the limits of Union 
competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.’ Hence, 
whereas the principle of conferral elaborates upon the ‘existence’ of competence, the 
principle of subsidiarity (and proportionality), aims to regulate its ‘exercise.’4 
Scrutiny of the competence to propose draft legislative acts became a subject of 
interest for national parliaments under Protocol No. 2. Hence, it is not only the 
question of the exercise of powers by the EU that is delegated to parliamentary 
scrutiny under Protocol No. 2; rather, the existence of a competence for the EU to act 
also seems to stimulate the reasoned opinions of national parliaments. Taking into 
account the close links between the two principles, this review of the principle of 
conferral by national parliaments, especially with regard to Article 114 TFEU and 
Article 352 TFEU is not surprising.  
Maintaining, however, that the role of national parliaments under Protocol No. 2 
should be limited to review of the subsidiarity principle, this chapter attempts to 
uncover which treaty anchors for EU competence are the most disputed by national 
legislatures. Is it only Articles 114 and 352 TFEU? Inasmuch as the question of the 
EU competences and their limits in fact concerns the reach and the purpose of 
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European integration, this chapter aims to present the views of national parliaments 
on this issue, as expressed in their reasoned opinions.5 
To explore the limits of EU competence from the national parliaments’ perspective, 
Section 1 first elaborates on the understanding of the principle of conferral under the 
Lisbon Treaty and its links to the subsidiarity principle. Next, Section 2 examines the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments, which aim to control the principle of 
conferral. Section 3 focuses on the problematic Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. The case 
study pursued in Section 4 provides an in-depth analysis of the right to strike proposal 
based on the flexibility clause, where the main concern of national parliaments was 
the lack of competence of the EU. 
1 The EU competence question 
In this section, I summarise the reasons why ongoing European integration demanded 
clearer boundaries of EU competence. Further, I provide an overview of the doctrinal 
positions on the new order of competences introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, I 
explore the meaning of the principle of conferral and its close relationship with the 
subsidiarity principle, which contributes to the broad scrutiny of Commission 
proposals, including an assessment of their legal basis that we find in the reasoned 
opinions of national parliaments. 
1.1 The development of EU ‘competence creep’  
The phenomenon of ‘competence creep’ was defined by Weatherill as the situation in 
which ‘the scope of EC/ EU action has tended to ‘creep’ outwards beyond that 
foreseen by the Treaty.’6 The EWS was seen as a palliative against ‘competence 
creep.’ Specifically, because the principle of subsidiarity concerns the question of the 
exercise of competence, it could address the issue as to whether the EU takes action 
when it can be better done at national level. ‘Competence creep’ does not (only) 
concern questions about whether the EU has a competence or whether a legal basis 
has been chosen correctly; rather it asks whether the shared competence can be used 
by the national level, instead of being assimilated into the EU’s competences. 
                                                 
5 Mayer, ‘Competences-Reloaded-The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New European 
Constitution’ at 493. 
6 Weatherill, ‘Using national parliaments to improve scrutiny of the limits of EU action’, 910. 
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There are two sources of EU competence creep: qualified majority voting (QMV) and 
the use of the ‘functionally broad’ Articles 114 and 352 (Article 95 and 308 EC; ex 
100a and 235 EC).7 The application of majority voting at the expense of unanimous 
decision-making ‘generates a sharper appreciation of the importance of defining the 
limits of EU competence from that which prevails in times when anxious States knew 
the Council acted only if every State was in agreement.’8  
The limit of Community competences has been eroded since the revitalisation of the 
Community in the mid-1970s.9 Article 235 EC Treaty [since the Maastricht Treaty, 
Article 308 EC] was ‘the key’ to this revival. 10 It stipulated that, if action on the part 
of the Community in the common market was necessary to achieve the Treaty 
objectives, but the Treaty did not explicitly provide such power, the Council could, 
via a unanimous vote, and after consultation with the EP, approve legislation in that 
area. The frequent application of Article 235 EC Treaty when the Community did not 
have a specific legislative power in a certain area, ‘opened up practically any realm of 
state activity to the Community, provided the governments of the Member States 
found accord among themselves.’11  
It was not until the Single European Act that specific legal bases were introduced for 
the cases where Article 235 EC Treaty was applicable earlier. The Single European 
Act included a new Article 100a EC [since the Maastricht Treaty, Article 95 EC] 
Treaty, allowing for qualified majority voting for measures, the objective of which is 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This amendment, however, 
caused further growth in centralised EU policies; Member States especially contested 
‘the Community’s competence to regulate in sensitive national areas such as culture, 
education, and public health.’12 Taken together, the two provisions – Article 95 EC 
and Article 308 EC – were perceived as the ‘principal problem cases in the corrosive 
trajectory of “competence creep.”’13 
                                                 
7 Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’, 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’, 2449. Weiler explains that the Paris Summit of 1972 
attempted a fresh start for the Community, after the Luxembourg Crisis (‘empty chair crisis’) and the 
double rejection of the accession by the UK. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid at 2450. 
12 Mark A Pollack, ‘The end of creeping competence? EU policy‐ making since Maastricht’ (2000) 38 
Journal of Common Market Studies 519, 525. 
13Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 851. 
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The broad framing of Articles 308 EC Treaty and 95 EC Treaty caused Member 
States to be concerned about their extensive use.14 A clearer delimitation of EU 
competence became part of the agenda after the Treaty of Nice.15 The Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union urged a ‘better division and 
definition of competence in the European Union.’16 A first series of questions posed 
in the Declaration focused on the distinction between the three types of Union 
competence: EU exclusive competence; Member States’ exclusive competence and 
competence shared between these two levels. The series also included a question on 
the application of the subsidiarity principle. A second collection of questions 
concerned the ‘reorganisation of competence’ in areas such as common foreign policy 
and defence policy; police and criminal cooperation; social inclusion; the 
environment, health, and food safety. The issue at stake was whether the 
implementation of these policies should not be left ‘more emphatically’ to the 
national level. Finally, the problem of finding the right balance between the 
redefinition of competences and not halting the EU decision-making process and 
allowing the latter to react in time was pondered. The question was raised whether 
Articles 95 and 308 should be reviewed, taking into account the ECJ’s case law. 
1.2 The ‘new order of competences’ in the Lisbon Treaty and its assessment 
The Treaty of Lisbon eventually provided some clarity on the question ‘qui fait quoi, 
that is, which level(s) of governments may be responsible for which kinds of policy 
action.’17 Building upon the categories of the Constitutional Treaty,18 the Lisbon 
Treaty classifies competences as EU exclusive competences (Article 3 TFEU), shared 
competences (Article 4 TFEU), and competences to support, co-ordinate, or 
supplement Member State action (Article 6 TFEU).  
This new catalogue has been welcomed by EU law scholarship with varying degrees 
of satisfaction. Craig gives credit to the division as ‘helpful’ in providing ‘greater 
clarity,’ anticipating, however, ‘problems of demarcating the boundaries of each 
                                                 
14 Craig, EU administrative law at 387. 
15 Ibid at 369. 
16 Laeken Declaration p. 21-22. 
17 Gráinne de Búrca and Bruno de Witte, ‘The Delimitation of Powers between the EU and its Member 
States’ in Anthony Arnull and Daniel Wincott (eds), Accountability and legitimacy in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press 2002) at 203. 
18 On the division of competences under the Constitutional Treaty Cf. Constantinesco, ‘Les 
compétences et le principe de subsidiarité’ at 305. For a critical assessment see Mayer, ‘Competences-
Reloaded-The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New European Constitution’ at 493. 
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category.’19 In the same vein, Weatherill assesses the reforms as ‘useful,’ but with a 
‘conservative taste.’ On the one hand, Articles 2-6 TFEU are more transparent when it 
comes to the ‘scope, nature and effect’ of the EU legislative competence; on the other 
hand, ‘in substance little changes.’20 In addition, in the view of Weatherill, the 
problematic Article 114 TFEU, together with subsidiarity and proportionality, 
underwent only ‘cosmetic’ textual changes, without an effort to put a limit on EU 
competence.21 Chalmers does not see in the Treaty of Lisbon an extension of EU 
competences, but rather a reflected image of the existing case law of the ECJ.22 
Adopting a much more negative stance, Schütze perceives the competence 
categorisation as a ‘step backwards’ in terms of ‘constitutional clarity;’ ‘instead of 
three clear-cut competence categories, the Reform Treaty would give us three official 
and a number of “unofficial” competence types, none of which impresses by defined 
contours,’ with similar criticism of the lack of clarity with regard to the ‘distinction 
between different types of competences.’23  
1.3 Links between the principles of conferral and subsidiarity 
Article 5 TEU closely links the principle of conferral to the principle of subsidiarity.24 
This close relationship renders the competence question not a simple ‘yes-or-no 
question,’25 which leads a number of scholars to put forward that the assessment of 
Commission proposals under the EWS includes the scrutiny of the principle of 
conferral as the ‘first step.’26 This argument is often based on the logical assumption 
that ‘if the Union already fails the competence test, a subsidiarity test even if 
conducted cannot possibly be positive.’27 Against this reasoning, Article 5(3) TEU 
does not indicate that under the EWS national parliaments can control also the 
principle of conferral, but in fact the provision at stake makes a direct referral to 
                                                 
19 Craig, EU administrative law, 399. 
20 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 850. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the European Union, 20.11.2007, 
oral evidence given by D. Chalmers, 10th Report of Session 2007–08, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact 
assessment, Volume II: Evidence, S3. 
23 Robert Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the federal order of competences: a prospective analysis’ (2008) 33 
European law review 709. 
24Craig, EU administrative law, 391. 
25 de Búrca and de Witte at 205. 
26 See for example Calliess, Subsidiaritäts-und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union at 64. 
27 Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and 
empirical reality, 99. 
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Protocol No. 2. The answer to the logical argument could be hence that for the 
purpose of the EWS national parliaments have to assume that the legal basis of the 
proposal is correct. 
To support the view of that conferral and subsidiarity principles can be reviewed 
separately, Judge Thomas von Danwitz expands on the relationship between them by 
first noting that the Amsterdam Protocol provided for ‘tangible contours’ to the 
concept of subsidiarity, allowing for its legal application as ‘a benchmark for the 
exercise of nonexclusive Community competences in specific cases.’28 Moreover, he 
highlights that the Lisbon Treaty has put ‘additional emphasis on the task of 
separation of competences that significantly extends its importance relative to 
previous treaties.’29 Von Danwitz concludes from this that the subsidiarity principle, 
as enshrined in the Treaty, cannot settle the question of competence, even though that 
question might be related to the more general idea of subsidiarity.30  
There is also a widespread argument that national parliaments should scrutinize the 
principle of conferral under the subsidiarity review, because the ECJ has not been a 
sufficient safeguard of the distribution of competences. In defence of the Court, von 
Bogdandy and Bast argue that the argument that the Court ‘pushes for an expansive 
interpretation of the competences has always been false;’ they argue similarly as 
regards the view that the Courts’ judgments are ‘one-sided in favour of a (short term) 
integration-friendly solution.’31 Von Bogdandy and Bast support their position with 
the argument that ‘in a number of important decisions since the beginning of the 
1990s, the ECJ has adjudicated on the vertical competences, and not always 
favourably for the Union,’ as for example in the Tobacco Advertising case, where the 
Court ruled against the broad political consensus of EU legislative institutions and 
Member States.32  
In Chapter 4, I explained why the ECJ, rather than national parliaments, is more apt to 
review the compatibility of EU draft legislative acts with the principle of conferral. 
The Court, as the final interpreter of the EU Treaties, with an explicit function to 
review the legality of EU legislative acts, appears to be better endowed with the 
                                                 
28 von Danwitz at 40. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 41. 
31 von Bogdandy and Bast at 257. 
32 Ibid. 
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technical expertise on EU law needed to review whether the EU has the power to act 
within a certain domain. In addition, in the ex ante legislative phase, the Council and 
the EP conduct a review of the legal basis of proposals. Taking into account these 
arguments, I have argued against a broad subsidiarity review, which encompasses the 
review of the competence.  
Notwithstanding this, parliamentary chambers in their reasoned opinions very often 
put the principle of conferral under scrutiny. How do national parliaments justify the 
scrutiny of the enabling provision? National parliaments focus on the positive aspect 
of the principle of constitutional legality, which purports that every act of EU 
secondary law requires a legal basis in the treaties or in secondary law, itself anchored 
in the treaties.33 For example, the German Bundesrat, which habitually checks the 
principle of conferral, justifies its broad scrutiny of Commission proposals with the 
logical interrelation between competence and subsidiarity. As the chamber argues, 
‘[t]he subsidiarity principle in essence concerns the principle of the exercise of 
competences. The subsidiarity principle is also breached if there is no European 
Union competence in the area in question. For that reason, the first question to 
consider when conducting a subsidiarity check is the issue of the legal basis.’34  
Similarly, the Spanish parliament considers first the principle of conferral, as ‘[i]n the 
wording of Article 5 of the TFEU, the principle of conferral precedes, not by pure 
chance, the definition of the principle of subsidiarity.’35 Occasionally, some 
parliaments while drafting their reasoned opinions, test whether the legal basis has 
been chosen correctly, not necessarily as a first step in their scrutiny.36 
                                                 
33 Ibid at 229-231. Von Bogdandy and Bast frame the competence question as a principle of 
constitutional legality upon which builds European constitutional law. This principle consists of two 
limbs - a negative and a positive one - which delimit and enable EU actions accordingly. The negative 
aspect underlines the hierarchical order of EU law and means that any EU act must be compatible with 
EU primary law. In fact, the negative aspect of competence is rather marginal in the reasoned opinions 
of national parliaments. See for example Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 17.10.2013 on 
COM(2013) 520. 
34 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 16.12.2012 on COM(2011) 654, pt 2; of 30.03.2012 on 
COM (2012) 10 and of 7.06.2013 on COM(2013) 173. Also the Polish Sejm perceives a violation of 
the conferral principle as a violation of subsidiarity (scrutiny of competence supplements subsidiarity). 
Cf. Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 13.05.2011 on COM(2011) 121 and of 15.9.2012 on COM(2012) 
369. However, some parliaments, like Italian Camera dei Deputati, Reasoned opinion of 15.12.2011 on 
COM(2011) 615 assess that the legal basis is wrong, but there is no subsidiarity violation. 
35 Spanish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 13.06.2012 on COM(2012) 167. 
36 Greek parliament, Reasoned opinion of 21.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788 and Italian Senato of 
30.01.2013 on COM (2012) 788; Dutch Eerste Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 24.01.2012 on COM 
(2011)793, 794; Both Dutch chambers, Reasoned opinion of 17.02.2011 on COM(2010) 748; 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, Reasoned opinion of 24.10.2011 on  COM(2011) 453. 
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Finally, the notions of ‘competence’ and ‘power’ used in the treaties or the terms 
‘enabling norm’ and ‘legal base,’ do not seem to have distinct legal meanings.37 This 
allows for the qualification of the criticism of national parliaments in relation to a lack 
of competence or enabling norms, through a violation of the principle of conferral.  
2 Reasoned opinions on competence violation 
In this section, I attempt to answer the question of how national parliaments frame a 
violation of the conferral principle. To this extent, this section lists the competence 
issues raised by national parliaments concerning treaty provisions other than Articles 
114 and 352 TFEU, which will be elaborated upon separately in Section 3. There are 
two strands of arguments of competence violation that national parliaments pursue, 
which I develop separately. First, the principle of conferral might be violated, because 
the area under regulation falls outside the ambit of the Treaty’s legal basis. Second, 
the Commission proposal may pursue an objective that is different from the one 
indicated in the legal basis. Finally, this section lists the areas which are of ‘exclusive 
competence’ or remaining under ‘national sovereignty’ that are indicated by 
parliamentary chambers in their reasoned opinions. 
2.1 The area that the draft legislative act regulates falls outside of Treaty legal 
basis  
The dominant type of competence scrutiny concerns situations where the action 
pursued by a Commission proposal falls outside of Treaty legal basis in the view of 
national parliaments. However, this claim is different from the allegation that the 
issue at stake falls ‘outside (overall) EU competence,’ as presented in Section 2.3 
below.  
The first illustration of a draft proposal with an allegedly wrong legal basis is the 
Commission proposal establishing a set of rules of international private law applicable 
to the property consequences of registered partnerships in the area of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters.38 The proposal was based upon Article 81(3) TFEU 
which allows the Council acting unanimously after consulting the EP to establish 
measures concerning family law with cross-border implications. The Italian Senato 
questioned the legal basis of the proposal by arguing that ‘family law’ does not cover 
                                                 
37 von Bogdandy and Bast at 229. 
38 COM(2011) 127. 
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the notion of ‘registered partnership.’39 In its reply to the chamber, the Commission 
plausibly indicated that ‘the concept of “registered partnership” finds its sources in a 
family relationship between the persons involved and it is so closely linked with the 
family, it is considered to be part of family law.’40  
With regard to another draft legislative act, the Polish Sejm highlighted problems with 
the legal basis concerning the Commission proposal ‘Women on Board’ introducing a 
40% quota for women on non-executive company boards. The chamber argued that 
board members who are not employed within the meaning of TFEU are not covered 
by the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of 
equal value, which applies only in relationships of employment (Article 157(3) 
TFEU).41 As the Commission rightly pointed out in the reply to the Polish Sejm, 
‘[t]he use of [Article 157(3) TFEU] is not restricted to ‘workers’ but it must also be 
stressed that the EU law concept of ‘worker’ has been given a wide interpretation by 
the Court of Justice of the EU.’42 The Commission convincingly invoked the Danosa 
case according to which a member of a capital company’s Board of Directors who 
provides services to that company and is an integral part of it must be, under specific 
conditions, regarded as having the status of a worker.43  
The examples of the concerns of national parliaments with regard to the legal basis 
seem hence to show that the assessment of national parliaments is not necessarly 
correct. It might also be explained by the fact that national parliaments seem to 
reserve ‘exclusive national competence’ in areas such as family law (see section 2.3. 
below). 
2.2 The draft legislative act pursues a different objective than indicated in the 
legal basis 
The second strand of arguments regarding competence violations relies on Article 
5(2) TEU, which states that the EU may take action ‘only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein.’44 Following the wording of the treaty, national parliaments 
                                                 
39 Italian Senato, Reasoned opinion of 25.05.2011 on COM(2011) 127. 
40 Commission reply of 12.03.2012 to the Reasoned opinion of the Italian Senato on COM(2011) 127. 
41 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 4.01.2013 on COM(2012) 614. 
42 Commission reply of 17.7.2013 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2012) 614. 
43 Case C-232/09 Danosa [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:674, para 56. 
44 Emphasis added. 
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argue that the Commission anchors its proposals on an incorrect legal basis, as the 
draft legislative act pursues a different objective than that stipulated in the treaty 
provision in question. 
The series of Commission proposals on aid to the most deprived people in the EU 
illustrates this problem well. In 2010, following the reform of the CAP, the 
Commission proposed a regulation on the distribution of food products to the most 
deprived persons in the Union.45 The proposal, amending the existing legislation in 
this area, was supposed to guarantee the aims of the CAP and help achieve cohesion 
objectives.46 Its aim was to establish a scheme to distribute food products to the most 
deprived persons in the Union through Member State organisations. The products 
were to be made available from intervention stocks, but could have also been 
purchased on the market. The national parliaments, in their reasoned opinions, 
questioned the extent to which purchases from the market contribute to the objectives 
of the CAP, maintaining instead that the objective shifted from having been an 
agricultural policy measure to a social policy measure.47 The Commission withdrew 
the proposal due to an ECJ judgment, stating that purchases from the market for 
deprived persons could not be made under the auspices of agricultural legislation.48 In 
consequence, the Commission revised the proposal and added Article 175(3) TFEU as 
the legal basis, relating to economic, social and territorial cohesion, as a joint legal 
base next to Articles 42 and 43(2) TFEU on agriculture.49 National parliaments 
maintained, however, that the proposal’s objective is extended to social policy.50 
Nevertheless, the proposal was adopted and the supply of food to the most deprived 
people was extended to the end of 2013. In the meantime, in 2012 the Commission 
proposed a new instrument, namely the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, 
which is based on Article 175(3) TFEU, that is, social cohesion policy, and no longer 
                                                 
45 COM(2010) 486. 
46 Motive (2) of the preamble. 
47 Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 15.11.2011; Swidish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 
10.11.2010; Dutch Eerste Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 30.11.2010, all on COM(2010) 486. The 
Danish Folketing (7.3.2011) and the Swedish Riksdag (9.3.2011) maintained the same position with 
regard to COM(2010) 799 on common organization of agricultural markets and on specific provisions 
for certain agricultural products, which included provision regarding distribution of food products to 
the most deprived persons in the Union. 
48 Case T-576/08 Germany v Commission [2011] ECLI:EU:T:2011:166. 
49 COM(2011) 634. 
50 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 1.12.2011 and House of Lords, Reasoned opinion of 
11.11.2011 both on COM(2011) 634. 
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on the CAP.51 Nonetheless, the German Bundestag maintained that the legal basis 
provided by the Commission does not include a competence for combating poverty 
and the proposal concerns the implementation of social policy, which falls within the 
remit of the Member States of the European Union.52 
Overall, the saga on the aid for the most deprived persons depicts the critical approach 
of national parliaments to the Commission’s choice of a treaty anchor and the 
argument that the proposal allegedly pursues objectives other than those stated in that 
basis.53  In fact, the Lisbon treaty added ‘mainstreaming clauses’ which oblige EU 
institutions to take into account in defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, requirements linked to, among others, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection and the fight against social exclusion (Article 9 TFUE).54 Hence, such 
requirements as social protection should not be criticised by national parliaments as a 
violation of the conferral principle.   
2.3 List of the areas of ‘exclusive national competence’  
The examples cited above show a sensitivity of national parliaments vis-à-vis the 
validity of the legal basis chosen by the Commission for its proposals. This is not only 
a purely legal control of the principle of conferral. In fact, the use of the Early 
Warning System for the review of issues other than subsidiarity, and specifically for 
the scrutiny of EU competence to act is quite telling when it comes to the reach and 
the purpose of European integration, as seen from the perspective of national 
parliaments. Their views, previously voiced only through their respective 
governments in the Council, are a new source of information about the fields of 
competence that national parliaments perceive as falling under national sovereignty. 
Specifically, in the view of national parliaments, the criticised Commission proposals 
breach the principle of conferral as they touch upon an ‘exclusive competence of 
Member States.’  
                                                 
51 COM(2012) 617. 
52 German Bundestag on COM (2012) 617. 
53 Similarly, national parliaments maintained that a proposal introducing the Common Financial 
Transaction Tax aims at creating a new EU budget income resource and is not directed at a smooth 
functioning of the internal market. Cf. Cypriot parliament, Reasoned opinion of 2.12.2011; Swedish 
Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 1.12.2011; Maltese parliament, Reasoned opinion of 12.12.2011, all on 
COM(2011) 594. 
54 Bruno De Witte, ‘A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market 
legislation ’ in Phil Syrpis (ed), The judiciary, the legislature and the EU internal market (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) at 32. 
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The notion of exclusive competence, often used by national parliaments, cannot be 
found in the same wording in the treaties, which rather speak of an exclusive Member 
State competence in the sense that ‘competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States.’ However, some of the treaty provisions bar 
certain matters from EU regulation, as for example Article 153(5) TFEU, which 
concerns pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-
outs. 
Areas that reasoned opinions consistently qualify as an ‘exclusive competence,’ as a 
‘national competence’ or as remaining under national sovereignty are the following: 
direct corporate tax,55 combating poverty,56 substantive family law,57 maritime spatial 
plans and integrated coastal management strategies (substantive spatial planning 
law),58 some aspects of criminal law,59 emergency services,60 management of the 
national statistical system,61 maintaining public order and internal security,62 deciding 
on operating restrictions and noise abatement at EU airports,63 access to and sharing 
of benefits from genetic resources and traditional knowledge concerning genetic 
resources,64 management of spectrum in electronic communications,65 allowing for 
access to information on economic operators,66 and the functioning and supervision of 
                                                 
55 Irish Dail Eireann, Reasoned opinion of 17.05.2011; Slovak Národná Rada, Reasoned opinion of 
12.05.2012; Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 13.05.2011, all on COM(2011) 121. 
56 Swidish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2011 on COM(2010) 799; Swidish Riksdag of Reasoned 
opinion of 1.12.2011 on COM(2011) 634; German Bundestag, Reasoned opinion of 12.12.2012 on 
COM(2012) 617. 
57 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 26.05.2011 on COM(2011) 127. 
58 Lithuanian Seimas, Reasoned opinion of 7.05.2013; Finish Eduskunta, Reasoned opinion of 
8.05.2013; Dutch Twede Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 25.04.2013; Dutch Erste Kammer, Reasoned 
opinion of 25.04.2013 and German Bundesrat, reasoned opinion of 3.05.2013 all on COM(2013) 133. 
59 Swidish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 17.10.2012 on COM(2012) 363; German Bundesrat, 
Reasoned opinion of 30.03.2012 on COM(2012) 10. 
60 As a competence of German Länder; German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 2.03.2012 on COM 
(2011) 897. 
61 As a competence of Spanish regions and Austrian Länder; Spanish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 
13.06.2012 and Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 12.06.2012 both on COM(2012) 167. 
62 Portugese parliament, Reasoned opinion of 4.11.2011; Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 
10.11.2011 and Dutch chambers, Reasoned opinion of 8.11.2011 all on COM (2011) 560. 
63 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 7.02.2011 on COM(2011) 828. 
64 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 20.12.2012 and French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 
20.12.2012, both on COM(2012) 576. 
65 Irish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 23.10.2013 and Maltese parliament, Reasoned opinion of 
7.11.2013 both on COM(2013) 627. 
66 Spanish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 21.01.2014 on COM(2013) 796. 
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pensions systems.67 Moreover, national parliaments argue that deciding on 
expenditure and revenue in the national budget is a national concern. 68  
What do we learn from this list? First, the competences selected by national 
parliaments significantly vary which shows that Member States may have different 
sensibilities. Second, issues such as family and criminal law and security are seen as 
reserved for Member States, similarly as social measures – fight against poverty or 
supervision of pensions or close to the budgetary prerogatives: taxation and decisions 
on expenditure and revenue. The main problem is however the quality of the criticism 
of national parliaments; the notions such as ‘family’, ‘criminal’ or ‘social’ seem to be 
the ‘buzz words’ for national parliaments leading to some simplifications. The 
reasoned opinions seem to generalise and be rather superficial with regard to 
competences; regulation of recognition and enforcement of decisions concerning 
property consequences of registered partnerships implied in the view of the Polish 
parliament violation of exclusive national competence on substantive family law and 
introduction of partnerships into national law through the ‘back door.’69 
3 Special cases: Article 114 and Article 352 TFEU 
In this section, I discuss, first, whether the Lisbon Treaty endows national parliaments 
with specific competence scrutiny powers to review draft legislative acts based on 
Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Second, focusing on Article 114 TFEU, I demonstrate 
how the scrutiny of the internal market clause is pursued by national parliaments, 
without an enabling provision in the treaty. 
The biggest number of reasoned opinions concerns draft legislative acts based on 
Articles 114 TFEU and 352 TFEU. The former provision concerns the approximation 
of laws in the internal market and the latter provides a foundation for when EU action 
is necessary to attain one of the treaty objectives in cases where the treaty did not 
foresee such a power for the EU (the so-called ‘flexibility clause’).70 As a 
                                                 
67 Tweede Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 15.05.2014 on COM(2014) 147. 
68 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 25.01.2012 on COM(2011) 821. 
69 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 27.05.2011 on COM(2011) 127 and the Commission reply to the 
Polish Sejm of 26.01.2012. 
70 On the history of earlier version of Art 352 TFEU in legislative practice see Weiler, ‘The 
transformation of Europe’, 2444. 
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consequence of these ‘functional competences,’ the EU may legislate in fields where 
a specific policy legal basis is not given.71  
Opposition to Commission proposals based on Articles 114 and 352 TFEU does not 
come as a surprise. These provisions are the usual suspects of ‘competence creep.’72 
Already at the time of the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty, the drafters 
attempted to introduce some supervision of the original Article 95 EC Treaty (current 
Article 114 TFEU) and Article 308 EC Treaty (current Article 352 TFEU). Weatherill 
argued that ‘both Articles 95 and 308 were properly implicated by the Laeken 
Declaration in the crime of competence creep, and the new monitoring arrangements 
should be targeted at both their successors, Arts III-172 and I-18 respectively, and not 
at the latter alone.’73 Moreover, the same scholar maintained that Article I-18 
proposed in the Constitutional Treaty (current Article 352 TFEU) gave national 
parliaments the possibility to control competence as well as subsidiarity, and should 
also apply in those cases where the EU aims at harmonizing the internal market, 
according to Article III-172 (nowadays Article 114 TFEU).74 The lack of such a 
competence control mechanism with regard to the latter provision would make 
national parliaments ‘work backwards, by attacking the use of Art. III-172 in 
legislative drafts by relying on their acknowledged right to raise objections rooted in 
subsidiarity, and arguing that review of the matter from the perspective of subsidiarity 
necessarily also implicates assessment of the very validity of the chosen legal base.’75  
Under the Lisbon Treaty, which did not significantly change the internal market 
provision or the flexibility clause, no specific, legal basis oriented control rights are 
conferred upon the national parliaments, especially with regard to Article 114 TFEU. 
Only Article 352(2) TFEU refers to national parliaments: 
‘Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle 
referred to in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the 
                                                 
71 de Búrca and de Witte at 214. 
72 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 855. 
73 Weatherill, ‘Better competence monitoring’, 36. 
74 Weatherill argues that the omission of the national parliaments oversight with regard to Article 114 
TFEU, seem not to be a conscious design, but rather a consequence of spreading the issue of 
competences between different Convention Working Groups. Cf. Weatherill, ‘The Limits of 
Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Case Law has 
Become a Drafting Guide’, 856. 
75 Weatherill, ‘Better competence monitoring’, 37. 
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Commission shall draw national Parliaments' attention to proposals 
based on this Article.’  
Despite the quite strict, but clear, wording of Article 352 TFEU on ‘drawing attention 
of national parliaments,’ Rosas posits that the flexibility clause allows national 
parliaments to review the compatibility of draft legislative acts with this provision.76 
As Rosas notes, Article 352(2) TFEU provides that the procedure for monitoring the 
subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 5(3) TEU should be used to draw national 
parliaments’ attention to draft legal acts based on the flexibility clause. In the opinion 
of Rosas, ‘the control mechanism (…) in relation to the principle of subsidiarity [has] 
been transposed to the operation of the competence clause.’ In the same vein, 
Weatherill argues that the Early Warning System is ‘applicable not only to 
subsidiarity concerns arising under any Treaty provision authorizing legislative 
action: it applies mutatis mutandis to any legislative proposal adopted under Article 
352 TFEU, where objectives need not be confined to perceived violation of the 
subsidiarity principle.’77 The views of Rosas and Weatherill imply, therefore, that 
national parliaments would have the possibility to issue reasoned opinions with regard 
to the legal basis of proposals based on Article 352 TFEU.78  
Yet, Article 352 TFEU seems to put an obligation on the Commission only to signal 
to national parliaments that the proposal is anchored on the flexibility clause, without 
changing the original role of national Parliaments in the EU legislative process. In 
Craig’s view, ‘the more natural interpretation is that because [the] flexibility clause 
entails an exceptional use of EU legislative power, the Commission has an obligation, 
to draw this to the attention of national parliaments, in order that they might contest it 
on the grounds of subsidiarity.’79 As will be explained below, this is also the 
interpretation of the Commission, which, by rejecting the first ‘yellow card,’ also 
excluded that the EWS should involve scrutiny of the legal base in case of proposals 
based on Article 352 TFEU.  
                                                 
76 Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati, EU constitutional law: an introduction (Hart 2010) at 42.  
77 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 853. 
78 See UK House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 12.02.2014 on COM(2013) 893, point 8 which 
follows up on Waetherill’s position and labels Art 352(2) as an ‘extra ground’ for challenging 
Commission proposals. In the case at stake, even though the Art 352 legal basis seemed ‘highly 
doubtful’ to the chamber it relied on other arguments. 
79 Craig, EU administrative law at 389.  
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The internal market provision is even less friendly to national parliaments. Article 114 
TFEU does not even include a ‘national parliaments clause’ comparable to that in 
Article 352 TFEU. In consequence, as foreseen by Weatherill, by not providing 
specific scrutiny rights for Article 114 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty with Protocol No. 2 
opened opportunities for national parliaments to reprimand the Commission’s choice 
of legal basis.80 It is true that, on a number of occasions, national parliaments have 
raised difficult questions with regard to Commission proposals based on the internal 
market clause.81 These concerned cases where, in the view of national parliaments, 
the internal market regulation was not the main objective of the proposal,82 the 
proposal aimed at harmonisation of purely national situations,83 the proposal’s 
reference to Article 114 was insufficient,84 or harmonisation in a specific field was 
excluded.85 Moreover, according to national parliaments, cases where the 
Commission introduces a system in parallel to existing national provisions do not fall 
within the scope of Article 114 TFEU.86 
The draft of the Common European Sales Law illustrates such a case.87 In October 
2011, the Commission proposed a regulation to reduce differences in contract law 
between Member States, which hinder traders and consumers from engaging in cross-
border trade within the internal market.88 The Common European Sales Law, as a 
                                                 
80 Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the 
Court's Case Law has Become a Drafting Guide’, 855-857 and Weatherill, ‘Better competence 
monitoring’, 37 (concerns CT but applicable to LT). 
81 Davies points out that while Art 114 TFEU enshrines a shared competence, it seems that subsidiarity 
will not apply since when the EU wants to create uniformity, ‘Member States will never be able to 
achieve the goals pursued by harmonization.’ Lack of application of subidiairity to ‘functional 
competences’ seemed ‘bizzare’ to Davies. Cf. Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time’, 75. However, Davies’ point  might explain the focus of national parliaments 
on the legal basis instead of subsidiarity with regard to proposals based on Art 114 TFEU.   
82 House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 9.11.2011 on COM(2011) 452. It was argued that the 
primary objective is prudential supervision of banks. Similarly, see the reasoned opinions of the 
Bulgarian parliament (28.02.2013), Italian Camera (19.02.2013), Czech Chamber of Deputies 
(24.1.2013) on COM (2012) 788. These chambers argued that the proposal aims at regulating public 
health, which is under the scope of article 168 TFEU. 
83 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 24.01.2012 on COM(2011) 793 stated that ‘in the case of 
purely domestic transactions, there is no sound reason for obliging Member States to adopt measures 
for a legal protection system for alternative dispute settlement with a view to promoting cross-border 
trade.’  
84 Austrian Nationalrat, Reasoned opinion of 17.04.2012 on COM(2012) 84 argued that Art 114 is not 
sufficient to cover the organisation of statutory health systems of Member States, which the proposal 
intends to do.  
85 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 10.10.2012 on COM(2012) 369 argued that Art 179(3) TFEU 
excludes harmonisation of clinical trials. 
86 Italian Senato, Reasoned opinion of 30.01.2013 on COM(2012) 788. 
87 COM(2011) 635. 
88 Explanatory Memorandum p.1. 
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‘self-standing uniform set of contract law rules including provisions to protect 
consumers’ would run as ‘a second contract law regime within the national law of 
each Member State.’89 
In their replies to the Commission, national parliaments reacted negatively to the legal 
basis of the proposal. The Bundesrat of Austria and that of Germany argued that 
Article 114 TFEU could not be used for legal acts which exist in parallel to national 
laws.90 Similarly, both Belgian chambers, the Chambre des Représentants and the 
Sénat opined that the proposal did not aim at approximating national sales law 
provisions, as it neither replaces nor harmonises them.  
Interestingly, in the Common European Sales Law case, the Austrian Bundesrat, the 
German Bundesrat and the Belgian Sénat proposed that a more appropriate legal basis 
for the proposal would be Article 352 TFEU. This is not a unique case where, via an 
assessment of the legal basis, national parliaments suggest a correct legal basis to the 
Commission.91 In most of the cases, national parliaments put forward Article 352 
TFEU as an appropriate legal basis for the contested Commission proposals.92 The 
reasons for this seem twofold. First, the Council has to unanimously agree to the legal 
acts based on Article 352 TFEU. Second, in some Member States, the national 
provisions demand that the national parliament has to consent to a Commission 
proposal based on Article 352 TFEU before a national minister votes in the Council. 
For example, in such case German law demands that the German representative in the 
Council needs the consent of the Bundestag expressed in a legal act before it can 
agree to the proposal,93 similarly to in the UK, where the agreement demands the 
                                                 
89 Ibid, p. 4, 6. 
90 Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 30.11.2011; German Bundestag, Reasoned opinion of 
1.12.2011; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Reasoned opinion of 9.12.2011 and Belgian Senate, 
Reasoned opinion of 9.12.2011 all on COM(2011) 635. 
91 Both Dutch chambers, Reasoned opinion of 8.11.2011; Portugese parliament, reasoned opinion of 
4.11.2011; Swedish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 10.11.2011 and Romanian Senate, Reasoned 
opinion of 9.11.2011 all on COM(2011) 560. They propose to exchange Art 77(1)(2) with Art 72 
TFEU. Spanish parliament; Reasoned opinion of 14.06.2011 on COM(2011) 216. It proposes to 
exchange Art 118(1) with Art 118 (2) TFEU. 
92 Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 15.11.2010 and Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 
10.11.2010 both on COM(2010) 486; Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 7.3.2011 and Swedish 
Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 9.3.2011 on COM(2010) 799; Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 
30.11.2011; German Bundestag, Reasoned opinion of 1.12.2011 and Belgian Senate, Reasoned opinion 
of 9.12.2011 all on COM(2011) 635; Austrian Nationalrat, Reasoned opinion of 28.05.2014 and 
Austrain Nationalrat, Reasoned opinion of 27.05.2014 both on COM(2014) 212. 
93 §8 Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz vom 22. September 2009 (BGBl. I S. 3022), geändert durch 
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previous consent of the Westminster parliament via an Act of Parliament before a 
Minister can agree to the proposal in the Council.94  Milder means, such as those in 
Poland, include that a minister asks for the opinion of the parliament before 
consenting in the Council to a legal act based on Article 352 TFEU.95 
The lack of a possibility for national parliaments to scrutinise the legal basis of 
Commission proposals and most of all, proposals anchored in Articles 114 and 352 
TFEU, did not prevent national parliaments from raising the first ‘yellow card,’ which 
was to a large extent focused on the lack of competence of the EU to act and to apply 
the flexibility clause. This case is the subject of the case study in the next section. 
4 Case study: The ‘yellow card’ on the right to strike proposal 
In this part of the chapter, I will explore in detail the first ‘yellow card’ triggered by 
national parliaments.96 First, I explain briefly the background of the Commission 
proposal. Second, I summarise the content of the proposal. Next, I list the main 
concerns of national parliaments with regard to the Commission proposal. Finally, in 
the last section, I comment on the outcome of the first ‘yellow card’ and its meaning 
for the relationship between the principles of conferral and subsidiarity.   
4.1 Background 
In December 2007, the Court of Justice decided on two related cases International 
Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking97 and Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets.98 For the first time, the ECJ ruled that the right to strike 
is a fundamental right of the EU constitutional order, and that the right of workers to 
                                                                                                                                           
Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 1. Dezember 2009 (BGBl. I S. 3822). This provision, introduced at the 
request of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Lisbon judgment is criticised as going ‘too 
far,’ because of the ‘danger of lack of flexibility.’ See Calliess and Beichelt at 12. 
94Paul Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, limits and legality’ (2011) 48 Common Market 
Law Review 1881, 1884. 
95 Art 10, Ustawa z dnia 8 października 2010 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w 
sprawach związanych z członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej. 
96 On the first ‘yellow card’ see also Cygan, Accountability, parliamentarism and transparency in the 
EU at 179-183; Barrett, ‘Monti II. The Subsidiarity Review Process Comes of Age... Or Then Again 
Maybe It Doesn't’; Goldoni; Danuta Adamiec, ‘Pierwszy wypadek zastosowania mechanizmu żółtej 
kartki–opinie parlamentów dotyczące rozporządzenia Monti II’ [2012] Zeszyty Prawnicze 23; Jančić, 
‘Representative democracy across levels? National Parliaments and EU Constitutionalism ’, 260-263. 
97 Case C-438/05 The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union 
[2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 (Viking). 
98 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. 
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take industrial action is to be protected as a constitutional principle of EU law.99 The 
Viking and Laval rulings established a standard of the protection of the right to strike 
that is different to that in a number of EU Member States. In this way, Viking and 
Laval highlighted the rising influence of EU law in the social area and launched a 
discussion among scholars and social actors on the implications of these judgments 
for the protection of social rights in the EU. Indeed, the ECJ did not hold that the right 
to strike is absolute. On the contrary, it affirmed that the right to strike can be put 
under some limitations, and must be exercised in conformity with the proportionality 
principle. In situations when the industrial action affects the exercise of EU 
fundamental freedoms, the Court subjected the possibility for trade unions to go on 
strike to a review of the suitability, necessity and ultima ratio of the industrial action, 
and empowered national courts to ‘verify whether the union has exhausted all other 
avenues under national law before the industrial action is found proportionate.’100 In 
the light of the limitations placed by the ECJ on the recognition of the right to strike, 
the ECJ judgments have faced strong criticism from trade unions (labelling the 
decisions as ‘anti-social’ and demanding clarification),101 as well as labour lawyers.102 
4.2 Content of the proposal 
Responding to the concerns of stakeholders,103 the Commission decided to address the 
‘tensions between the freedoms to provide services and of establishment, and the 
exercise of fundamental rights such as the right of collective bargaining and the right 
to industrial action’ uncovered by the ECJ’s decisions in Viking and Laval.104 On 21 
March 2012, the Commission published a proposal for a Council regulation ‘on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.’105 The aim of the proposal was to 
                                                 
99 Robert O'Donoghue and Bruce Carr, ‘Dealing with Viking and Laval: From Theory to Practice’ 
(2008) 11 Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies 123. 
100 Case C-438/05 Viking para 44; case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri para 91. Cf. Catherine Barnard, 
‘Viking and Laval: an introduction’ (2007) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 463.  
101 See Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5. 
102 For example, it has been argued that ‘in neither Viking nor Laval did the [ECJ] formulate a right to 
collective action in a manner likely to provide effective legal protection of its exercise. Indeed it could 
be said that other aspects of the Viking and Laval judgments render judicial recognition of such a right 
negligible in terms of its practical effects.’ Tonia Novitz, ‘Human Rights Analysis of the Viking and 
Laval Judgments’ (2008) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 541, 542. 
103 See an overview in Explantory Memorandum, p. 7. 
104 Ibid, p. 8. 
105 COM(2012) 130. The proposal drew from the report of 9 May 2010 by former Commissioner Mario 
Monti (Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market, 9 May 2010) and is hence often labelled as the 
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‘lay down the general principles and rules applicable at Union level with respect to 
the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.’106  
The impact assessment addressed different policy options; however only a regulatory 
intervention at EU level ‘would have positive economic and social impact’ and 
‘provide for more legal certainty’ than a non-regulatory intervention.107 An EU 
regulation would ‘most effective[ly] and efficient[ly]’ address the objective of 
‘reducing tensions between national industrial relation systems and the freedom to 
provide services’108 
The Explanatory Memorandum also assessed the legal elements of the proposal.109 
The Commission proposal was based on Article 352 TFEU, with a short justification 
of lacking ‘explicit provision in the Treaty for the necessary powers.’110 In addition, 
the Commission explained that, although ‘Article 153(5) TFEU excludes the right to 
strike from the range of matters that can be regulated across the EU by way of 
minimum standards through Directives,’ ‘the Court rulings have clearly shown that 
the fact that Article 153 does not apply to the right to strike does not as such exclude 
collective action from the scope of EU law.’111 
The Commission’s reasoning in circumventing the prohibition enshrined in Article 
153(5) TFEU seems quite formalistic. The Commission interpreted that provision as 
only preventing the harmonisation of national labour laws,112 but allowing the EU ‘to 
clarify the general principles and EU rules applicable to the exercise of the 
fundamental right to take industrial action within the context of the [single 
market].’113 With regard to the subsidiarity principle, the Commission argued that the 
mentioned objective of clarifying the general principles and EU rules applicable to the 
right to strike and fundamental freedoms demands EU action, and cannot be achieved 
                                                                                                                                           
Monti II Regulation. The Monti report was a basis for a number of proposals. Cf. Communication from 
the Commission, Towards a Single Market Act. For a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy, 
27.10.2010, COM(2010) 623, proposal No. 30. 
106 Art 1(1), proposed Monti 2 Regulation. 
107 Commission Explanatory Memorandum, p. 9. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, p. 10. 
110 Ibid, p. 11. 
111 Ibid. 
112 The proposal for EU harmonization of national strike laws had been advanced in the 1970s by 
Antoine Jacobs, ‘Towards Community Action on Strike Law?’ (1978) 15 Common Market Law 
Review 129. 
113 Commission Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10. 
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by Member States alone.114 Additional aspects ensuring the subsidiarity compliance 
included the role of national courts in deciding on the proportionality of actions; 
national laws on the exercise of the right to strike were not affected by the proposal 
and no changes in the existing alternative dispute-settlement institutions at national 
level were foreseen.115 On proportionality, the proposal did ‘not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the envisaged objectives.’116 
The Commission proposal enshrined the so-called ‘Monti clause’ that the regulation 
shall not affect, in purely internal situations ‘the exercise of fundamental rights as 
recognised in the Member States, including the right or freedom to strike or to take 
other action covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States in 
accordance with national law and practices.’ 117 Next, the central provision of the 
proposal - Article 2 - provided that ‘[t]he exercise of the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services enshrined in the Treaty shall respect the 
fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to strike, 
and conversely, the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action, 
including the right or freedom to strike, shall respect these economic freedoms.’ 
Nonetheless, this provision appeared to basically repeat the general principle of 
proportionality, used as a standard tool for the reconciliation of conflicting 
constitutional interests by the Court. Since the application of the principle of 
proportionality by the ECJ was at the core of the Viking and Laval rulings (and at the 
core of the criticism of these decisions) it is difficult to see how Article 2 of the 
proposal could trigger a change in ECJ’s case law and improve the protection of the 
right to strike. 
The Commission proposal also contained Article 3(1), which established the principle 
of equal access for cross-border cases to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
those ‘Member States which, in accordance with their national law, tradition or 
practice, provide for alternative, non-judicial mechanisms to resolve labour disputes.’ 
                                                 
114 Ibid, p. 11. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Art 1(2) of the proposed Monti 2 Regulation (which reproduces the content of Art 2 of the Monti 1 
Regulation) does not refer to the notion of purely internal (i.e. intra-state) situation. Given the general 
purpose of the Regulation of regulating the right to strike in inter-states labour disputes, however, it 
must be concluded that the provision of Art 1(2) – which proclaims the non-affectation of state right to 
strike regimes – can only apply to intra-state labour-management disputes in which the EU freedom of 
establishment and to provide services are not at play. 
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Article 3(2) encouraged the social partners at the EU level to ‘conclude agreements at 
Union level or establish guidelines with respect to the modalities and procedures for 
mediation, conciliation or other mechanisms for the extrajudicial or out-of-court 
settlement of disputes (…) with a cross-border character.’ Reference to dispute 
resolution mechanisms could not deprive the parties from access to judicial remedies, 
after any failure to reach an agreement via the alternative dispute-resolution 
mechanism.118 The recourse to the dispute-resolution mechanism should prejudice 
neither the role of national courts in labour disputes, nor the role of the ECJ.119 These 
provisions perhaps represented the most innovative part of the regulation. Article 3, 
however, did not give an answer on the uniform availability of the alternative dispute-
resolution mechanisms within the EU unless the social partners had agreed on a 
proper contractual regime of alternative dispute resolutions in transnational labour 
disputes.120 Finally, Article 4 created an alert mechanism in cases of serious damage 
to the industrial relations system or serious social unrest in a Member State. In such a 
situation, concerned Member States were to inform both the Member State of the 
establishment or origin of the service provider, and the Commission, of the current 
situation. 
In sum, seeking to achieve the aim of reconciling the protection of the right to strike 
with the fundamental freedom and to provide legal certainty in this respect at EU 
level, the regulation highlighted the question of the EU’s competence to act. The 
question was whether the Commission proposal was founded on a correct legal basis, 
and whether the sidestepping of Article 153(5) TFEU was well justified.  
4.3 The reasoned opinions of the national parliaments 
The Commission proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action was the first to trigger the ‘yellow card’ procedure. Twelve national 
                                                 
118 Art 3(3). 
119 Art 3(4). 
120 Art 3(1) of the proposed regulation allows those Member States that already have mechanisms of 
alternative dispute resolutions to use them where the labour management dispute is transnational in 
character. The proposed regulation does not require however those Member States that do not yet have 
mechanisms of alternative dispute resolutions to introduce them. As a consequence, it would seem that 
a certain asymmetry is likely to exist between the Member States until the social partners regulate the 
field with agreements at the EU level. 
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parliaments issued reasoned opinions, and the opinions of seven unicameral (fourteen 
votes) and five bicameral (five votes) parliaments amounted to nineteen votes.121  
The major challenge posed by national parliaments to the proposal concerned its legal 
basis. Concerns about both the application of the flexibility clause (Article 352 
TFEU), as well as Article 153(5) TFEU were raised. In the first case, national 
parliaments assessed that the criteria prescribed by Article 352 TFEU were 
‘manifestly not fulfilled’ by the regulation.122 Accordingly, the Latvian Saeima123 and 
the Swedish Riksdag124 highlighted that the regulation did not indicate which of the 
Treaty objectives it wanted to pursue. Similarly, the Belgian Chambre des 
Représentants,125 the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés126 and the Portuguese 
Assembleia da República127 opined that Article 352 TFEU was not a justified legal 
basis for the proposed regulation. 
Additionally, concerning the legal basis of the proposal, national parliaments 
criticised the Commission’s argument that ‘[...] the fact that Article 153 TFEU does 
not apply to the right to strike does not as such exclude collective action from the 
scope of EU law.’128 For example, the Luxembourgish parliament argued that the 
right to strike and the right to collective action are ‘categorically excluded’ by Article 
153(5) TFEU from EU legislation and that, therefore, Article 352(3) TFEU (which 
prohibits the use of the flexibility clause for harmonization in areas where 
harmonization is excluded) applied.129 The French Sénat,130 the Maltese Kamra tad-
Deputati,131 and the Portuguese Assembleia da República132 maintained a similar 
position. Furthermore, the Danish Folketing133 and the Dutch Tweede Kamer134 
                                                 
121 According to information available on IPEX, the Czech Senát and the Committee for European 
Affairs in the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna adopted a reasoned opinion after the elapse of eight week 
deadline. In July 2012, the German Bundesrat and Slovenian Državni zbor issued a negative opinion on 
the proposal, without declaring it contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. The Polish Senat found a 
breach of the principle of proportionality only. The Lithuanian and Spanish parliaments and the Italian 
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122 Finnish Eduskunta, Reasoned opinion of 16.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130.  
123 Latvian Saeima, Reasoned opinion of 18.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130, point 3. 
124 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 11.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
125 Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Reasoned opinion of 30.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
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129 Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, Reasoned opinion of 15.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
130 French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 22.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
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132 Portuguese Parliament, Reasoned opinion of 18.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130, Part II let. a. 
133 Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 3.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130. 
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highlighted that, even though the proposed regulation did not provide for new 
mechanisms on the basis of Article 153(5) TFEU, the EU did not have the power to 
legislate in this area. Finally, the Belgian Chambre des Représentants also signaled 
that labour law was a national question ‘par excellence.’135  
Furthermore, in their reasoned opinions, national parliaments questioned the 
proportionality and the merits of the Commission proposal.136 These however, for the 
purposes of this chapter, are left aside.137  
4.4 Outcome 
On 12 September 2012, less than three months after the Commission took notice of 
the reasoned opinions and acknowledged that the conditions for the activation of the 
‘yellow card’ procedure had been met,138 the Commission communicated the 
withdrawal of the proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to strike.139 
However, in a letter to national parliaments, the Commission stated that it still 
considered the proposal as compatible with the principle of subsidiarity and the 
reason for the withdrawal was the possible lack of necessary political support for the 
proposal in the European Parliament and the Council in the future.140 Moreover, the 
Commission explained that the opinions of the national parliaments had raised a 
                                                                                                                                           
134 Dutch Tweede Kamer, Reasone opinion of 22.05.2012 on COM(2012) 130, p. 2. 
135 Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Reasoned opinion of 30.05.2012 on COM(2013) 130. 
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number of issues, but had essentially failed to identify a subsidiarity violation in the 
Commission proposal.141  
In light of lack of any formal communication from the Commission, in October 2012, 
COSAC asked the Commission for individual responses to the reasoned opinions with 
an explanation on why, in the view of the Commission, the principle of subsidiarity 
had not been breached.142 Hence, in March 2013 in an identical letter to all the 
national parliaments participating in the first ‘yellow card,’ the Commission 
attempted to give a more thorough reply to the concerns raised in the reasoned 
opinions. With regard to the legal basis, the Commission explained that, due to the 
absence of an explicit provision in the Treaty, it had chosen Article 352 TFEU as a 
legal basis for the proposal. Moreover, it upheld the earlier argument from the 
Explanatory Memorandum that the ECJ’s rulings ‘have clearly shown that the fact 
that Article 153 does not apply to the right to strike does not exclude collective action 
from the scope of EU law.’143 On the choice of a regulation instead of a directive, the 
Commission underlined that a regulation ‘would have reduced regulatory complexity 
and offered greater legal certainty.’144 Finally, on the merits of the proposal, the 
Commission highlighted the enhanced role of national courts in adjudicating on the 
proportionality of collective actions, taking into account national laws and procedures 
on the exercise of the right to strike, encompassing existing alternative dispute-
settlement mechanisms. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the introduction of such 
mechanisms would remain facultative for the informal resolution of labour disputes at 
the national level. 
As such, the Commission replies confirmed that the role of national parliaments under 
Protocol No. 2 should be limited to a review of the subsidiarity of a legislative 
proposal, and that in the present case no violation of subsidiarity had taken place. In 
fact, an assessment of the Commission proposal in light of the material and 
procedural dimension of subsidiarity demonstrates that the draft regulation was 
consistent with the core idea of subsidiarity: that action at the EU level should be 
                                                 
141 Ibid. On the interpretation of the Commission reply see also B. Schima, p. 384-385. Schima 
criticises Commission statement about the failure to identify a subsidiarity issue by national 
parliaments as ‘apodictic.’ 
142 COSAC, 19th Bi-annual Report, at 26. 
143 See for example Commission reply of 14.03.2013 to the Portuguese parliament.  
144 Ibid. 
262 
taken when it cannot be taken by the Member States and, by reason of its scale or 
effects, can better be pursued by the EU.  
Indeed, the transnational labour disputes that were the object of the Commission 
proposal have a cross-border dimension that cannot be regulated by Member States. 
While safeguarding national industrial relations regimes in purely internal situations, 
the Commission proposal established a framework for the management of those 
conflicts between business and labour that falls outside the regulatory powers of a 
single Member State, because one of the actors in the conflict is enjoying rights 
derived from EU free movement law. As cases like Viking and Laval have 
demonstrated, national systems of industrial relations are no longer insulated from EU 
law when the industrial dispute is trans-national in character and one of the parties to 
the labour-management conflict invokes its free movement rights. The interaction 
between domestic and supranational law is now such that any meaningful attempt to 
counter-balance the pressures emerging from EU free market rules must also take 
place at the EU level.145 From this point of view, the Commission proposal was an 
acknowledgement that only an EU act regulating the exercise of transnational 
industrial action can offer, by reason of its scale and effects, a satisfactory answer to 
the challenge posed by Viking and Laval. In other words, because national action in 
this field would be insufficient, and because supranational action is comparatively 
more efficient, the proposed regulation fit comfortably with the material requirement 
of the principle of subsidiarity. Nor did the procedural requirement seem problematic 
in this case.146  
However, it is clear that the Commission did not expend much effort in its arguments 
concerning the suitability of the legal basis. Basically, in its replies to national 
parliaments participating in the first ‘yellow card’ procedure it repeated the arguments 
from its explanatory memorandum. This is definitely not an exceptional case. The 
Commission has thus far never been materially influenced by the legal basis 
                                                 
145 See also Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and 
Social Rights in the EU’ in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and human rights (Oxford University Press 
1999) at 449-472 (explaining that much of the difficulties in protecting social rights in the EU are due 
to the fact that currently, national social rights are balanced with supranational free movement rules, 
and suggesting that the most appropriate response to this situation may be to make the EU the relevant 
level for the establishment and protection of social rights). 
146 In the abstract, it could be argued that the impact assessments or the explanatory memoranda could 
have been clearer on the subsidiarity reasoning and could have supported the proposal with specific 
data. This is, however, harder to expect in cases of proposals that tackles a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative problem, as in the present case. 
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arguments raised by national parliaments. The Commission remains firm in its 
position, maintaining that proposals contribute to the pursued objectives,147 or do not 
call into question Member States’ competences.148 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented how national parliaments acting within the subsidiarity review 
procedure also verify whether EU legislative acts remain within the limits of the 
principle of conferral. Such a check upon the existence of EU competence to act is not 
unexpected, especially taking into account the close links between the principles of 
conferral and subsidiarity. National parliaments often find Commission proposals as 
going beyond the conferred competence, and as pursuing an additional, different 
objective than that indicated in the legal basis. Moreover, the reasoned opinions, 
which assess the principle of conferral, provide a first account of the areas where 
national parliaments call for national sovereignty or ascertain an ‘exclusive 
competence’ of the Member States. While the reasoned opinions of national 
parliaments may be interpreted as giving a new perspective on the limits of EU 
integration from the bottom-up point of view, this chapter pointed out that the 
assessment of the legal basis of Commission proposals is often very shallow. 
Moreover, this chapter analysed the reasoned opinions concerning proposals based on 
Articles 114 and 352 TFEU, always perceived as a main source of EU ‘competence 
creep.’ It is true that the proposals based on the internal market clause have the 
highest number of reasoned opinions and, in addition, the first ‘yellow card’ was 
triggered with regard to the Commission proposal on the right to strike, based upon 
the flexibility clause. While it was questionable whether the Commission proposal at 
stake was able to improve the status quo and increase the protection that collective 
action enjoys in transnational labour conflicts, nonetheless it is not the task of national 
parliaments to control the legal feasibility of Commission proposals under the EWS 
pursuant to Protocol No. 2. As I argued in Chapter 2, textual, structural and functional 
reasons speak in favour of interpreting the role of national parliaments in the EWS as 
restricted to a control of the subsidiarity of a legal draft only. The Commission reply 
to the first ‘yellow card’ also shows that the Commission is drawing a line between 
                                                 
147 See the replies of the Commission to reasoned opinions on COM(2010) 486. 
148 See the reply of the Commission to the Swedish Riksdag of 07.11.2011 on COM(2011) 121 and of 
29.05.2012 on COM(2011) 821. 
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the subsidiarity-oriented arguments and other points, including those on the suitability 
of the legal basis.  
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Chapter 7: 
The role of national parliaments regarding ‘delegated legislation’ 
Introduction 
The role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process has increased 
significantly due to the Lisbon Treaty. The national legislatures have evolved into 
active participants in the scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle, very often even going 
beyond a strict formal understanding of that mechanism. One unexpected outcome of 
this active participation of national parliaments in the EU legislative process is the 
role they claimed with regard to EU executive acts. A total of 47 reasoned opinions1 
take stock of the delegations provided for in the drafts of EU legislative acts 
submitted by the Commission. The most active reviewers are the Luxembourg 
Chambre des Députés, with seven reasoned opinions assessing delegations, and the 
Austrian Bundesrat, Polish Sejm and Senat, each with five reasoned opinions 
conducting similar assessments.2 Yet, this activity of national parliaments has been 
taken into consideration neither by scholars working on the new role of national 
parliaments under the Lisbon Treaty, nor by recent studies on delegated and 
implementing rule making.3  
The main aim of this chapter is to offer an overview and assess the concerns of 
national parliaments on delegations encompassed by Commission proposals. Section 
1 briefly presents the concept of delegated and implementing acts as introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty. Section 2 moves to an examination of the reasoned opinions issued by 
national parliaments, encompassing their concerns with regard to both types of 
delegated legislation – delegated and implementing acts. With regard to delegations 
by means of delegated acts, a case study of the Commission proposal on the Tobacco 
                                                 
1 Out of around 256 opinions issued since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on Commission 
proposal issued until the end of 2013, and 9 reasoned opinions by August 2014. 
2 As of August 2014 the reasoned opinions touching upon delegations come from the Lithuanian 
Seimas (2), Spanish Cortes Generales (1), French Sénat (4) Romanian Chamber of Deputies (2), 
Swedish Riksdag (2), German Bundesrat (1), Portuguese parliament (1), Italian Senato (2), Greek 
Parliament (1), Danish Folketing (1), Czech Chamber of Deputies (1), Bulgarian National Assembly 
(1), Belgian Chambre des Représentants (1), Italian Camera dei Deputati (1), British House of 
Commons (1), Maltese parliament (1), Dutch Tweede Kamer (1) and Finish Eduskunta (1). 
3 See however that COSAC 16th Bi-annual Report of October 2011 mentions this type of scrutiny of 
national parliaments. With regard to Polish parliament’s scrutiny of the delegations by means of 
delegated acts (only) see Agnieszka Grzelak and Justyna Łacny, ‘Kontrola przestrzegania unijnej 
zasady pomocniczości przez parlamenty narodowe–pierwsze doświadczenia’ (2011) 32 Zeszyty 
Prawnicze 11, 28. 
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Products Directive is presented. Beyond this case study, this section also provides 
examples of other concerns voiced by national parliaments, especially on delegations 
by means of implementing acts and on the distinction between the two types of 
delegations. Section 3 focuses on the replies of the Commission to the national 
legislatures, showing the arguments of the Commission rebutting the concerns voiced 
in the reasoned opinions. In this respect, I divide the arguments of the Commission 
into those that concentrate on the formal aspects of the delegations, and those that 
focus on their merits. Finally, Section 4 assesses whether national parliaments should 
review delegations to adopt delegated and implementing acts under the subsidiarity 
review procedure at all. 
1 Delegated and Implementing Acts 
Comitology came into existence in 1960s, when the Council delegated some of its 
powers to the Commission. The committees of Member States supervised these 
delegated powers.4 The Single European Act (Article 202 EC) for the first time 
formally recognized committees and enshrined them in the later Comitology 
Decisions (1999 and 2006). Different types of the comitology committees existed, the 
involvement of which depended on the policy area: management; regulatory; 
regulatory with scrutiny; and an advisory committee. The complexity of the 
comitology system led Weiler & al. to label ‘comitology' as ‘an apt neologism - a 
phenomenon that requires its very own science, which no single person has 
mastered.’5  
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has a new system of ‘delegated 
legislation.’ Specifically, two types of acts ‘below that of legislative acts’ have been 
established.6 Delegated acts are provided for in Article 290 TFEU and implementing 
acts in Article 291.7 Delegated and implementing acts have been categorized in 
                                                 
4 On the development of the comitology system see Adrienne Héritier and others, Changing Rules of 
Delegation: A Contest for Power in Comitology (Oxford University Press 2013) at 4-7.  
5 Weiler, Haltern and Mayer at 9. 
6 Paul  Craig, ‘Delegated acts, implementing acts and the new comitology regulation’ (2011) 36 
European Law Review 671, 672. 
7 Cf. Adrienne Héritier, ‘Institutional Change in Europe: Co‐decision and Comitology Transformed’ 
(2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 38; Bart Driessen, ‘Delegated legislation after the treaty 
of Lisbon: An analysis of Article 290 TFEU’ (2010) 35 European law review 837. 
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different ways in the literature: simply as non-legislative acts;8 non-legislative 
‘habilitated acts;’9 or ‘delegated legislation.’10 Because of the novelty of the delegated 
acts, they can be described as ‘a new intermediate level of law-making, between the 
purely legislative and purely executive.’11 The procedure for implementing acts, in 
turn, is not that novel, as it is remains under the control of Member States, in a similar 
manner to comitology.  
Article 290(1) TFEU states that a legislative act can delegate to the Commission the 
power to ‘adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend 
certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.’ Moreover, as provided by Article 
290(2) TFEU, which is also important from the perspective of this chapter, the 
legislative act should contain the ‘objectives, content, scope and duration of the 
delegation of power.’ Only the legislative act can provide for the ‘essential elements’ 
of an area under regulation.12 Article 290(3) TFEU introduces two safeguards; first, 
the EP or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; second, the EP or the 
Council may express an objection within a period stipulated in the legislative act. 
Since 2011, the Common Understanding, which builds on the Commission 
Communication of 2009,13 ‘sets out the practical arrangements and agreed 
clarifications and preferences applicable to delegations of legislative power under 
Article 290 TFEU.’14 These concern issues such as consultation of the Commission 
with the EP and Council when preparing and drawing delegated acts, their 
                                                 
8 Thomas Christiansen and Mathias Dobbels, ‘Non‐ Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty: 
Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 
42. 
9 Bast defines habilitated acts as a ‘generic concept for all acts that have their legal basis in another act 
adopted by the institutions (“basic act”).’ Cf. Jürgen Bast, ‘New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon 
Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 885, 
908. 
10 Robert Schütze, ‘‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ 
(2011) 74 Modern Law Review 661. 
11 Bruno De Witte, ‘Legal instruments and law-making in the Lisbon Treaty’ in Stefan Griller and 
Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty 
(Springer 2008) at 92. On the contrary Héritier and others argue that delegated acts under Art 290 
TFEU do not constitute a new type of decision making, as they were previously encompassed by a 
wide notion of implementation in Article 202 EC. The novelty is in the top-down logic of Art 290 
TFEU, in contrast to implementation with its bottom-up logic. Cf. Héritier and others at 49.  
12 Case C-355/10 Parliament v Council [2012]  ECLI:EU:C:2012:516, para 84. 
13 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Implementation 
of Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9.12.2009, COM(2009) 673 
final. 
14 Common Understanding, Council of the European Union, 8753/11, 10.04.2011. 
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transmission, duration of delegation, periods for objection by the EP and Council and 
the urgent procedure. 
Implementation of EU law can take place either by the Member States themselves, as 
provided for by Article 291(1) TFEU or, as prescribed by Article 291(2) TFEU, by 
the Commission (or in some cases by the Council) ‘where uniform conditions for 
implementing legally binding Union acts are needed.’ Following Article 291(3) 
TFEU, the EP and the Council enacted Regulation 182/2011, which allows Member 
States to control the exercise of implementing powers by the Commission.15 
Regulation 182/2011 adopted two procedures: an examination procedure and an 
advisory procedure depending on the nature or impact of the implementing act16 and 
established a new appeals committee allowing the reconsideration of the draft 
implementing act.17 
2 Assessing Commission proposals with delegations by national parliaments: 
A case study of the Tobacco Products Directive 
Before embarking on specific analysis of the opinions of national parliaments with 
regard to both types of non-legislative acts, it should be recalled that Protocol No. 2 to 
the Lisbon Treaty invests national parliaments with subsidiarity scrutiny of draft 
legislative acts only.18 Delegated or implementing acts themselves cannot be assessed 
within this procedure. In fact, national parliaments receive only the already enacted 
non-legislative act.19 Hence, national parliaments may assess only the delegations to 
adopt a delegated or implementing act, which are enshrined in the ‘basic’ draft 
legislative act. This assessment takes place at the moment of scrutiny of that ‘basic’ 
draft legislative act. This scrutiny, however, does not amount to an assessment of the 
substance of a future delegated or implementing act. The question is whether the 
                                                 
15 Regulation No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying 
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, Official Journal of the European Union, L55/13. On 
this regulation cf. Craig at 677. 
16 See Art 2 of Regulation No 182/11. 
17 Art 6 of Regulation No 182/11. 
18 Additionally, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 grants national parliaments information rights, as they 
receive consultation documents directly from the Commission the Commission (green and white papers 
and communications and the annual legislative programme) and any other instruments of legislative 
planning or policy. 
19 See for example §5 (1)b  Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem 
Bundestag in Angelegenheiten (BGBl. 2012 II S. 1006), according to which the German federal 
government forwards to the Bundestag legal acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of Art 290 
TFEU. 
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assessment of the delegations for the Commission to adopt the delegated or 
implementing acts can be conducted within the Early Warning System, the focus of 
which is the subsidiarity principle. The reasoned opinions invoked in the sections 
below seem to indicate that national parliaments do not see any obstacle in using the 
Early Warning System for that purpose. 
This section takes the Commission proposal for a directive concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products as a case study for 
the national parliaments’ scrutiny of the delegations to adopt delegated acts.20 Section 
2.1 presents the merits of this Commission proposal. Section 2.2. turns to the other 
opinions of national parliaments which provide a vivid illustration of the national 
parliaments’ main criticisms with respect to Article 290 TFEU requirements: the non-
essential elements; the duration of the delegation of power; and the large number of 
delegations. Beyond the case study, this section presents a review of the delegations 
by means of implementing acts with regard to matters that can be regulated in this 
procedure and the distinction between the two types of delegations as understood by 
national parliaments. 
2.1 The Commission proposal 
In December 2012, the Commission proposed a directive, which updates and replaces 
the current Tobacco Products Directive and which, in general terms, aims at 
improving the functioning of the internal market with regard to tobacco products.21 
The novelty of the Commission proposal involves a number of its elements.22 With 
regard to the ingredients, the proposal forbids tobacco products with characterising 
flavours, such as fruit or chocolate flavours, and additives associated with energy and 
vitality (e.g. caffeine and taurine), as well as those creating the impression that such 
                                                 
20 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco and related products, COM(2012) 788. 
21 Cf. Matthew James Elsmore and Viktoria Obolevich, ‘Thank you for not smoking : the 
Commission's proposal for a new tobacco products directive : legally sound, but does it hit the spot?’ 
(2013) 38 European Law Review 552. 
22 Cf. COM(2012) 788, Legal elements of the proposal. For the adopted act see Directive 2014/40/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC, not yet 
published in the Official Journal. The directive differs quite substantially from the Commission 
proposal: the text health warnings will cover 65% instead of 75% of the front and the back of cigarette 
packs, whilst the controvertial prohibition of menthol cigaretts (a characterising flavour) will start after 
a phase-out period of four years. 
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products have health benefits. Further, in relation to labelling and packaging, the 
Commission proposal envisages large health warnings covering 75% of the package, 
displayed on both sides of the packages of cigarettes and roll-your own tobacco, 
whereas it exempts other tobacco products from the larger health warnings. The 
Commission also projected a EU tracking and tracing system at packet level 
throughout the supply chain, excluding retail. Moreover, the ban of tobacco for oral 
use remains upheld, with the exception of Sweden; producers of novel tobacco 
products need to introduce such products through a new notification system; products 
containing nicotine and herbal products for smoking may be sold only with adapted 
health warnings.  
In relation to the subsidiarity principle, the Commission argued that, as the previous 
Tobacco Products Directive had already harmonized some of the areas included in the 
proposal, Member States could not act unilaterally, and hence, only an EU directive 
could, for example, increase the size of the health warnings.23 Additionally, the 
proposal was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, because in the view of the 
Commission, Member States subject some of the relevant areas of the proposal, such 
as labelling and ingredients, to different legal regimes, which in consequence imposes 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market.  
2.2 Reasoned opinions of national parliaments 
Nine chambers in total issued a reasoned opinion to the Commission proposal: the 
unicameral Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, the Portuguese Assembleia da República, the 
Danish Folketing, the Hellenic Vouli ton Ellinon, the Swedish Riksdag and four 
chambers of bicameral parliaments, namely, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, the 
Italian Camera dei Deputati and the Senato and the Romanian Camera Deputailor. 
These together represented 14 votes out of the 18 required to raise a ‘yellow card’.  
2.2.1 Essential elements 
The EWS scrutiny of most of the parliamentary chambers issuing reasoned opinions 
focused to a large extent on the delegated acts foreseen by the Commission proposal 
and the prohibition of the regulation of essential elements of the legislative act by 
                                                 
23 Cf. COM(2012) 788, pt. 3.9.2. 
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means of delegated acts.24 As the Bulgarian parliament stated, the essential elements 
of the act must be included in the legislative proposal and cannot therefore be subject 
to delegation of power; hence, in its opinion, the proposal was in breach of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.25 The chamber specifically disputed the 
application of delegated acts to change the maximum permitted yields of tar, nicotine 
and carbon monoxide, adjusting these limitations to scientific development and 
internationally agreed standards. Moreover, the Bulgarian parliament criticised a 
number of delegations to the Commission providing for delegated acts to set 
maximum levels of additives or combinations of additives which cause a 
characteristic flavour or amplify in an appreciable manner at the stage of consumption 
the toxic or addictive effect of a tobacco product, empowering the Commission to 
adopt delegated acts to set maximum levels for such additives (Article 6 paragraph 3 
and 9). Additionally, the Bulgarian Narodno sabranie disapproved of the provision 
that provided that, via a delegated act, the Commission could withdraw the 
exemptions with regard to additives applicable to tobacco products other than 
cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco and smokeless tobacco (Article 6, pararagraph 
10).26 Further, the chamber disagreed with Article 8, empowering the Commission to 
adopt delegated acts to adapt the wording of the health warnings to scientific and 
market and to define their position, format, layout and design. The Bulgarian chamber 
expressed additional misgivings over the Commission proposal with regard to the 
combined health warnings (combination of a text warning and a picture) regarding 
tobacco for smoking (Article 9), where the proposal entrusts the Commission with the 
adoption of delegated acts to adapt the combined warnings due to scientific and 
technical developments; establish and adapt the picture library and define position, 
format, layout, design, rotation and proportions of the combined health warnings. The 
                                                 
24 Not all the parliaments dealt with the problem of delegated powers in their reasoned opinions. The 
legal basis of the Commission proposal was the main concern of the Italian Camera dei Deputati, 
Reasoned opinion of 19.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, which drew attention to the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on harmonisation measures affecting the protection of human health, specifically in 
relation to the advertising of tobacco products. Similar arguments were raised the Bulgarian and the 
Czech chambers. On the contrary, the Italian Senato claimed that Art 114 is the right legal base for the 
proposal. Another issue not connected to the delegated powers was the prohibition of distribution and 
sales of oral tobacco which was the main focus of the Swedish reasoned opinion. Cf. Swedish Riksdag, 
Reasoned opinion of 21.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788. The reasoned opinion of the Danish Folketing 
was concurring in this regard.  
25 Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Reasoned opinion of 28.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, pt. 3. 
26 All the listed situations where the Commission may regulate by means of delegated acts apply if the 
Commission gained scientific evidence, experience or if a Commission report establishes a substantial 
change of circumstances. 
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final provision criticised – Article 13 – entitled the Commission to define, by means 
of delegated acts, more detailed rules for the shape and size of unit packets, if these 
were deemed necessary for the full visibility and integrity of the health warnings 
before the first opening, during the opening and after reclosing of the unit packet; or 
to mandate either cuboid or cylindric shapes for unit packets of tobacco products 
other than cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco, in case of substantial changes of 
circumstances, as established in a Commission report. In the view of the Bulgarian 
chamber, the approach presented in the proposed directive deprives the Member 
States of ‘the opportunity to implement a policy tuned to their national specificities 
and societal and cultural differences, in accordance with national health policies.’27  
Similarly, the Greek Vouli ton Ellinon and the Italian Senato referred to the 
delegations by means of delegated act in their reasoned opinions. The Hellenic Vouli 
ton Ellinon put forward reservations corresponding to those of the Bulgarian 
parliament, concerning the delegations for the adaptation of maximum nicotine, tar 
and carbon monoxide yields, claiming that they formed the substantial elements of the 
Commission proposal.28 Furthermore, the Italian Senato addressed the empowerments 
to adopt delegated acts and stated that they concern essential elements of the proposal 
and present ‘an excessive and unjustified’ conferral of power on the Commission.29 
Moreover, the Italian Senato estimated that the Commission proposal offers ‘an 
excess of federal over national regulatory authority’ and encroaches on the 
competence of national parliaments, by denying them the possibility to assess the 
subsidiarity and proportionality of the delegated acts.30 Finally, the Portuguese 
parliament simply stated that ‘the delegation of powers affects essential matters which 
are the responsibility of Member States to the Commission. This delegation of powers 
                                                 
27 Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Reasoned opinion of 28.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, pt. 3.  
28 Hellenic Vouli ton Ellinon, Reasoned opinion of 20.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, p. 5. 
29 Italian Senato, Reasoned opinion of 30.01.2013 on COM(2012) 788, p. 1-2. In addition to the points 
raised by the Bulgarian chamber, the Italian Senato criticised Art 18 (2) and (5), allowing the 
Commission to update the nicotine quantities in products placed on the market, taking into account 
scientific developments and marketing authorization and requirements regarding the health warnings, 
taking into account scientific and market developments and to adopt and adapt their position, format, 
layout, design and rotation. 
30 Ibid. 
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affects essential matters which are the responsibility of Member States and is carried 
out in an imprecise manner unclearly related to the Commission’s objectives.’31 
In general, the problem of the notion of essential elements is the most common in the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments, also beyond this case study. The section 
below studies also reasoned opinions other than those issued in the Tobacco Directive 
case. In general, national parliaments foresee a number of suggestions on how to deal 
with the delegations by means of delegated acts: 
1. delegate powers by means of implementing acts instead of delegated ones; 
2. refer to the ordinary legislative procedure instead of delegations by means 
of delegated acts; 
3. refer to national measures instead of delegations by means of delegated 
acts. 
First, some national parliaments suggest that the Commission proposals should 
delegate power to the Commission by means of implementing acts instead of 
delegated ones, where the essential elements are at stake.32 Specifically, the Polish, 
the Lithuanian and the Luxembourg parliaments furnished this proposal. The Polish 
Senat focused on the conditions when, in the trade between the Union and third 
countries, imported agricultural products (which have a special character) are 
considered as providing an equivalent level of compliance with the Union 
requirements concerning marketing standards. These conditions, expected to be 
defined by the Commission in a delegated act, in the view of the Senat, represented a 
‘significant element’ of the regulation, and hence the Commission should establish 
them by means of implementing acts.33 Similarly, the Lithuanian Seimas argued in 
favour of an implementing act instead of a delegated one, to set the principles of 
controls, sanctions, exclusions and the recovery of undue payments to ensure their 
efficient application and equal treatment of all beneficiaries in the EAFRD 
programme. In this case, the Commission decided to amend the provision in the 
existing regulation, in order to align it to the introduction of the delegated and 
implementing acts.34 Yet, in the view of the Lithuanian Seimas, the change concerns 
                                                 
31 Reasoned opinion of the Portuguese parliament of 1.03.2013 on COM(2012) 788, point 4, English 
translation available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/cm/930/930214/930214en.pdf. 
32 This is an obvious legal mistake; only a legislative act can provide for the ‘essential elements’ of an 
area under regulation. See Section 1 of this Chapter. 
33 Polish Senat, Reasoned Opinion of 4.02.2011 on COM(2010) 745. 
34 COM(2010) 537, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
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an ‘essential’ part of the Commission proposal; hence, in consequence, these issues 
should be regulated by means of implementing acts.35 This represents a way, 
according to the chamber, to take into account any possible administrative burden on 
national authorities, operators and citizens. Similarly, the Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés negatively assessed the Single CMO proposal and maintained that the 
Commission should exchange a large amount of empowerments providing for 
delegated acts for implementing acts.36 
Second, national parliaments argue that issues that were supposed to be delegated 
should be regulated in the basic act and the EU ordinary legislative procedure should 
apply, ensuring the participation of the EP and the Council.37 As the Spanish 
parliament posits, in arguing for the engagement of the EP and the Council, many of 
the delegated powers disregard the specific interests of some sectors of the 
agricultural or fishing policies, and present ‘an impoverishment of the decision 
making process without a greater effectiveness in the implementation of legislative 
acts.’38 
Third, another possibility foreseen by national Parliaments is that the issues from the 
delegations should rather be decided by the Member States through national 
measures. With regard to the tobacco advertising directive, the Bulgarian chamber 
argued that the delegations to adopt delegated acts, ‘take away from Member States 
the opportunity to implement a policy tuned to their national specificities and societal 
and cultural differences, in accordance with national health policies.’39 Further, the 
Polish parliament frequently raises the point that Member States have ‘better 
knowledge of the local conditions’ and they are more apt to provide the measures 
initially foreseen in the delegations.40  
Finally, in a combination of the first and second option, some chambers, like the 
French Sénat in its reasoned opinion on the General Data Protection Regulation, 
                                                 
35 Lithuanian Seimas, Reasoned opinion of 17.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537. 
36 Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Reasoned opinion of 8.03.2011 on COM(2010) 799. 
37 See for example, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Reasoned opinion of 8.02.2011 on 
COM(2010) 738. 
38 Spanish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 4.02.2013 on COM(2012) 724, pt. 10. 
39 Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Reasoned opinion of 28.02.2013 on COM(2012) 788, pt. 3. 
40 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinions of 25.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537 and COM(2010) 539. 
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divide issues into those demanding regulation by the EU legislator (e.g. ‘the right to 
be forgotten’), and other aspects that should be decided at national level.41  
2.2.2 Duration and number of delegations 
Coming back to the Tobacco Products Directive, the reasoned opinions of the 
Bulgarian parliament and the Italian Senato also objected to the unlimited duration of 
the empowerment to adopt delegated acts. Parliaments often stress the absence of 
limits to the period granted to the Commission to exercise the delegation at stake.42 
In addition, an excessive number of delegations – sixteen in this case – within one 
legislative act seemed problematic for some national parliaments.43 A number of 
chambers, for example the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, the Greek Vouli ton Ellinon 
and the Romanian Camera Deputailor, objected to such a large transfer of powers to 
adopt non-legislative acts on substantial provisions of the proposal to the 
Commission.44 The consequence of such transfers, as highlighted by the Danish 
Folketing was the imposition of hurdles upon national parliaments concerning the 
monitoring of the compliance of proposals with the principle of subsidiarity.45 
Moreover, the comprehensive use of delegated acts, in the view of this chamber, 
represents an impediment for the assessment of the consequences of the directive and 
its compatibility with the subsidiarity principle.46 
                                                 
41 French Sénat, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2012 on COM(2012) 11, p. 3. See also Polish Senat, 
Reasoned opinion of 3.03.2011on COM(2010) 799, pt. 16. 
42 See for example Spanish parliament, Reasoned opinion of 4.02.2013 on COM(2012) 724, pt. 8.; 
Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 24.05.2012 on COM(2012) 150, p.1. 
43 Another example of a legislative act with a large amount of delegations was the the General Data 
Protection Regulation, where the  French Senat and the German Bundesrat in their reasoned opinions 
underlined the number of delegations provided by the Commission proposal, extending far beyond the 
objective of comprehensive regulation of European data protection law exclusively by the European 
legislator. Cf. French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2012 on COM(2012) 11, p. 2-3; German 
Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 30.03.2012 on COM (2012) 11, p.2. Similar cases: Austrian 
Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 2.07.2013 on COM (2013)267; Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion 
of 5.06.2013 and the Dutch Tweede Kammer, Reasoned opinion of 2.07.2013 both on COM (2013) 
262; Luxembourg parliament, Reasoned opinion of 20.05.2014  and Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned 
opinion of 14.05.2014, Reasoned opinion of on COM(2014)180, which contained 30 delegations for 
delegated acts acts and 12 delegations for implementing acts. See also similar points by the Italian 
Senato, Reasoned opinion of 26.02.2014 on COM(2014) 4,5. 
44 Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Reasoned opinion of 24.01.2013; Hellenic Vouli ton Ellinon, 
Reasoned opinion of 20.02. 2013, p. 5; Romanian Camera Deputailor, Reasoned opinion of 
26.02.2013, p. 1 (English courtesy translation) all on COM(2012) 788. The Slovak Národná Rada 
raised this issue within the political dialogue. 
45 Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2013 on COM(2012) 788, p. 3. 
46 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
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2.2.3 Delegation by means of implementing acts 
The delegations by means of implementing acts received only a marginal level of 
attention on the part of national parliaments in the case of the Tobacco Products 
Directive.47 Nonetheless, beyond this case study, some typical examples of the 
concerns mentioned in reasoned opinions with regard to delegations by means of 
implementing acts are due. They concern a list of questions such as: 
1. What matters can be regulated by means of implementing acts? 
2. Is there a more appropriate procedure for the issues at stake than adopting 
them by means of implementing acts? 
3. How should one distinguish between the issues that should be regulated by 
means of delegated acts and those that demand an implementation by 
means of implementing acts? 
In general, the reasoned opinions which target delegations to adopt implementing acts 
raise one main issue: which matters can be regulated by means of implementing 
acts?48 A few examples of national parliaments addressing this question are in order. 
In the first example, the German Bundesrat put forward that provisions on corrections 
to tax returns concern procedural law issues and as such cannot be determined by 
implementing acts.49 Another example is the view of the French Sénat, on the 
delegation by means of implementing acts, which set the measures that the marketing 
authorisation holder should fulfill with regard to the content and presentation of 
information on authorised, prescription-only medicines. The Sénat disagreed with 
implementing acts in this regard, as there is no agreement between the Member States 
on a common distinction between advertising and information with regard to the 
marketing of the prescription-only medicines.50  
What is a more appropriate procedure for the issues at stake than to adopt them by 
means of implementing acts? While in case of the delegations by means of delegated 
                                                 
47 The German Bundesrat, which replied to the Commission proposal within Barroso’s ‘political 
dialogue’ as the only chamber referred to the delegations to adopt the implementing acts. 
48 Also the objections of a formal character could be indicated. Specifically, at the moment when the 
Commission was sending legislative proposals which prescribed an implementing act, the regulation 
foreseen by Art 291(3) TFEU, was not yet in force. See especially the reasoned opinions of the Polish 
Sejm on the following Commission proposals of 3.02.2011 on COM(2010) 728; of 4.02.2011 on 
COM(2010) 738; of 4.03.2011 on COM(2010) 799; of 25.11.2010 on COM(2010) 539; of 25.11.2010 
on COM(2010) 537. This criticism lost its relevance as the Regulation No 182/2011 entered into force 
on 1.03.2011. The Commission indicated this in its replies to national parliaments. See for example 
Commission reply to the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 539 of 4.05.2011.  
49 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 29.11.2013 on COM(2013) 721. 
50 French Sénat, Reasoned opinion of 10.04.2012 on COM(2012) 48 and 49.  
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act, national parliaments would propose a number of alternative ways to regulate the 
issue at stake, this is not the case for the delegations by means of implementing acts. 
It might be connected with the fact that changing the delegation from implementing to 
delegated act would decrease the national influence that national parliaments possess. 
Hence, the reasoned opinions rather suggest that the issue should be dealt with in the 
basic legislative act, and should not be delegated by means of delegated or 
implementing acts. In this way, the participation of the EP and the Council is 
ensured.51 
Finally, going beyond the case study, the question that national parliaments often deal 
with in their reasoned opinions is the distinction between delegated and implementing 
acts. According to the Polish Sejm, the Commission did not set criteria enabling the 
chamber to establish, ‘whether an area will be regulated by means of delegated acts or 
implementing acts.’52 In a like manner, the Lithuanian Seimas with regard to two of 
the Commission’s proposals on rural development reform and on the support scheme 
for farmers, considered whether to regulate in form of a delegated act or 
implementing act, which, it stated, should depend on the delegation of ‘more’ 
essential powers to the Commission.53  
3 Commission’s replies 
In order to assess how the Commission deals with the reasoned opinions of the 
national parliaments regarding ‘delegated legislation’, I will next explore the replies 
of the Commission.54 I divide these into replies with regard to the characteristics of 
the delegated and implementing acts (essential elements, duration and number of 
delegations and distinction between delegated and implementing acts) on the one 
hand, and the explanations given by the Commission with regard to the merits of the 
delegations on the other hand. 
                                                 
51 See Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Reasoned opinion of 6.04.2012 on COM(2012) 11, p. 14; 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies of 24.10.2011 on COM(2011) 453, pt. 6. 
52 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2011 on COM(2010) 799. 
53 Lithuanian Seimas, Reasoned opinion of 17.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537 and Reasoned opinion of 
17.11.2010 on COM(2010) 539. 
54 Replies are available on the webpage of the Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm as well as on 
IPEX. 
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3.1 Replies regarding the characteristics of delegations 
Old comitology acts needed to be adjusted after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty.55 In a number of cases where national parliaments maintained that a proposal 
empowers the Commission to regulate an essential element by means of delegated 
acts, the Commission simply stated that the proposal ‘merely takes account of the fact 
that the new Articles 290 and 291 TFEU introduce a new system of conferral of 
powers to the Commission to replace the one provided by the TEC.’ 56 In the view of 
the Commission, it did nothing more than introduce into the text of the existing 
regulation the required legal basis for these acts. The Commission sees its role in this 
respect as only classifying the existing acts under the definition of either delegated 
acts in the sense of Article 290 TFEU or implementing acts in the sense of Article 291 
TFEU. As the Commission puts forward, delegated acts were chosen for cases of 
‘quasi legislative acts’ in the sense that they regulate non-essential elements of the 
legislative act, are of general application and amend or complete the legislative act, 
whereas implementing acts were selected for acts of an ‘executive’ nature, meaning 
that Member States are responsible for implementation, and there is a need for 
uniform application.57 In the view of the Commission, it adjusted the original 
legislative acts according to objective legal criterion of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; 
thus, these adjustments concern only non-essential elements of a legislative act.58 
Consequently, proposed regulations do not grant the Commission any new powers to 
adopt acts in areas not regulated at the EU level.59 Moreover, in order to assuage 
parliaments, the Commission stressed the guarantees for the EP and the Council, 
which delimit the delegation of powers to the Commission, as the co-legislators retain 
control of the delegated power through the possibility of opposing a delegated act 
adopted by the Commission or even revoking the delegation of powers to the 
Commission.60 
                                                 
55 See Section 1 in this Chapter. 
56 Commission reply of 24.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 537. 
57 Commission reply of 4.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 539.  
58 Commission reply of 18.9.2012 to the reasoned opinion of the Austrian Bundesrat on COM(2012) 
150. 
59 On the Commission’s argument that the aim of the Commission proposal was the adjustment to the 
Lisbon Treaty see futher for example such replies as Commissions reply of 24.05.2011 to the reasoned 
opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 537 or Commission reply of 13.05. 2011 to the reasoned 
opinion of the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés on COM(2010) 537. 
60 Commission reply to the reasoned opinions of the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés of 12.09.2011 
on COM (2010) 799 and of 15.06.2011 on COM(2010) 738. 
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In the new legislative proposals, as in the case of the Tobacco Products Directive, the 
Commission replies to the concerns of national parliaments in a very succinct way, 
rebutting all their arguments against the delegation of powers with regard to essential 
elements of the proposal.61 The Commission maintained that the delegations of power 
provide for ‘clear and concise criteria, giving limited discretion to the Commission.’ 
In addition, the Commission fundamentally does not agree with the reasoning that 
where a delegation concerns, in the view of a national parliament, an essential 
element of the legislative act, it should be regulated by an implementing act rather 
than a delegated one. The disagreement of the Commission with this approach is 
visible in the reply to the Lithuanian Seimas, which argued in favour of implementing 
acts regarding some of the provisions of the Commission proposal amending the 
existing regulation on Support for Rural Development by the EAFRD. In this case, 
the Commission underlined that the Treaty does not allow for the conferral of powers 
to the Commission to adopt essential elements of a legislative act by means of 
implementing acts either; essential elements are ‘the reserved domain of the 
legislator.’62  
The Commission has also highlighted with regard to the high number of delegations 
within one proposal that the TFEU does not set a formal limit on the number of 
delegated or implementing powers that may be conferred upon the Commission.63  
With regard to the duration of the delegations, the Commission prefers the lack of 
constraints involved in the form of a time-limited delegation, because it is hard to 
foresee the developments and the exact moment of application of the measures.64 In 
its reply to the Italian Senato, it highlights that a limited duration of the delegation of 
power makes it difficult to achieve the objective of the regulation, ‘as foreseeable 
innovation and technological developments may at any time require adjustments of 
the non-essential elements of the legal framework,’ whereas in any case, the EP and 
                                                 
61 Commission reply to the reasoned opinion of the Italian Senato (25.06.2013), the Greek (25.06.2013) 
and the Bulgarian parliaments (18.7.2013) on COM(2012)788. See also Commission reply of 
13.3.2013 to the opinion of the Italian Senato on COM(2012) 150. 
62 Commission reply of 8.04.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Lithuanian Seimas on COM(2010) 
537. 
63 Commission reply of 22.10.2013 to the reasoned opinion of the Austrian Bundesrat on COM(2013) 
267. 
64 Commission reply of 22.05.2012 to the reasoned opinion of the French Senate on COM(2011) 452. 
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the Council are always able to revoke the delegation.65 In one case, the Commission 
agreed with the Italian parliament with regard to limiting the period of delegation to 
five years.66 
The Commission has also countered the arguments that the criteria to distinguish 
between delegated and implemented acts are not clear, by simply stating that the 
Treaty envisages this distinction.67 Therefore, the Commission does not see the need 
to ‘repeat the criteria in each and every proposal that aligns an existing regulation to 
the Treaty of Lisbon.’68   
3.2 Replies regarding the merits of delegations 
With regard to the merits of specific delegations, especially in cases where national 
parliaments underlined delegation of essential powers, the Commission mainly 
focused on clarifying the wrong understanding of the delegation by a national 
parliament. In other cases, still sustaining its position, the Commission justified the 
delegations by a need for innovation and future technological development; efficiency 
or taking away from the Member States the disproportionate burden of regulation in 
all technical topics. 
First, in a number of cases the Commission clarified a wrong interpretation of 
delegations by the national chambers.69 The Commission proposal amending the 
Council Regulation on Support for Rural Development by the EAFRD offers an 
illustration of such a situation. This regulation provided the Commission with the 
possibility to issue delegated acts to adopt specific conditions for the co-financing of 
interest rate subsidies and of other financial engineering instruments in order to 
ensure the efficient use and coherent implementation of the EAFRD.70 In this regard, 
the Polish Senat claimed that the issues concerning levels of co-financing of support 
                                                 
65 Commission reply of 11.12.2012 to the opinion of the Italian Senato and of 12.3.2012 to the Austrian 
Nationalrat on COM(2012) 238 (both opinions issued within ‘political dialogue’). 
66 Commission reply of 6.04.2011 to the opinion of the Italian Senato on COM(2010) 393. 
67 See Commission reply to the reasoned opinion of the Austrian Bundesrat of 18.9.2012 on 
COM(2012) 150: ‘The delegated powers were adjusted according to objective legal criterion of Art. 
290 and 291. They concern hence only non-essential elements of directives.’ 
68 Commission reply of 24.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 537.  
69 Cf. Commission reply of 13.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés on COM(2010) 537 regarding Art 36 bis of the proposal; Commission reply of 24.05.2011 to 
the reasoned opinion of the Polish Sejm on COM(2010) 537 regarding Art 74(4) and Art 86 of the 
proposal; Commission reply to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Senat on COM(2010) 537 of  
15.04.2011 regarding Art 5(2), 5(6), Art 71(5) of the proposal; Commission reply of 25.3.2014 to the 
reasoned opinion of the German Bundesrat on COM(2013) 721. 
70 Art 71(5) of COM(2010) 537 proposal. 
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instruments constitute a vital aspect of Regulation No. 1698/2005 on support for rural 
development.71 The Commission replied that the provision criticised by the chamber 
does not concern the level of the co-financing of support, ‘but rather the adoption of 
specific conditions for the use and operation of interest rate subsidies and other 
financial engineering instruments.’72  
Another example where the Commission was obliged to clarify the use of delegated 
acts concerns the proposal amending an existing regulation establishing common 
rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and 
establishing certain support schemes for farmers.73 One of its provisions empowered 
the Commission to adapt the rules on the definition in the national legislation for 
‘inheritance’ and ‘anticipated inheritance’ by means of delegated acts, in order to 
clarify specific situations that may occur in the application of the single payment 
scheme.74 In their reasoned opinions, the Polish Sejm and the Senat, the 
Luxemburgish Chambre des Députés and the Lithuanian Seimas opined that such a 
delegation interferes with national succession, an area not covered by European 
Union competence.75 The Commission, replying to the chambers, emphasised that it 
does not have the objective of defining ‘inheritance’ and ‘anticipated inheritance,’ but 
only of providing a legal basis for the existing provision, which asserts that the 
definition in the national legislation for ‘inheritance’ and ‘anticipated inheritance’ 
should be applied.76 
The second type of argument involved innovation and future technological 
development. In its replies to claims such as the ‘extremely broad-ranging powers to 
adopt delegated acts relating to almost every one of the most important elements of 
the proposal,’77 as in the Italian Camera dei Deputati assessment of General Data 
Protection Regulation, the Commission applies the following defence. The 
Commission asserted that the regulation was ‘deliberately drafted as a technologically 
                                                 
71 Polish Senat, Reasoned opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537. 
72 Commission reply of 15.04.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Senat on COM(2010) 537. 
73 COM(2010) 539. 
74 Art 45a(3)a of the proposal. 
75 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 25.11.2010; Polish Senat, Reasoned opinion of 25.11.2010; 
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Reasoned opinion of 30.11.2010; Lithuanian Seimas, Reasoned 
opinion of 17.11.2010 all on COM(2010) 539. 
76 Commission reply of 20.04.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Lithuanian Seimas; of 15.06.2011 to 
the reasoned opinion of the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés; of 4.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion 
of the Polish Sejm and of 13.05.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Polish Senat on COM(2010) 539.  
77 Italian Camera dei Deputati, Reasoned opinion of 4.04.2013 on COM(2012) 11. 
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neutral legal instrument,’ ‘to anticipate all technological developments of the next 
twenty years,’ so the regulation can be supplemented without in every case leading to 
a revision of the regulation itself.78 Moreover, as the Commission maintained in its 
reply to the German Bundesrat on the same legislative proposals, more detailed rules 
‘would result in an inflexible and unwieldy legal text which would not be open to 
innovation and new technologies.’79 Addressing the concerns of national parliaments, 
the Commission points out that the delegated acts are necessary to provide a ‘flexible 
legal instrument to ensure legal certainty in an area which is characterised by frequent 
and unforeseeable technological developments.’80  
Similarly, the Luxembourgish Chambre des Députés issued a reasoned opinion with 
regard to the EU legislative proposal concerning the definition, description, 
presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised 
wine products.81 The chamber claimed that the delegation to the Commission to adopt 
by means of delegated acts the methods of analysis for determining the composition 
of the aromatised wine products and the rules to establish whether those products 
have undergone processes contrary to the authorised production processes, in the 
absence of such methods or rules, is contrary to the subsidiarity principle.82 
Furthermore, the reasoned opinion highlighted that this delegation concerns an 
essential element of the proposal. In its reply, the Commission maintained that the 
methods of analysis present a technical element and must be regularly updated to 
comply with the evolution of technology in the domain of products analysis.83 
The third approach in the Commission replies is to underline the efficiency of 
delegations. The reply to the reasoned opinion of the UK House of Commons  depicts 
this concept well. In its reasoned opinion on the prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms, the House of Commons was hesitant with regard to 
Article 443 of the proposal, which allowed the Commission to adopt delegated acts 
imposing stricter prudential requirements for a limited period of time in a number of 
                                                 
78 Commission reply of 21.02.2013 to the reasoned opinion of the Italian Camera dei Deputati on 
COM(2012) 11. 
79 Commission reply of 10.01.2013 to the reasoned opinion of the German Bundesrat on COM(2012) 
11. 
80 Commission reply of 11.12.2012 to the opinion of the Italian Senato and of 12.3.2012 to the Austrian 
Nationalrat on COM(2012) 238 (both opinions issued within ‘political dialogue’). 
81 Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Reasoned opinion of 13.10.2011 on COM(2011) 530. 
82 Art 3(3) of the proposal. 
83 Commission reply of 22.06.2011 to the reasoned opinion of the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés 
on COM(2011) 530. 
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cases. This provision, in the opinion of the chamber is ‘an appropriate use of the 
Commission’s delegated powers under Article 290 TFEU: prudential requirements are 
not ‘non-essential’ elements of the proposed Regulation.’84 Yet, relying on the 
explicit link between the recommendations or opinions of the parties responsible for 
monitoring and managing financial stability in the EU and the use of delegated acts 
by the Commission, in its reply the Commission argued that this connection helps to 
ensure the efficient and effective use of such powers.85 
The final argument concerns lifting the burden of regulation from the Member States. 
The Commission argues that leaving the regulation of technical topics to the Member 
States would be ‘disproportionate and administratively burdensome.’86 The 
Commission sees the regulation by means of delegated acts as a flexible and 
proportionate approach.  
3.3 Assessment of the activity of national parliaments vis-à-vis the Commission 
To assess the role of national parliaments as a new interlocutor in ‘delegated 
legislation’ vis-à-vis the Commission, the issue of the quality of Commission’s replies 
and the Commission’s willingness to take the comments of national parliaments on 
board demand further attention.  
First, the quality of Commission replies to national Parliaments, especially 
immediately after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was not satisfactory. The 
reasoned opinion of the Polish Senat on the Single CMO regulation proposal 
illustrates this point well. In this case, the Polish chamber lamented the excessively 
far-reaching powers to adopt delegated acts and questioned a long list of delegations, 
in fact drafting its opinion exclusively on that point.87 The Commission addressed 
these claims in a general formula on essential powers, without devoting any effort to 
assessing each provision mentioned by the Polish chamber.88 Moreover, on another 
                                                 
84 UK House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 12.10.2011 on COM(2011) 452. 
85 Commission reply of 10.07.2012 to the reasoned opinion of the UK House of Commons on 
COM(2011) 452. 
86 Commission reply of 22.10.2013 to the reasoned opinion of the Austrian Bundesrat on COM(2013) 
267. 
87 Polish Senat, Reasoned opinion of 3.03.2011 on COM(2010) 799. 
88 Commission reply of 20.09.2011 to the Polish Senat on COM(2010) 799. 
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occasion, the Commission did not reply to the concerns of the Luxemburgish 
parliament with regard to the executive acts.89  
Second, the effectiveness of the reasoned opinions with respect to the ability to shape 
the delegation is questionable. The examination of the parliamentary opinions and the 
Commission’s replies seem to show that the Commission has not acknowledged the 
correctness of any of the points of the parliaments or, consequently, amended any of 
its proposals, which is compatible with Commission’s practice on adjusting or 
discussing further the proposals critically opined by national parliaments.90 Only in 
one case, did the Commission reply to the national parliament that the Council’s 
general approach had implemented some changes in line with the expectations of that 
chamber.91  
4 Should national parliaments review the delegations to adopt ‘delegated 
legislation’? 
The extensive scrutiny of delegations to the Commission to adopt delegated or 
implementing acts by national parliaments, as presented in the case study on the new 
Tobacco Products Directive, shows that the delegations may at first glance seem to 
aim at the centralization of power at European level, in the hands of the Commission. 
Many of the reasoned opinions of national parliaments see in the use of the 
delegations a reduction of national powers to take the necessary action at local level 
and thus a direct violation of the principle of subsidiarity.92  
Yet, the reasons why national parliaments should not address the concerns regarding 
the use of delegations in the reasoned opinions are the following. First, in case of 
delegated acts, checking whether the delegation in the ‘mother act’ delegates essential 
elements, or contesting ‘objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of 
power’ is a constitutional safeguard, provided by the TFEU for the European 
Parliament and the Council. It is they who have the power to revoke a delegation or 
                                                 
89 Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Reasoned opinion of 16.11.2010 on COM(2010) 475 and 
Commission reply of 13.04.2011. Yet, as the chamber criticised the delegated acts only in the 
preliminary remarks, the Commission might have distinguished it from the subsidiarity violations 
arguments. 
90 Cf. Commission Reports: COM(2011) 344, p. 6-11 and COM(2012) 373, p. 8-9. 
91 Commission reply of 12.6.2012 to the reasoned opinion of the French Senate on COM(2011) 650. 
92 See Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 8.10.2013 on COM(2013) 620; Maltese parliament, 
Reasoned opinion of 6.11.2013 on COM(2013) 627 concerning delegations by means of delegated acts 
and French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 30.01.2012 on COM(2011) 650 concerning delegations by 
means of implementing acts. 
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express an objection. This is an existing ‘horizontal separation of powers;’93 hence, 
the subsidiarity review should not apply to this question.  
Second, national parliaments are also not competent to review within the subsidiarity 
mechanism the delegations to adopt implementing acts. In fact, the implementation of 
EU acts, as provided for by Article 291(1) TFEU, may take place via two alternative 
routes: at the Member State level by ‘measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts’ or, at the EU level, as indicated in Article 
291(2) TFEU, by the Commission (or exceptionally by the Council) ‘where uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed.’ Of these two 
avenues of implementation, any criticism by national parliaments regarding 
implementation at the national level does not concern the subsidiarity principle in any 
way, as it already chooses the national level over the European level as more apt for 
regulation. Attacking such an arrangement in a reasoned opinion would thus not 
reflect a subsidiarity concern. 
The second avenue of implementation – by means of EU implementing acts – is thus 
the more problematic one. Does it still fall under the subsidiarity scrutiny? In this 
case, we deal with a ‘vertical separation of powers’ between the EU and the Member 
States.94 Yet, the control of implementing acts is already accomplished by the 
Member States through the committees established in Regulation 182/2011. Thus, as 
Schütze points out ‘it is thus the Member States directly - not the Union institutions - 
that take part in the decision-making process.’95 It seems that when stating in their 
reasoned opinions that a delegation by means of implementing acts is a violation of 
subsidiarity, national parliaments’ concerns are in fact unfounded, as the exercise of 
control over the implementing acts already lies in the hands of the Member States.96  
On the last point: national parliaments sometimes highlight that the Commission does 
not advance sufficient justification that the issues to be regulated by means of 
delegated or implementing acts are compatible with the subsidiarity principle. This is 
an important issue for national parliaments, since they do not have a possibility to 
                                                 
93 Schütze, ‘‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’, 690. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid at 689. 
96 Ibid. 
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conduct such an assessment in the future, as these are non-legislative acts.97 Due to 
the arguments against the control of delegations by national parliaments under the 
EWS, a justification in the Explanatory Memorandums by the Commission that the 
delegations are compatible with the principle of subsidiarity seems not necessary.  
In sum, it follows from the above that the subsidiarity review should not encompass 
the question of delegations in Commission proposals, neither as a question of a 
subsidiarity violation nor as a comment on the merits of the draft delegated acts. The 
Lisbon Treaty has established sufficient safeguards for delegated and implementing 
acts. 
The participation of national parliaments in the political dialogue presents an avenue 
that is better suited for raising criticism with regard to the delegated and 
implementing acts. As the issue of delegations is in fact not a question of subsidiarity, 
but rather of competence of the Commission to act, national parliaments should 
address such concerns within the ‘Barroso initiative’ framework. Yet, as it is not an 
official mechanism, its visibility is also reduced. Moreover, it is directed only to the 
European Commission, which implies that the EP and the Council have even fewer 
incentives than in the Early Warning System to take these opinions into account.  
Despite these negative points, some of the opinions issued within the political 
dialogue concern too far-reaching delegations to adopt delegated acts,98 delegation of 
essential elements of the act,99 the number of delegations,100 the duration of the 
delegation -,101 especially its undetermined period102 - or the distinction between 
                                                 
97 Polish Sejm, Reasone opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537 and of 4.02.2011 on COM(2010) 
738. 
98 See for example Polish Senate, opinion of 13.03.2013 on COM(2013) 18, pt. 6; Estonian parliament, 
opinion of 3.05.2012 on COM(2012) 11 (claiming that the right to be forgotten should be regulated by 
the European legislator); Polish Senat, opinion of 27.03.2012 on COM(2011) 876; Polish Senat, 
opinion of 14.02.2012 on COM(2011) 866; German Bundesrat, opinion of 2.03.2012 on COM(2011) 
866; German Bundesrat, opinion of 16.12.2011 on COM(2011) 615; Irish Houses of Oireachtas, 
opinion of March 2012 on COM(2011) 370. 
99 Italian Senato, for exeample opinion of 1.08.2012 on COM(2012) 150; of 1.08.2012 on COM(2012) 
136; of 7.11.2012 on COM(2012) 548; of 18.04.2012 on COM(2012) 89, 90; of 30.11.2011 on 
COM(2011) 594; of 9.03.2011 on COM(2010) 767, of 1.02.2011 on COM(2010) 539, of 1.02.2011 on  
COM(2010) 537; of 14.10.2010 on COM(2010) 475;  Polish Senat, opinion of 14.02.2012 on 
COM(2011) 866; Polish Sejm, opinion of 15.04.2011 on COM(2011) 79; German Bundesrat, opinion 
of 2.03.2012 on COM(2011) 866; opinion of 14.10.2011 on COM(2011) 370; Romanian Senat, 
opinions of 24.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537 and 539; Czech Senate, opinion of 26.01.2011 on 
COM(2010) 484; opinion of 20.05.2010 on COM(2010) 119. 
100 See for example Austrian Nationalrat, opinion of 4.09.2012 on COM(2012) 238; Italian Senato, 
opinion of 13.06.2012 on COM(2012) 11; Romanian Camera Deuputatilor, opinion of 27.04.2011 on 
COM(2011) 615; German Bundesrat, opinion of 16.12.2011 on COM(2011) 615. 
101 See for example Italian Senato, opinion of 21.11.2012 on COM(2012) 350 and COM(2012) 360. 
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delegated and implementing acts.103 To a lesser extent, the opinions criticise the 
delegations to adopt the implementing acts.104 It is worth mentioning that the Italian 
parliament is very active in the political dialogue and issues the vast majority of such 
opinions. The argument advanced by the chamber is that the Commission proposals 
encompassing a delegation comply with subsidiarity, as only the EU can amend 
European legislation and update it to the new procedures of delegated acts and 
implementing acts introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.105 Moreover, some of them are 
positive, pointing at the conformity of delegations with Article 290 TFEU106 and 
praising the ‘best practice’ of the application of delegated acts in some cases.107  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the role that national parliaments have 
adopted with regard to the new rules of delegation. The reasoned opinions on 
subsidiarity issued in the process of Early Warning System under Protocol No. 2 to 
the Lisbon Treaty allow for the highlighting of the main issues that concern national 
parliaments with regard to delegated and implementing acts. The directive proposed 
by the Commission on the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related 
products aptly summarises the core concerns of national legislatures with regard to 
delegated acts. Specifically, the delegation of powers beyond the regulation of non-
essential elements of a proposal, as well as the duration and the excessive number of 
delegations lie at the heart of national parliaments’ concerns. Further, with regard to 
implementing acts, the major problems relate to the matters that implementing acts 
may regulate, and the use of delegated acts instead of implementing ones. 
Against this background, the Commission pre-eminently argues that the delegated and 
implementing acts are a necessary adjustment to the distinctions introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty, without creating any new competence for the EU. Moreover, on the 
                                                                                                                                           
102 See for example Italian Camera dei Deputati, opinion of 23.06.2011 on COM(2011) 118; Italian 
Senato, opinion of 1.08.2012 on COM(2012) 238 and COM(2012) 150; of 18.12.2012 on COM(2011) 
895, 896 and COM(2011) 897; of 2.03.2011 on COM(2010) 775; Romanian Senat, opinion of 
30.11.2011 on COM(2011) 615; of 24.11.2010 on COM(2010) 537 and 539; German Bundesrat, 
opinion of 16.12.2011 on COM(2011) 615.  
103 Cf. German Bundesrat, opinion of 26.11.2010 on COM(2010) 539 and 537.  
104 See for example Czech Senate, opinion of 8.02.2012 on COM(2011) 880. 
105 See for example Italian Senato, opinion of 28.11.2012 on  COM(2012) 403. 
106 See for example Italian Senato, opinion of 18.12.2012 on COM (2012) 584;  of 21.11.2012 on 
COM(2012) 530; of 29.11.2011 on COM(2011) 555; of 16.06.2011 on COM(2011) 8; of 2.03.2011 on 
COM(2010) 761; of 3.11.2010 on COM(2010) 505. 
107 Italian Senato, opinion of 8.02.2012 on COM(2011) 866. 
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merits of specific delegations, especially in the cases where national parliaments 
underlined the delegation of essential elements of the legislation, the Commission 
focused on clarifying their erroneous interpretation by national parliaments. In other 
cases, defending its position, the Commission promoted the need for openness to 
technical innovation and efficiency.  
This chapter has also negatively assessed in legal and political terms the application 
of subsidiarity review to the scrutiny of delegations in Commission proposals. As has 
been argued, with regard to delegations by means delegated acts, not only is it a 
question of ‘horizontal division of power,’ but it is also the EP and the Council that 
were granted a competence to revoke or object to the power of the Commission. 
Finally, concerning the delegations to adopt implementing acts, the control of such 
implementing powers is already in the hands of the Member States. 
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Chapter 8: 
The Role of National Parliaments in Fundamental Rights Protection under 
Protocol No. 2 
Introduction 
The content of the reasoned opinions of national parliaments issued under the EWS 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty shows that fundamental rights protection does not 
only affect the courts. Legislative acts proposed by the Commission, including those 
the main objective of which is fundamental rights protection, are reviewed for their 
consistency with the subsidiarity principle. Taking into account that parliamentary 
chambers increasingly address fundamental rights issues, this chapter investigates the 
relationship between the subsidiarity review mechanism and fundamental rights 
protection. How does the subsidiarity principle relate to fundamental rights 
protection? Under which circumstances is one level more apt to protect them than the 
other?  
In order to apply the subsidiarity principle in the field of fundamental rights 
protection, two assumptions are necessary: first, the EU does not have an exclusive 
competence in fundamental rights protection; and second, the EU competence is 
subsidiary to the protection offered in this regard at the national level.1 Following the 
principle of subsidiarity, the level at which the protection of fundamental rights can 
be better achieved, should prevail over that where it cannot be sufficiently 
safeguarded. In addition, as von Bogdandy pointed out, a ‘forceful and 
comprehensive human rights policy’ can, however, violate the subsidiarity principle.2 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section starts with a short review of the 
fundamental rights standards of the EU with an insight into the guidelines established 
by the Commission for legislative drafts in this regard. The main sections reflect three 
possible configurations in which national standards of fundamental rights protection 
relate to those pursued by Commission proposals. Hence Section 2.1. focuses on the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments to Commission proposals where 
fundamental rights are not the objective of the act at stake. Then, Section 2.2 looks at 
                                                 
1 Leonard FM Besselink, ‘Entrapped by the maximum standard: on fundamental rights, pluralism and 
subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 629, 677. 
2 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a human rights organization? Human rights and the 
core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307, 1317. 
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the reasoned opinions concerning proposals where fundamental rights are one of the 
objectives pursued by the EU draft legislative act. In Section 3, I explore the setting in 
which fundamental rights protection is the main objective of a draft legislative act. To 
this end, this chapter takes the Commission proposal ‘Women on boards’ as a case 
study of subsidiarity scrutiny in the field of fundamental rights. The assessment of the 
applicability of the subsidiarity mechanism in the field of fundamental rights 
protection follows in Section 4. 
1 Fundamental rights standards in the EU 
The ‘functional legal order’ of the Community aimed at economic integration of 
national economies and was ‘not meant to protect, but rather to change [democratic 
societies].’3 As von Bogdandy explains further, step-by-step, human rights ‘were (…) 
introduced as limits to the discretion of the supranational institutions.’ The ambition 
became, however to make ‘human rights (…) determine rather than simply limit the 
European legal system and would move to the forefront of its institutions’ activity,’ 
placing them at the core of the Community order. Yet, before the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was proclaimed, it was first the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the 
provisions of the Treaty itself, for example Article 141 EC (now Article 157 TFEU), 
that enhanced the position of human rights in the Community.4 The subsequent 
amendments, especially the Amsterdam Treaty and the introduction of Article 6 TEU, 
further strengthened fundamental rights in the EU.5 With the Lisbon Treaty, Article 6 
TEU was adapted, and fundamental rights became its sole focus. Each paragraph of 
this provision refers to a different fundamental rights source, depicting three ‘Bills of 
Rights’: the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, the European Convention of Human 
Rights, and fundamental rights as general principles of EU law resulting from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.6 
In particular, Article 53 of the Charter states that ‘nothing in the Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application (…) by the Member 
States’ constitutions.’ This indicates that the Charter is meant to be an additional 
                                                 
3 Ibid at 1308. 
4 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and treaty reform at 193-195. 
5 Ibid at 195. 
6 Robert Schütze, ‘Three ‘Bills of Rights’ for the European Union’ (2011) 30 Yearbook of European 
Law 131. 
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system of fundamental rights protection, without threatening the existing standards, 
more specifically ‘existing regimes should not be applied and interpreted ‘downwards’ 
by invoking the language of the Charter.’7 In the Court’s interpretation, Article 53 of 
the Charter ‘confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for national implementing 
measures, national authorities remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as 
interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
thereby compromised.’8 In sum, national standards of fundamental rights protection 
will apply, as long as they comply with primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law, 
which in consequence means that ‘state-specific constitutional guarantees stand no 
chance of survival when they collide with the standards set by the Charter.’9 
Against this broader structure of EU fundamental rights protection, this chapter 
concentrates specifically on the EU legislative procedure, looking into how 
fundamental rights are protected within it. In particular, it is worth exploring how the 
Commission attempts to safeguard them in the preparation of legislative proposals. 
Since the Charter of Fundamental Rights gained a legally binding character with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has prepared a Strategy Paper 
for its departments with a set of guidelines ‘to make the fundamental rights provided 
for in the Charter as effective as possible.’10 Accordingly, the Commission 
departments should highlight the fundamental rights aspects in preparatory 
consultations (e.g. green papers), in impact assessments and in the drafting of 
legislative proposals (in recitals of the preamble and the explanatory memorandum to 
the proposals). Similarly, throughout the legislative process ‘the Commission is ready 
to help other institutions find an effective way to take into account the effects of their 
amendments on the implementation of the Charter.’11 
In 2011, in addition to the Strategy Paper, the Commission introduced a 
complimentary document, the Operational Guidance, focusing on the fundamental 
                                                 
7 Bruno De Witte, ‘Article 53, Level of protection’ in Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of 
fundamental rights: a commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014). 
8 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para 60. 
9 Filippo Fontanelli, ‘National Measures and the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights–Does curia. eu Know iura. eu?’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 231, 263. 
10 Communication from the Commission, Strategy for the Implementation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights by the European Union, 9.10.2010, COM(2010) 573. 
11 Ibid, point 1.2. 
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rights justification in impact assessments.12 The operational Guidance gives examples 
for the drafters of impact assessments that illustrate how to approach fundamental 
rights at different stages; while consulting interested parties or examining the impact 
on fundamental rights of the different policy options. 
The effectiveness of this type of guidelines seems limited, however. First, it has been 
argued that the directorates do not always recognize that a fundamental right may be 
at stake and the consultation with other parties does not always safeguard that these 
issues will be taken into account.13 Moreover, another type of criticism is that impact 
assessments are ‘superficial’ on fundamental rights, and are not necessarily corrected 
after consultation with the Commission’s legal service.14 This problem might be 
connected with the nature of fundamental rights, because of the value assessment 
involved, which this chapter elaborates upon in Section 4, below. Before that, 
however, it is necessary to look into the assessment of fundamental rights aspects in 
the Commission proposals by national parliaments. 
2 Application of the subsidiarity principle to Commission proposals touching 
upon fundamental rights 
The involvement of national parliaments in the scrutiny of the fundamental rights 
standards of the Commission’s proposals has implications for the EU institutional 
balance. In fact, national parliaments can be seen as a new counterpart for the ECJ, 
engaging in the question of fundamental rights protection.15 In this light, the 
involvement of national parliaments can be seen as adding – next to the EP and the 
Council – to the politicisation of fundamental rights in the EU.  
Quite distinctively, the growing EU legislation, with implications for the protection of 
EU fundamental rights, has been explored by the EU scholarship less than, for 
example: the interaction between different sources of EU fundamental rights; the 
scope of application of the Charter; or the horizontal application of its provisions.16 
                                                 
12 Commission Staff Working Paper, Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights 
in Commission Impact Assessments, SEC(2011) 567 final, 6.5.2011, at 5, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/docs/sec_2011_0567_en.pdf. 
13 Israel de Jesús Butler, ‘Ensuring Compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Legislative 
Drafting: The Practice of the European Commission’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 397, 417. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Muir arguing in this vein in relation to increased number of fundamental rights legislation and 
involvement of the EP and Council. Elise Muir, ‘The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU 
Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 219, 221.   
16 Ibid at 220. 
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Muir divides the EU fundamental rights legislation into two groups: first, setting 
fundamental rights standards, and second, concerning fundamental rights protection 
on a specific subject matter.17 
Partially building upon Muir’s division, I propose to divide fundamental rights into 
three groups, depending on the type of Commission draft legislative act to which 
national parliaments issued their reasoned opinions. Since the focus of the application 
of the subsidiarity principle in Article 5(3) TEU is on achieving the objectives of the 
Treaties, the main criterion for the division between different groups of proposals is 
whether the objective of such a legislative proposal is the protection of fundamental 
rights. Accordingly, first, I will consider the submissions of national parliaments 
concerning Commission proposals without a fundamental rights objective (Section 
2.1.), and then those where fundamental rights are one of the objectives (Section 2.2.). 
The main focus will be on the ‘genuine’ fundamental rights legislation with a case 
study of the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal (Section 3). 
2.1 Commission proposals without a fundamental rights objective 
This section gives an overview of reasoned opinions in which national parliaments 
assess fundamental rights issues in legislative proposals that have no fundamental 
rights objective. Despite this, the argument put forward by national parliaments is that 
the level of protection proposed by the Commission is not satisfactory. Specifically, 
in the view of national parliaments, a draft legislative act may violate fundamental 
rights provided for in the EU Charter or the ECHR, as well as in a Member State’s 
constitution, and hence lead to a violation of the subsidiarity principle and the issuing 
of a reasoned opinion. 
As an example of reasoned opinions claiming infringement of fundamental rights, we 
may examine the Commission proposal establishing the European Public Prosecutor 
Office.18 The objective of this proposal was the effective fight against offences 
affecting the Union budget.19 
In what turned out to be the second ‘yellow card’ ever triggered, some of the national 
parliaments found that the Commission proposal infringed upon a number of 
                                                 
17 Ibid at 221. 
18 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 
COM(2013) 534. 
19 See Explanatory Memorandum, point 3.3. 
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fundamental rights. The Cypriot House of Representatives found that rights of 
suspects are insufficiently protected under the proposal, as it includes investigative 
measures that are not allowed ‘under the national law of all Member States.’ 
Similarly, the Czech Senate highlighted a possible violation of a number of 
fundamental rights. The first infringement concerned the right to a lawful judge, ‘due 
to [the] broad discretion’ of the EPPO in the choice of the competent national court; 
the second referred to the right to a fair trial, because of the single-instance decision-
making of the EPPO, the absence of appellate procedures, and the procedure for 
adjudication on the objection of prejudice of the EPPO.20 In addition, the Czech 
parliament found these aspects as compromising the fundamental rights protection 
under the national constitution and the EU Charter.21  
In its replies to national parliaments, the Commission included the opinions 
concerning fundamental rights into the group of arguments ‘other than subsidiarity 
violations’ and hence falling outside the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism. 
Nonetheless the Commission promised that these arguments will be ‘duly taken into 
account in the process of negotiating the Proposal and will be addressed in the 
political dialogue, and namely in the individual replies to be sent to the relevant 
national Parliaments.’22 Acting through the Barroso dialogue, the Commission 
pointed out that Article 11(1) of the proposal ensures that the activities of the EPPO 
respect the rights enshrined in the Charter. Specifically, with regard to the Cypriot 
concern on investigative measures, the Commission underlined that the proposal 
enshrines a catalogue of instruments available to the EPPO and applicable in all 
Member States, which safeguard legal certainty, coherence in investigation and will 
stop the fragmented use of investigative measures in crimes with an EU dimension.23 
In addition, the most intrusive investigative measures will demand the authorisation 
of a national court. With regard to the Czech reasoned opinion, the Commission 
                                                 
20 Czech Senate, Reasoned opinion of 9.10.2012 on COM(2013) 534, point II 6. 
21 On the margin, it has to be underlined that national parliaments are not isolated in their criticism of 
the EPPO proposal concerning the fundamental rights guarantees. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency 
has expressed similar concerns concerning in particular the judicial review of the EPPO’s action, 
defence rights and victims’ rights. Cf. Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
on a proposal to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, FRA Opinion 1/2014, 4.02.2014.  
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the National 
Parliaments on the review of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor's Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with 
Protocol No. 2, COM(2013) 851 final point 2.1. 
23 Commission reply of 13.3.2014 to the reasoned opinion of the Cypriot parliament on COM(2013) 
534. 
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underlined that the right to a lawful judge is not compromised because the EPPO is a 
national authority for the purposes of judicial review.24 The ECJ can interpret the 
regulation and ensure uniform application via the preliminary reference procedure. 
Judicial review also applies to the choice of jurisdiction. With regard to the right to a 
fair trial, Article 27 of the proposal provides clear strict and objective criteria, leaving 
the EPPO limited discretion. The cases of conflict of interest can be brought before 
the EPP and the case might then be reassigned. Moreover, the EDPs, EPP or his 
deputies might be dismissed. 
While the reasoned opinions in the EPPO case evidently addressed fundamental rights 
constraints as a subsidiarity violation, a contrasting example is provided by the 
reasoned opinion of the Swedish Riksdag on the Commission proposal for a 
regulation on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic 
communications networks, which aimed at ‘facilitat[ing] and incentivis[ing] the roll-
out of high-speed electronic communications networks’ and was based on Article 114 
TFEU.25 The chamber assessed the proposal negatively, pointing out that ‘certain 
parts of the proposal are wide-ranging and intrusive, mainly regarding the right of 
landowners and the protection of ownership rights.’26 Nevertheless, the Riksdag 
agreed with the Commission’s assessment that the subsidiarity principle had not been 
violated, because only the EU level may improve the conditions for the 
implementation and function of the internal market in that area.27 The Swedish 
example seems, however, to be an isolated case. In the EPPO case, the fundamental 
rights arguments seems to be one of many raised in the reasoned opinions tipping the 
balance towards a subsidiarity violation, while in the Riksdag’s reasoned opinion, a 
clear line between a subsidiarity violation and fundamental rights is drawn.  
In sum, these examples show that reasoned opinions often include general comments 
on the consequences of Commission proposals for fundamental rights. However, the 
points raised by national parliaments do not concern the question of which level, the 
EU or Member States, is more apt to achieve the objective of the Treaties, such as the 
fight against EU fraud or deploying high-speed electronic communications 
infrastructure to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
                                                 
24 Commission reply of 13.3.2014 to the reasoned opinion of the Czech Senate on COM(2013) 534. 
25 COM(2013) 147, see Art 1 of the proposal. 
26 Swedish Riksdag, Reasoned opinion of 30.05.2013 on COM(2013) 534. 
27 It could be however questioned whether the opinion of the Swedish Riksdag can be perceived as a 
reasoned opinion when no subsidiarity violation has been argued. 
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internal market. In consequence, in accordance with the textual, structural and 
functional arguments raised in favour of a narrowly designed subsidiarity review, the 
matters exemplified in this section concern the substance of the proposal and should 
not be addressed in the reasoned opinions directed to the Commission. In turn, 
national parliaments may raise these fundamental rights questions within the political 
dialogue, which seems a more apt forum in this regard. 
2.2 Fundamental rights as one of the objectives of the proposal 
The second type of configuration of the relationship between the national standards of 
fundamental rights protection and those offered by a Commission proposal concerns 
situations in which the EU draft legislative act in question aims at achieving a number 
of Treaty objectives, only one of them being fundamental rights protection. This 
section will elaborate upon this issue, taking a closer look at the Commission 
proposals on data protection and third country seasonal workers. 
The first example concerns the General Data Protection Regulation.28 The objective 
of this proposal was twofold: first, to provide rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, and second, to offer rules 
relating to the free movement of personal data.29 When assessing this proposal, the 
members of the Bundesrat contended that the Commission proposal lags behind 
German regulation in this area. Specifically, German law already offers ‘nuanced data 
protection guarantees, which are more readily enforceable and offer a higher degree 
of legal security than the highly abstract individual provisions of the draft 
Regulation.’30 The Belgian Chambre des Représentants raised an identical argument 
on the higher level of data protection in Belgium, including in the public sector.31 
Hence, the directive should ‘clearly demonstrate that it sets only a minimum standard 
while allowing national legislators to provide a higher level of protection, particularly 
in the areas of government, social security and health’. Finally, the French Senate 
maintained, in general terms that ‘in the area affecting the rights of citizens, the 
proposed regulation should not prevent Member States of the possibility to 
                                                 
28 COM(2012) 11. 
29 Art 1(1) of the proposal. 
30 German Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 30.03.2012 on COM(2012) 11. Cf. also Bundesrat 
Stenografischer Bericht of 30.03.2012 at 180. 
31 Belgian Chambre des Représentants, Reasoned opinion of 6.04.2012 on COM(2012) 11, par.2 in 
Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, DOC 53 2145/001, p. 13. 
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temporarily maintain more protective national provisions so that EU-wide 
harmonization will not lead to a decreased protection.’32 
The second example discusses the directive on third-country seasonal workers. This 
directive attempted to manage migration flows, by setting transparent rules for the 
admission and stay to protect them from social dumping.33 First, some national 
parliaments condemned the proposal as granting rights to third-country nationals that 
are too low to diminish the possibility of wage and social dumping.34 For example, in 
comparison to the directive, Austria has granted seasonal workers the same rights as 
their own nationals, in order to prevent their abuse. Further, the Dutch chambers 
expressed a differentiated view with regard to the directive. On the one hand, the 
houses declared that ‘the exploitation and irregular conditions of employment of 
seasonal workers from third countries must end.’35 On the other hand, the parliament 
maintained that European and global (ILO) agreements sufficiently protect the socio-
economic rights of seasonal workers. To contest the proposal, the Czech Senate went 
even further. The Czech chamber focused specifically on the equal treatment with 
nationals of the hosting Member States with regard to such issues as freedom of 
association and affiliation and membership of an organisation representing workers, 
social security and the benefits defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/04 on 
the coordination of social security systems; the payment of statutory pensions based 
on the worker's previous employment; access to goods and services; and the supply of 
goods and services made available to the public.36 The parliament underlined that ‘it 
cannot be precluded that in the area of social welfare the guarantees of seasonal 
workers’ rights (…) will lead to [a] higher level of protection of seasonal workers 
from third countries than of the citizens from the new Member States to which the 
transitional periods regarding access to labour markets are still being applied.’37 In the 
same vein, the Polish Senat argued that the obligation upon the employers of seasonal 
workers to provide evidence that the seasonal worker will have accommodation 
                                                 
32 French Senate, Reasoned opinion of 4.03.2012 on COM(2012) 11 (own translation). 
33 COM(2010) 379. 
34 Austrian Bundesrat, Reasoned opinion of 5.10.2010 and Austrian Nationalrat, Reasoned opinion of 
14.9.2010 on COM(2010) 379. 
35 Dutch Eerste and Tweede Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 14.10.2010 on COM(2010) 379. 
36 Art 16(2) of the proposal. 
37 Czech Senate, Reasoned opinion of 22.06.2010 on COM(2010) 379. 
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ensuring an adequate standard of living, is more far-reaching compared to conditions 
applicable to local and other Member States’ workers.38 
These two examples allow us to conclude, first, that the fundamental rights questions 
raised by national parliaments with regard to Commission proposals with mixed 
objectives clearly show that subsidiarity can be violated according to parliaments both 
because the proposed EU standard might be too high or too low. For example, in case 
of data protection only the Member States with standards that are supposedly higher 
than the European one reacted, whereas in the case of seasonal workers which touches 
upon socio-economic rights, two sides of the parliamentary spectrum were active. On 
the one hand parliaments of Member States that are destinations for cheap labour (e.g. 
the Netherlands), and on the other hand those that provide this labour (Poland, Czech 
Republic) participated in the subsidiarity scrutiny. 
Second, because ‘non-economic common objectives,’ such as fundamental rights 
protection, may coexist in Commission proposals next to other objectives, such as 
‘market objectives’ on the elimination of obstacles to trade or distortions of 
competition, or as in the examples above, the free movement of data or the 
management of migratory flows, it is often not easy to delineate two or more 
objectives from each other.39 National parliaments may thus raise concerns about the 
fundamental rights in their reasoned opinions, as long as these are within the 
subsidiarity assessment. However, the next section will show that the subsidiarity 
assessment of fundamental rights proposals may not be a straightforward task, 
because of the value choices enshrined in this reasoning.  
3 Case study of a ‘genuine’ fundamental rights legislation 
The case study of the ‘Women on boards’ proposal exemplifies the third type of 
relationship between the subsidiarity principle and fundamental rights. The proposal 
represents a type of draft legislation where fundamental rights protection is the main 
objective. The fundamental right at stake in this case study is gender equality with a 
specific focus on public company boards. At first glance, gender equality might be 
                                                 
38 Polich Senat, Reasoned opinion of 21.10.2010 on COM(2010) 379. 
39 De Witte, ‘A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market 
legislation ’ at 26. 
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seen to have more of an economic justification than a social or moral one.40 
Nonetheless, as Barnard explains, the adoption of directives on equality and the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence has given the principle of equality the status of a fundamental right, 
with a dual economic and social role.41 
3.1 Divergent standards at national level 
The financial crisis triggered the review of corporate governance codes; diversity in 
corporate boards became a new issue, indeed ‘[t]he policy focus in Europe is almost 
entirely on gender diversity.’42 Member States have taken divergent approaches to the 
position of women on boards: some introduced binding legislation, others non-
binding corporate governance codes, while still others remained inactive. Eleven EU 
Member States (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Austria and Slovenia) undertook legislative measures to increase 
gender equality in corporate boards.43  
Following Norway, a pioneering non-EU Member State, France, Italy and Belgium 
introduced binding legislation on women quotas. France is currently the Member 
State with the highest proportion of women on the company boards.44 The binding 
quota adopted in 2011 is set to reach 40% by 2017, with an intermediate target of 
20% by 2014, and applies to all listed companies and large unlisted companies.45 
Non-compliance with these quotas will invalidate appointments, except for those of 
women.46 However, decisions taken by boards in violation of the quota would remain 
valid. Also in 2011, Italy approved a quota of 1/3 for female members of boards in all 
stock exchange listed companies and state companies by 2015.47 The sanctions 
                                                 
40 Catherine Barnard, ‘Gender Equality in the EU’ in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and human rights 
(Oxford University Press 1999) at 217.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Paul L Davies and Klaus J Hopt, ‘Corporate Boards in Europe—Accountability and Convergence’ 
(2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 301, 326. 
43 European Commission, Memo, Questions and Answers: Proposal on increasing Gender Equality in 
the Boardrooms of Listed Companies, 14.11.2012. 
44 Cf. Overview in Julie C Suk, ‘Gender parity and state legitimacy: From public office to corporate 
boards’ (2012) 10 International journal of constitutional law 449, 451. 
45 Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des hommes 
au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle (1), Journal 
Officiel de la République Française, January 27, 2011, at 1680.  
46 Art 1 Loi 2011-103. 
47 Legge 12 Luglio 2011, n. 120 Modifiche al testo unico delle disposizioni in material di 
intermediazione finanziaria, di cui al decreto legislative 24 febbraio 1998, no. 58, concernenti la parità 
di acceso agli organi di amministrazione e di controllo delle società quotate in mercati regolamentati, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale N. 174 del 28 Luglio 2011. 
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foreseen by the new law provide for non-compliant companies to receive a warning 
with a four-month deadline to comply. If the company does not change its rules, it is 
to receive a fine of 20,000 euros and a second warning. If, within a further three 
months, no changes are introduced, the illegally appointed board members lose their 
positions. Finally, Belgium approved a law in 2011 aimed at achieving a share of 
women of 1/3 by 2019, with the following sanctions: illegal appointments will be 
invalid and the benefits for board members suspended.48 
The Netherlands and Spain49 approved non-binding legislation with female quotas of 
30% and 40%, respectively. In 2013, Denmark introduced a flexi-quota, allowing 
each company to establish its own targets, but no sanctions for non-compliance will 
apply. 
In Germany female quotas are under discussion,50 whereas other countries, including 
the UK, have only voluntary regulations anchored in corporate governance codes.51 
Other Member States are lagging behind. For instance, the existing laws in Sweden 
and Poland do not foresee any targets or quotas.52  
3.2 Commission Proposal 
In 2011, the Commission took the first steps to increase gender equality in companies. 
Specifically, the Commission encouraged publicly listed companies in the European 
Union to sign a ‘Women on the Board Pledge for Europe,’ to commit to an increase in 
the number of women on their boards by self-regulatory measures, and, by making 
                                                 
48 Loi visant à promouvoir une representation équilibrée des femmes et des hommes dans les conseils 
d’administration d’entreprises publiques économiques et de societies qui on fati publiquement appel à 
l’épargne, Sénat de Belgique, Document legislative no. 5-186-2 (1 février 2011) (adopted June 30, 
2011).  
49 Ley Orgánica 3/2007, de 22 de marzo, para la Igualdad Efectiva de Mujeres y Hombres (Organic 
Law 3/2007, of Mar. 22, 2007, on the Effective Equality between Women and Men)  
50 The coalition agreement foresees introduction of gender quota: in non-executive boards starting from 
2016 - 30% quota (with a sanction that the positions not taken by women have to remain free) and 
starting from 2015, rules forcing listed companies to adopt binding targets for executive, non-executive 
boards and highest levels of management which will be published and reported. 
https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
51In the UK, Lord Davies report (a government-endorsed commission) recommended a voluntary 25% 
target in 2015 to be reached by FTSE-100 companies, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-women-
on-boards.pdf. 
52 Davies and Hopt at 327. 
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commitments, to achieve a proportion of women on boards 30% by 2015 and 40% by 
2020.53  
However, only 24 companies signed the pledge proposed by the Commission.54 Lack 
of visible engagement of companies in improving the situation triggered the now-
famous statement by Commissioner Reding: ‘I don’t like quotas, but I like what 
quotas do.’55 In November 2012 the Commission put forward a proposal for a 
directive ‘on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures.’56 
The aim of the Commission proposal is ‘a floor of 40% presence of the under-
represented sex among the non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges.’57 The idea behind the proposal is to ‘promote gender equality in 
economic decision-making’ and, in consequence, to achieve the Europe 2020 
objectives.58 
Specifically with regard to fundamental rights, the Commission stated, following 
Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU, that equality between women and men is one of the Union's 
founding values and core aims. Moreover, Article 8 TFEU provides that ‘in all its 
activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, 
between men and women.’ The Commission also argued that the proposal promotes 
the EU Charter rights, such as equality between women and men (Article 23) and the 
freedom to choose one’s occupation (Article 15). Article 21, which encapsulates the 
anti-discrimination principle in the Charter, read together with the exception allowing 
measures on specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex spoke also in 
support of the conformity of the proposal with the Charter. Finally, because of the fact 
that the focal point of the proposal was on non-executive board members only, the 
interference with the right to run a business (Article 16) and right to property (Article 
17) was proportional. 
                                                 
53 MEMO/11/124, 1.03.2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-124_en.htm 
54 See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/womenpledge/. 
55 The Economist, Waving a big stick, Quotas for women on boards in the European Union are moving 
a little closer, http://www.economist.com/node/21549953. 
56 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender 
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures 
COM (2012) 614. 
57 Explanatory Memorandum, p.1, page 5. 
58 Ibid. 
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The legal basis of the proposal was Article 157(3) TFEU, which comprises the EU 
competence to adopt measures ensuring ‘the application of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal 
value.’59 On proportionality, the Commission stressed that the proposal provides only 
for a minimum harmonization, and does not regulate small and medium-sized 
enterprises, for which following the quota requirement might have been overly 
burdensome. 
Concerning the subsidiarity principle, the proposal went to explain the differences 
between the less and more supportive national provisions on gender balance in 
companies. The legal diversity resulted in a range from 3% to 27% of women within 
the boards.60 Relying on its Impact Assessment, the Commission emphasized that 
female representation on boards will not achieve 40% by 2020 without further 
measures. Additionally, some Member States held back from regulating this area, for 
fear of becoming less competitive. Finally, the legal diversity was apt to produce 
problems in the functioning of the internal market, such as exclusion from public 
procurement because of lack of compliance with national binding quotas in another 
Member State. In sum, because only an EU-level action could effectively achieve a 
40% female quota and diminish the internal market related problems, the proposal 
was in conformity with the subsidiarity principle. 
Whereas the directive applies the notion of ‘under-represented sex’ the preamble 
shows quite clearly that it aims at enhancing the presence of women on company 
boards.61 The central provision of the proposed directive is Article 4, which sets a 
target for listed companies to achieve that women hold 40% of the director positions 
on non-executive boards by 2020, or by 2018 in case of listed companies that are 
public undertakings.62 The non-executive boards are those that are ‘not engaged in the 
daily management of the company and any member of a supervisory board in a dual 
board system.’63 This distinction from executive members is important, as the 
                                                 
59 See further Detailed explanation of the choice of the legal basis for the Commission's proposal for a 
Directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges and related measures, SWD(2013) 278 final, 22.07.2012. 
60 Explanatory Memorandum, p.3, page 9. 
61 See recital 16. 
62 As provided in Art 10(2) of the proposal, the directive will expire in 2028. 
63 Art 2(4) of the proposal. 
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proposal foresees that the directive’s objective is met in cases where the female 
members hold at least one third of all director positions, both executive and non-
executive.64 Member States may exclude from the application of a 40% quota listed 
companies where the members of the under-represented sex represent less than 10 per 
cent of the workforce.65 
The Commission also explained the reason why only non-executive board members 
fall within the scope of the directive. Namely, the limitation is necessary to diminish 
the impact on the day-to-day management of companies. Also, the directive only 
covers publicly listed companies for a number of reasons; first, they are economically 
important and have higher visibility; second, they set standards for the private sector 
as a whole; third they have larger boards and a similar legal status across the EU, 
which allows for more comparability.66 
The appointments should be carried out ‘on the basis of a comparative analysis of the 
qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-established, clear, neutrally 
formulated and unambiguous criteria.’67 However, the proposal does not oblige the 
companies to appoint women so that their membership will be 50% or more of the 
non-executive members of the board, so that no ‘excessive constraints’ are put on 
companies.68 In the selection procedure, Article 4(3) specifies that female candidates 
should be chosen if they are ‘equally qualified as a candidate of the other sex in terms 
of suitability, competence and professional performance, unless an objective 
assessment taking account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the 
balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.’ The ‘objective assessment’ is a 
‘savings clause,’ which avoids granting absolute and unconditional priority to female 
candidates.69 Member States will be obliged to secure that listed companies reveal the 
qualification criteria for the selection if requested by an unsuccessful candidate. 
National judicial systems must shift the burden to the listed companies to prove that 
the rules of the choice of female candidates were not breached. 
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The improvement of the gender balance is also directed at the situation in executive 
boards. The directive prescribes that listed companies should commit to improve the 
representation of both sexes among executive directors by 2020, or by 2018 in the 
case of listed companies which are public undertakings.70 This is the so-called ‘flexi 
quota’ requiring companies to set their own individual targets for female members in 
the executive boards.71 The listed companies should report on the improvements in 
gender equality on executive and non-executive boards.72 
Finally, the Commission proposal foresees that Member States introduce sanctions for 
infringements of national provisions implementing the directive. Article 7(2), 
following the general formula in equality legislation on ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’ sanctions, exemplifies that they may take the form of administrative fines 
or a court’s annulment of an appointment contrary to the directive’s rules.  
The Commission proposal has been assessed by Peters as ‘relatively modest’ – full 
gender parity has not been foreseen, and with a ‘quite soft’ quota, because at an 
advanced stage in a career, it is hard to define ‘equality of qualification.’73 Yet, taking 
into account the persistent problem of low rates of female representation, the proposal 
seems to be ‘suited and necessary’ to address this problem and should in the future be 
complemented by educational measures and parental leave and childcare policies, 
which are at the origin of the need for gender quotas.74 
3.3 Reasoned opinions of national parliaments 
Eight parliamentary chambers issued reasoned opinions on this proposal: the Danish 
Folketing, the Czech Chamber of Deputies, the UK House of Commons and House of 
Lords, both chambers of the Dutch parliament, the Polish Sejm and the Swedish 
Riksdag. The threshold for the ‘yellow card’ was not met, yet the arguments against 
the proposal require attention from the perspective of this chapter.75 
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The Czech chamber argued that the Commission violated the subsidiarity principle 
that ‘the adoption of affirmative measures in accordance with Article 157, paragraph 
4 TFEU should be taken as closely as possible to the citizens, in this case, at the level 
of the Member States.’76 In the same vein, the Danish Folketing maintained that ‘a 
more balanced gender participation in company boards as well as at management 
level can be reached by way of national initiatives,’ and hence does not comply with 
the subsidiarity principle.77 
Parliaments stated that the evidence on which the Commission relies is not sufficient 
for the proposal of EU measures. For example, the Polish Sejm underlined the 
problems with the Commission’s evidence on the cause of gender under-
representation, whereas the House of Commons argued that the Commission did not 
submit evidence confirming problems encountered within the internal market.78 
Moreover, the UK House of Commons and the Dutch chambers argued that the 
reforms in many Member States began only recently and that there is not yet 
sufficient evidence for the need of the EU to act.79 For example, in Sweden, the 
companies listed on stock exchanges have taken steps by self-regulation aiming to 
achieve an equal gender distribution, whereas in the Netherlands, the upcoming 
reform sets the female equality target at 30%. As the Polish Senate summarised it, 
‘the proposal is in effect aimed at substituting for legislation of those Member States, 
which do not decide to adopt positive legal measures to promote the under-
represented sex.’80 Following that approach, the House of Lords proposed that the 
Commission should rather issue non-binding recommendations to Member States to 
introduce some policy changes.81 
The Polish Sejm posited that the proposal is contrary to the subsidiarity principle, 
because the 40% target only for non-executive directors reinforces gender 
stereotypes.82 In particular, the non-executive positions require less specialist 
                                                                                                                                           
issues such as ‘discrimination in maternity and paternity leave, gender pay gap and overcoming of 
gender stereotypes.’  
76 Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Reasoned opinion of 6.12.2012 on COM(2012) 614. 
77 Danish Folketing, Reasoned opinion of 14.12.2012 on COM(2012) 614. 
78 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 4.01.2013 on COM(2012) 614. 
79 UK House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 18.12.2012 on COM(2012) 614; Dutch Tweede and 
Eerste Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 18.12.2012 on COM(2012) 614. 
80 Polish Senat, Reasoned opinion of 9.01.2013 on COM(2012) 614. 
81 UK House of Lords, Reasoned opinion of 17.12.2012 on COM(2012) 614. 
82 Polish Sejm, Reasoned opinion of 4.01.2013 on COM(2012) 614. 
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knowledge and experience. An additional argument raised in the political dialogue by 
the Czech Senate was that the applicability of the directive to the non-executive 
boards only ‘significantly limits the real impact on equal opportunities for women and 
men.’83 
Another argument against the directive raised by national parliaments was that the 
distinction between executive and non-executive directors envisaged in the proposal 
demands changes in national legislation.84 In fact, both the Polish and Swedish 
chambers underlined that the position of board members is not identical to that of a 
worker.85 Board membership is often based on trust and the direction and 
remuneration components might be missing. 
In sum, the core of national parliaments’ argument was that they are better placed to 
improve the position of ‘women on boards,’ and that insufficient evidence had been 
advanced by the Commission to the contrary. The table in the annex illustrates the 
percentage of ‘women on boards,’ the national approach to the problem (legislation, 
corporate governance code), as well as whether the Member State submitted a 
reasoned opinion on the proposal. The table shows that reasoned opinions tended to 
be issued by parliaments in those Member States that had no existing legal quota and 
relatively high shares of women on boards. These countries often use corporate 
governance codes. National parliaments with relatively low shares of female 
participation on boards tended not to submit a reasoned opinion.  
3.4 The Commission’s reply 
In its reply to the parliaments, the Commission welcomed the legislative initiatives 
taken at the national level to improve the situation of women on boards in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK.86  Nonetheless, the Commission rejected self-
regulation as an effective means to achieve gender equality. The Commission 
remained firm on its position, arguing that the majority of Member States are not 
committing to increasing gender equality in big companies, and an action at EU level 
is indispensable in this regard. However, Member States may follow their national 
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approach, as long as they can show that their existing national measures are ‘of 
equivalent effectiveness of reaching the target of a 40% representation of both sexes 
on company boards by 2020.’ The Commission also explained that ‘the method of 
achieving 40% would be binding (obligation of means), but not the 40% target 
itself.’87 This approach, in view of the Commission, ‘reinforces the compliance of the 
Proposal with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.’88  
Replying to the argument raised by the Swedish Riksdag regarding the hampering of 
shareholders’ rights in appointment decisions, the Commission underlined that the 
proposed directive does not force the shareholders to take any specific appointment 
decisions.89 The directive, in view of the Commission, aims only at making the 
appointment procedures more transparent, but the qualification criteria remain set by 
the companies themselves, applying the rules of the directive on the preference for 
equally qualified candidates of the under-represented sex. 
In relation to the gender stereotypes argument raised by the Polish Sejm, the 
Commission stressed that as the directive also covers executive directors, and, as 
listed companies can show that members of the under-represented sex hold at least 
one third of all board positions, including executive directors, there is therefore no 
danger of prejudice.90 
3.5 Current proceedings at EU level 
During the examination of the directive in the Council, it appeared that all delegations 
in principle supported improving the gender balance on company boards. However, 
some Member States stated their preference for national measures, while others 
supported EU legislation.91 
In the EP, the draft report submitted for the first reading introduces some changes, 
such as extending the scope of the directive to non-listed public undertakings which 
do not fall under the definition of SME and to non-listed large undertakings.92 The 
report also proposes the tightening of sanctions. Listed companies that ‘do not 
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89 Commission reply of 7.6.2013 to the Swedish Riksdag on COM(2012) 614. 
90 Commission reply of 17.7.2013 to the Polish Sejm on COM(2012) 614. 
91 Council of the European Union, 3247th Council meeting, Press release, 11081/13, p. 16. 
92 Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, A7-0340/2013, 25.10.2013. 
308 
establish, apply or respect the foreseen procedures for the appointment or the election 
of non-executive directors shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions’. Specifically, these companies should be excluded from public calls for 
tender and partially excluded from the award of funding from the European structural 
funds. 
In the plenary debate on 19 November 2013, Commissioner Reding welcomed the 
amendments proposed in the report, but was more reluctant with regard to the 
strengthening of sanctions, which may transpire to be disproportionate.93 
Subsequently, on 20 November 2013, the EP approved the Commission proposal.94 
The legislative resolution provided the additional sanctions applicable to 
infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the directive: an 
exclusion from public calls for tenders and a partial exclusion from the award of 
funding from the European structural funds.95 
The proposal is currently awaiting the Council’s first reading. Thus far, ‘in an attempt 
to break the deadlock in the discussions,’ two Member State delegations tabled a 
compromise package.96  
3.6 Assessment  
There exist a number of arguments favouring gender equality on corporation boards. 
It gives expression to the principle of equality, social market economy and the 
principle of democracy.97 
First, establishing the gender quotas articulates the principle of equality between men 
and women, which is one of the foundational values of the EU, as expressed in Article 
2 TEU. Moreover, one of the aims of the EU is to promote gender equality, as 
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provided in Article 3(3) TEU and Article 8 TFEU. There is no doubt that the 
proposed directive contributes to this aim of the EU treaties. In this sense the treaties 
give significance to the equality between men and women as a ‘principal and moral 
value.’98 
Second, the EU’s aim to work for social market economy99 ‘mandates democratic 
governance in the field of economics that consists in the broad participation of self-
interested undertakings and other representatives (such as trade unions and non-
governmental organisations) in the determination of the legal rules that will bind all 
these stakeholders.100 Gender equality is hence necessary to give legitimacy to 
industrial democracy, economic and social governance.101 
Third, the principle of democracy speaks in favour of the directive. Exploring the 
binding quotas in Europe, Suk points at Scandinavian and French corporatism: ‘the 
traditions of formal collaboration between the state and corporate interests in the 
making of public policy (…) render it logical to expect corporations to be 
representative in order to legitimize the actions of the state.’102 In consequence, ‘[t]he 
state’s legitimacy is compromised when the largest corporations fail to represent half 
of humanity if these corporations are recognized as exercising state power.’103 
Even if the individual equality, social market economy and democracy arguments 
speak in favour of the Commission’s proposal, the question remains whether it is 
compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. Some scholars have assessed the 
proposal as not in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, because it is too soon to 
argue that the national measures are not effective.104 Moreover, instead of imposing 
reforms, the EU should rather, following Article 4(2) TEU, support and respect the 
actions of the Member States.105 It can, however, be argued that the Commission 
proposal does not violate the subsidiarity principle. With regard to the ‘Women on 
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boards’ proposal, reasoned opinions came from chambers in Member States that 
tended to be relatively successful without imposing quotas, using instruments such as 
governance codes. These national parliaments can convincingly argue that they 
manage successfully at the national level and that other Member States are lagging 
behind. However, as argued in Chapter 2, the assessment of the subsidiarity principle 
should take into account the insufficiency of Member State action in general terms. 
Indeed, it can be argued that ‘a necessary condition for Community action is that at 
least one Member State has inadequate means at its disposal for achieving the 
objectives of the proposed action.’106  
4 Scrutiny of fundamental rights proposals within the EWS 
The central question of this chapter was how subsidiarity relates to fundamental 
rights. Under which circumstances is one level more apt to protect them than the 
other? 
It has been posited by Muir that the subsidiarity test is not appropriate as a rule 
guiding the setting of fundamental rights standards because of the function of the 
subsidiarity principle and the nature of fundamental rights.107 First, while the 
subsidiarity principle concerns the choice of the right level for the exercise of 
competences in a transnational context, some pieces of EU legislation ‘give a specific 
expression’ to a fundamental right ‘within States.’108 Hence, there is a ‘mismatch 
between the function of the principle of subsidiarity as defined in EU law and the 
function of fundamental rights standard-setting in the EU.’109 Second, the nature of 
fundamental rights is that they express values; this is in contrast to the subsidiarity 
test based on effectiveness. In consequence, conflicting fundamental rights standards 
‘cannot be solved by comparative efficiency tests; they are instead concerned with 
prioritizing and balancing values.’110 
In truth, the ‘Women on boards’ proposal only marginally concerns situations of truly 
transnational context, with substantive cross-border effects. Such a case would exist if 
a female member of a non-executive board would like to take advantage of the 
freedom of movement in the internal market and apply for a similar position in 
                                                 
106 Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’, 22. 
107 Muir at 239. 
108 Ibid at 240. 
109 Ibid at 241. 
110 Ibid. 
311 
another Member State.111 However, the case study proves that this piece of genuine 
fundamental rights legislation demanded from the national parliaments a value 
assessment; whether this right should be protected to a greater extent, despite the lack 
clear cross-border situation. Moreover, it should not be assumed that fundamental 
rights legislation cannot concern transnational situations. Examples include the 
Commission proposal on the right to strike or the draft directive strengthening certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in 
criminal proceedings which concerned judicial cooperation in criminal matters with a 
cross border dimension.112 
The question of effectiveness inherent in the subsidiarity test may also apply to 
fundamental rights, when applied to the practicalities of ensuring the protection of a 
fundamental right, for example by indicating in the impact assessment how a binding 
quota will improve the position of women in companies. Yet, this seems to reduce the 
right itself to a specific numerical measure, while gender equality and its protection 
obviously go beyond the share of women on a limited set of corporate boards. 
One can also think about the protection of fundamental rights and subsidiarity looking 
at the issues of ‘process,’ ‘outcome’ (capacity of the levels of authority to deal with 
certain issues) and ‘willingness’ rather than subsidiarity as an efficiency measure, 
which is a more open ended approach to the allocation of the exercise of fundamental 
rights competences.113 With regard to the decision-making process and willingness, 
Grainne de Búrca argued that, on the one hand, fundamental rights matters are best 
decided on at the national level, because it has ‘the information, the capacity and the 
political legitimacy to intervene.’114 On the other hand, the balance can be tipped in 
favour of the EU or international level, which is ‘less mired in the immediacy of a 
local political situation [and] is the more appropriate actor in certain human rights 
matters, since it is more likely to have the will, the independence, the wider 
experience and the normative authority to act.’115 From the perspective of outcome, 
de Búrca argued that the national level might be more appropriate with regard to 
issues such as ‘articulating and defining the constitutional values and institutions for 
protection within that particular political and geographic community, and that an 
                                                 
111 COM(2012) 614, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3; recital 13 in the proposal’s preambule. 
112 COM(2013) 821.  
113 de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’, 2-3. 
114 Ibid at 4. 
115 Ibid. 
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international institution may be the appropriate level for acting in other matters, such 
as in monitoring the way the nation state purports to give protection to certain 
minimum-level rights, or by censuring certain types of action in that field.’ On the 
contrary, one may also conclude that ‘while an international level of authority is best 
placed to evolve and articulate shared international values and standards of protection 
for human rights more broadly conceived, it is for the nation state, or even for more 
regional or local political actors to determine how those standards will be observed 
and implemented in concrete situations.’ The consequence is an ‘inevitable interaction 
between those different levels and actors in adopting and carrying through a particular 
policy in a given sphere.’  
Looking at the proposal on ‘Women on boards’ in light of de Búrca’s views, acting at 
the EU level could increase the level of protection significantly in those Member 
States that at this point have very low shares of women on boards, such as Malta 
(3%), Hungary (5%) and Greece (6%). This could help these Member States to 
overcome national level constraints, such as the position of national parties 
concerning the position of women in society. For example, the vote of the Polish 
Sejm on the reasoned opinion on the ‘Women on boards’ proposal clearly indicated 
the political cleavages on this issue.116 Another apt example is furnished by the 
Commission proposal on the strengthening of the presumption of innocence. The 
reasoned opinion of the UK House of Commons underlined that the deficits in the 
protection of the presumption of innocence lay in the culture of Member States and 
thus it is only the national level that can change it.117 Yet, it is exactly this type of 
political constraint at the national level that proves the need for an EU level proposal 
to increase protection of fundamental rights. The EU proposal on female quotas thus 
seems to be a more apt measure to tackle gender equality on companies’ boards than 
leaving it to be regulated at national level.  
                                                 
116 Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 31. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
04.01.2013, p. 133. 
117 House of Commons, Reasoned opinion of 10.02.2014 on COM(2013) 821, point 21. See also 
reasoned opinion of the Tweede Kamer arguing on a similar proposal – regulation concerning 
procedural safeguards for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings – that the problems 
with enforcement of such safeguards occur within a Member State and should hence be solved there. 
Dutch Tweede Kamer, Reasoned opinion of 11.02.2014 on COM(2013) 822.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter studied the interaction of the EWS and the EU’s complex system of 
fundamental rights protection, showing that not only the judicial process, but also 
national parliaments, act as ‘watchdogs’ of fundamental rights. In particular, this 
chapter showed how national parliaments deal with fundamental rights questions in 
their reasoned opinions, some of which did however focus on the substance of the 
Commission proposals rather than the subsidiarity question. To this end, this chapter 
analysed three types of Commission proposals depending on whether, and to what 
extent, their objective is fundamental rights protection.  
With regard to the EU draft proposals without such an objective, for example the 
EPPO regulation, this chapter has argued that concerns of national parliaments 
regarding fundamental rights protection should not be addressed within reasoned 
opinions when they concern the substance of the proposal. Next, the analysis of 
reasoned opinions on Commission proposals with mixed objectives, which partially 
pursue fundamental rights protection, revealed that national parliaments argue both 
that standards proposed by the EU are too low or too high. Finally, the case study of a 
‘genuine’ fundamental rights proposal, ‘Women on Boards’, was used as a basis to 
discuss whether the subsidiarity review, which is based on assessing effectiveness of 
an action at different levels is apt to deal with the value balancing inherent in 
fundamental rights protection.  
In particular, this chapter pondered the fact that fundamental rights issues often have a 
rather limited cross-border dimension. The conclusion seems to be that, while the 
‘Women on Boards’ proposal, when reduced to numbers such as quotas can undergo 
national insufficiency and comparative efficiency tests, it is also true that, as a value, 
gender equality reaches beyond the purely numerical share of women on boards in 
public companies. Assuming, however, that subsidiarity is applicable to choosing the 
more apt level of protection of fundamental rights, at times the local political 
constraints may tip the balance in favour of the more willing, independent and 
experienced action of the EU legislator, while at other times, national political 
legitimacy concerns may tilt the balance towards the national legislator, leaving only 
the monitoring function to the EU level. Moreover, the universality of fundamental 
rights speaks in favour of legislative initiatives at EU level. 
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In sum, the question whether the EWS can apply to scrutiny of Commission proposals 
with fundamental rights objectives should be answered positively. It is, however, true 
that, because of the value nature of fundamental rights, the efficiency tests involved in 
subsidiarity reasoning might not be easily applicable, like for example the cross-
border test, which would  reduce fundamental rights to economic calculations. A 
different subsidiarity test for fundmental rights might be hence necessary. For 
example, such issues as the local boundaries of the political process, the political 
legitimacy and the willingness to act, must be taken into account in addition to the 
universality of fundamental rights, by the subsidiarity assessment. 
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Annex 1 
Country Share of Women 
among Members on 
Boards 
National Approach Reasoned 
Opinion 
Finland 27% Corporate Governance Code  
Latvia 26% No Action  
Sweden 25% Corporate Governance Code Yes 
France 22% Legislative Quota  
Netherlands 19% Legislative Quota Yes 
Denmark 16% Corporate Governance Code  
Germany 16% Corporate Governance Code  
United Kingdom 16% Corporate Governance Code Yes 
Bulgaria 16% No Action  
Czech Republic 15% No Action Yes 
Lithuania 15% No Action  
Slovenia 15% No Action  
Slovakia 13% No Action  
Poland 12% Corporate Governance Code Yes 
Belgium 11% Legislative Quota  
Spain 11% Legislative Quota  
Austria 11% No Action  
Romania 10% No Action Barroso 
Ireland 9% No Action  
Luxembourg 6% Corporate Governance Code  
Italy 6% Legislative Quota  
Estonia 6% No Action  
Greece 6% No Action  
Portugal 6% No Action Barroso 
Hungary 5% No Action  
Cyprus 4% No Action  
Malta 3% No Action  
Source: Prepared from data in Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Impact 
Assessment on Costs and Benefits of Improving the Gender Balance in the Boards of 
Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges’, SWD(2012) 348 final, 14.11.2012 
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Conclusions 
Like the title of Paul Gauguin’s painting ‘Where Do We Come From? What Are We? 
Where Are We Going?’ this conclusion puts the role of national parliaments in the 
policing of the subsidiarity principle into context. The findings of the thesis show, 
first, how the EWS developed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
second section inquires into how its current practice reflects the two aims with which 
it was created: increasing ‘democratic legitimacy’ and diminishing the EU’s 
‘competence creep.’ Finally, the last section considers possible ways of further 
development of the position of national parliaments in the EU. 
1 Findings of the thesis 
This thesis studied the new role of national parliaments in the EU with regard to the 
policing of the subsidiarity principle. Its purpose was to examine why national 
parliaments participate in the EWS, and why they interpret the subsidiarity principle 
broadly. With the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments have been strengthened and the 
subsidiarity principle has been made more robust due to the mechanism in Protocol 
No. 2. However, the consequences of these changes have been largely unexplored; in 
particular, the content of the reasoned opinions has not undergone a detailed analysis. 
To answer the research questions, this thesis has studied the increasing role of 
national parliaments in the EU and the position and content of the subsidiarity 
principle. Possible means of inter-parliamentary cooperation on the review of 
subsidiarity and beyond have been also presented. Chapter 2 analysed in detail how 
the EWS is designed. It establishes that national parliaments’ reasoned opinions do 
not always focus only on the subsidiarity principle under the EWS. They address 
issues such as the competence of the EU to act, the proportionality of Commission 
proposals or their substance. The case study on the EPPO proposal illustrated this 
tendency. This thesis has argued against this broad review of the principle of 
subsidiarity. A set of three arguments, namely textual, structural and functional, was 
put forward.  
This thesis has also examined the design of national procedures for ex ante (Chapter 
3) and ex post (Chapter 4) subsidiarity scrutiny. With regard to the ex ante 
subsidiarity review, it concluded that national parliaments have generally introduced 
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new provisions to accommodate the EWS, which fall into three general types of 
scrutiny, depending on the participating committees: centralised, mixed and 
decentralised. While it was hypothesised that the mixed system will produce the 
largest number of reasoned opinions, a direct impact has, however, not been 
established. At the same time, the procedures for ex post scrutiny at the EU level 
indicated that subsidiarity action is not a new type of procedure before the ECJ; 
parliaments can be labelled only as ‘indirect semi-privileged applicants.’ As ex post 
scrutiny relies on the governments that bring the case before the Court, the study of 
the internal design of the subsidiarity action found a causal link between the 
parliaments categorised as weak and strong EU affairs scrutinisers and the shape of 
their procedures. This chapter also defended the current ‘hands-off approach’ to 
subsidiarity; the ECJ would otherwise be forced to conduct political assessments that 
have been already taken, and to review the need for EU action already confirmed by a 
Council majority. 
Chapter 5 studied the subsidiarity votes and debates in four Member States, and 
indicated that national parliaments have gained some independence from their 
governments in the EWS. Moreover, there was prevailing convergence of views on 
subsidiarity between the governing majority and the opposition; however left-right 
and socioeconomic cleavages remained visible to some extent. The reasoned opinions 
took into account that the Commission proposals might limit some of the regional 
competences in question. The analysis of the parliamentary debates in these Member 
States also showed that defending idiosyncratic national interests and fighting against 
the distributive character of EU policies might represent some of the key motivations 
behind issuing a reasoned opinion. 
The following Chapters 6 and 7 focused directly on the question of why national 
parliaments participate in the EWS. Through a study of the complete set of reasoned 
opinions issued between December 2009 and August 2014, it has been shown that 
large numbers of reasoned opinions attacked the Commission’s proposals because of 
a putative violation of the principle of conferral, as well as, much more unexpectedly, 
because of the delegations in the Commission proposals to regulate by means of 
delegated and implementing acts. In both cases, the Lisbon Treaty did not grant 
national parliaments a competence to conduct a review in these areas. This leads to 
the conclusion that the participation in the EWS and its broad approach aims at 
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increasing the prerogatives of national parliaments with regard to EU policy-making. 
It has also been argued that, in normative terms, national parliaments should not take 
such a broad role. With respect to the principle of conferral, the ‘new order of 
competence’ of the Lisbon Treaty has brought clarity to whether the EU can act, in 
addition to both ex ante and ex post safeguards, which are more apt to pursue such 
scrutiny. Similarly, with regard to delegations by means delegated acts, not only is it a 
question of ‘horizontal division of power,’ but in addition, it was the EP and the 
Council that were granted a competence to revoke or object to the power of the 
Commission. Concerning the delegations to adopt implementing acts, the control of 
implementing powers is already in the hands of Member States.  
Finally, Chapter 8, with a focus on EU fundamental rights, established that the 
subsidiarity test with regard to proposals with fundamental rights objectives is not 
easily conducted in efficiency terms or as a cross-border test, since the review in 
question focuses largely on values. In order not to narrow fundamental rights down to 
an economic calculation, it was argued that the right level of fundamental rights 
protection has to take into account the level of political legitimacy, and that the 
willingness to act must be taken into consideration by the subsidiarity assessment.  
2 The EWS as an answer to the ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘competence creep’? 
Since the EWS was widely seen as a tool that would combine the fight against 
competence creep with one that would bring more democratic legitimacy to the EU, 
these two issues should be addressed here. 
2.1 Democratic deficit 
In her assessment of the state of EU democracy Gráinne de Búrca underlined that 
despite ‘numerous efforts [having] been put over the decades, particularly in the last 
decade and a half to strengthen its democratic quality, we still see intractable 
democratic difficulties in the EU: popular alienation, distance between the ordinary 
citizen, the voter and the EU as a governing entity. The essence of democracy (…) – 
responsiveness to a real person – remains elusive in the EU context despite the work 
that has been done to build democratic institutions, despite parliamentary elections, a 
powerful European Parliament, the democratically elected members of the Council of 
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Ministers, enshrined principles of transparency, a strong EU court, layers of 
constitutional rights protection.’1  
This rather pessimistic account of the EU’s democratic legitimacy does not refer 
directly to the EWS. However, we may ask: did this new system improve the EU’s 
democratic credentials? This section will address this question, first, from the 
perspective of the impact of reasoned opinions on the legislative process. Second, it 
will critically assess the claim that a broad scrutiny of Commission proposals by 
national parliaments brings more democratic legitimacy to the EU. Third, this section 
will discuss whether the EWS compensates for a rather weak position of a national 
parliament in the scrutiny of EU affairs. 
First, one way to measure the influence of the EWS on EU’s democratic legitimacy is 
to examine whether reasoned opinions have any real impact on the legislative process. 
However, the problem here is that Article 7 of Protocol No. 2 provides that the 
institution from which a draft legislative act originates shall take account of the 
reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments. Hence, in fact Protocol No. 2, 
except where the ‘orange card’ is triggered, does not create a direct link between 
national parliaments and the actions of the EP or the Council. In consequence, it is not 
easy to establish how far the MEPs and Council members take into account the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments. 
While in the case of the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal, the position of the EP shows 
support for the Commission proposal and even for strengthening it, the position of the 
Council is still unknown (Chapter 8). The case studies of the new Tobacco Products 
Directive and the EPPO proposal show, however, that some ideas have been taken on 
board by the EU legislator. For example, in the case of the Tobacco Products 
Directive, the approach taken in the EP upheld only less than half of the delegated 
acts foreseen by the Commission, removing controversial provisions on characteristic 
flavourings, the shape of unit packets and nicotine-containing products. With regard 
to one delegation, the EP directly regulated details of text warnings on tobacco 
products in the legislative act. This approach would be in line with the demand of 
national parliaments, yet it could be also explained by a general preference of the EP 
for legislation instead of delegation of power. The views of national parliaments did, 
                                                 
1Gráinne de Búrca, ICON·S 2014 Inaugural Conference speech 26.06.2014 (2014). 
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however, find some support within the EP and the Council in relation to the duration 
of the delegation. The EU legislator proposed that delegations should be limited to 
five years. As to the mode of delegation under delegated acts or implementing acts, 
only the delegated act on detailed rules for the shape and size of unit packets, to 
which national parliaments objected, was deleted by both the EP and the Council. 
Nonetheless, we cannot empirically ascertain the influence of national parliaments, as 
neither the Council nor the EP referred directly to the submissions of national 
parliaments as the reason for introducing these changes. 
As to the high number of delegations, the EP also opted to limit the number of 
delegations, but again did not directly invoke the arguments of national parliaments. 
This specific objection of national parliaments did not find support in the Council; the 
final legislative act contains a high number of delegations to adopt delegated acts.2 
This might be due to the fact that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania 
were in the opposing minority in the Council, and hence their views were not taken 
into account in the general approach.3 
The case study of the EPPO also shows that some of the criticism of national 
parliaments was of inspiration in the debates in the EP and in the Council. Regarding 
the structure of the EPPO, the Council proposed a model based on a college from all 
participating Member States.4 This change correlates with the reasoned opinions of 
the Dutch, French, Romanian, Maltese and Cypriot chambers. Furthermore, the 
Council exchanged the exclusive competence of the EPPO with a concurrent 
competence, meaning that both the EPPO and national prosecution authorities are 
competent to investigate and prosecute crimes against the EU budget, but that if the 
EPPO decides to exercise this comptence, the national authority cannot exercise its 
own. This change is again in line with the criticism of national parliaments of the 
EPPO’s exclusive competence. In addition, like some national parliaments, the EP 
pointed out that the scope of ancillary competence of the EPPO should be precisely 
determined. While prima facie, there is an overlap between the changes proposed by 
                                                 
2 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 
2001/37/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 127, 29.4.2014, p. 1–38   
3 House of Commons, 13th Report of the European Scrutiny Committee, p. 1.9, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-xiii/8302.htm. 
4 Council of the European Union, 8999/14, 15.04.2014, some specifications added in May 2014. 
Council of the European Union, 9834/1/14, 21.05.2014.  
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the EP and the Council and the reasoned opinions of national parliaments, in the 
absence of explicit evidence, it is impossible to trace the real impact that these 
opinions had within the legislative procedure. 
As I presented in Chapter 1, the ‘Barroso initiative’ presents a valuable alternative for 
addressing non-subsidiarity related issues relating to Commission proposals in the 
EWS. The changes reported by the Commission, as well as discussed by Jančić,5 
seem to show that the ‘Barroso initiative’ does have an impact on the EU law-making 
process. In this way, the idea behind the introduction of the EWS – to raise more 
subsidiarity awareness (Subsidiaritätsbewusstsein) among EU institutions –will not be 
endangered in consequence of ‘excessive and unfocussed’ use of the subsidiarity 
review.6 
Second, at first blush, the argument ‘more parliamentary involvement brings more 
democratic legitimacy’ seems plausible. The examples of both EWS and ‘Barroso 
initiative,’ despite the impossibility to identify precisely the scope of that impact, 
show that reasoned opinions or opinions may have some influence at the EU level. 
However, it is hard to imagine that the EWS can correct the alienation of individuals 
vis-à-vis the EU. It is yet another complicated and distant mechanism, even if any 
aspect of a Commission proposal could be addressed.  
The argument of more parliamentary involvement is often linked with the idea that 
national parliaments should have broad powers in assessing Commission proposals 
under the EWS. Weatherill approaches the question of the content of reasoned 
opinions by stating that ‘a formal legal approach would condemn the new procedures 
as ill-targeted.’7 Giving national parliaments more leeway with regard to competence 
control is capable of enriching the debate about the quality of EU law, especially as 
no ‘red card’ veto is foreseen. In addition, according to Weatherill, not allowing 
national parliaments to control its ‘near-relative proportionality’ is ‘artificial.’8 In 
sum, ‘national parliaments would be thereby empowered. But not too much.’9 It has 
been also argued that a narrowly tailored EWS undervalues the political nature of 
                                                 
5 Jančić, ‘The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost’, 85. 
6 Deutscher Bundestag, Protokoll der 8. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses-Unteraussschuss Europarecht, 
‘Öffentliches Expertengespräch zu dem Thema: “Prüfung des unionsrechtlichen 
Subisidiaritätsprinzips”’, 16.06.2010, expertise of Franz Mayer (own translation). 
7 Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’ at 45. 
8 Ibid at 46. 
9 Ibid. 
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national parliaments which are ‘completely political, and therefore “multifunctional,” 
and they are thus free to interpret the meaning and the function of their interventions 
in the EU decision-making process differently, according to the context and to the 
case in question.’10  
There is however a set of arguments speaking against a broad subsidiarity review that 
would allow the EU to ‘live with subsidiarity’ without undermining its ‘capability to 
function.’11 First, the textual, structural and functional arguments elaborated upon in 
this thesis point to why such a broad approach is not necessary. In addition, the 
practice shows that, in the case of the first ‘yellow card,’ the withdrawal of the 
proposal in a case where the Commission did not find convincing subsidiarity 
arguments caused a misunderstanding within national parliaments about their role in 
the EU legislative process. This was also confirmed by the major discontent of some 
national parliaments to the fact that the Commission did not withdraw the later EPPO 
proposal. Although Protocol No. 2 provides that the Commission may withdraw its 
proposal in the case of a ‘yellow card,’ this could only reasonably be expected in a 
case where the Commission itself is persuaded by the subsidiarity arguments in the 
reasoned opinions. The outcome of the first ‘yellow card’ was thus closer to a ‘red 
card.’ In consequence, in the second ‘yellow card,’ national parliaments expected 
their reasoned opinions to have a ‘red card’ effect once again. As argued by 
Convention Working Group I, which set the principles of the subsidiarity scrutiny, the 
EWS ‘should not make decision-making within the institutions more cumbersome or 
lengthier, nor block it.’12 A possibility to allow a ‘red card’ procedure would have 
been ‘an enormous concession to the supposed wisdom of national Parliaments at the 
expense of efficient problem solving initiated by the Commission and carried forward 
by the Council and European Parliament.’13 In sum, the broadly designed EWS would 
not allow the EU, as feared by Pescatore, to ‘live with subsidiarity’ without 
undermining its ‘capability to function.’ 
                                                 
10 Nicola Lupo, ‘National parliaments in the European integration process: re-aligning politics and 
policies’ in Marta Cartabia, Nicola Lupo and Andrea Simoncini (eds), Democracy and subsidiarity in 
the EU (Il Mulino 2013) at 127. 
11 Pescatore at 1080 (own translation). 
12 European Convention, Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 
286/02, 23.09.2002, Point I (2). 
13 Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’, 44. 
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Moreover, a broad approach under the EWS would mean replicating the role already 
played by the ‘Barroso initiative’, which has had an effect on EU policy-making. 
Currently, the amount of opinions sent within the political dialogue outnumbers those 
within the EWS. This means that allowing broadly drafted reasoned opinions would 
also have probably increased their total number. For the Commission to go through 
these within a reasonable time and pick up from the views submitted the subsidiarity 
arguments would have involved certain concessions on the speed and efficiency of the 
legislative procedure, and would probably not satisfy national parliaments. Of course, 
some national parliaments already draft broad reasoned opinions, but it could be 
assumed that with a general concession in this regard, the approach would be more 
widely adopted.  
Third, in another approach to ‘democratic deficit’, one could also look at whether the 
participation in the EWS compensates for a rather weak position of a national 
parliament in the scrutiny of EU affairs? Looking at the changes introduced by 
national parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the performance in the EWS, in fact, 
the performance of national parliaments in EWS seems to show little relationship with 
its degree of activity in EU affairs more generally. Using the ranking of Karlas,14 we 
find that, amongst the member states that are the most active in the EWS, some are 
highly ranked (Poland, Sweden), and some are ranked as particularly weak (France 
and Luxembourg) in their national position with regard to the scrutiny of EU affairs. 
Likewise, amongst those least active under the EWS, Finland and Slovenia are 
classified as strong parliaments, while Belgium and the Czech Republic are classified 
as weak parliaments. It seems thus that the EWS is not necessarly used by the weak 
parliaments as a new avenue of impact on EU affairs, but some of both weak and 
strong parliaments rely on the EWS to have more say on Commission proposals. 
In sum, this section assessed the functioning of the EWS against the imporovement of 
EU’s democratic legitimacy that the introduction of the system was supposed to 
ameliorate. First, in the absence of explicit evidence, it is impossible to trace the real 
impact that these opinions had within the legislative procedure. Nonetheless, as the 
EPPO case study shows, the national parliaments did raise valid subsidiarity 
                                                 
14 This is the most recent ranking on the strengh of national parliaments in EU affairs (based on such 
indicators as the scope of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs; involvement of parliamentary 
committees in the scrutiny; mechanisms of influence such as mandating; the binding character of the 
scrutiny; and the role of the upper chamber) as it takes into account also new Member States. See in 
Karlas, Table 1. 
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arguments and the issues discussed were later discussed in the EP and in the Council. 
Second, this section rejected the argument that the broadly interpreted EWS (in 
connection with the expectation that the Commission will withdraw its proposals 
independently from the arguments raised by the parliament) plays an important role 
for EU’s democratic legitimacy. The risk at stake is the EU’s capability to function. 
Third, this section put forward that the EWS is used by some parliaments perceived as 
weak scrutinizers of EU affairs, but also by those that have strong powers under the 
national system of scrutiny. It seems hence that the EWS can not be directly linked to 
the empowerment of weak legislatures only. 
2.2 ‘Competence creep’ 
The answer to the question whether the EWS diminishes the ‘competence creep’ 
seems to be more straightforward. As I presented in Chapter 6, ‘competence creep’ 
does not (only) concern questions about whether the EU has a competence or whether 
a legal basis has been chosen correctly; rather it asks whether the shared competence 
can be executed at national level, instead of being assimilated into the EU’s 
competences.  
With regard to the former problem, this thesis illustrated the concerns of national 
parliaments regarding the lacking competence and the choice of legal basis and 
pointed out lack of quality and understanding of the EU legal system. Moreover, on 
the basis of textual, structural and functional arguments I argued that the ECJ is better 
suited to conduct this type of scrutiny.  
‘Competence creep’ understood as a condition in which the shared competence can be 
executed at national level, instead of its exercise at the EU level directly concerns the 
scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle. The Commission proposals studied in this thesis 
show that this type of ‘competence creep’ is much less underlined in the reasoned 
opinions of national parliaments. For example, the case study of the EPPO proposal 
does show that national parliaments raise the issue of a ‘creeping competence’ also in 
the relation to subsidiarity than the legal basis or competence of the Commission to 
enact the proposal at stake. The EWS seems hence to offer an appropriate avenue for 
addressing ‘competence creep’ by national parliaments. The design of the EWS, 
specifically the thresholds necessary for triggering the ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ cards 
and the lack of a veto power for national parliaments in a situation of perceived 
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‘competence creep’ should however not be seen as making the procedure ineffective. 
The role of national parliaments under the EWS was to give an ‘early warning’ and 
not to stop the procedure; the Commission and in the case of ‘orange card’ also the 
EU legislator have a decisive voice on the matter.  
Moreover, the fact that national parliaments in their reasoned opinions often raise 
issues that are not concerned with ‘competence creep,’ might be connected with the 
fact that ‘competence creep’ does not seem to pose major problems in the EU. In fact, 
two Member States have recently decided to inquire into the EU’s ‘creeping 
competence.’15 In June 2014, after a review of EU legislation conducted by each of 
the Dutch ministries in its area of specialization, a list of ‘54 points of action’ was 
drawn up, aiming to initiate a process in the EU, founded on the principle of 
‘European where necessary, national where possible.’16 The Dutch proposal listed a 
number of recommendations, including, for example, that the legal basis of EU 
proposals should be clearly stated; where the EU has no competence, it should also 
refrain from making recommendations; EU proposals should concentrate on the main 
lines of policy and their goals, but not on their detailed regulation; and impact 
assessments should be used more often, so that the proportionality principle is 
safeguarded.17 
With regard to the ‘points of action’: it is a list of areas which the government 
perceived as better left to Member States, yet without introducing any treaty change. 
Some ‘points of action’ clearly highlight that the issue at stake ‘can best take place at 
national level’ or that they do not have a ‘transnational character,’ as in the case of the 
‘shock absorption fund’ for euro countries (point 11); the EU programme for school 
milk and fruit (point 25); the ‘pan-European forestry agreement’ (point 23); the ‘soil 
framework directive’ (point 31); and the tunnel safety directive (point 36). Yet, 
clearly not all these problems directly concern subsidiarity. For example, the 
government pointed out that, in some cases, no legislation was necessary, as was the 
case with regard to accessibility of public sector websites (point 41) and the 
                                                 
15 From the Board, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’ (2014) 41 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 127. 
16 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Testing European legislation for subsidiarity and proportionality 
– Dutch list of points for action. See also Michael Emerson, ‘The Dutch wish-list for a lighter 
regulatory touch from the EU. CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2013’ <http://ceps.eu/book/dutch-wish-list-
lighter-regulatory-touch-eu> .  
17 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Testing European legislation for subsidiarity and proportionality 
– Dutch list of points for action, p. 1-3. 
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environmental noise directive (point 26). Only one point found the legal basis 
problematic (see point 54 on organ donation). Other points concerned different 
aspects of proportionality: the statute and funding of EP political parties (point 1); the 
directive on spatial planning and integrated coastal management (point 30); or the 
Telecom package (point 39) were seen as simply going ‘too far.’ In other cases, the 
Netherlands, with regard to the application of delegated acts, will scrutinize the 
Regulation on the Customs Code (point 7) and the regulation laying down 
harmonized conditions for the marketing of construction products (point 9); and 
marketing standards for olive oil (point 24). Some comments concerned the substance 
of proposals, such as the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (point 47). 
This review of competences by the Dutch government shows a trend similar to that 
envisaged in this thesis. EU proposals very often raise the critical point of their 
proportionality and substance. With regard to the subsidiarity principle itself, the 
Dutch tested only the national insufficiency prong of the subsidiarity principle, 
without looking into the EU’s comparative efficiency.18 As the Dutch government 
underlined itself, it ‘fully accepts the existing distribution of competences. It is the 
division of tasks that it is aiming to discuss: is everything that the European Union 
currently does really necessary?’19 
At the same time, in the UK, a process called ‘Balance of Competences Review’ is 
taking place and altogether 32 reports are planned. The aim is to analyse ‘what the 
UK’s membership of the EU means for the UK national interest. It aims to deepen 
public and Parliamentary understanding.’20  
The first report in the series inquired into the balance of competences between the UK 
and the EU in the Single Market.21 It concluded that there is an overall benefit to the 
UK from participation in the Single Market, confirmed by the evidence submitted, 
increasing both the EU’s and UK’s GDP relative to what it would otherwise have 
been, underlining however that ‘much depends on the future direction of the Single 
                                                 
18 See Andrew Duff, ‘Why the Dutch Version of the Balance of Competence Review will Not Please 
the Brits’ (2013)  < http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/08/27/why-the-dutch-version-of-the-
balance-of-competence-review-will-not-please-the-brits/> . 
19 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NL Subsidiarity review-explanatory note.  
20 https://www.gov.uk/review-of-the-balance-of-competences  
21https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227069/2901084_Sing
leMarket_acc.pdf 
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Market.’22 Furthermore, in the area of health, the balance of competence was likewise 
assessed as ‘broadly appropriate.’23 Moreover, it is ‘generally strongly in the UK’s 
interests to work through the EU in foreign policy,’ and that Member States should 
remain in charge of the CFSP and CSDP, while some comparative disadvantages 
were also indicated.24 With regard to the EU’s supporting competences in culture, 
tourism and sport, they were seen as ‘on balance either beneficial to the future 
development of these sectors and UK national interest or had the potential to be so.’25 
Some reports are more ambivalent. For example, the report on the free movement of 
persons was seen both as positive for the UK economy, but also in negative terms 
creating competition on the job market and problems connected to public services and 
housing.26 Nonetheless, even in this case, the problem does not seem to be 
competence creep: the EU is not encroaching on a competence of a Member State; it 
is rather the effect of a certain policy. 
In sum, the oversight of national parliaments over the ‘competence creep’ should be 
assessed positively. National parliaments can give an ‘early warning’ to the 
Commission and the EU Legislator that the issue at stake can be also sufficiently 
achieved at the national level. As the Dutch and British cases show, ‘competence 
creep’ is however not the main problem that the EU is facing now. Hence, the fact 
that there have been only two ‘yellow cards’ so far should not be interpreted as an 
argument that the EWS is an ineffective mechanism for decreasing the EU’s 
‘competence creep.’  
3 Outlook: Discussions on how to improve the EWS 
There are currently two distinct lines in the discussion on the future role of national 
parliaments in the EU. The first concerns the ways to improve the EWS and the 
second focuses on the role of national parliaments in the Eurozone crisis. While the 
latter one is not connected to the main topic of this thesis, it is only briefly mentioned 
in Chapter 1. This section focuses thus on the possible strengthening of the role of 
                                                 
22 Ibid point 3.45. 
23 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224715/2901083_EU-
Health_acc.pdf Point 5.1.1. 
24https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Fore
ign_Policy_acc.pdf , points 6.2. and 6.3. 6.4. 
25https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279456/2901485_BoC
_CultureTourismSport_acc.pdf, point 3.1. 
26https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335088/SingleMarketF
ree_MovementPersons.pdf 
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national parliaments within the EWS and beyond has been debated by parliaments 
and scholars alike.  
Starting with the most innovative proposal advanced by Professor Damian Chalmers, 
he sees national parliaments as ‘[t]he institutions with most credibility to verify 
whether an EU measure adds democratic value.’27 Chalmers perceives them as ‘the 
central fora for democratic contestation within Europe and, as they lose by EU 
competence creep, do not have the same reasons as EU institutions to be passive 
about EU law.’28 His proposal sets national parliaments as the guardians of the ‘test of 
relative democratic authority’ and the ‘test of democratic responsiveness.’ In addition, 
national parliaments should have an opportunity to pass laws that actively disobey EU 
law. 
The first test endows national parliaments with a mandate to safeguard that the EU 
acts only ‘where it enlarges choices or protects certain values in a way that cannot be 
done or has been historically poorly done by domestic parliaments, and the value of 
this action offsets any domestic democratic cost.’29 In consequence, he proposes that 
two-thirds of parliaments will have to actively indicate their support for a 
Commission proposal for it to move forward. The second reform implies that one-
third of national parliaments may request that existing legislation be reviewed or may 
put forward a new draft themselves, which would then put an obligation upon the 
Commission to act accordingly.30 Finally, the ‘test of democratic responsiveness’ 
grants the opportunity to disapply EU law to any national parliament where ‘an 
independent study has shown that the costs of EU law are higher than benefits for the 
Member State.’31 These reforms, per Chalmers, do not demand a Treaty amendment; 
a declaration from the EU institutions would be sufficient.32 
The House of Commons and the House of Lords have also recently proposed changes 
of the role of national parliaments in the EU. The House of Commons in its report 
advanced the idea of a mechanism according to which the House of Commons can 
decide prior to the adoption of a particular EU legislative proposal that it should not 
                                                 
27 Chalmers at 8. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at 4. 
30 Ibid at 9. 
31 Ibid at 10. 
32 Ibid at 13. 
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apply to the UK.33 Its consequence would be that the government should ‘express 
opposition to the proposal in the strongest possible terms, including voting against it.’ 
In addition, the House of Commons proposed the introduction of a possibility for the 
chamber to ‘disapply parts of the existing acquis.’34 The House of Lords, on its side, 
picked up the idea of the reform on initiating legislation, however making it lighter, 
and labelling it a ‘green card’ – ‘a right for a number of national parliaments working 
together to make constructive policy or legislative suggestions, including for the 
review or repeal of existing legislation, not creating a (legally more problematic) 
formal right for national parliaments to initiate legislation.’35 Other changes suggested 
by the House of Lords concern including the proportionality principle into the scope 
of the subsidiarity review and an undertaking by the Commission to drop a proposal 
or amend it in case of a ‘yellow card’.36 
The main criticism of the first ‘test of relative democratic authority’ is comparable to 
that of giving national parliaments a ‘red card.’ Just one third of parliaments can 
effectively block a proposal simply by remaining passive and withholding support, in 
contrast to the existing ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures, which first require 
parliaments to be active in order to block a proposal and second have higher 
thresholds for the share of parliaments required to trigger action. Furthermore, even 
without a sizeable minority of parliarments against, the need for a positive reply of 
two-thirds of national parliaments each time the Commission presents a proposal 
demands a constant vigilance on the side of the national legislatures. Because this 
might be hard to maintain, it is quite possible that such a threshold will not be easily 
achieved. This is why this test seems to have the character of a ‘red card’ but with an 
even lower hurdle required to block a proposal than the rejected actual ‘red card’ 
proposal put forward during the Convention, which required two-thirds of parliaments 
to voice their opposition on subsidiarity grounds.  
An argument against any type of ‘red card’ is that it would be ‘an enormous 
concession to the supposed wisdom of national Parliaments at the expense of efficient 
problem-solving initiated by the Commission and carried forward by the Council and 
                                                 
33 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, Reforming the European Scrutiny System in the 
House of Commons, Twenty-fourt Report of Session 2013-14, para 170. 
34 Ibid, para 171. 
35 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, para 58. 
36 Ibid, para 79 and 95. 
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the European Parliament.’37 In Weatherill’s view, the idea promoted at the time of the 
Convention that ‘the proper corrective to perceived problems in today's European 
Union is enhanced national “control” over the European institutions’ is ‘troublingly 
backward-looking.’38 The risk at stake is that ‘“[n]ationalising” the context in which 
EU decisions are taken may produce selfish State-centric outcomes which fail to pay 
heed to the need to adjust political decision-making in line with the growth of 
economic and social activities undertaken in the transnational domain.’ Ergo, ‘greater 
involvement of national Parliaments is not necessarily a virtue.’ 
The second reform – whereby when national parliaments think that new legislation 
should be proposed, the Commission will be under an obligation to propose a 
corresponding piece of legislation – can have a negative impact on the EU’s balance 
of powers, which is an ‘essential constitutional value,’39 and compromise the role of 
the Commission as an initiator of EU legislation.40 Similarly, the operation of a more 
modest ‘green card’ might coincide with the already existing possibility of an 
invitation of the European Council for the Commission to present a proposal. 
Furthermore national parliaments can always convince their governments to back 
their proposal through this forum.41 Finally, the possibility to disapply EU law by 
national parliaments, even if only in limited cases, could disintegrate the EU system, 
by breaching the EU principle of loyalty enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU that 
commands Member States to take measures ‘to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.’ 
Despite the arguments that can be raised against an enhancement of the role of 
national parliaments and seeing the current shape of the EWS as not ‘incurr[ing] costs 
by impairing effective EU decision-making and imbalancing existing institutional 
arrangements,’42 in June 2014 the chairmen of most of the EU affairs committees of 
national parliaments addressed a letter to Jean-Claude Juncker, the Presidential 
nominee of the Commission. They called a working group, which would include 
                                                 
37 Weatherill, ‘Competence creep and competence control’, 44. 
38 Weatherill, ‘Using national parliaments to improve scrutiny of the limits of EU action’, 909. 
39 De Witte, ‘Community law and national constitutional values’, 7. 
40 The EP can however ask the Commission to present legislative proposals for laws to the Council. 
Yet, the proposal of Chalmers clearly gives an initiative to national parliaments themselves.  
41 See the evidence given by Commissioner Šefčovič to the House of Lords, Select Committee on the 
European Union Inquiry on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, Evidence Session 
No. 6 Heard in Public, Question 94, 7.01.2014. 
42 Weatherill, ‘Using national parliaments to improve scrutiny of the limits of EU action’, 911. 
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members of national parliaments and representatives of EU institutions, with the aim 
of drafting ‘an action plan on ways to strengthen the role of national parliaments in 
the European Union.’43 The letter underlined that the participation of national 
parliaments must move beyond the subsidiarity review and the oversight of their 
respective governments’ actions in the Council. In this regard, the letter explained that 
three national parliaments (the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the UK House of Lords and the 
Danish Folketing) had advanced some proposals, which focus on the following 
questions. The first concerned designing a democratic framework that would take into 
account the enhanced role of the EU in economic governance, while at the same time 
respecting the prerogatives of national parliaments. The second and third questions 
were more generally asking about possible ways of national parliaments’ 
contributions to the good functioning of the EU and ensuring that EU citizens are not 
‘alienated’ from the EU decision-making process. The working group of the 
Commission could thus address these questions. 
It remains to be seen whether and how the EWS can be upgraded in the future. As 
proposed and assessed in this thesis, the EWS seems to be an improvement from the 
perspective of its two pursued aims of bringing more legitimacy to the EU legislative 
process and decreasing the EU’s ‘competence creep’. 
                                                 
43 Joint Letter to Mr Juncker, ‘on the establishment of a Commission working group on the role of 
national parliaments in the EU,’ 30.06.2014. 
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